FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 207539. April 21, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE JOEL LANUZA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated April 21, 2014which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 207539 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versusJOSE JOEL LANUZA, accused-appellant.
Before this Court is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 257 of Parañaque City, finding appellant guilty of carnapping and qualified theft.
Summarily, the prosecution proved the following facts: On March 12, 2007, private complainant Ferdinand Go y Arcangel hired appellant to drive his Isuzu van which he used in his trucking business. On appellant's first two deliveries, Ferdinand accompanied appellant. On March 15, 2007, appellant's third day at work, he was allowed to drive the truck without Ferdinand's supervision and was only accompanied by the truck helper, Jason Gozon. Ferdinand instructed appellant and Jason to deliver the merchandise of JAKA Distributor, Inc. at Km. 18 East Service Road, San Martin de Porres, Parañaque, to Super 8 Warehouse, Kalawaan, Pasig City. 3
Appellant and Jason left in the morning but did not return from their scheduled delivery. Thinking that appellant parked the van after the delivery, Ferdinand went to JAKA's compound the following day to check if the van was there but it was not. He looked for Jason, but was told that the latter did not return home. Thus, Ferdinand reported the incident to the Parañaque Police which issued Alarm and Anti-Carnapping Reports. 4
Sometime thereafter, Ferdinand received a call from Jason. Jason told him that he was in his cousin's house and that appellant had left him at a carinderia in Bulacan. According to Jason, he and appellant left the JAKA compound at around 9 o'clock in the morning on March 15, 2007. At lunch time, they stopped at a place he had not been to before. Appellant told Jason to go ahead to a carinderia while he looked for a place to park. Jason waited for several hours, but appellant never showed up at the carinderia. Later, Jason learned that he was in Sta. Cruz, Bulacan. 5 IASTDE
Alarmed, Ferdinand sent several text messages to appellant telling the latter that he can have the merchandise, which was worth P125,328.25, 6 but he should return the van. Appellant replied and told Ferdinand that the van was parked at a market in Novaliches. When Ferdinand went to the given location, the van was not there. Appellant gave several more locations where Ferdinand can get his van, but these also turned out to be false. 7
Faced with the prosecution evidence, appellant simply denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was with Jason at the JAKA compound to deliver the merchandise to Liana's Supermarket in Malolos, Bulacan, but the van's shifting gear malfunctioned so they transferred the merchandise to another truck driven by another person. When he was about to have the van repaired, a mechanic stationed near JAKA compound assured him that he will repair the van inside the compound. With the mechanic's assurance, appellant left the van in JAKA compound and went home. He waited for Ferdinand to call him back to work but the latter never did, so he no longer reported back to work. Appellant admitted that there were other pending charges against him for qualified theft and carnapping, but he claimed that the charges were false. 8
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of carnapping under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539 9 and qualified theft. For the crime of carnapping, the RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 14 years and 8 months as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months as maximum, and for the qualified theft, appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant was further ordered to pay Ferdinand P70,000 representing the purchase price of the van and P125,328.25 for the value of merchandise he had stolen. The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the one who took the van and the merchandise loaded therein. Appellant's denial was also disproved because the van was not recovered in the JAKA compound or any nearby place where he allegedly parked it. The trial court noted that appellant disappeared with the van and the merchandise, and that it took the police more than a year to hunt him. Appellant was caught only when the Pampanga Police Provincial Office arrested him and some companions in connection with another case of carnapping and robbery in band. The trial court ruled that in taking the van without Ferdinand's consent, appellant has violated the Anti-Carnapping Act or R.A. No. 6539. Appellant had also absconded with the merchandise in grave abuse of the confidence reposed on him by Ferdinand, thereby malting him liable for qualified theft. 10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, but modified and increased the penalty imposed for the crime of qualified theft to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA agreed with the findings of the RTC and held that the categorical statements of the prosecution's witnesses must prevail over the bare denials of appellant. However, as to the penalty for the qualified theft, the CA found that the RTC failed to take into consideration the value of the merchandise in computing the imposable penalty. Applying the formula in People v. Mercado, 11 the CA deducted P22,000 from P125,328.25, the value of the merchandise, then divided the result (P103,328.25) by P10,000 to arrive at the number of additional years to be imposed on top of the penalty stated in paragraph 1 of Article 309 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA held that if the case were only for simple theft, then appellant would suffer 20 years old reclusion temporal, the maximum allowable penalty under Article 309, after adding the additional years. But since appellant is guilty of qualified theft by grave abuse of confidence under Article 310 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty is two degrees higher than the penalty specified in Article 309. And considering the prohibitions against the imposition of the death penalty, the CA imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua but with the same accessory penalties as death in view of Article 74 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 15 DEHaTC
After a careful review of the records of this case and the parties' submissions, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. This deference to the trial court's appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. This is especially true when the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed by the appellate court. 16 Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked, misunderstood and misappreciated substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered would change the result of the case, this Court gives deference to the trial court's appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses.
However, in view of prevailing jurisprudence, we likewise deem it proper to award interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded in this case reckoned from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34109 which affirmed the conviction of appellant Jose Joel Lanuza for carnapping and qualified theft is AFFIRMED.
Interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all monetary damages awarded in this case reckoned from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid shall likewise be paid by appellant.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2-13. Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Mario V. Lopez concurring. The assailed decision was rendered in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34109.
2. CA rollo, pp. 15-22. Penned by Judge Rolando G. How.
3. Id. at 16; rollo, p. 4.
4. Id. at 16-17.
5. Id. at 17, 18.
6. Id. at 17, 19.
7. Id. at 17; rollo, p. 5.
8. Id. at 18-19; id.
9. AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING otherwise known as the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972."
10. CA rollo, pp. 19-22.
11. 445 Phil. 813, 828 (2003).
12. ART. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
13. ART. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
14. ART. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specifically designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the higher penalty.
15. Rollo, pp. 9-12.
16. People v. Obina, G.R. No. 186540, April 14, 2010, 618 SCRA 276, 281.