SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 241946. September 7, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ELEVER JAEN y MORANTE, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Special Second Division, issued a Resolution dated07 September 2020which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 241946 (People of the Philippines v. Elever Jaen y Morante). —
Before the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration 1 (MR) dated December 17, 2019 filed by accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (Jaen) through the Public Attorney's Office and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 dated December 20, 2019 (Supplemental MR) filed by accused-appellant himself, from the Decision of the Court dated July 29, 2019 which affirmed the Court of Appeal's ruling that found him guilty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
In our July 29, 2019 Decision, we held:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07970 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with its concomitant accessory penalties under Article 41 of the same Code. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo the following amounts: (a) P75,000,00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000,00 as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Jaen is moving for the reconsideration of said Decision asserting that there is no direct evidence to prove that he was the perpetrator of the crime. The combination of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses did not provide sufficient circumstantial evidence that would warrant his conviction. SPO3 Freddie Cayot, Jr. (Cayot)'s testimony that he (Jaen) confessed to Cayot is unbelievable. Cayot's testimony was self-serving especially since the autopsy showed that the trajectory of the bullets could also pin the guilt on Cayot. Cayot's credibility as witness was also undermined by his actuations after the shooting. He only arrested Jaen hours after Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo (Manzo) was killed. If it was true that there were only three individuals inside the car — Jaen, Cayot and Manzo, and it was him (Jaen) who shot Manzo several times on the head, it is incomprehensible why he arrested Jaen only after several hours after Manzo's death. The logical thing to do was to stop the car, pull out the gun under his seat, go out of the vehicle and arrest Jaen. Instead, Cayot first drove to Manzo's residence, spent hours being interviewed by Manzo's relatives and brought Manzo to the hospital where he was declared dead, before he arrested Jaen. Furthermore, Jaen's statement "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko so inyo" is ambiguous. It could imply that he was not the perpetrator but he knows the latter's identity. It could have also meant that he was ready to reveal the identity of the perpetrator but was prevented by SPO3 Cayot. 3
In his Supplemental MR, Jaen asserts that when the circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, the one that is consistent with the innocence of the accused should be favored. 4
We GRANT the motion.
Upon second look at the circumstances of the case, we find that a reversal of our original ruling is in order.
It is basic that a successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime was committed would be of no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender's identity. 5
As we previously pointed out, the physical evidence and testimony on the bullet trajectory showed that it failed to establish with absolute certainty the relative position of the gun wielder. It did not foreclose the possibility that the gun wielder was positioned at the front, where Cayot, the lone eyewitness, was located.
The gun used in the killing is the service firearm officially issued to Cayot. There was no proof, or even a suggestion, that Cayot had given Jaen access to the said firearm. According to Cayot himself, he kept the gun in a bag and placed it under the driver's seat, away from plain view.
Cayot's actuations immediately after the incident, his claim that the victim committed suicide and that he slapped the accused twice for interrupting the conversation with the victim's family, also cast doubt on his credibility as a witness. As the third person who was inside the vehicle when the shooting incident happened, the courts a quo should have been more exacting of the scrutiny done on his testimony.
While it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, in order for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the following must be present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 6
The circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 7
As discussed above, the evidence presented does not completely preclude the possibility that another person perpetrated the crime. On the contrary, the prosecution evidence relied heavily on the testimony of the third person inside the vehicle, whose firearm was used in killing the victim and whose actuations immediately after the shooting incident are also suspect.
A slight doubt in the identity of the perpetrator of the crime should be resolved in favor of the accused. 8 For it is always better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. When the People's evidence fails to prove indubitable the accused's authorship of the crime of which they stand accused, it is the Court's duty — and the accused's right — to proclaim their innocence and grant an acquittal. 9
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated July 29, 2019 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante. He is accordingly ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Resolution and inform the Court of the date of the actual release from confinement of the appellant within live (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., dissenting:
I dissent. I maintain my position in the Decision 1 dated July 29, 2019 on the main finding accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (Jaen) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder based on the circumstantial evidence established in this case. Accordingly, the present Motion for Reconsideration 2 should not be granted.
Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. 3 It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence as case law has consistently recognized that it may even surpass the latter in weight and probative force. 4 In criminal cases, resort to circumstantial evidence is warranted in the absence of direct evidence implicating an accused for the crime charged. It is sufficient for conviction if there are sufficient circumstances, when proven and taken together, enough to create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime. 5 In this regard, it is well to stress that the determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test and not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 6 Hence, case law instructs that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is like a 'tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven.' Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture." 7
Circumstantial evidence based on the trial courts' factual findings are entitled to great weight and authority. The well-settled rule is that "[when there is] no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings of the trial court, [especially when] affirmed by the [Court of Appeals (CA)]. This is in line with the precept that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon Us. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below." 8 As held in Co Kiat v. CA: 9
It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and authority and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of facts being conclusive. 10
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, arrived at factual findings that point to the fact that Jaen was clearly responsible for the death of the victim, Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo (Manzo). The circumstances that establish Jaen's culpability were detailed as follows:
1. [SPO3 Freddie Cayot, Jr. (Cayot), Jaen, and the victim, Manzo,] were together that fateful night in a drinking session;
2. After the said drinking session, they left together in a car, [Cayot] drove, the victim was seated at the front passenger seat, and [Jaen] sat at the back;
3. White driving and nearing the house of the victim, [Cayot] heard near his ear a series of gunshots and saw smoke inside the car which caused him to immediately pull over;
4. While parked, [Cayot] asked [Jaen] what happened and where his gun [was,] to which [the latter] replied that the victim took his gun;
5. Simultaneously, [Cayot] saw blood dripping from the victim's head and panicked;
6. [Cayot and Jaen] brought the victim to the [latter's] house and informed the family that he committed suicide;
7. At that time, [Jaen] was fidgety. He suddenly interrupted and repeatedly exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo"[;]
8. When they brought the victim [to] the hospital, [Jaen] admitted that he was the one who shot the victim;
9. The victim's death was due to the gunshot wounds[;]
10. The gunshot wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the [posterior occipital region] of his head; [and]
11. The investigation disclosed that the shots were fired inside the vehicle and the assailant was positioned at the back seat and which was two (2) feet away from the victim. 11
Despite the foregoing, the majority still insists that the "physical evidence and testimony on the bullet trajectory showed that it failed to establish with absolute certainty the relative position of the gun wielder [which consequently,] did not foreclose the possibility that the gun wielder was positioned at the front, where Cayot, the lone eyewitness, was located." 12 In this relation, the majority points out that:
(a) the gun used in the killing was Cayot's service firearm which he kept in a bag and placed under the driver's seat, and that he never gave Jaen access to the same; and
(b) Cayot's actuations immediately after the incident, his claim that the victim committed suicide, and his act of slapping Jaen twice when the latter repeatedly exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" in front of Manzo's family, cast doubt on Cayot's credibility as the lone eyewitness. 13
However, it was clearly established during trial that although the service firearm was Cayot's, Jaen had actual knowledge of its whereabouts, and necessarily, had access to the same. As Cayot himself testified: (i) Jaen was inside the car when he placed his handgun inside the bag, and thereafter, tucked said bag under the driver's seat; 14 (ii) Jaen and Manzo went to the car ahead of him in order to start the engine; 15 and (iii) Jaen sat at the backseat, directly behind the driver's seat. 16 In this regard, as the Decision on the main explained, "at the time Jaen was already positioned at the back of the driver's seat and before Cayot entered the car, Jaen may have already taken the bag containing the handgun which was tucked underneath the driver's seat, thus, giving him access thereto." 17 Further, it was found that "neither Manzo nor Cayot discovered that Jaen already had the handgun, since Manzo was at the front passenger seat, and thus, could not see Jaen's actions at the back, while there was no showing that Cayot checked the whereabouts of his gun before driving his car." 18 Hence, considering the established fact that Jaen knew the whereabouts and had access to the murder weapon, it is of no moment that the firearm used by the latter to kill Manzo was Cayot's.
Anent the majority's qualms over Cayot's actuations immediately after the incident, it is well to reiterate that Cayot and Jaen are relatives. Because of their kinship, Cayot naturally attempted to make it appear that Manzo committed suicide; and thereafter, slapped Jaen whenever the latter exclaimed "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!," in an attempt to cover up his relative's criminal misdeeds. However, as explained in the Decision on the main, "it was only when Cayot had realized that he could no longer contain the truth that he made a turn-around and arrested Jaen." 19 Thus, while Cayot did initially attempt to fabricate a suicide story and silence Jaen when he was about to admit his crime in front of Manzo's family, he eventually relented to the truth and turned Jaen in as he could not continue covering up the latter's acts, much more run the risk of being tagged as a co-conspirator or accused of obstruction of justice.
At any rate, the evidence on record — consisting of the testimonies and reports of the forensic officer and the medico-legal officer who conducted the bullet trajectory examination on the incident and the autopsy, respectively — lead to no other conclusion than that the assailant was seated at the back seat, which in this case, was only Jaen.
It is well to reiterate that the forensic officer testified that "the possibility was around 80 to 90%" that the shooter was in the rear passenger seat. 20 On the other hand, the medico-legal officer's testimony established that there were six (6) entry wounds at the occipital/posterior region, i.e., lower back near the nape, of Manzo's head (with the corresponding exit wounds), 21 and that the entry wounds were classified as "distant wounds," being inflicted from a distance of approximately two (2) feet. 22In light of the foregoing evidence, it was virtually impossible for Cayot, the one driving the vehicle, to be able to angle the gun in such a way as to shoot Manzo at the nape area — all while driving a moving vehicle. 23 Further, even assuming arguendo that Cayot was able to angle the gun in such a way that the bullets would have hit Manzo's nape while he was seated in the driver's seat, still Cayot would be unable to create enough space to fire the gun at a distance of approximately two (2) feet from Manzo, so as to not create stippling or "powder tattooing" on the skin surrounding the entry wounds. 24
Verily, by these accounts, the ruling reached by the Court in the main Decision should remain. As borne from the evidence, it was factually impossible for Cayot, being the driver of the vehicle, to have shot Manzo. Also, suicide was ruled out as the cause of Manzo's death. As such, the only reasonable and judicious conclusion is that Jaen, being the sole passenger seated at the back of the vehicle, was the one responsible for shooting the victim. By turning a blind eye away from these factual findings determined by no less than the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, the majority's acquittal of Jaen based on a mistaken notion of "reasonable doubt" results into a serious and perpetual injustice to the family of the murdered hapless victim.
In fine, I vote to DENY the instant Motion for Reconsideration and AFFIRM the Decision dated July 29, 2019 on the main.
(SGD.) ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABESenior Associate Justice
CAGUIOA, J., concurring:
Accused-appellant Elever Jaen y Morante (accused-appellant) filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated December 17, 2019 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 dated December 20, 2019 seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of Murder in the Decision 3 dated July 29, 2019 (Assailed Decision) of the Court. The accused-appellant's Motion for Reconsideration was granted in the Court's Resolution dated September 7, 2020. 4 In reversing the conviction of the accused-appellant, the ponente ruled:
The circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
As discussed above, the evidence presented does not completely preclude the possibility that another person perpetrated the crime. On the contrary, the prosecution evidence relied heavily on the testimony of the third person inside the vehicle, whose firearm was used in killing the victim and whose actuations immediately after the shooting incident are also suspect.
A slight doubt in the identity of the perpetrator of the crime should be resolved in favor of the accused. For it is always better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. When the People's evidence fails to prove indubitable the accused's authorship of the crim[e] of which they stand accused, it is the Court's duty — and the accused's right — to proclaim their innocence and grant acquittal. 5
I concur with the ponente.
I write this Concurring Opinion to further strengthen and emphasize anew and in detail the reasons why the accused-appellant's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
To start, there were significant and glaring gaps in the testimony of the lone witness, SPO3 Freddie Cayot Jr. (SPO3 Cayot), as well as the other evidence presented by the prosecution. Verily, the prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence. It is well to emphasize that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is enshrined in no less than the Constitution. To overcome said presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. 6 Proof beyond reasonable doubt means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence must be duly taken into account. 7
While the Court is mandated to give due deference to a trial court's findings of fact and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, this rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. 8 In this case, the exception to the general rule applies as there are circumstances of great weight and substance, which if taken into consideration, would clearly create reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the lone witness, the weight of the other evidence presented by the prosecution, and corollary, the guilt of the accused-appellant.
In addition, the conclusion in the Assailed Decision that all the circumstances and pieces of evidence when taken together and not nitpicked individually paint the complete picture that it was the accused-appellant who was responsible for the victim's death to the exclusion of all others 9 is clearly misplaced. In this connection, the equipoise doctrine states that when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 10 Thus, faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the established doctrine that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scale in favor of the accused. 11 In the instant case, any reasonable mind would see that the prosecution was not able to fulfill the test of moral certainty needed to convict the accused-appellant. The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution do not paint a clear and complete picture that it was the accused-appellant who killed the victim to the exclusion of all others.
As stated in my Dissent to the Assailed Decision, the conviction of the accused-appellant is almost entirely premised on the statements made by the so-called "sole eyewitness" to the crime, SPO3 Cayot and the purported "circumstantial evidence" presented by the prosecution. 12 Indeed, while it is true that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove the guilt of an accused, the following requisites must however be present: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 13
The circumstances must be proved, and not presumed.
The Assailed Decision states that in the absence of direct evidence, the guilt of the accused may nevertheless be proven through circumstantial evidence if sufficient circumstances proven and taken together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime. 14 However, it is clear that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution do not create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that it was the accused-appellant — to the exclusion of all others — who killed the victim. Indeed, the evidence presented point to the possibility that another person, namely, SPO3 Cayot, who was in the same car when Jacob Eduardo Miguel O. Manzo (victim) was killed, was the person who murdered the victim.
The Assailed Decision further states that "[t]he peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular piece of evidence. They are like puzzle pieces which when put together reveal a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime." 15 The Assailed Decision also states that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is like a 'tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven.' Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture." 16
By the same standard adopted in the Assailed Decision, there are numerous pieces of the puzzle that evidently do not fit. Thus, it is not a matter of nitpicking or individually scrutinizing each strand of the tapestry — rather, an assessment of the whole picture as one that does not point to any clear and convincing conclusion that it was the accused-appellant who was the author of the crime.
I reiterate anew the reasons I stated in my previous Dissent why the numerous pieces of the puzzle simply do not fit and create a clear picture that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Stated differently, looking at all the strands of the tapestry, one is drawn to the conclusion that the author of the crime here is no other than SPO3 Cayot: 17
First, it was SPO3 Cayot's gun that was the alleged weapon of the crime. And the evidence on this point shows that the gun was kept inside a belt bag and hidden underneath the driver's seat. 18 Against this clear strand or evidence, what the Assailed Decision does is to surmise that it is "plausible" that the accused-appellant was able to take possession of the gun since he and the victim went ahead to the car to start the engine. 19 The Assailed Decision further states that it is "believable" that the victim could not have seen the accused-appellant take possession of the gun since the former was seated at the front passenger seat. 20 However, since the gun was placed underneath the driver's seat, it would be more logical to conclude that said gun would be nearer the front area of the car than the back. Thus, even if the victim was seated in front, he would have still surely noticed the accused-appellant reaching for the gun underneath the driver's seat from behind given the fact that they were in a small enclosed space where even the slightest movements would be noticeable.
In addition, SPO3 Cayot's testimony regarding the location of the gun before and after the killing seriously puts in doubt his credibility. As a police officer, one of SPO3 Cayot's first instincts should have been to look for the gun that was used to shoot the victim. It thus strains credulity that he would rely on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant that it was the victim who was holding the gun and then later on recant and say that he did not actually see the victim holding the gun — when, in fact, it was he who was beside the victim inside the car and, at the time he asked the accused-appellant regarding the gun, the car was no longer moving. 21 After the killing, he did not even bother to look for the gun and simply said that it was in the custody the Philippine National Police (PNP) — he did not even know how the gun was turned over to the PNP. 22
Second, the victim was shot six (6) times inside the car. SPO3 Cayot claims that he only heard three (3) gunshots near his ear 23 and, according to him, he "realized" what had happened only after the last shot had already been fired. This claim is simply unbelievable since the incident happened in a small enclosed space where even the slightest sounds could be heard. 24 In an attempt to explain away this logical understanding of the incredibility of SPO3 Cayot's assertion, what the Assailed Decision does is to "deduce" that the gunshots were fired in rapid succession, given the model of the firearm in question, i.e., a Beretta 9mm pistol, thereby giving SPO3 Cayot the smallest of a window of time to immediately react thereto. 25 However, even this "deduction" is not logical because a Beretta 9mm pistol is a double action, semi-automatic pistol. 26 Unlike a fully automatic pistol that has the capability to discharge the entire magazine load with a single pull of a trigger and thus its shots are continuous until the triggering device is disengaged, 27a semi-automatic pistol fires a single bullet each time the trigger is pulled — there is thus a pause in between each shot. Hence, it is highly improbable that SPO3 Cayot did not have any time to immediately react at the first shot, and for each successive shot. 28
If the shot was made by the accused-appellant, using a Beretta 9mm pistol, then SPO Cayot would have immediately stopped the car upon hearing the initial gunshot. And yet, SPO3 Cayot's first reaction, according to him, came only after the 6th shot, i.e., after the 6th pull on the trigger. This is incredible testimony and does not induce belief. And what was his first reaction according to him? It was to ask the accused-appellant where his gun was, and then drive to the house of the victim. How can this be believable?
The testimony of SPO3 Cayot that he did not see what transpired in the car because the car was moving is another tall tale. To be sure, SPO3 Cayot's version of the events borders on the absurd because, as he himself admitted, he was driving only at more or less 40 kilometers per hour. 29
Third, the exclamation of the accused-appellant, "Aaminin ko lahat. Sasabihin ko sa inyo!" in the presence of the family of the victim, 30 is equivocal and does not, to my mind, necessarily equate to an admission of his guilt. Rather, it could have been the precursor to him telling the family that it was SPO3 Cayot who had shot the victim. 31 This view is supported by the admitted fact that as he was beginning to say what truly happened, SPO3 Cayot immediately slapped him in the face and stopped him from further talking. 32 How can this action of SPO3 Cayot be viewed as anything but totally irregular, especially coming from a policeman? A more rational understanding of the behavior is that he was stopping the accused-appellant from pointing the finger at him.
Also, the alleged admission of the accused-appellant which the Court relied upon to convict him was an admission alleged or testified to by SPO3 Cayot as having been given to him by the former in isolation at the hospital. How can this testimony be not seen as the self-serving testimony that it is? 33 What's more, how can this one-sided version of SPO3 Cayot be believable when, prior to this supposed admission, the accused-appellant was trying to say something in front of the family — and he was stopped only by SPO3 Cayot himself? Thus, this "sudden" admission, which is SPO3 Cayot's yarn simply cannot be believed. 34
To maintain the conviction on the basis only of the story concocted by SPO3 Cayot, whose testimony is clearly incredible and illogical, is simply unjust.
Lastly, the other strands that do not fit into the tapestry of the Assailed Decision is that the physical evidence presented by the prosecution belied the story of SPO3 Cayot: 35
(1) The paraffin test conducted on the accused-appellant yielded negative results for the presence of gunpower nitrates.
(2) PO2 Albert Pedrano, the fingerprint examiner, testified that he had no means to determine the fingerprint that was found on the gun because he could not find any fingerprint data in their database of the accused-appellant as the former had no previous criminal record. However, this could not have been taken as evidence against the accused-appellant because the Court could have easily verified the fingerprints found on the gun since the accused-appellant was in custody and they could have simply just gotten his fingerprints and compared them to the ones on the gun. However, they did not do so.
(3) The forensic chemist Michael Angelo Tudlong (FC Tudlong), who conducted a bullet trajectory examination to determine the specific location where the shots were fired, concluded that: (1) the front passenger door and the windshield had been intentionally detached prior to his investigation, (2) there were bullet marks on the dashboard, glove compartment and front passenger door of the vehicle, (3) since the windshield was already gone, he could no longer accurately determine the specific location where the shooter fired the bullets that hit the dashboard and glove compartment, and (4) as regards the third bullet that hit the front passenger door of the vehicle, he concluded that the shooter was inside the vehicle when he fired the said bullet.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there are numerous tampered, missing, and misplaced puzzle pieces. Hence, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not reveal a convincing picture36 or unbroken chain37 pointing to the conclusion that the accused-appellant is the author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. This is reasonable doubt.
To recall, in criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt in order to justify a verdict of guilt. It is true that the law does not require absolute certainty, but only moral certainty. To be sure, the concept of moral certainty is subjective. But, in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 38 Indeed, the conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged. 39
However, in this case, even moral certainty is not present with regard to the guilt of the accused-appellant. It must be pointed out that the Assailed Decision relies on presumptions, assumptions, and deductions, such as: (1) that it is "plausible" that at the time the accused-appellant was already positioned at the back of the driver's seat and before the accused-appellant entered the car, the accused may have already taken the bag containing the handgun which was tucked underneath the driver's seat; 40 (2) that it is "believable" that neither victim nor SPO3 Cayot discovered that the accused-appellant already had the handgun, since the victim was at the front passenger seat, and thus could not see the accused-appellant's actions at the back; 41 (3) that it is "reasonable to deduce" that the gunshots were fired in rapid succession, thereby giving SPO3 Cayot the smallest of a window of time to immediately react thereto; 42 (4) that it is "highly probable" that it was only when SPO3 Cayot had realized that he could no longer contain the truth that he made a turn-around and arrested the accused-appellant, lest he be branded a co-conspirator to the crime; 43 and (5) that it is "highly improbable" that a person seated on the driver's seat, i.e., SPO3 Cayot, would angle the gun in such a way as to shoot the victim at the latter's nape area. 44 In regard to the last item, as admitted by the expert witness, there was a 10-20% chance that the assailant could have been seated in front. That the six (6) entry wounds are at the occipital or posterior region is not actually conclusive that the shooter was at the back. 45
Said presumptions, assumptions, and deductions, together with the fact that there is 10-20% doubt in the real identity of the assailant as stated by the expert witness presented by the prosecution, as well as the fact that it had been established that the front passenger door and the windshield of the car had been intentionally detached prior to forensic examination — all these show that the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Again, the application of the equipoise rule is triggered when there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Thus, when there is reasonable doubt, it is imperative that the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the accused. 46 To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to wrongful conviction of innocent men and the protective mantle accorded by the equipoise doctrine is defeated. As I said in my previous Dissent, if even an iota of doubt about the guilt of an accused is compelling enough to warrant an acquittal, then, with more reason, when uncertainty abounds. 47
Thus, given the foregoing reasons, I concur with the ponencia that the accused-appellant should be ACQUITTED.
(SGD.) ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOAAssociate Justice
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 67-73.
2.Id. at 74-80.
3.Id. at 67-69.
4.Id. at 78.
5.People v. Vargus y Ramos, 784 Phil. 144-157 (2016).
6.People v. Pangan, G.R. No. 193837, 795 SCRA 779, 799-790 (2016).
7.Id. at 790.
8.People v. Vargas y Ramos, 784 Phil. 144-157 (2016).
9.Id.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., dissenting:
1.Rollo, pp. 38-49.
2.Id. at 67-71.
3. See Almojuela v. People, 734 Phil, 636, 646 (2014).
4. See People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 26 (2004); citations omitted.
5. See Almojuela v. People, supra note 3, citing People v. de Quijano, G.R. No. 102045, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 66, 73-74.
6. See Planteras, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018; citations omitted.
7.Bacerra v. People, 812 Phil. 25, 38-39 (2017), citing People v. Ragon, 346 Phil. 772, 785 (1997).
8.Medina v. People, 760 Phil. 729, 740 (2015).
9. 265 Phil. 4 (1990).
10.Id. at 11, citing Macua v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 239 Phil. 37, 46 (1987); and Chan v. CA, 144 Phil. 678, 684 (1970).
11.Rollo, pp. 7-8.
12. See ponencia, p. 2.
13. See id.
14. See TSN, November 5, 2013, pp. 24-25.
15. See id. at 10.
16. See id. at 11.
17.Rollo, p. 45.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 46.
20.Id., citing TSN, April 29, 2014, pp. 19-20.
21.Id., citing TSN, December 17, 2013, pp. 9 and 11.
22.Id., citing TSN, December 17, 2013, pp. 9-10.
23.Id.
24. Id.
CAGUIOA, J., concurring:
1.Rollo, pp. 67-73.
2.Id. at 74-80.
3.Id. at 38-49. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe with Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (retired) and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring while Associate Justices Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa and Jose C. Reyes, Jr, with Dissenting Opinions.
4.Ponencia, p. 3.
5.Id.
6.People v. Mejia, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 & G.R. No. 119407, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 127, 155.
7.People v. Claro, G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 365, 380.
8.People v. Librias, G.R. No. 208067, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 213, 223.
9.Rollo, p. 47.
10.People v. Librias, supra note 8.
11.Id.
12.Rollo, p. 50.
13. RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
14.Rollo, p. 43; Almojuela v. People, G.R. 183202, June 2, 2014, 724 SCRA 293, 302, citing People v. Vda. de Quijano, G.R. No. 102045, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 66, 73-74.
15.Id., citing People v. Galvez, G.R. 157221, March 30, 2007, 519 SCRA 521, 541; emphasis and underscoring omitted.
16.Id. at 44; emphasis omitted.
17.Id. at 51.
18. TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot), p. 12.
19.Rollo, p. 45; italics supplied.
20.Id.
21.Id. at 53; TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot). pp. 21-23.
22. TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot). pp. 13-23.
23.Rollo, p. 53.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 45.
26.Id.; see Beretta, Pistols, accessed at <http://beretta.com/en/pistols/>.
27. Section 3.28, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10591 otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT," May 29, 2013.
28.Rollo, p. 54.
29. TSN, November 5, 2013 (SPO3 Cayot). p. 21.
30.Rollo, p. 55.
31.Id.
32.Id. at 46, 55.
33.Id. at 55.
34.Id.
35.Id. at 55-56.
36.Supra note 15.
37.Supra note 14.
38.People v. Pagaura, G.R. 95352, January 28, 1997, 267 SCRA 17, 24.
39.Daayata v. People, G.R. 205745, March 8, 2017, 820 SCRA 58, 75, citing People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324, 335 (1995).
40.Rollo, p. 45.
41.Id.
42.Id.
43.Id. at 46.
44.Id.
45.Id. at 57.
46.People v. Librias, supra note 8.