THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 219580. January 24, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. LEONARDO LOTA @ LEON, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 24, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 219580 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO LOTA @ LEON, Accused-Appellant.) — Murder is committed when the accused fatally strikes his sleeping victim. The defense of insanity must be convincingly established by the accused in order to exculpate him of his crime.
The Case
The accused appeals the affirmance by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on December 16, 2014 1 of his conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. H-1667 under the decision rendered on November 3, 2010, whereby the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, in Hilongos, Leyte imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 2
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte charged the accused with murder for the killing of Melanio Recto, his own brother-in-law, through the following information filed in the RTC, viz.:
That on November 7, 2007 at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, in Brgy. Baliw, Hilongos, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, with intent to kill, maliciously wilfully, unlawfully, and with treachery, struck the victim MELANIO RECTO, while the latter was asleep in their house, using a piece of wood, hitting the left portion of his head (left parietal area), which resulted to his death in the hospital where he was immediately brought.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The CA synthesized the evidence adduced by the parties in the assailed decision, to wit:
Evidence for the Prosecution
Rosenda Lota Recto (Rosenda), the widow of the victim, Melanio Recto (Melanio), and sister of accused-appellant Leonardo Lota, testified that in the evening of November 7, 2007, she was inside the room of their house in Brgy. Baliw, Hilongos, Leyte. She was sleeping together with her husband, mother, and daughters Mary Rose Recto and Mel Rose Recto. At about 12:00 in the evening, she was awakened by the knocking on the door by accused-appellant, who was then staying in their house at that time. As she peeped outside through the door, accused-appellant blocked the door with his shoulder and tried to get inside the room. Despite her resistance, accused-appellant succeeded in going inside the room. Accused-appellant immediately struck her husband, who was sleeping, with the wooden handle of an axe, hitting the latter on the left side of the head. She immediately embraced accused-appellant to prevent him from further hitting Melanio. She said to accused-appellant, "What happened to you Leon?" and asked help from her children.
She was embracing accused-appellant tightly, until her son, Victor Aus, arrived and helped her. Her other son, Eric, also arrived and helped Manuel stand up. Since Manuel was bleeding profusely, he was brought to the Leyte Baptist Hospital, Hilongos, Leyte and transferred to Saint Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City. At 3:00 in the afternoon of the following day, the victim died. She spent about Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) from the hospital bills, coffin, burial and wake of his husband. The axe that was used in striking the victim was around 3 feet long by its handle and made of hardwood.
Rosenda recalled that seven (7) years earlier, accused-appellant got drunk and challenged the victim to a fight, but the latter refused. She does not know why accused-appellant killed her husband. At the time of the killing, accused appellant did not have any mental disorder.
Victor Aus y Lota, Jr., (Victor) the stepson of the victim Melanio Recto and the nephew of the accused-appellant, testified that in the evening of November 7, 2007, he was sleeping in the other room of their house in Brgy. Baliw, Hilongos, Leyte. He was awakened by her mother who was shouting for help. He rushed to the bedroom of his mother and saw accused-appellant trying to beat his mother with a piece of wood. Her mother was then embracing accused-appellant and tried to restrain him. Then he tried grabbing that wood which he failed so his mother called his elder brother Eric who lives in a house nearby. He heard the accused-appellant say, "I will annihilate you all," so they took the piece of wood from accused-appellant and escorted him out of the house.
He saw his stepfather bleeding in the head, so they carried him outside of the house and brought him to Baptist Hospital in Hilongos, Leyte. Upon advice of the doctors in the said hospital, the victim was transferred to St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City where the victim died the following day.
Outside, he saw the accused-appellant being tied by the tanods and other residents of the place who rushed to the scene. He recalled that a few years earlier, accused-appellant and his father had a quarrel.
Melrose Recto y Lota (Melrose), 12 years of age and daughter of the victim Melanio, testified that in the evening of November 7, 2007, she was at her home in Brgy. Baliw, Hilongos, Leyte. She slept at around 9:00 P.M. together with her parents and younger siblings. Accused-appellant, who is the younger brother of her mother, was staying in their house at that time. She was awakened by the scream of her mother. She saw the accused-appellant inside the room holding a piece of wood. Her mother was embracing the accused-appellant, while the latter struggled to free himself. Fortunately, her older brothers, Eric and Victor, arrived and helped her mother. She saw her father lying in bed and bleeding. Vic then lifted his father and brought him to the hospital. The next day, she learned that her father had died. 4 aScITE
Evidence for the Defense
LEONARDO LOTA alias "Leon," the accused-appellant, testified that on November 7, 2007, for about two (2) days already, he was staying in the house of his elder sister Rosenda and her husband Melanio Recto. He feels that his mind was not well, and that a "manghihilot" (quack doctor) told him that he has "kabuhi" (stomach upset). At midnight, he was at the municipal building of Poblacion, and he was told by his children that he struck his brother-in-law, Melanio. However, he has no recollection of the said incident.
On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he has no history of mental condition.
SPO2 Mark David Velmonte (SPO2 Velmonte), a police officer, testified that when the accused-appellant was brought and remanded to the police station from the Office of the Barangay, he observed that the accused-appellant was extremely violent and was restrained by the tanods. Accused-appellant was immediately placed inside the jail because of his violent behavior. Based on his observation, accused-appellant lacks sleep. 5
As stated, on November 3, 2010, the RTC found and declared the accused guilty of murder as charged, 6 disposing:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused LEONARDO LOTA alias "LEON" is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentenced to suffer the imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the heirs of Melanio Recto the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and to pay the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and pay the actual damages of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00).
In the service of his sentence accused is hereby credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.7
The accused appealed the conviction to the CA, asserting the lone assignment of error, as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT HE WAS INSANE AT THE TIME HE ATTACKED THE VICTIM MELANIO RECTO. 8
Citing People v. Bonoan, 9 the accused argued that his being insane when he struck the victim exempted him from criminal liability pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; and insisted that to establish his insanity, he did not need to rely on direct testimony thereon, or to prove specific acts of derangement, for it was enough that there be circumstantial evidence that was clear and convincing demonstrating his insanity at the time of the commission of the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the sudden and unprovoked manner by which the accused had attacked the victim while the latter was sleeping was a patently treacherous act; that, accordingly, the RTC properly convicted him of murder; that he did not meet the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the exempting circumstance of insanity; and that he did not present any expert witness who would have testified on his purported insanity immediately before, or simultaneous with, his commission of the offense. 10
On December 16, 2014, the CA rejected the defense of insanity and affirmed the conviction, 11 ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 3, 2010 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Hilongos, Leyte finding accused-appellant Leonardo Lota guilty of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on his civil liability. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay to the Heirs of Melanio Recto the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, interest on all the damages herein awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of the incident to the finality of the judgment and 12% from the finality hereof until fully paid, and to pay costs.
Accused-appellant shall immediately be committed to the New Bilibid Prisons upon notice by the Jail Warden of LSPJ of Hilongos, Leyte of this Decision. He shall report to the Court within five (5) days from his compliance of this order. Likewise, the Director of Prisons of the New Bilibid Prisons shall also submit his own report acknowledging the presence of accused-appellant thereat also within the above-stated period from his receipt of the latter. HEITAD
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal.
On April 4, 2016, the Court noted the OSG's manifestation in lieu of supplemental brief. 13 On July 25, 2016, the Court noted the accused's manifestation (in lieu of supplemental brief). 14
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks substance and merit.
First of all, the accused anchored his defense of insanity on the fact that he could not remember hitting the victim with a piece of wood, and came to know of that fact only when his children informed him thereof. He has cited People v. Bonoan, supra, wherein the Court ruled that circumstantial evidence of insanity, if clear and convincing, sufficed to establish insanity.
In People v. Dungo, 15 the Court has observed about the defense of insanity, to wit:
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87) 16
The rule is that the accused who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance admits the killing of the victim. He then assumes the responsibility of clearly and convincingly establishing his defense. Hence, the accused herein had the burden of proof with respect to his insanity.
The CA considered the accused's defense of insanity lacking in persuasion, and rejected it, observing as follows: ATICcS
On the Defense of Insanity
xxx xxx xxx
To emphasize, insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When insanity is alleged, the evidence on this point must refer to the time p[receding the act or to the very moment of its execution.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
There must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of power to discern, or there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
Here, other than accused-appellant's self-serving declaration that he could not remember hitting the victim, no other credible evidence was presented to prove that he was insane or completely deprived of reason at the time of the commission of the crime. The following facts are worth noting: First, accused-appellant was not confined in any mental institution, prior to or after the commission of the crime. Second, no person acquainted with the accused-appellant was presented to testify as to his mental condition or state of mind. Third, accused-appellant did not present a qualified expert witness, such as a psychiatrist, to prove that he was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the incident. Fourth, accused-appellant, on cross-examination, admitted that he had no history of mental condition. Lastly, the case of People v. Bonoan cited by accused-appellant is not in point as the facts in that case are substantially different from the facts in the present appeal. In Bonoan, the accused therein was previously confined at San Lazaro Hospital for dementia præcox, a disease which deprives the patient of any control over his acts. Moreover, the accused was confined at the Insular Psychopathic Hospital immediately after the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the report of the attending physical showed that the accused, during the period of confinement, suffered from manic depressive psychosis. None of these facts are present here. Perhaps, the only thing that accused-appellant was suffering from is selective amnesia.
From the above discussions, it is crystal clear that accused-appellant was not insane prior to, or during, the commission of the crime. When insanity is interposed as a defense or a ground of a motion to quash, the burden rests upon the accused to establish that fact, for the law presumes every man to be sane. Hence, in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove insanity, the legal presumption of one's sanity stands. Notably, accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden and he is thus presumed to have acted intelligently and voluntarily.
The trial court, therefore, was correct in finding that the accused-appellant was not insane at the time of the incident. As already mentioned, the issue of insanity is a question of fact. And in this case, We find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the lower court on that matter. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of trial courts are given great weight on appeal because they are in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and can therefore discern if they are telling the truth or not.17
We concur with the CA. In People v. Austria, 18 we stressed that when the accused alleged insanity as a reason for his exemption from criminal responsibility, his evidence thereon must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or at the very moment of its execution; and that his counsel must then prove that the accused had not been in his right mind, or had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or had been generally regarded as insane when he executed the act attributed to him. 19 There is no question that the accused herein did not present such proof of his insanity preceding or during the commission of the murder.
In this regard, the CA properly rejected the plea of the accused to benefit from the mitigating circumstance analogous to insanity under Article 13, paragraph 10, of the Revised Penal Code. He based his plea on his claim of having no recollection at all of whatever he had done against the victim on that fatal evening of the murder. Indeed, such lack of recollection — a bare assertion — could not equate to a circumstance analogous to insanity considering that it did not show his being deprived of reason, even at the slightest degree, at the time he mounted his sudden but deadly assault on the sleeping and unaware victim.
Secondly, the State convincingly and sufficiently established the attendance of treachery in the commission of the crime. As the CA pointed out in its assailed affirmance, the accused struck Melanio Recto with the axe handle at a time when the latter was sleeping, hitting the latter on the left part of the head. In the certificate of death, the examining physician, Dr. Gil Asoy, certified that the cause of death was epidural hematoma, a traumatic brain injury in which a build-up of blood occurs between the dura mater (the tough outer membrane of the central nervous system) and the skull. Clearly, the victim died from the trauma on his head caused by the force or impact of the blunt object. This cause of death was consistent with the testimonies of the State's witnesses who attested to the accused striking the sleeping victim with the axe handle.
Treachery or alevosia exists "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." 20 The concurrence of two conditions is, therefore, necessary, namely: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution which would insure the offender's safety from any defensive or any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) such means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. 21
Both requisites were present. The sudden attack on the victim who was then sleeping and unable to defend himself constituted treachery because the accused thereby ensured that the victim would not be in any position to defend himself, or to retaliate. cSEDTC
Thirdly, voluntary surrender should not be appreciated. The accused did not voluntarily surrender himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he wished to save them the trouble and expense in looking for and capturing him. In truth, his own witness, SPO2 Velmonte, recalled that the accused had been escorted to the police station by the tanods who had meanwhile captured him. In any event, the consideration of any mitigating circumstance in his favor would be superfluous because although the imposable penalty under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to death, the prohibition to impose the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 22 rendered reclusion perpetua as the only penalty for murder, which penalty, being indivisible, could not be graduated in consideration of any modifying circumstances. 23
And, lastly, in order to conform to People v. Jugueta, 24 we uphold the amounts allowed for civil liability of the accused subject to increasing the P30,000.00 granted as exemplary damages to P75,000.00 and to allowing P50,000.00 as temperate damages (in lieu of actual damages for the burial of the victim's remains). All such amounts shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 16, 2014 by the Court of Appeals finding LEONARDO LOTA @ LEON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua subject to the MODIFICATION that the civil liability of the accused shall consist of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as temperate damages, with all such amounts to earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this resolution until full satisfaction.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
(Martires, J., on wellness leave.)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 4-16; penned by Associate Justice Marilyn P. Lagura-Yap, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
2. CA rollo, pp. 30-34; penned by Judge Ephrem S. Abando.
3.Id. at 3.
4.Id. at 31-32.
5.Id. at 32.
6.Supra note 2.
7. CA rollo, pp. 32-34.
8.Id. at 53.
9. 64 Phil. 93.
10. CA rollo, p. 84.
11.Supra note 1.
12.Id. at 88.
13.Rollo, p. 33.
14.Id. at 45.
15. G.R. No. 89420, July 31, 1991, 199 SCRA 860.
16.Id. at 866-868.
17.Rollo, pp. 10-12.
18. G.R. No. 111517-19, July 31, 1996, 260 SCRA 106, 115-119, where the accused was charged with two counts of frustrated murder and one for murder committed on September 25, 1989; he presented the psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital who had examined and treated him on April 23, 1991, for which a psychiatric evaluation was issued on November 14, 1991 to the effect that he had been "found to be suffering from a long-standing illness classified as Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid type;" after trial, the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan declared him guilty because the trial judge found him to be sane when he committed the crimes charged; on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and ordered the accused committed immediately to the National Mental Hospital but declared him civilly liable to indemnify the heirs of the victims who died and the victims who survived.
19.Id., citing United States v. Guevarra, 27 Phil. 547.
20. Article 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code.
21.People v. Banayo, No. L-64164, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 725, 734-735; People v. Rhoda, No. L-58613, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 909, 921; People v. Macariola, No. L-40757, January 24, 1983, 120 SCRA 92, 103.
22. Entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, repealing Republic Act 8177 otherwise known as the Act Designating Death By Lethal Injection, Republic Act 7659 otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and All Other Laws, Executive Orders and Decrees, whose Section 1 states:
Sec. 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. — Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
23. See Article 63, Revised Penal Code.
24. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.