FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 250185. March 24, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. EDMUND LURCHA y JURALBAR, 1accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 24, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 250185 (People of the Philippines v. Edmund Lurcha y Juralbar). — This is an appeal 2 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 3 dated October 13, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08814. The assailed Decision of the CA found accused-appellant Edmund Lurcha y Juralbar (Edmund) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Facts of the Case
Edmund, along with his brother Joemar Lurcha y Juralbar (Joemar), was charged with murder and attempted murder. The Informations against them read:
Criminal Case No. 10-0580
That on or about the 4th day of May 2010, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually and helping each other, without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery, and evident premeditation, and by taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one ALBERTO CARIÑO y FERRAN @ ABET, by then and there stabbing him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 (Emphasis in the original)
Criminal Case No. 10-0587
That on or about the 4th day of May 2010, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually and helping each other, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ROMANO CARIÑO y FERRAN, hitting him on the right side of the abdomen, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds, which would ordinarily cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely medical attendance rendered to said ROMANO CARIÑO y FERRAN which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 (Emphasis in the original)
Only Edmund was arraigned since Joemar remained at large. Edmund entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thus ensued. 6
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Romano F. Cariño (Romano); (2) Ma. Theresa F. Cariño (Theresa); and (3) Atty./Dr. Antonio Rebosa. The parties stipulated on the testimony of a certain Dr. Reynaldo Romero, 7 an NBI Medico-Legal Officer who issued a Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination. 8
For his defense, Edmund testified on his own behalf. 9
The prosecution's evidence established that between 1:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010, Romano was awoken by his brother Raymond, who said, "Si Abet pinagtutulungan siya." 10 Abet was Romano and Raymond's brother. 11 Upon stepping out of their house, they saw Edmund and Joemar each stabbing Abet using homemade knives. Romano shouted at them to stop and told them to talk it over. Joemar approached Romano and uttered, "Isa ka pa," 12 and stabbed Romano on the right side of his body. As a result, Romano fell to the ground. Joemar stabbed him a second time, which Romano parried with his left arm. Raymond was able to prevent Joemar from stabbing Romano for a third time by hitting him, causing Joemar to fall to the ground. 13
Thereafter, Theresa approached and hugged a bloodied Abet. Edmund attempted to stab Theresa but was prevented by Raymond. It was at this point that Edmund ran away. 14
Romano, Raymond, and Theresa brought Abet to the University of Perpetual Help Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Romano's wounds were also treated. 15 The Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination 16 stated that Abet died at 2:00 a.m. of stab wounds. According to a Medico-Legal Certificate, 17 Romano sustained the following injuries: (1) Stabwound, about 2x2 centimeters, lumbar area, right, non-penetrating; (2) Lacerated wound, about 3.0 centimeters, posterior aspect, distal 3rd of arm, left. 18
For his defense, Edmund denied the accusations hurled against him. He testified that on May 4, 2010 around 1:00 a.m., he was sleeping inside his house. When he got up to urinate, he noticed a commotion near his house. He went to where the commotion was because he saw his brother's (Joemar's) motorcycle. He saw Abet and Romano, armed with a pipe and a knife, ganging up on Joemar ("Pinagtulungan nila"). 19 When Edmund pulled his brother away, Abet and Romano tried to stab him. Edmund was able to grab the knife and pipe. He stabbed one of his assailants because there was another person who stabbed Edmund on his stomach. He escaped and called the barangay tanod to save Joemar. 20
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After evaluating the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 197, found Edmund guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Joint Decision 21 dated November 25, 2016 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in Criminal Case No. 10-0580, this court finds accused EDMUND JURALBAR LURCHA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified with abuse of superior strength, and sentences him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused EDMUND JURALBAR LURCHA is ordered to pay the heirs of deceased victim Albert Cariño y Ferran @ Abet, the amount of Php75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages; plus six percent (6%) interest per annum on all of his civil liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and to pay the costs of suit.
While in Criminal Case No. 10-0587, on reasonable doubt, this court ACQUITS accused EDMUND JURALBAR LURCHA of the crime of frustrated homicide charged against him.
SO ORDERED. 22 (Emphasis in the original)
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and concluded that all the elements of the crime of murder were present — particularly that Edmund and Joemar killed Abet through the abuse of superior strength. 23 The trial court qualified the killing to murder because Edmund and Joemar were armed with knives when they attacked Abet, who was alone and unarmed at that time. Conspiracy was found to be present because their act of stabbing Abet showed a common design to kill the said victim. However, the trial court did not appreciate the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the absence of evidence proving the presence of such circumstances. 24
The RTC debunked Edmund's claim of self-defense since the defense failed to prove that Abet and Romano committed unlawful aggression. Between the contradicting testimonies of the prosecution and defense, the RTC believed that Edmund and Joemar were the aggressors as they were the ones armed with knives. 25
Edmund was acquitted of frustrated murder since the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Edmund conspired with Joemar to attack and stab Romano. 26
Edmund appealed his conviction with the CA. 27 In his Brief, 28 Edmund averred that the trial court should have appreciated his claim of self-defense as he was able to prove the elements thereof, i.e.: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of Romano and Abet when they were ganging up on Joemar; (2) Edmund's use of reasonable means to repel the unlawful aggression by grabbing the aggressors' knife and pipe and stabbing Abet; and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on Edmund's part as he merely went to the area of the commotion to defend his brother. 29 Edmund also assailed the trial court's finding that Abet's killing was attended by abuse of superior strength since the prosecution failed to show that there was a notorious inequality of forces between Edmund and Abet. The fact that Edmund was accompanied by Joemar did not automatically qualify the attack as one with abuse of superior strength. 30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
For failure to file an appellee's brief despite two motions for extension of time to file the same, the CA resolved the appeal after denying the Office of the Solicitor General's third motion for extension of time to file an appellee's brief. 31
In its Decision 32 dated October 13, 2017, the CA modified the RTC's Decision by finding Edmund guilty of homicide only, to wit:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and shall accordingly suffer an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four months (4), as maximum. The accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00, as moral damages. In addition, he is ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) from the date of finality [of] the Decision until the awards be fully satisfied.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 33
Like the RTC, the CA held that Edmund and Joemar were the aggressors. The CA pointed out Edmund's dire lack of evidence to prove that Abet and Romano attacked Joemar and Edmund first. Even the testimony of Edmund showed that he did not sustain any wound and did not even bother to seek medical treatment. On the other hand, Abet suffered multiple stab wounds, showing an intent to kill by Edmund and Joemar. The CA also cited a Sport Report made by the Investigation and Detective Management Section of the Las Piñas Police Station, which stated that only a 13-inch dagger was recovered from the crime scene — negating Edmund's claim that Abet and Romano used a pipe to hit him. Joemar's act of fleeing the scene of the crime and hiding from authorities only bolstered Edmund and Joemar's guilt in relation to the attack on May 4, 2010. 34
Nevertheless, the appellate court agreed with Edmund and held that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not present. Citing People v. Beduya, 35 the CA explained that mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of abuse of superior strength in the absence of showing: (1) the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim; and (2) a deliberate intent to use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim. As a result, the CA lowered the crime from murder to homicide. 36
The CA applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in determining Edmund's imposable penalty. Since Edmund was already convicted by final judgment of another homicide case, 37 making him a recidivist, the appellate court imposed the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. The monetary awards were also reduced to P50,000.00 each for civil indemnity and moral damages 38 in accordance with People v. Jugueta. 39
Edmund filed a Notice of Appeal 40 before this Court. Both the OSG and Edmund manifested that they will no longer file any supplemental brief. 41
Issue
Between the two issues raised by Edmund before the CA, the only issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether Edmund sufficiently proved his act of self-defense in killing Abet.
Ruling of the Court
Edmund incorrectly sought to elevate the instant case through an ordinary appeal. Under Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, 42 an appeal to this Court may only be taken via a petition for review on certiorari, save for criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Since Edmund's conviction was modified by the CA from murder to homicide, the original penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on him was likewise modified to reclusion temporal43 (i.e., an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum). Therefore, the remedy of an ordinary appeal was not available to him. Edmund's failure to seek the proper recourse under the Rules of Court makes the instant appeal dismissible on such ground.
In any case, a review of the records shows that Edmund's conviction for homicide was proper. Edmund failed to prove his act of self-defense in killing Abet.
Edmund interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense during trial. Thus, he/she "admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability." 44 Thus, the accused must prove — through clear and convincing evidence — all the elements of self-defense, particularly: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending [one's self]." 45 In People v. Mahilum, 46 We held that the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's. 47
Edmund's defense only consisted of his unsubstantiated testimony — i.e., when he woke up to urinate, he saw his brother, Joemar, being stabbed by Abet and Romano, prompting him to stab Abet as a means of defending himself while he tried to rescue Joemar. 48 He never presented Joemar, his co-accused in the instant criminal case who remains at large, to corroborate his allegation. Neither did he present the barangay tanod whom he supposedly sought help from.
Edmund's testimony also contradicts the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution. Aside from Romano's and Theresa's testimonies that Edmund and Joemar took turns stabbing Abet, 49 the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination 50 shows that Abet sustained more than one stab wound. If Abet's stab wounds were a result of Edmund's act of self-defense, Edmund failed to explain why he needed to stab Abet more than once. He failed to prove that there was a reasonable necessity to inflict multiple stab wounds against the victim to prevent or repel an attack against him. Note that Edmund testified to the commotion ending when he simply backed away ("umatras ako"). 51 If his testimony were true, it would seem that his alleged aggressors were not insistent on inflicting mortal wounds on him.
Edmund's testimony, on its own, is unworthy of belief. He allegedly sustained a stab wound in the stomach. He also claimed to having being hit with a pipe. 52 However, Edmund never went to the hospital to seek medical attention. Human experience dictates that the victim of a stab wound would promptly seek treatment especially since he already went to the hospital when he visited Joemar. It is also contrary to human experience: (1) to defend one's self by indiscriminately stabbing the people hitting him/her without trying to aim at the aggressor; and (2) not to file any criminal case against his and Joemar's aggressors.
In a Letter 53 dated January 9, 2014, the Davao Prison and Penal Farm disclosed that on April 30, 2008, Edmund was released on parole after serving the minimum of his prison sentence for a different homicide case he was convicted of by the RTC of Cantilan, Surigao del Sur, Branch 41. Following Section 13 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Pardons and Parole, 54 a prisoner is qualified for parole after "a showing that he is confined in prison or jail to serve an indeterminate sentence . . . pursuant to a final judgment of conviction." Thus, Edmund's grant of parole proves that he was previously convicted by final judgment for a separate crime of homicide at the time the instant case was on trial — thereby, classifying Edmund as a recidivist under Article 14 (9) 55 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Although recidivism was not alleged in the Information filed against Edmund, this Court has ruled that the same may be appreciated if proven by evidence. 56
Since recidivism is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the RPC, the maximum penalty that the CA should have imposed must be within the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. 57 The maximum period for reclusion temporal has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Therefore, this Court modifies the penalty by imposing a maximum penalty of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day.
Lastly, this Court imposes the additional monetary award P50,000.00 as temperate damages following Our ruling in People v. Jugueta58 "when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court." 59
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 13, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08814 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Edmund Lurcha y Juralbar is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for homicide and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Also referred to as "Edmund Joralbar Lutcha" before the Regional Trial Court.
2.Rollo, p. 16.
3. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court); CA rollo, pp. 95-106.
4. Records, p. 1.
5. CA rollo, pp. 53-54.
6.Id. at 54.
7.Id.
8. Records, p. 13.
9.Rollo, p. 57.
10. TSN dated August 14, 2014, p. 6.
11.Id. at 6-7.
12.Id. at 11.
13.Id. at 7-8, 11-13.
14. TSN dated January 22, 2015, p. 9.
15.Id. at 10; TSN dated August 14, 2014, pp. 15-16.
16. Records, p. 247.
17.Id. at 248.
18.Id.
19. TSN dated August 19, 2016, p. 7.
20.Id. at 5-11.
21. Penned by Judge Ismael T. Duldulao; records, pp. 291-302.
22.Id. at 302.
23.Id. at 296.
24.Id. at 298-299.
25.Id. at 300-301.
26.Id. at 302.
27.Id. at 305.
28. CA rollo, pp. 35-49.
29.Id. at 42-47.
30.Id. at 47-48.
31.Id. at 112.
32.Supra note 3.
33. CA rollo, p. 106.
34.Id. at 99-102.
35. 641 Phil. 399 (2010).
36. CA rollo, pp. 102-105.
37. Records, p. 33.
38. CA rollo, pp. 105-106.
39. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
40. CA rollo, p. 117.
41.Rollo, pp. 25, 29-30.
42. Section 3. How appeal taken. —
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
xxx xxx xxx.
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
43. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 249.
44.People v. Advincula, 829 Phil. 516, 526-527 (2018).
45.People v. Roxas, 780 Phil. 874, 881 (2016).
46. 438 Phil. 641 (2002).
47.Id. at 647.
48. TSN dated August 19, 2016, pp. 5-9.
49. TSN dated August 14, 2014, pp. 11-12; TSN dated January 22, 2015, p. 7.
50. Records, p. 247.
51. TSN dated August 19, 2016, p. 10.
52.Id. at 9.
53. Records, p. 33.
54. Section 13. Review of Cases for Parole. — Unless otherwise disqualified under Section 15 of these Rules, a case for parole of a prisoner shall be reviewed upon a showing that he is confined in prison or jail to serve an indeterminate sentence, the maximum period of which exceeds one (1) year, pursuant to a final judgment of conviction and that he has served the minimum period of said sentence.
55. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
56.People v. Ga, G.R. No. 49831, June 27, 1990, citing People v. Ang, 223 Phil. 333, 341 (1985).
57. Article 64 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
58.Supra note 39.
59.Supra note 39 at 853.