SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225329. September 11, 2017.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs. ALLAN HILADO Y NARGA, appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated11 September 2017which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 225329 (People of the Philippines v. Allan Hilado y Narga). — Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated July 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06521 which affirmed with modification as to the damages awarded in the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in the morning of June 2003, AAA's mother was doing laundry at a neighbor's house when Hilado called her to look after his child who was supposedly crying. AAA went to Hilado's house but decided to leave when she saw that the child was not crying. On her way out, AAA was called by Hilado, saying that he will whisper something to her. When AAA approached him, Hilado pulled her shoulder sleeves, brought her inside his house, and closed the door. AAA was not able to do anything because he threatened her not to shout or tell anyone about it, or else he would kill her. Hilado then took his clothes off, and undressed AAA, who was frightened and cowed into tears. Hilado started kissing AAA's lips down to her vagina, held her arms and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA knew that he inserted his penis in her vagina because it felt painful. Thereafter, Hilado stood up, kissed AAA all over again and threatened to kill her if she speaks of the incident to anyone. Out of fear, it was only on October 18, 2003 that AAA told her uncle about the incident, and then to the barangay and the police. After conducting a medico-legal examination of AAA on October 24, 2003, Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Mamerto Bernabe concluded that she is "in non-virgin state physically" and "there are no external signs of application of any form of trauma. He also noted that AAA's hymen has shallow healed laceration at 7 o'clock position.
On November 17, 2004, appellant Hilado was charged with rape for having sexual intercourse with AAA, 3 the 14-year-old daughter of his common-law wife in an Information, which reads:
Upon arraignment on March 14, 2005, Hilado, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.
During the pre-trial conference on July 4, 2005, the parties stipulated on the court's jurisdiction, Hilado's identity as the accused, his personal knowledge of AAA, and the fact that she is the minor daughter of his common-law wife. During trial, the prosecution proffered the testimonies of the victim AAA and PCI Bernabe, who conducted a medico-legal examination on AAA, as well as the documentary evidence consisting of AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay, the Medico-Legal Report, and AAA's Birth Certificate. On the other hand, the defense presented only the testimony of Hilado.
Raising the defenses of denial and alibi, Hilado claimed that in the morning of June 14, 2003, he was at home helping his wife with the laundry, while AAA was with her aunt in the neighborhood. Thereafter, he collected garbage in Pasig, Taguig and Makati in the afternoon, and returned home at around 12:00 midnight. He surmised that AAA filed a rape case against him for having previously slapped her five (5) times, and having fought with her mother.
On June 25, 2013, the RTC found Hilado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A and B of the Revised Penal Code, (RPC) as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, 4 in relation to R.A. No. 7610. 5
The RTC stressed that AAA was unwavering and straightforward in her testimony. The RTC ruled that denial like alibi is inherently weak, and cannot prevail over the positive identification provided by a credible eyewitness like AAA.
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed an appeal.
In the assailed Decision dated July 3, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal, and affirmed the Decision of the RTC with modification as to the damages awarded.
The CA found that the element of carnal knowledge was established by AAA's testimony when she positively identified Hilado as the perpetrator, and narrated the rape incident in a consistent, steadfast, detailed and straightforward manner.
Thus, the instant appeal.
The appeal is denied for lack of merit.
The elements of qualified rape as defined under paragraph 1, Article 266-A 6 and penalized under paragraph 1, Article 266-B 7 of the RPC, as amended, are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. 8
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the elements of qualified rape were alleged in the information and proved beyond reasonable doubt. Hilado himself admitted during the pre-trial 9 and the trial 10 that AAA is the daughter of his common-law wife (Anak-anakan) and that AAA's birth certificate 11 shows that she was only 14 years old when Hilado had sexual intercourse with her. Sexual congress and the absence of consent were likewise established through the consistent, steadfast, detailed and straightforward testimony of AAA on how Hilado had carnal knowledge of her sometime in June 2003.
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect, more so if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. 12 Said findings are generally binding upon the Court, unless there is a clear showing that they were reached arbitrarily or it appears from the records that certain facts of weight, substance or value are overlooked, misapprehended or misappreciated by the lower court which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. 13 aScITE
The Court finds nothing to show that the RTC and the CA committed any error in their findings of fact and conclusions of law. The CA agreed with the RTC that AAA positively identified Hilado as the perpetrator, and she narrated the rape incident in a consistent; steadfast, detailed and straightforward manner.
AAA cannot be faulted for her failure to resist or shout for help while she was being kissed and raped by Hilado. Anent her failure to report the incident to her mother, suffice it to state that AAA testified that she got frightened because Hilado already threatened her. 14 Neither the presence or use of deadly weapon nor the employment of physical violence by the accused upon the victim is essential to a finding that force or intimidation existed at the time the rape was committed. 15 Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exerted upon the victim who submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for her loved one's lives and safety. 16 It is also not necessary that the intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted, for it is enough that such intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Nonetheless, the presence of intimidation was proved through the credible testimony of AAA that Hilado threatened to kill her if she would shout or make any scandal, and if she would report the incident to anyone. 17 It is not amiss to state that in cases where the rape is committed by a close kin such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother — as in this case where Hilado is the common-law spouse of AAA's mother — it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. 18
Moreover, there being no evidence to show of any improper motive why prosecution witness AAA should testify falsely against Hilado or implicate him in a serious offense, her testimony deserves faith and credit. At any rate, family resentment, revenge or feud have never prevented the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a rape victim, especially a minor, who remained clear and consistent throughout her direct and cross-examinations that she was sexually abused. 19
Also, the fact that the medico-legal officer noted no external signs of trauma in AAA's vagina and found her to be in a non-virgin state physically, does not negate the commission of rape. In the crime of rape, the testimony of the victim, and not the findings of the medico-legal officer, is the most important element to prove that the felony had been committed. 20 Insofar as the evidentiary weight of the medical examination is concerned, it is settled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible. 21 Whether the victim was a virgin or not at the time of the rape is also irrelevant because virginity is not an element of rape. 22
Against the affirmative testimony of AAA that he raped her, Hilado merely raises the defenses of denial and alibi. Being a self-serving negative evidence which can be easily fabricated, the defense of denial is inherently weak 23 and cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters. 24 Thus, Hilado's bare denial cannot prevail over the positive identification and declaration made by AAA.
As to the penalty for qualified rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, Article 266-B (1) of the RPC provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age, and the offender is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Applying R.A. No. 9346, 25 the RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, but it should be specified that it is without eligibility for parole. This is pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC which states that "[w]hen circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the qualification 'without eligibility for parole' shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346."
Finally, the modified damages awarded by the CA are in accord with People v. Jugueta. 26 In cases of qualified rape where the imposable penalty is death but the same is reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. No. 9346, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages are fixed at P100,000.00 each. 27 Equally in order is the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from finality of this resolution until fully paid. 28 HEITAD
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 06521, finding appellant Allan Hilado y Narga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape as defined by Article 266-A and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 each, plus legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that he shall be ineligible for parole.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring,
2. Penned by Presiding Judge Ruth C. Santos.
3. In line with the Courts ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 426, citing Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children, Sec. 40, Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise Known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act," the real name of the rape victim will not be disclosed.
4. Known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."
5. Known as "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
6. ART. 266-A.Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed — 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of thee following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
If committed by a parent against his child under eighteen (18) years of age, the rape is qualified under paragraph 1, Article 266-B of the same Code, viz.:
7. ART. 266-B.Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
l. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
8.People v. Lagbo, G.R. No. 207535, February 10, 2016, 784 SCRA 1, 11, citing People v. Colentava, G.R. No. 190348, February 9, 2015, 750 SCRA 165, 178; and People v. Candellada, 713 Phil. 623, 635 (2013).
9. Records, p. 34, Pre-Trial Order.
10. TSN, September 12, 2011, p. 7.
11.Id. at 20. Exhibit "C" and "C-1".
12.People v. Lagbo, supra note 8.
13.People v. Tuboro, G.R. No. 220023, August 8, 2016.
14. TSN, January 23, 2006, p. 18.
15.People v. Galagati, G.R. No. 207231, June 29, 2016.
16.Id.
17. TSN, November 21, 2005, pp. 17-18.
18.People v. Padua, 661 Phil. 366, 370 (2011).
19.People v. Miclat, Jr., 435 Phil. 561, 581 (2002).
20.People v. Tamano, 652 Phil. 214, 232 (2010).
21.Id.
22.People v. Miclat, Jr., supra note 19, at 581.
23.People v. An, 612 Phil. 476, 491 (2009).
24.People v. Tuboro, supra note 13.
25. Known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines."
26. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.
27.People v. Galagati, supra.
28.Id.