FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232041. July 6, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION], JESUSA ABAJA TERUEL, CATHERINE PORTIA PULMONES CORTEZA, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 6, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232041 (People of the Philippines, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan [Special Third Division, Jesusa Abaja Teruel, Catherine Portia Pulmones Corteza, et al.,Respondents.) — This Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assails both the Decision 2 dated 29 November 2016 and Resolution 3 dated 18 April 2017 of respondent Sandiganbayan in SB-08-CRM-0001, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Rudy C. Tesoro, et al." The Sandiganbayan acquitted private respondent Jesusa Ruby A. Teruel (Teruel) for the offense proscribed under Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
We note at the outset that this case arose from the same facts as those in G.R. No. 222257 4 entitled, Jesusa Ruby A. Teruel v. COA, where this Court, sitting en banc, ordered the revocation of Notice of Disallowance No. 2008-001-101 (03) issued by the Commission on Audit against the disbursement of the mobilization fee to Embrocal Builders, Inc. (Embrocal). For consistency, we quote the Resolution in relevant part:
On August 14, 2001, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Iloilo Field Office issued Office Order No. 51-01 to create the In-House Building Committee/Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) for the construction of the GSIS Iloilo Field Office (project), chaired by Angelo C. Grio (Grio). To render professional advice, Engineer Ruperto C. Gaite (Gaite) was employed as a consultant for the project.
On January 23, 2003, an invitation to bid for the construction of the project was posted in several public places, namely, Iloilo City Hall; Iloilo Provincial Capitol; Department of Education, Culture, and Sports-La Paz, Iloilo; and TTK Corporate Tower (GSIS Iloilo Office Building).
On February 19 and 24, and March 3, 2003, an Invitation to Prequalify to Bid was published in the Philippine Star. Nine contractors applied and submitted their qualification forms. On March 13, 2003, the BAC conducted the Pre-Qualification Proceedings and held Pre-Bid Conference on April 3 and 29, 2003, to discuss the terms of reference for the conduct of the bidding. All the parties conformed to the terms of reference. Accordingly, Bid Bulletin No. 1 dated April 29, 2003 was issued with the following terms of reference:
1. Submission of [the] bids will be until 10:00 AM [of] 16 May 2003; x x x
6. PD [No.] 1594 (as amended) and RA [No.] 9184 shall apply in this bidding unless otherwise stated;
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8. Any bid higher than the approved budget, or 15% lower than the [Approved Agency Estimate] AAE (to be posted on the date of bidding) will be deemed non-responsive, and will be rejected; and
9. The GSIS will make an award based on the most advantageous bid received in favor of the GSIS but it does not guarantee that an award will be made.
On September 1, 2003, eight (8) out of nine (9) contractors were pre-qualified. On September 4, 2003, Bid Bulletin No. 2 was issued with the following matters:
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Approved Budget: P57,000,000.00
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2. Submission of [the] bids will be until 2:00 PM [of] 19 September 2003 x x x;
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7. PD [No.] 1594 and RA [No.] 9184 will apply to this bidding unless otherwise stated; and
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9. Any Bid higher than the Approved Budget or 10% lower than the Approved Agency Estimate (AA) will be rejected.
Several days thereafter, on September 11, 2003, Bid Bulletin No. 3 was issued:
1. This Bid Bulletin together with the previous bulletins (unless otherwise superseded) will form an integral part of the Bid Documents;
2. If there are conflict between the bulletins, the latter bulletin will prevail; [and]
3. RA [No.] 9184 and its implementing rules will apply to this bidding.
On the opening of bids on September 19, 2003, upon the advice of Gaite, the BAC set the contingency percentage of five percent (5%) of the revised AAE of P59,849,966.92 and fixed a ten percent (10%) lower/floor limit of P53,864,970.22 as per condition set in Bid Bulletin No. 2. Accordingly, before the opening of the bids, the BAC informed the bidders of the value of the lower limit.
Of the eight (8) pre-qualified bidders, only four (4) submitted bids, thus:
|
Name of Bidder |
Amount of Bids |
|
1. Embrocal Buildings, Inc. (Embrocal) |
P55,350,000.00 |
|
2. Henry S. Oaminal Construction, Inc. (Oaminal) |
51,307,146.30 |
|
3. F. Gurrea Construction, Inc. (Gurrea) |
53,503,013.33 |
|
4. Nelson S. Lee Construction (Lee) |
55,125,000.00 |
Of the four (4) bids, the BAC rejected outright the bids of Oaminal and Gurrea because their bids were below the lower limit of the floor price of P53,864,970.22.
Subsequently, on October 10, 2003, the BAC disqualified Lee for incurring a negative slippage of fifteen percent (15%) in the construction of the GSIS Cebu City Branch Office, leaving Embrocal as the sole qualified bidder.
On November 4, 2003 the BAC issued Resolution No. 1, series of 2003, recommending to Senior Vice President (SVP) for Field Operations Group, Rudy S. Tesoro (SVP Tesoro), the award of the contract to Embrocal.
On even date, GSIS issued the Notice of Award in favor of Embrocal, signed by Vice President Mateo E. Basa, Jr. (VP Basa Jr.) and SVP Tesoro.
Also on the same day, to culminate the award of the bidding process, GSIS, through SVP Tesoro and Embrocal, through its President, Edgardo M. Brocal (President Brocal), entered into a Contract for the Construction (Contract) of the GSIS Iloilo Office. Attached to the Contract were other documents, including the Notice to Proceed.
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To commence the execution of the project, Embrocal requested from [Teruel] the release of the mobilization fee equivalent to the stipulated thirty percent (30%) of the contract price. [Teruel] referred the letter request with a notation to release the mobilization fee to Embrocal. Thus, the Administrative Division and Finance Division issued an undated unnumbered Disbursement Voucher for the amount of P8,302,500.00, representing the mobilization fee, inclusive of taxes. Accordingly, Land Bank Check No. [00000227008] dated November 25, 2003, in the amount of P7,430,737.50, net of taxes, was issued to Embrocal on November 27, 2003.
Meanwhile, in response to the BAC decision rejecting their bids, Gurrea and Oaminal sent protest letters to the former for the inconsistencies in its bid bulletins. Gurrea and Oaminal averred that the BAC caused confusion as to which law or laws would apply to the bidding process. Gurrea and Oaminal disputed the BAC's error in rejecting their bids on the ground that their bids were lower than the ten percent (10%) limit of the approved agency estimate, when their bids were compliant with R.A. No. 9184, which did not provide for any low ceiling. 5
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Gurrea and Oaminal's protests eventually led to the conduct of an investigation and the issuance of a report finding irregularities on the conduct of the bidding. On the basis of this report, administrative and criminal actions were instituted against SVP Tesoro, VP Basa, Teruel, and the rest of the members of the BAC (collectively "accused"). 6
On 10 June 2004, an Affidavit-Complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. 7 Accused were indicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the case docketed as SB-08-CRM-0001. The Sandiganbayan found probable cause to hold them for trial. Accordingly, an Order of Arrest dated 19 June 2008 was issued. 8 Teruel and her co-accused, save for SVP Tesoro, 9 voluntarily surrendered and posted respective cash bonds and, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 10
The prosecution claimed that by providing and applying the 10% lower limit not allowed under R.A. No. 9184, accused caused the disqualification of the bidder with the lowest bids and the award of the Contract to the bidder with the highest bid. This, in turn, caused GSIS to be obligated to pay an additional P4,042,853.70 for the same project, to the damage and prejudice of the Government. According to the prosecution, accused's "persistent reliance" 11 on the applicability of P.D. No. 1594, despite the enactment of R.A. No. 9184, is tantamount to gross inexcusable negligence, if not evident bad faith. The defense, on the other hand, maintained that the application of a lower limit was not prohibited under P.D. No. 1594, which was still in effect during the inception of the whole bidding process.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 29 November 2016, issued its Decision acquitting accused of the offense charged. 12 The dispositive portion of this Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Court finds that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Jesusa Ruby A. Teruel, Catherine Portia P. Corteza, Adelaida J. Jamontoc, Jose Ma. C. Capalla, and Lita L. Sonalan, and consequently ACQUITS them of the offense under Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
There being no basis for a finding of civil liability, none is adjudged against the accused. Let the bond posted for the provisional liberty of accused Teruel, Corteza, Jamantoc, Capalla, and Sonalan, be returned to them, subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures of the Court. The Hold Departure Order issued against them is likewise lifted.
The case against accused Rudy C. Tesoro, considering that he remains at large, is in the meantime sent to the archive in order that the case may not appear in the records as pending for [an] indefinite period of time. This is without prejudice on the part of the Ombudsman to prosecute him as soon as the accused is apprehended.
SO ORDERED. 13
The Sandiganbayan found, based on the evidence presented, that the first Invitation to Pre-Qualify and Bid was issued on 25 January 2003, or before R.A. No. 9184 took effect on 26 January 2003. 14 Thus, it held that P.D. No. 1594 governed the subject bidding, pursuant to this Court's ruling in Abaya v. Ebdane, 15 which ruled that the determining factor of the applicable law depends on the date of date of issuance of the advertisement or invitation to bid.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration. 16 This was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution 17 dated 18 April 2017, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration dated December 16, 2016 for (1) being violative of the principle against double jeopardy; and (2) lack of merit and/or for being pro forma. 18
Hence, this Petition alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it issued the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of the Court: 1) whether or not the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily and capriciously refused to perform its duty of weighing all the evidence on record, and with bias and prejudice, merely relied on the allegations of the defense; and 2) whether or not the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily exercised its judicial power when it acquitted respondents despite prosecution having proved, beyond reasonable doubt, evident bad faith and unwarranted benefit. 19
Ruling of the Court
We DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
First. The general rule is that a judgment of acquittal rendered after trial on the merits shall be immediately final and unappealable because further prosecution will place the accused in double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sandiganbayan may, however, be assailed without violating the proscription against double jeopardy via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This can only be made on narrow grounds established in jurisprudence, that is, on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process. Both imply an invalid or otherwise void judgment which, if established, causes a judgment of acquittal to be considered void and thereby legally inexistent and will not have the effect of an acquittal. 20
In People v. Sandiganbayan and Juan Roberto Abling (Abling), 21 we held:
x x x Unlike in an appeal, this remedy does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits, an examination of evidence and a determination of its probative value, or an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. Judicial review in certiorari proceedings shall be confined to the question of whether the judgment for acquittal is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. The court will look into the decision's validity — if it was rendered by a court without jurisdiction or if the court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction — not on its legal correctness. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. More specifically, to prove that an acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner must show that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. 22
As in Abling, this Court finds that petitioner failed to meet the criteria required in availing the exceptional legal remedy of certiorari. There is nothing in the Petition which avers that petitioner's right to due process was violated or that the trial before the court a quo was a sham. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the crime charged and the prosecution had its day in court and adduced its evidence. There was no allegation of collusion between the prosecutor and respondents. The anti-graft court analyzed the evidence of the parties and made its findings and conclusions based therein. 23
Moreover, Our review of the records and pleadings shows that petitioner's arguments are, at their core, challenges to the Sandiganbayan's appreciation of evidence. Errors of judgment, however, are not the province of certiorari proceedings; the extraordinary writ of certiorari may only correct errors of jurisdiction. 24
Petitioner's claim of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in acquitting Teruel is all the more negated when one considers the fact that this Court would itself arrive at the same conclusion in a related case. In G.R. No. 222257, which was decided on 09 August 2019, this Court was asked to resolve the issue of whether the Commission on Audit (COA) was correct in issuing a Notice of Disallowance against disbursements made by respondents arising from the same procurement subject of this case. As the basis for the disallowance was the purported irregularity in the procurement process, the Court in G.R. No. 222257 necessarily had to settle the issue of which between P.D. No. 1594 or R.A. No. 9184 applied to the subject procurement. Thus:
Government procurement and construction contracts have always been a challenging enterprise. They are prone to corruption, leaving taxpayers at the losing end. Thus, the general policy is to conduct public bidding for government procurements and construction contracts. Designed to protect the public interest by giving the best possible advantages, bidders compete to offer the best possible reduced price, curtailing corruption in the process. In the end, the open competition precludes suspicion of favouritism and anomalies in the execution of public contracts.
To ensure the public bidding principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and accountability are implemented, the government agency must comply with specific procedural requirements. Among these is to level the field for all interested bidders by informing them of the necessary details in the invitation to bid and allowing bidders ample time to prepare their offers. The government must advertise the invitation to bid in a prescribed manner and the time when the advertisement was posted would serve as the reckoning point as to which law shall apply to the procurement process.
The two laws subject of the controversy are P.D. No. 1594 and R.A. No. 9184. P.D. No. 1594 took effect on June 11, 1978, while R.A. No. 9184 was made into law on January 26, 2003. Clearly, since the invitation to bid was first posted in January 23, 2003, during the effectivity of P.D. No. 1594, such law unequivocally applies.
Assuming arguendo that the January 23, 2003 advertisement is void, and the invitations to bid were published on February 19 and 24, and March 3, 2003, x x x law and jurisprudence still dictate the application of P.D. No. 1594.
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It is a well-settled tenet that a law or regulation has no retroactive application, unless it expressly provides for retroactivity. Again, and as extensively discussed above, the Court, to the point of being redundant, reiterates that since R.A. No. 9184 was put into law subsequent to the posting of the invitation to bid, the aforesaid law cannot be applied retroactively.
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A scrutiny of the provisions of the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 spells absolute certainty of the applications of P.D. No. 1594.
The Transitory Clause carved in Sec. 11.1 of the IRR categorically states that the reckoning period shall be the date when the advertisement or invitation to bid was issued. Section 77.1 of the IRR reads:
Section 77. Transitory Clause. —
77.1. In all procurement activities, if the advertisement or invitation for bids was issued prior to the effectivity of the Act, the provisions of E.O. 40 and its IRR, P.D. No. 1594 and its IRR, R.A. [No.] 7160 and its IRR, or other applicable laws, as the case may be, shall govern.
While the succeeding invitations to bid were posted at the time R.A. No. 9184 was already in effect, the reckoning point remains the date of the first issuance of the bid: January 23, 2003.
As if to set the rule in stone, the mandate to apply P.D. No. 1594 on advertisements or invitations to bid that were issued during the effectivity of R.A. No. 9184, but before the issuance of the IRR, is scribed in the succeeding proviso, which reads:
77.2. In cases where the advertisements or invitations for bids were issued before the effectivity of this IRR, Procuring Entities may continue adopting the procurement procedures, rules, and regulations provided in the [Revised] IRR [of 2009] or other applicable laws, as the case may be.
The factual circumstances square within the ambit of Sec. 77.2 of the IRR. In the case at bar, the first invitation to bid was posted prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9184 and the succeeding invitations were published during the effectivity of R.A. No. 9184, but before the issuance of the IRR. Pursuant to Sec. 77.2 of the IRR, therefore, the procuring entity has the option whether to apply P.D. No. 1594, the law in effect during the publication of the bid or the subsequent IRR. Otherwise stated, the BAC has the option whether to continue adopting the rules of P.D. No. 1594 or the procedure laid down in R.A. No. 9184. In this case, it is clear that the BAC chose to adopt the regulations in P.D. No. 1594.
As proof of its decision in electing to apply P.D. No. 1594, the BAC reiterated, in not one but in two bid bulletins, dated April 29, 2003 and September 4, 2003, respectively, and in a pre-bid conference bulletin, dated April 3, 2003, the undisputable application of the aforesaid law. While the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the third bid bulletin's statement of applying R.A. No. 9184, the Court deems that the same was just a matter of oversight on the part of the BAC; for what is conclusive is the decision of the BAC during the pre-procurement conference, which in this case, is P.D. No. 1594. Any change from then on was inconsequential. To change the governing law days before the opening of the bid would unduly delay the bidding and would require the BAC to recommence the whole process and start all over again.
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Finally, given that P.D. No. 1594 applies, the rule on disclosure of relations and prohibition on imposing a minimum allowable bid equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the AAE enforced in R.A. No. 9184 are not applicable. Hence, [Teruel] cannot be faulted for non-compliance thereof, and the subsequent failure to follow the aforesaid rules prescribed in R.A. No. 9184 did not result in any irregularity that would warrant a disallowance of the mobilization fee.25 [Emphases supplied.]
The Court, in G.R. No. 222257, like the Sandiganbayan, reached the exact same conclusion, that is, P.D. No. 1594, and not R.A. No. 9184, was the applicable law. 26 The Sandiganbayan thus cannot be faulted for gravely abusing its discretion any more than this Court could.
In fact, and following this Court's pronouncement in the recent case of People v. Camenforte, 27 the Court's finding in G.R. No. 222257 is a determination of a "prejudicial question" which necessarily forecloses the prosecution of the pending criminal cases inasmuch as the criminal charge against Teruel for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 rests entirely on R.A. No. 9184 being the law governing the subject procurement:
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In sum, the prejudicial factual finding of genuineness of the Sps. Granda's signatures on the questioned Deeds of Sale in Civil Case No. 2001-09-135 must operate to bar the prosecution of the respondents for the falsification of the same signatures on the same questioned Deeds of Sale. This is the heart of the doctrine of a prejudicial question, without the appreciation of which the application of said doctrine may never come to be.
Finally, petitioner's submission that he must be allowed to present new evidence in order to establish the allegation of forgery which was already conclusively found as without basis in Civil Case No. 2001-09-135 is to completely render nugatory the very premise of a prejudicial question, for one, and the value of finality of judgments, for another.
Chiefly, the doctrine of a prejudicial question serves the following purposes: (i) to avoid multiplicity of suits; (ii) avoid unnecessary litigation; (iii) avoid conflicting decisions; (iv) safeguard the rights of the accused; and (v) unclog the courts' dockets. Therefore, if petitioner is allowed to effectively relitigate a point of prejudicial fact already tried and found by another court in a civil case, and which has, in this case, already attained finality, then the above purposes of the doctrine of a prejudicial question will be wholly defeated. 28
Further, In Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, 29 We explained:
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude — by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," — the re-litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. However, the dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist.
Indeed, absolution from an administrative case does not necessarily bar a criminal case from proceeding and vice versa. While proceedings on the disallowance before the COA are distinct and separate from criminal cases filed before the Sandiganbayan, 30 if, as in this case, the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence will be a futile and useless exercise. 31
The criminal charge against Teruel for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 rests entirely on R.A. No. 9184 being the law governing the subject procurement. The Court in G.R. No. 222257 has squarely ruled that P.D. No. 1594, and not R.A. No. 9184, is the applicable. Consequently, we find that the prosecution's basis for Teruel's criminal indictment (conditioned as it is on the applicability of R.A. No. 9184) has been sufficiently negated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 29 November 2016 and Resolution dated 18 April 2017 rendered by the Sandiganbayan in SB-08-CRM-0001 are AFFIRMED.
It appearing that the copies of the Resolutions dated July 15, 2020 and October 14, 2020 sent to Atty. Gabriel Francisco A. Ramirez, Jr., counsel for respondents Cortez and Capalla, at No. 39-O Pugad Lawin Drive, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, 1116 Quezon City, were both returned to this Court on January 13, 2021 unserved with postal notation "RTS-unknown addressee" and on February 24, 2021 unserved with postal notation: "RTS-Unknown addressee," respectively, the Court resolves to CONSIDER said copies of resolutions as SERVED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 8-45.
2.Id. at 49-70; penned by Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires (now Ombudsman and a former member of this Court) with Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz, concurring.
3.Id. at 73-80; penned by Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, with Associate Justices Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Alex L. Quiroz, concurring.
4. 06 August 2019 (Resolution).
5. G.R. No. 222257, 06 August 2019, Most of these were also subject of stipulations made by the parties before the Sandiganbayan (Rollo, pp. 94-126).
6.Rollo, p. 53.
7.Id. at 53-54.
8.Id. at 54.
9. Who remains at large.
10.Rollo, p. 54.
11.Id. at 66.
12.Id. at 49-70.
13.Id. at 69.
14.Id. at 63.
15. 544 Phil. 645 (2007), G.R. No. 167919, 14 February 2007 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.].
16.Rollo, pp. 81-91.
17.Id. at 73-80.
18.Id. at 80.
19.Id. at 23.
20.People v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division], 681 Phil. 90 (2012), G.R. No. 153304-05, 07 February 2012 [Per J. Brion].
21. 818 Phil. 843 (2017), G.R. No. 198119, 27 September 2017 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].
22.Abling, supra.
23. See People v. Sandiganbayan and Belac (Belac), 524 Phil. 496 (2006), G.R. No. 168188-89, 16 June 2006 [Per J. Callejo].
24.Abling, supra and Belac, supra.
25.Teruel v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 222257, [Resolution], 06 August 2019. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
26. This ruling became final on 19 November 2019, when the Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
27. G.R. No. 220916, 14 June 2021 [Per J. Caguioa]. *note approved for release; awaiting promulgation.
28.People v. Camenforte, supra.
29. 559 Phil. 622 (2007), G.R. Nos. 140656 & 154482, 13 September 2007 [Per J. Tinga]. Emphasis supplied.
30.Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 190 (2016), G.R. Nos. 212014-15, 212427-28, 212694-95, 212794-95, 213477-78, 213532-33, 213536-37 & 218744-59, 06 December 2016 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe] citing Reyna v. Commission on Audit, 657 Phil. 209 (2011), G.R. No. 167219, 08 February 2011 [Per J. Peralta].
31.People v. Sandiganbayan and Basco, 637 Phil. 147 (2010), G.R. No. 164577, 05 July 2010 [Per J. Mendoza]. See also Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 223972, 03 November 2020 [Per J. Caguioa].