People v. Loveriza y Marmol

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 251881. June 16, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMEO LOVERIZA y MARMOL, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 251881 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appelleev. Romeo Loveriza y Marmol, Accused-Appellant.) — This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 28 June 2019 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11486. The CA affirmed the Decision 2 dated 28 March 2018 of Branch 73, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City in Criminal Case No. 10-40271, finding accused-appellant Romeo M. Loveriza (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder.

Antecedents

Accused-appellant was indicted for the crime of Murder, in relation to Section 5 (k) of Republic Act No. 8369 (RA 8369) in an Information, 3 the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 25th day of July 2010, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a gun, with intent to kill, and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack; assault and shoot with said gun one JOHN LIENEL CORONA y TESORO, seventeen (17) years old, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds, which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

On his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 5 Hence, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

At around 8:00 p.m., Louie Juanillo (Louie) and Ronald Molina (Ronald) were with their friend, the victim, John Lienel Corona Tesoro (John), inside their community's covered basketball court. Ronald and John were listening to the music from John's cellular phone when accused-appellant came from out of nowhere. 6 The latter, who was about two (2) meters away from where the trio were seated, 7 shouted "Hoy!" and instantaneously pulled his gun from his left waist. Then and there, accused-appellant started shooting John successively. 8 Louie and Ronald saw accused-appellant fire two (2) shots first, hitting John in the chin. As they ran for cover, they heard more gunshots. 9

Jacqueline Dichoso, a neighbor of John, 10 corroborated the testimonies of Louie and Ronald. She claimed that she was about to enter the covered court when accused-appellant went ahead of her going inside. 11 Immediately thereafter, she heard two (2) gunshots followed by five (5) more gunshots. 12

John was brought to the hospital, but he was pronounced dead on arrival. 13 His cadaver was later autopsied by Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, who found seven (7) gunshot wounds and one (1) lacerated wound on his body. 14 The wounds in the head, trunk and left upper extremity caused John's death. 15

Liza Corona (Liza), John's mother, presented the latter's birth certificate to prove that John was born on 30 November 1992. She also presented a list of expenses that their family incurred by reason of John's death. The list detailed funeral and burial expenses, as well as plane tickets purchased by her husband and sister who had to fly home immediately from abroad upon learning of John's untimely demise. The expenses allegedly reached an aggregate amount of Php213,700.00 while the "Total Damage and Loss of Future," pertaining to John's possible future earnings had he not died, was pegged at Php1,000,000.00

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant narrated that on the evening of 25 July 2010, he was in the house of his kumpadre, which was situated in the same neighborhood where the incident transpired. There was a birthday celebration and they were having a drinking spree. 16 At 8:00 p.m., he was about to go home when he was called by a certain Dante to join him for a drink with his buddies, to which he acceded. While they were drinking, he heard a series of gunshots, but ignored the same and kept drinking. 17 A moment later, he had an altercation with one of the people in their group, Rody, the barangay chairman. 18 Rody pointed a gun at him and tried to arrest him when he stood up. 19 He grabbed the gun and grappled with Rody for its possession. When he took hold of the gun, he went to the barangay to complain against Rody. 20

Ruling of the RTC

On 28 March 2018, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of Murder. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, accused Romeo M. Loveriza is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages; Php30,000.00 as exemplary damage[s]; and Php30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this decision until fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. In addition, the trial court found the circumstance of treachery to be present in this case, which qualified the killing of John to Murder. On the other hand, the RTC found accused-appellant's defense of denial to be weak for his failure to present disinterested witnesses to corroborate his version of events. 22 It held that the defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses' positive identification of him as John's killer.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC, but modified the award by increasing the amount of moral and exemplary damages, as well as add temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 28, 2018 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73 of Antipolo City, finding the accused Romeo Loveriza y Marmol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Romeo Loveriza y Marmol is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of John Lienel Corona the amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this decision until fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.23

Issue

This Court is now called upon to rule on whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the conviction of accused-appellant for Murder.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is unmeritorious.

To be liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. 24 The pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder.

First, the prosecution duly established the fact of death of the victim with the presentation of his Certificate of Death, 25 coupled with the testimonies of key witnesses. As culled from the records, John's father testified that his son was rushed to the hospital, but the latter was already declared dead on arrival. Furthermore, the prosecution also presented the testimony of the doctor who autopsied John's cadaver.

Second, contrary to the argument of accused-appellant, the evidence on record fully supports the RTC's and CA's common factual finding that accused-appellant killed the victim.

There is no merit in the argument of accused-appellant that none of the aforementioned witnesses sufficiently proved that it was he who killed John since none of them actually saw him shot the latter. A perusal of the pertinent portion of the testimonies of Louie and Ronald, which was highlighted by the CA in its decision, 26 clearly shows that they were with John when accused-appellant started firing his gun. They had already seen two (2) bullets hit John before they scampered away.

Accused-appellant also argues that it would be improbable for the eyewitnesses to determine the identity of the person who shot John in view of the circumstances. He pointed out that it was nighttime and there were plenty of people inside the covered court. Furthermore, the assailant was supposedly wearing a jacket and a cap, as claimed by the eyewitnesses. Finally, Ronald was preoccupied listening to music at that time.

The argument is untenable. The facts clearly show that Ronald, Louie, and Jacqueline knew accused-appellant since he was also residing in their area. Also, even if the incident transpired at nighttime, the covered court, according to the eyewitnesses, was sufficiently illuminated. Finally, even if there were many individuals inside and that Ronald was initially listening to music, accused-appellant nevertheless caught their attention when he shouted "Hoy!" from a short distance of two (2) meters.

All the foregoing considered, there is clearly no reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.

As it is often stressed in jurisprudence, the factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the highest respect, if not conclusive effect. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 27 This rule finds an even more stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the CA, as in this case. 28

We sustain the common assessments of the RTC and the CA with respect to the credibility of the witnesses, the same not being tainted with arbitrariness, oversight or misapprehension of facts. Moreover, the testimonies of the eyewitnesses are indeed credible, straightforward, and presented in a clear and convincing manner. Ronald, Louie and Jacqueline, are considered unbiased witnesses. There is nothing in their testimonies to indicate that they were moved by malice as to falsely accuse accused-appellant of any wrongdoing, let alone the commission of a heinous crime like murder.

Accused-appellant's denial, which is an intrinsically weak defense, crumbles against the positive identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the appellants. 29 Also, the defense of denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 30 This, accused-appellant failed to do.

Likewise, accused-appellant's alibi fails to persuade. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was at a place so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 31 In this case, however, accused-appellant admitted in court that he was within the area at the time of the incident, in such proximity that he even supposedly heard the gunshots, but ignored the same.

As to the third element, accused-appellant further claims that the trial court and the CA erroneously appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in this case. For one, accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish that he made some preparation and consciously adopted a particular method to ensure that the victim would be killed and that it would be difficult for the latter to defend himself. For another, accused-appellant contends that the Information against him failed to sufficiently describe how treachery attended the killing.

The Court is not persuaded.

It has been held time and again that the essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and is done in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In treachery, the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim is without the slightest provocation on his part. The mode of attack, therefore, must have been planned by the offender and must not have sprung from an unexpected tum of events. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Treachery is likewise committed when the victim, although warned of the danger to his life, is defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. 32

The suddenness of the attack in this case was clearly shown by the fact that accused-appellant just came out of nowhere and lost no time in shooting the hapless John successively, thereby ensuring the latter's death. Accused-appellant also clearly gave John no means to repel the attack. It should be noted that accused-appellant fired his gun at a very short distance from where John was, and as found during the autopsy, all seven (7) shots accused-appellant fired hit John's body. There was also clearly no slightest provocation on John's part since the incident transpired when he was merely enjoying the night with his friends and the attack was not even preceded by any argument or altercation between him and accused-appellant.

Anent the second argument, it is not lost to this Court that the allegations of treachery in the Information against accused-appellant failed to measure up to the requirements under the Rules of Court given the lack of factual averment on how accused-appellant deliberately employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of his act. The same notwithstanding, this Court finds that the lower courts correctly appreciated treachery under the circumstances.

As spelled out in People v. Dasmariñas, 33 and further underscored in subsequent cases, including the fairly recent case of People v. Solar, 34 a mere allegation of treachery, without any further explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it, is insufficient as it is merely a conclusion of law, not an averment of fact. In such a case, the accused generally could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide. However, accused-appellant only raises this issue for the first time before this Court. He never questioned the sufficiency of the Information below and even allowed the prosecution to present competent evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the crime. Furthermore, accused-appellant failed to move for the quashal of the Information before he entered a plea of not guilty on his arraignment, as required under Rule 117.

Under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court it is before the arraignment when the accused must move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. 35 Likewise, Rule 117 thereof allows an accused to file a motion to quash a patently insufficient or defective Information. 36 For failing to timely raise such an issue, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question such defects. 37 The accused-appellant is deemed to have understood the acts imputed against him by the Information. 38

Verily, as stated in Section 9, Rule 117, the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule. 39 Moreover, the Court can no longer disregard the allegation of treachery herein. It cannot convict the accused-appellant for a lesser crime without unduly prejudicing the State, which, on account of accused-appellant's failure, was also deprived of the opportunity to amend the Information or submit a bill of particulars. 40

Finally, the fourth element of Murder was also proven as there exists no filial relationship between the victim and the assailant in this case so as to qualify the killing to parricide or infanticide.

All the foregoing duly considered, the Court affirms the conviction of accused-appellant for Murder.

As to the imposable penalty, Murder is penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 41 with reclusion perpetua to death. There being no ordinary aggravating circumstance alleged and proved in this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of reclusion perpetua only.

With respect to the monetary awards imposed by the lower courts, it settled that when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. Jurisprudence has decreed that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need for proof other than the commission of the crime, while moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 42 Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are imposed by way of example or correction, to deter others from committing a similar conduct. It is awarded not only due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.

Pursuant to People v. Jugueta (Jugueta), 43 the CA correctly increased the moral damages and exemplary damages awarded by the RTC to Php75,000.00.

With respect to the award of temperate damages, however, the RTC and the CA both awarded the amount of Php30,000.00 without giving any basis therefor. Temperate damages are awarded in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 44 In the instant case, the RTC and the CA correctly awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages since Liza merely submitted a list of expenses amounting to Php213,700.00 without presenting any receipt to substantiate the same. Moreover, while she submitted a copy of the Contract 45 for the funeral services, the same amounted only to Php25,000.00, which is a lower amount than the current sum allowed by the Court for temperate damages. It is settled that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, temperate damages is justified in lieu of actual damages which is of a lesser amount. And pursuant to Jugueta, the temperate damages awarded by the lower courts herein should be increased to Php50,000.00. 46

Finally, with regard to Liza's claim for loss of future income in the amount of Php1,000,000.00 for her son, John, while the RTC and the CA noticeably did not pass upon this issue in their respective rulings, the Court nevertheless finds no factual and legal basis to award the same. The prosecution only proved that John, at the time of his death, was a 17-year old minor. There was no showing that he was gainfully employed at that time. Neither was there any thing to prove that he was then studying which could have, at least, allow the courts to reasonably assume that he would have finished his schooling and become a useful and productive person had he lived. 47 In awarding compensation for loss of earning capacity, the Court has repeatedly held that evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. 48

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated 28 June 2019 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 11486 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the award for temperate damages is INCREASED to Php50,000.00.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-16; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, and concurred in by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser and Associate Justice Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig of the Special Sixth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

2. Records, pp. 200-205; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Leili Cruz Suarez.

3.Id. at 1-2.

4.Id. at 1.

5.Id. at 47; see Order, 27 September 2010.

6. TSN, 29 June 2011, pp. 3-4; see also TSN, 19 September 2012, pp. 6-8.

7.Id. at 4; Id. at 8.

8.Id. at 4-6; TSN, 29 June 2011.

9.Id. at 5; see also TSN, 19 September 2012, pp. 9-10.

10. TSN, 13 February 2014, p. 10.

11.Id. at 5.

12.Id. at 8-9.

13. TSN, 27 August 2014, p. 7.

14. TSN, 25 March 2015, p. 7.

15.Id. at 8.

16. TSN, 21 September 2016, p. 5.

17.Id. at 6-7.

18. TSN dated 10 May 2017, p. 4.

19.Id.

20. TSN, 21 September 2016, pp. 8-10.

21.Records, p. 205.

22.Rollo, p. 6.

23.Id. at 15.

24.See People v. Sota, G.R. No. 203121, 29 November 2017 [Per J. Martires].

25. Records, p. 34.

26.Rollo, pp. 9-11.

27.See People v. Diaz, 711 Phil. 227 (2013), G.R. No. 200882, 13 June 2013 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].

28.See People v. Almorasa, G.R. No. 223512, 24 July 2019 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

29.See People v. Anticamara, 666 Phil. 484 (2011), G.R. No. 178771, 08 June 2011 [Per C.J. Peralta].

30.Supra at note 24.

31.See People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519 (2013), G.R. No. 200329, 05 June 2013 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].

32.Supra at note 24.

33. 819 Phil. 357 (2017), G.R. No. 203986, 04 October 2017 [Per J. Bersamin].

34. G.R. No. 225595, 06 August 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].

35.See Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 (2004), G.R. No. 152259, 29 July 2004 [Per J. Panganiban].

36.See People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 160619, 09 September 2015 [Per J. Jardeleza].

37.People v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 238120, 12 February 2020 [Per J. Inting].

38.Id.

39.See People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 05 April 2016 [Per J. Peralta].

40.See Enrile v. People, 766 Phil. 75 (2015), G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015 [Per J. Brion].

41. "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes."

42.People v. Sabangan, 723 Phil. 591 (2013), G.R. No. 191722, 11 December 2013 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].

43. G.R. No. 202124, 05 April 2016 [Per J. Peralta].

44.See supra at note 39.

45. Records, p. 222.

46.See People v. Racal, 817 Phil. 665 (2017), G.R. No. 224886, 04 September 2017 [Per J. Peralta].

47.See Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company, 807 Phil. 317 (2017), G.R. No. 164749, 15 March 2017 [Per J. Bersamin].

48.See Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18 (1998), G.R. No. 116617, 16 November 1998 [Per J. Mendoza].