EN BANC
[G.R. No. 175592. August 16, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON C. MAGBITANG, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated AUGUST 16, 2016, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 175592 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDISON C. MAGBITANG, Accused-Appellant.
Through his Motion for Reconsideration, 1 the accused-appellant begs the Court to reconsider and reverse the decision promulgated on June 14, 2016 affirming his conviction for the composite crime of rape with homicide. Maintaining his innocence and asserting that the totality of the evidence presented by the State did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, he challenges the circumstantial evidence and the testimony of CCC, the lone witness, as bases for his conviction. He submits that CCC's incompetence as a six-year old witness rested on the findings of psychologists on the phenomenon termed as "infantile amnesia" 2 that the Court relied upon in concluding in People v. de Jesus 3 that the child witness thereat was not reliable in her recollections of the traumatic event that had occurred to her at a very tender age, and consequently acquitting the accused thereat.
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
To start with, the accused-appellant contends that the circumstantial evidence adduced against him did not point to his culpability. However, he only thereby rehashes arguments that the Court had already fully passed upon and considered, and ultimately rejected. We did set forth in our decision that we were affirming his guilt based on both direct and circumstantial evidence that, "combined, unerringly pointed to Magbitang, and to no other, as the culprit." We then stressed that "circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker in persuasive quality than direct evidence," and quoted the following passage from People v. Villaflores: 4
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free.
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Nor has the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus, the Court said in People v. Modesto:
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday: "No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt." (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
And, secondly, it is relevant to note that the theory of "infantile amnesia" adopted in People v. de Jesus, supra, is being interposed by the accused-appellant only for the first time to disparage the credibility and testimony of CCC as a child witness. Nonetheless, the records furnished no basis — factual and legal — for us to apply the theory to his favor. CAIHTE
People v. de Jesus concerned a prosecution for incest rape in which the victim was exactly one year and nine months old at the time of the alleged rape by her own father. When she testified in court against her father, she had just turned six years old. Upon reviewing the conviction, the Court entertained grave doubts about the recollection by the victim of the crime that had been committed when she was only one year and nine months old, particularly as it was observed that she had been coached by her mother prior to her testimony. 5 The Court only referred to the childhood amnesia theory as a plausible explanation of the inconsistencies in her declarations as a witness because of her very tender years. Moreover, the Defense had submitted evidence on the victim's intellectual incapacity.
People v. de Jesus actually re-affirmed that "any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he or she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his or her perception to others, that is, he or she is capable of relating truthfully facts for which the child is examined." 6 With all the doubts being noted, however, it became inevitable to acquit in People v. de Jesus based on failure of the State to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, viz.:
It affirmatively appears that she had been talked to so much about the alleged rape by her mother that she had little, if any, independent recollection as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged crime. Considering her tender age, the trial court seriously erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ma. Cristina. We find her to have little, nay nil, independent recollection as to the incident in July, 1990. It is likewise a portentous source of quandary for a reasonable mind how a child of such tender age could remember how her father repeatedly inserted his finger into her vagina and that she felt pain by reason thereof, and yet, when asked why she did not love her father, she replied that it is because she spanked her and not because he hurt her when he inserted his finger or penis. In one U.S. case, the court held that a child eight years of age was not a competent witness to testify to an accident that happened to him when he was between four and five years of age, where he was not a smart, precocious child and had little, if any, independent recollection as to the facts surrounding the accident. In the instant case, the records reveal that Ma. Cristina is functioning on the borderline level of intelligence as reported by the psychologist and social worker of the Reception and Study Center for Children. Further examination of her oral testimony discloses her level of intelligence when at the age of six, she did not even know her birthdate.
The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant also finds support in the theory of infantile amnesia. The theory posits that there is a general inability of people to remember specific events from the early years of their lives. Psychologists have concluded that there are very few memories under the age of 3, and the average age of the earliest memory reported is 3 1/2. Sigmund Freud, who first stated the theory, claims that early childhood memories, particularly sexual ones, are repressed because they are too frightening and distasteful to the child to be preserved as such. These types of memories are replaced by "screen memories" of ordinary events that are less threatening.
While it is recognized that pseudomemories of abuse are possible, the processes underlying accurate and inaccurate recollections of childhood abuse are largely unknown. The most frequently reported factor related to recall was being in therapy. In one case, a U.S. court found the repressed memory syndrome reliable and admissible. The plaintiff therein was found to have no memory of sexual abuse by her cousin until after 45 years after the incident and during psychotherapy.
This notwithstanding, critics are still reluctant to accept the idea which they consider unreliable, since recovered memories are too often obtained while the subject is under hypnosis and the therapist is in control, directing the client what to visualize and what to explore. They say that controls should be put in place to ensure the use of non-suggestive techniques by unbiased clinicians when "recovering memories."
As pointed out earlier, the testimony of Cristina's mother, Amelita Murillo, in like manner, failed to establish that appellant had committed acts of lasciviousness. She merely testified that she saw Mauro place his finger in the private parts of her children but she did not testify particularly on the incident concerning Ma. Cristina. Amelita was only able to prove that on or about the time the alleged rape was committed, she saw blood in the underwear of her daughter Ma. Josephine. But as to Ma. Cristina, Amelita did not cite any instance when she actually saw Ma. Cristina being molested by her father.
In fine, we are constrained to rule that the prosecution's evidence failed to discharge the burden of proof necessary for appellant's conviction for rape. Neither was the evidence consisting of the testimony of the victim and her mother's sufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. 7 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
We have reiterated in our decision of June 14, 2016 that the testimony of a child witness should be accorded credence unless the Defense persuasively discredited his worthiness and competence as a witness, to wit:
Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial court determines upon proper showing that the child's mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully. 8 The testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence. In the case of CCC, the Defense did not persuasively discredit his worthiness and competence as a witness. As such, the Court considers the reliance by the trial court on his recollection fully justified. 9 DETACa
Verily, a child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully. The burden still rests on the party objecting to the competency of the witness to establish the ground of incompetency. 10 The accused-appellant cannot now successfully interject the theory of infantile amnesia by relying on his mere allegations of inconsistencies without presenting proof of CCC's mental inability to perceive and make known such perceptions.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for being unmeritorious." Brion, J., on leave. Perlas-Bernabe, J., no part. (adv2)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) FELIPA B. ANAMAClerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 46-50.
2. Id. at 46.
3. G.R. No. 127878, July 25, 2003, 407 SCRA 265.
4. G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 365, 384-385.
5. Supra note 3, at 276-277.
6. Id. at 272.
7. Supra note 3, at 277-279.
8. Section 21 (b), Rule 130, Rules of Court.
9. Rollo, p. 42.
10. People v. Pruna, G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002, 390 SCRA 577, 591.