FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 246949. September 14, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LEANDRO LACAP y BARTOLOME, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 14, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 246949 (People of the Philippines v. Leandro Lacap y Bartolome). — To purge the drug menace in this country, the prosecution is reminded that in order to successfully convict alleged persons dealing with illegal drugs, they must show beyond reasonable doubt not only the fact of sale, but that the evidence presented to the Court is untainted by uncertainty that it is indeed the confiscated item from the accused. 1
This is an appeal 2 from the Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 13, 2018, which affirmed in toto the Judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba City (RTC), dated March 13, 2015, in Criminal Case Nos. 15601-2008-C, 15602-2008-C, and 15603-2008-C. Herein accused-appellant Leandro Lacap y Bartolome was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Antecedents
In three (3) separate Informations, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Sections 11, 5, and 12 of R.A. 9165, committed respectively as follows:
Criminal Case No. 15601-2008-C
That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening of February 6, 2008 at Brgy. Uno, Calamba City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession seven (7) sachets of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, having a total weight of 0.59 grams (sic), in violation of the aforementioned law. cDSAEI
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Criminal Case No. 15602-2008-C
That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the morning of February 6, 2008 at Brgy. Uno, Calamba City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer one (1) transparent plastic sachets (sic) containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu," weighing 0.04 grams (sic), in violation of the aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Criminal Case No. 15603-2008-C
That on or about 11:10 o'clock in the evening of February 6, 2008 at Brgy. Uno, Crossing, Calamba City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control equipments (sic) or paraphernalias (sic) used and intended for sniffing shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the aforementioned provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
Randy Pangga was likewise charged, along with accused-appellant, of violation of Section 15 of RA 9165 , committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 15598-2008-C
That on or about 11:10 o:(sic) clock in the evening of February 6, 2008 at Brgy. Uno, Crossing, Calamba City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-mentioned law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all three charges. 9 Randy Pangga also pleaded not guilty to the charge brought against him. 10 During pre-trial, the identity of the accused was admitted. 11
The consolidated trial of these cases ensued thereafter.
Antecedents
To prove the charges against the accused-appellant, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses, namely: SPO1 Apolonio Naredo, Jr. (SPO1 Naredo), PO1 Allen Llorente (PO1 Llorente), and Forensic Chemist Lalaine Ong-Rodrigo (Dr. Ong-Rodrigo).
SPO1 Naredo12 has been a police officer since 1988 and during the time of the incident, was assigned as part of the Intelligence Operative at the Calamba City Police Station. EDCcaS
On February 6, 2008, a confidential informant (CI) reported to SPO1 Naredo that a certain "Baldo," who was later identified as accused-appellant, was selling illegal drugs in Barangay I, Calamba City. He immediately relayed the information to Chief of Police Col. Nestor dela Cueva (Chief Dela Cueva), who then instructed him, along with the CI, SPO2 Llanes, PO3 Melendrez, PO3 Galera, and PO1 Llorente, to conduct a buy-bust operation. In preparation for the buy-bust operation, a pre-operation conference was conducted and SPO1 Naredo, together with the CI, were designated to act as poseur-buyers.
At around 11 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the buy-bust team proceeded to the area of operation, at Crossing, Barangay I, Calamba City. After the CI pointed to accused-appellant as the one identified as "Baldo," SPO1 Naredo approached him, signifying his intention to buy illegal drugs. Accused-appellant asked him how much he wanted to buy, to which he replied, "P500.00." Accused-appellant then walked a short distance to his home to retrieve the drugs. Soon after, accused-appellant returned, during which SPO1 Naredo handed him a pre-marked P500.00-bill in exchange for a plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance. Upon receipt of the sachet, SPO1 Naredo raised his right hand, the pre-arranged signal to signify the completion of the transaction, introduced himself to accused-appellant as a police officer, and proceeded to arrest him. He then marked the purchased sachet as "ACN LBL." A conduct of a preventive search yielded seven (7) more pieces of plastic sachets and the pre-marked bill from the sale. All the recovered sachets were marked by SPO1 Naredo as "ACN LBL-1" to "ACN LBL-7," respectively.
During the course of accused-appellant's arrest, SPO1 Naredo saw Randy Pangga through the latter's door left ajar, having a pot session with several companions, later identified at the police station as Ranchil Pangga, his wife, and a certain Allen Ramos. All three individuals were likewise arrested for having been seen sniffing shabu. SPO1 Naredo further narrates that after the arrest, the buy-bust team confiscated several drug paraphernalia being used by Randy Pangga and his companions. The recovered paraphernalia were marked as "ACN LBL-8" to "ACN LBL-15." After apprising the accused of their constitutional rights in the native language, they were brought to the police station where the team prepared a request addressed to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Vicente for the examination of the specimen.
During cross-examination, SPO1 Naredo admitted that his CI did not possess personal information regarding "Baldo" and that he was the only police officer who was responsible for marking the drug paraphernalia confiscated in the house of Randy Pangga. 13
The testimony of Dr. Ong-Rodrigo 14 was dispensed with, as the defense admitted her expertise. The parties likewise stipulated the authenticity and due execution of the following, namely: (1) Request for Drug Test Examination 15 dated February 6, 2008; (2) Request for Laboratory Examination 16 dated February 6, 2008; (3) Chemistry Report No. D-051-08 17 dated February 7, 2008, revealing that the eight (8) plastic sachets contain methamphetamine hydrochloride; (4) Chemistry Report Nos. CRIMDT-098-08 and CRIMDT-101-08, 18 which proves that the urine samples collected from accused-appellant, Randy Pangga, Ranchil Pangga, and Allen Ramos contained traces of methamphetamine. ISHaCD
Similarly, the testimony of PO1 Llorente 19 was dispensed with for being merely corroborative to the testimony of SPO1 Naredo. The defense, however, admitted to the following: (1) that PO1 Llorente was a member of the PNP and was assigned at the Laguna Drug Enforcement Group at the time of the incident; (2) that he was part of the buy-bust operation who caused the arrest of the accused-appellant, as well as Randy Pangga, Ranchil Pangga, and Allen Ramos; and (3) that he was ordered to cause the delivery of the confiscated specimen for laboratory examination.
The defense presented their version of the events through the testimonies of accused-appellant and Randy Pangga.
Accused-appellant Leandro Lacap 20 denied the version of the prosecution entirely. He testified that he personally knew SPO1 Naredo since high school, as he would often see him at the police outpost; in fact, he and his brother, Enrique Lacap, served as civilian assets to the police. He disclosed that he stopped being an asset after his brother was killed in 2005 for serving in such a capacity.
On the evening of February 6, 2008, at about 11 o'clock in the evening, he recalled that he was waiting for his brother's tricycle at the billiard hall near the house of Ranchil Pangga in Brgy. Uno, Crossing, Calamba City. While waiting, a vehicle arrived, from which four (4) men alighted. Accused-appellant recognized one of them as SPO1 Naredo. SPO1 Naredo approached him, asking him if "may matatrabaho," or if he would once again act as a poseur-buyer for a buy-bust operation. When accused-appellant refused, SPO1 Naredo, along with his three (3) companions, suddenly handcuffed him. He was forced into the house of Randy Pangga, who was also arrested. Aside from arresting him, the police officers also confiscated his cellular phone, wallet, watch, and iPad.
On cross-examination, 21 accused-appellant revealed that he chose not to file a case against SPO1 Naredo and his companions, fearful as to what they may do as police officers.
For his part, Randy Pangga 22 also denied the charges against him, testifying that on the day of the incident, or on February 6, 2008, at 11 o'clock in the evening, he was at home, putting his child to sleep. He heard a loud noise which prompted him to go outside the room. There, he was surprised to see accused-appellant on the ground, being held down by three other individuals. He recalled feeling afraid, as he saw them carrying arms. When the men saw him, he was asked to sit beside accused-appellant, after which they began conducting a search of his house. Despite his demands to tell him what they were looking for, his questions were left unheeded. After about thirty (30) minutes, they boarded a vehicle which brought them to the police station. It was there where he was first informed that he was being charged with violating Section 15 of R.A. 9165, having been found positive in a drug test.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 13, 2015, the RTC rendered a Judgment 23 in these cases, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165, and acquitting him of the violation of Section 12 of R.A. 9165. For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Randy Pangga, the RTC acquitted him of the crime charged. The dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in Criminal Case No. 15598-2008-C, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused RANDY PANGGA y THIEVES beyond reasonable doubt said accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. cDTACE
In Criminal Case No. 15601-2008-C, the Court finds accused, LEANDRO LACAP y BARTOLOME, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violation of Section 11, paragraph 2(3), Article II of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY A FINE of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS.
In Criminal Case No. 15602-2008-C, the Court likewise finds accused LEANDRO LACAP y BARTOLOME, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165. The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and TO PAY A FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 15603-2008-C, for lack of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, LEANDRO LACAP y BARTOLOME is ACQUITTED of violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act 9165.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to turn over the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia subject of this case to PDEA for proper disposition and destruction.
SO ORDERED.24
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal 25 from the adverse decision.
On appeal, 26 accused-appellant argued that the RTC erred in convicting him, despite the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of custody as well as the integrity of the allegedly seized items. Particularly, accused-appellant points out that there was a gap in the chain of custody, as SPO1 Naredo never mentioned that he turned over the confiscated sachets and the drug paraphernalia to PO1 Llorente; neither did Dr. Ong-Rodrigo mention whom she received the specimen from, nor did she manifest the certain precautions that she took to ensure the integrity of the samples. Moreover, accused-appellant also casts doubt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, primarily that of SPO1 Naredo, for admitting that accused-appellant was their CI after asserting that he did not know the latter prior to the operation and for misrepresenting that he was the only police officer who arrested all the accused and placed the markings on the items, when in fact, PO1 Llorente was designated as perimeter security. More disappointing, SPO1 Naredo did not even attempt to prepare an inventory and take photographs of the confiscated items along with the accused-appellant at the crime scene. The required witnesses found in Section 21, RA 9165 were also nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG)27 posits that the RTC did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It stressed that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu against accused-appellant. It adds that there was no break in the chain of custody and that the integrity of the evidence submitted to the trial was preserved. While there was failure to comply stringently with the requirements of Section 21, RA 9165, there was still substantial compliance; given that the accused-appellant was apprehended at around 11 o'clock in the evening, it was impractical, if not impossible, to conduct a physical inventory or to photograph the specimen in the presence of the required witnesses.
The Ruling of the CA
In a Decision 28 dated August 13, 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. The fallo of the Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 13, 2015 in Criminal Case Nos. 15601-2008-C, 15602-2008-C and 15603-2008-C is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 29 cCHITA
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the appeal. The State did not satisfactorily explain the gaping lapses committed by the buy-bust team in the chain of custody; hence, the guilt of accused-appellant for the crimes charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, no less than the Constitution mandates that the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental right that should be upheld at all times:
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. 30
Thus, the burden rests upon the prosecution, and the accused must then be acquitted and set free, should it fail to overcome the presumption of innocence in his or her favor. 31 Conversely, in order to secure a conviction in a criminal case, all the elements of the crimes charged must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 32 Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules on Evidence is clear:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
This Court, in People v. Que, 33 expounded that proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter of conscience. Though it does not demand absolutely impervious certainty, it still charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not merely engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a constitutional imperative.
In this regard, herein accused-appellant was charged and convicted by the courts a quo with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
Jurisprudence dictates that for there to be a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, 34 Article II, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 35People v. Unisa36 iterates that the crime is rendered consummated for as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former. On the other hand, the essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, 37 Article II are as follows: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. 38
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that in prosecutions for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, apart from the elements of the offense, must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. 39 In illegal drugs cases, the corpus delicti is the very drug itself. 40 Of significant import, proving the existence of the elements of the offense is insufficient to mount a conviction; rather, the State equally bears the obligation to prove the identity and the integrity of the seized drug, failing in which the State shall be considered as having failed to discharge its duty to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 41 This Court has gone as far as declaring that it would be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the elements of the crime if the corpus delicti had not been proved beyond moral certainty. 42 CScaDH
This rigorous requirement, known as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity and integrity of the evidence are removed. In People v. Ameril, 43 citing Section 1 (b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, this Court defined the chain of custody, viz.:
x x x The duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In People v. Kamad, 44 this Court explained the four (4) links that should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: "first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court."
Section 21 of R.A. 9165, the prevailing law at the time the crime was committed, embodies the chain of custody requirement:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. x x x.
This provision requires that upon seizure of illegal drug items, the apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall (1) conduct a physical inventory of the drugs; and (2) take photographs thereof immediately upon seizure or confiscation; (3) in the presence of the person from whom these items were seized or confiscated; and (4) a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official, all of which are required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof.
Strict compliance with the procedure set forth in Section 21 cannot be overemphasized; being a matter of substantive law, it cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Acting as safety precautions, Congress specifically crafted such provisions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. 45 This directive envisions to foreclose any opportunity for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. aHSTID
However, prevailing conditions on the field dictate that adhering to such strict requirements could unduly hamper the goal of drug eradication. Thus, there are cases where the Court has ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, 46 provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (1) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 47 In People v. De Guzman, 48 this Court underscored that the justifiable grounds for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
In view of these guideposts, the Court finds that the apprehending officers committed flagrant deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from accused-appellant.
Preliminarily, there is serious doubt as to how accused-appellant was identified as one engaged in the sale of illegal drugs, considering that the defense admitted that the CI employed for the operation did not even possess personal information about accused-appellant. Regardless of the insufficient knowledge as to the identity of accused-appellant, the buy-bust operation was still undertaken:
Q And before you related the information to your Chief of Police, Mr. dela Cueva, did you ask your supposed informant the identity of this "Baldo"?
A No, sir.
Q In short, the informant did not know the real name of that "Baldo," is that what you mean to say?
A Yes, sir.
Q And despite of that wrong information, a buy-bust operation was effected on that night?
A Yes, sir. 49
Equally suspect is the irreconcilable inconsistency between SPO1 Naredo's declarations as to how he knew accused-appellant, testifying on direct examination that the latter was their confidential informant, which lends credence to the admission of accused-appellant that he briefly served as the officers' CI, but later on declaring that he was not known to him personally:
Q What did you do before you conduct (sic) the buy-bust operation?
A SPO2 Melvin Llanes formed a team including me and other police officers and we prepared money for the test buy with Baldo, sir.
COURT:
Q This Baldo turned out to be who?
A Baldo is our confidential informant, your Honor.
Q Who is that Baldo?
A Baldo is Leonardo Lacap, a suspect in selling shabu, your Honor.50
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TIMOG:
Q Of course, you will admit that you are not known to Baldo personally?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
Q Neither Baldo knew you before hand (sic)?
A I do not know, sir, because if he knew that I am a policeman, he will not sell to me the prohibited drugs. 51
More, SPO1 Naredo's testimony failed to disclose who, in particular, held the seized items from the crime scene upon marking, up to the police station, and finally to the crime laboratory for the requisite chemical examination. While it was stipulated that PO1 Llorente was designated to deliver the items to the forensic chemist for examination, the testimony of Dr. Ong-Rodrigo, as well as the records from the laboratory bearing its findings, failed to confirm whether the laboratory had indeed received such items from PO1 Llorente. It is likewise uncertain who took custody of such specimens prior to its presentation as evidence in court. In People v. Sitco, 52 this Court considered these glaring gaps as fatal to the prosecution's case, since what are involved are fungible items that may be easily altered or tampered with.
To further negate the credibility of the prosecution's testimonies, SPO1 Naredo himself admitted that he was the only one solely responsible for marking the seized items and paraphernalia. In People v. Holgado, 53 citing People v. Magat, 54 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly seized; simply put, "marking of the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165." 55 Worse, it appears that none of those involved in the buy-bust team executed any statement regarding the details surrounding the operation, 56 thus, placing the conduct of the buy-bust in a shroud of doubt. Concededly, this Court is left questioning whether the persons alleged to have been part of the apprehending team were really present in the first place.
Of equally grave concern, the records of these cases were bereft of any showing that an inventory was conducted or that photographs were taken during the incident. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were most notably silent on such requirements mandated by law. Connectedly, neither was it satisfactorily shown that the representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official was present during the seizure and confiscation. While SPO1 Naredo specifically recalled having marked the confiscated sachets of shabu immediately after the seizure, he did not explicitly state if such marking was made in the presence of the accused himself or of his representative, or of the three witnesses required by law.
This Court shed light on the rationale of the three-witness rule in People v. Tomawis, 57 to wit:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest.
It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frameup as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165. ISCDEA
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To reiterate, following the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) 58 of R.A. 9165, courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases when the prosecution proves the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance. To successfully invoke this clause in the IRR, however, the prosecution must acknowledge its procedural lapses and specifically plead justifiable grounds for these lapses. 59
In the same vein, the Court instructed in People v. Romy Lim y Miranda60 that the prosecution must prove that earnest efforts were employed to secure the attendances of the three witnesses. Here, the police officers did not even recognize, nor did they even bother to tender any justification for their non-compliance. For the first time on appeal to the CA, it gave the flimsy excuse that considering the time of accused-appellant's apprehension at 11 o'clock, it would be impractical and virtually impossible to conduct such physical inventory or photograph the seized items in the presence of such witnesses. 61
The Court, in all good conscience, cannot be persuaded by such a reason. Here, the buy-bust operation was arranged and scheduled in advance, with the police officers conducting a pre-operation conference, even forming an apprehending team, as well as preparing the buy-bust money; yet, they failed to ensure the attendance of the three witnesses, which are plain requirements in the law and are straightforward nowhere near extraordinary. Consequently, the prosecution's justification is manifestly unacceptable as there was no showing of any genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law. As reached by this Court in People v. Ramos, 62 "mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance." In the fight against the drug menace in this country, this Court exhorts the prosecutors and the police officers to diligently discharge their onus to prove compliance with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR.
In fine, the persistent doubts on the origins of the drugs supposedly seized from the accused-appellant, coupled with the failure to conduct an inventory and to take the photographs sans the presence of the required witnesses, as well as their non-justification of their blatant lapses, ultimately reveal an explicit compromise to the chain of custody. These instances, taken together, raise doubt as to the integrity of the confiscated items, and ultimately, the guilt of accused-appellant. Necessarily, this Court is constrained to overturn the conviction and acquit accused-appellant.
To close, it is well to remind all agencies and branches of government involved in stifling, if not extinguishing, the drug problem of this Court's emphatic statement in People v. Pagaduan: 63
We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that destroy families and relationships, and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much we want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the Constitution, most particularly the presumption of innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less than an acquittal. EDCTIa
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The August 13, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07476, which affirmed in toto the March 13, 2015 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 37, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Leandro Lacap y Bartolome is ACQUITTED for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for some other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation and is DIRECTED to REPORT the action he/she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 235467, August 20, 2018.
2.Rollo, pp. 22-23.
3. Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan, with Presiding Justice Romeo F. Barza (now retired) and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-21.
4. Penned by Presiding Judge Caesar C. Buenagua; records, pp. 15-26.
5. Records (Crim. Case No. 15601-2008-C), p. 1.
6. Records (Crim. Case No. 15602-2008-C), p. 1.
7. Records (Crim. Case No. 15603-2008-C), p. 1.
8. Records (Crim. Case No. 15598-2008-C), p. 1.
9. Order dated April 23, 2008, records (Crim. Case No. 15601-2008-C), p. 18; Order dated April 23, 2008, records (Crim. Case No. 15602-2008-C), p. 15; Order dated March 18, 2008, records (Crim. Case No. 15603-2008-C), p. 17.
10. Order dated June 23, 2008, records (Crim. Case No. 15598-2008-C), p. 44.
11. Pre-Trial Order dated August 11, 2008, id. at 53-54.
12. TSN, March 8, 2010, pp. 1-14.
13. TSN, October 4, 2010, pp. 1-15.
14. TSN, August 11, 2010, pp. 1-9.
15. Records, Criminal Case No. 15598-2008-C, p. 7.
16.Id. at 8.
17.Id. at 9.
18.Id. at 10.
19. TSN, April 2, 2014, pp. 1-8.
20. TSN, October 30, 2019, pp. 1-11.
21. TSN, November 5, 2019, pp. 1-8.
22. TSN, November 6, 2019, pp. 1-7.
23. Records, pp. 15-26.
24.Id. at 25-26. (Emphases in the original)
25. CA rollo, pp. 27-28.
26. Accused-Appellant's Brief, id. at 45-61.
27. Accused-Appellee's Brief, id. at 83-102.
28.Rollo, pp. 3-21.
29.Id. at 20. (Emphases in the original)
30. 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2). (Emphasis ours)
31. See People v. Cruz, 736 Phil. 564, 580 (2014).
32. See Ngo v. People, 478 Phil. 676, 680 (2004).
33. 824 Phil. 882, 892 (2018).
34. Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution, and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
35.People v. Unisa, 674 Phil. 89, 108 (2011).
36.Supra.
37. Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
38.People v. Arposeple, 821 Phil. 340, 361 (2017), citing People v. Minanga, 751 Phil. 240, 248 (2015).
39.People v. Guanzon, G.R. No. 233653, September 5, 2018.
40.People v. Calates, 829 Phil. 262, 269 (2018).
41.Id.
42.People v. Arposeple, supra note 38, at 362.
43. 799 Phil. 484, 492 (2016).
44. 624 Phil. 289, 304 (2010), citing People v. Garcia, 599 Phil. 416 (2009), People v. Gum-Oyen, 603 Phil. 665 (2009), People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165 (2009) and People v. Coreche, 603 Phil. 665 (2009).
45.People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1038 (2012).
46.People v. Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 225786, November 14, 2018.
47.People v. Goco, 797 Phil. 433, 441 (2016).
48. 630 Phil. 637, 649 (2010).
49. TSN, October 4, 2010, p. 4.
50. TSN, March 8, 2010, p. 5. (Emphases ours)
51. TSN, October 4, 2010, p. 7. (Emphases ours)
52. 634 Phil. 627, 642 (2010).
53. 741 Phil. 78, 94 (2014).
54. 588 Phil. 395 (2008).
55.Id. at 405.
56. TSN, October 4, 2010, p. 11.
57. 830 Phil. 385, 408-409 (2018). (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted)
58. Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. 9165 reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours)
59.People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019.
60. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018.
61. Appellee's Brief, CA rollo, p. 97.
62. 826 Phil. 981, 996 (2018).
63. 641 Phil. 432, 650-651 (2010).