THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249159. September 13, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.KRISTINE GUTLAY y ZAMORANOS, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 13, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249159 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. KRISTINE GUTLAY y ZAMORANOS, accused-appellant). — When confronted with unjustified deviations from the requirements of the chain of custody rule in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, convictions cannot be sustained.
This Court resolves the Appeal 1 from the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 affirming the Regional Trial Court's conviction 3 of Kristine Gutlay y Zamoranos (Gutlay) of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
In an Information, Gutlay was charged with violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information reads:
"That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 1, 2012, in Barangay Bari, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally possess, sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer policeman two (2) transparent plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing 0.082 and 0.013 gram in exchange for One Thousand Pesos (PhP1,000.00), Philippine Currency, without authority to do so."
Contrary to Section 5, Article II, [Republic Act No.] 9165. 4
When arraigned, Gutlay pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. 5
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Chief Inspector Emelda B. Roderos (PCI Roderos); (2) Police Officer I Vicente G. Biala, Jr. (PO1 Biala); and (3) and Police Officer II Junas Sembrano (PO2 Sembrano). 6
PO1 Biala testified that on May 1, 2012, he received a tip from an informant claiming that Gutlay was selling illegal drugs in a sari-sari store in Barangay Bari, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Police Superintendent Mateo Cera Casupang (P/Supt. Casupang) then coordinated with the Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in La Union. Thereafter, P/Supt. Casupang formed a buy-bust team with PO1 Biala, PO2 Sembrano, PO1 Dante Mangonon (PO1 Mangonon), and Police Senior Inspector Rizalino B. Suarez (PSI Suarez). PO1 Biala prepared two P500.00 bills as buy-bust money. 7
On the same day, at 4:00 p.m., the buy-bust team proceeded to the area, stopping by the house of Barangay Kagawad Rodrigo Dante (Kagawad Dante) to inform him that they were about to conduct a buy-bust operation requiring his presence. Kagawad Dante went with the team. Once in the target area, the informant approached Gutlay and introduced PO1 Biala as a prospective buyer. Gutlay then asked PO1 Biala how much he wanted to buy, to which PO1 Biala responded by saying he would purchase P1,000.00 worth of shabu. Thereafter, Gutlay took two plastic sachets from her pocket and handed them to PO1 Biala. In exchange, PO1 Biala gave the two P500.00 bills. PO1 Biala then hold Gutlay's right hand, the pre-arranged signal, indicating that the sale had been consummated. The other police officers arrested Gutlay and informed her of her rights. PO1 Biala recovered the buy-bust money and marked the two plastic sachets with "VGB2" and "VGB3." Kagawad Dante, as a witness, signed the inventory receipt prepared by PO1 Biala. 8
After their operation, the team brought Gutlay to the police station. PO1 Biala remained in custody of the seized plastic sachets until these were turned over to Senior Police Officer II Reynaldo Q. Navarro (SPO2 Navarro) for recording in the police blotter and taking of photographs. SPO2 Navarro turned over the two plastic sachets to PO1 Gerald R. Petilla (PO1 Petilla) for the preparation of the Police Report, Joint Affidavit of Arrest, and request for laboratory examination. Finally, PO1 Petilla returned the plastic sachets to PO1 Biala who delivered the plastic sachets and the request to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 9
PO2 Sembrano, who served as a backup for the buy-bust team, corroborated PO1 Biala's testimony. 10
PCI Roderos, forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, testified receiving two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from PO1 Biala. She examined the content of the sachets and found that it tested positive for shabu. 11
The defense presented Gutlay and her sister-in-law Lordeliza Maza (Maza). Gutlay denied the allegations against her. She recounted that at around 4:00 p.m. on May 1, 2012, she was at her house sleeping next to her child. Her mother woke her up, saying that two men were looking for her. The men asked Gutlay if she knew a person named "Gerald." She denied knowing such a person. Then, one of the two men entered Gutlay's house and came out presenting a plastic sachet. Gutlay was then handcuffed and brought to the police station, where the marked money and two plastic sachets were shown to her. A strip search was done by a female police officer, who then informed Gutlay that she was facing the charge of illegal sale of shabu. 12
Maza corroborated Gutlay's testimony. Maza recalled that around 4:00 p.m. on May 1, 2012, she was manning the sari-sari store when she saw two men enter and drag Gutlay out of the latter's house. 13
In its October 26, 2015 Decision, 14 the Regional Trial Court found Gutlay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused KRISTINE GUTLAY y Zamoranos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of selling 0.082 and 0.013 gram of shabu, or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, without authority, in Violation of Section 5 or [sic] Art. II of RA 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
Let the shabu subject matter of this case be disposed of in the manner provided by law.
SO ORDERED. 15 (Emphasis in the original)
Gutlay filed her Notice of Appeal, which was given due course. On appeal, she asked the appellate court to give weight to the apparent broken chain of custody and noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, particularly that: (1) she was not present during the taking of photographs; (2) there were no representatives from the media and the Department of Justice at the time of seizure and inventory; and (3) she did not sign the inventory receipt. 16 Gutlay claimed that there was also discrepancy in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses regarding the markings on the sachet, which cast doubt on the identity of the plastic sachets. PO1 Biala claimed that he marked the plastic sachets with "VGB2" and "VGB3," his initials. On the other hand, PCI Roderos testified that the sachets she received had the markings "BGB2" and "BGB3.'' 17
In its assailed Decision, 18 the Court of Appeals affirmed Gutlay's conviction. According to the Court of Appeals, the identity and integrity of the seized items were maintained. On the discrepancy in the markings, the Court of Appeals noted that only the first letters were different, which could be attributed to the pronunciation of PCI Roderos of "V." It added how the discrepancy only appeared on the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of PCI Roderos's testimony. 19 The Court of Appeals was likewise satisfied by PO1 Biala's justification to explain the absence of representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, which was the expediency required to act on the tip from the informant. 20 These procedural deviations were not considered fatal by the Court of Appeals. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal filed by herein accused-appellant Kristine Gutlay y Zamoranos is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 26, 2015 of Branch 42, Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 2012-0222-D is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Kristine Gutlay y Zamoranos is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of "shabu," a dangerous drug, as defined and punished under Section 5, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Accordingly, accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole. Furthermore, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00). Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis in the original)
Thereafter, accused-appellant Gutlay filed her Notice of Appeal. 22 In a January 15, 2019 Resolution, 23 the Court of Appeals gave due course to Gutlay's Notice of Appeal and forwarded the records of the case to this Court.
This Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals, allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs, and required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City to confirm accused-appellant's confinement. 24
In separate Manifestations, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, 25 and accused-appellant 26 indicated that they would no longer file supplemental briefs as their arguments are already contained in the Briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not accused-appellant Kristine Gutlay y Zamoranos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
This Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant.
The elements that must be established for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, punishable under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, are settled. In People v. Morales: 27
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 28
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act addresses the integrity of the corpus delicti, and was amended by Republic Act No. 10640 in 2014.
Since the arrest and seizure in the present case happened on May 1, 2012, the original formulation of Section 21 in Republic Act No. 9165 applies. It reads:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
To preserve the integrity of the corpus delicti, Section 21, prior to its amendment, requires the presence of three independent witnesses at the time of the inventory and taking of photographs: a representative from (1) the media, (2) the Department of Justice, and (3) an elected public official.
The sheer number of deviations surrounding this case taint the integrity of the corpus delicti.
First, two of the required witnesses were absent, namely: a representative from the media and the Department of Justice. The presence of Kagawad Dante cannot substitute for the presence of the two other required third-party witnesses.
The significance of the presence of the mandatory third-party witnesses as early as the time of arrest and seizure was explained in People v. Tomawis: 29
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 30 (Citations omitted)
Apart from the absence of two required witnesses, there was no proper inventory. In lieu of the inventory report, only a handwritten certification executed by PO1 Biala was presented. This certification receipt, referred to as inventory receipt by the prosecution, does not bear the signatures of the required witnesses and even that of accused-appellant. 31
Moreover, the prosecution itself attested that the taking of photographs of the seized items was done at the police station and not at the place where the buy-bust operation happened. 32 Since the inventory and taking of photographs were not done at the place of arrest and seizure, there is an utter lack of independent guarantee of the identity and integrity of the seized items. This is true from the time they were allegedly seized from accused-appellant, to the time they were in transit, and ultimately, until their arrival at the police station. The Court of Appeals summarized these events:
PO1 Biala was in custody of the subject plastic sachets from the time these were handed over by accused-appellant, during the preparation of the inventory receipt, and up to the time the buy-bust team and accused-appellant reached the police station.
Upon arriving at the police station, PO1 Biala turned over the subject plastic sachets and the marked money to the desk officer, Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Reynaldo Q. Navarro ("SPO2 Navarro") for recording in the police blotter and for photograph ng purposes. 33
This Court has previously emphasized the necessity of having the inventory and taking of photographs done immediately at the place of seizure:
Moreover, Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs "immediately after seizure and confiscation," which means that these must be done at the place of the arrest. Que explained:
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing. Instead, it is the certainly that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence[.]
Section 21 (1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof. Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence[.] 34 (Citation omitted)
The police officers failed to account for precautions, if any, which they took to preserve the integrity of the allegedly seized items. All they have was self-serving assurance that the sachets allegedly obtained, marked and inventoried, were exactly the same sachets as those turned over to SPO2 Navarro in the police station for photographing.
In People v. Holgado, 35 this Court explained that the strict requirements of Section 21 were put in place to prevent tampering of evidence:
In [Mallillin] v. People, this court explained that the exactitude required by Section 21 goes into the very nature of narcotics as the subject of prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165:
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin — was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession — was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or otherwise — in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. 36 (Citations omitted)
As in Holgado, where the supposedly seized drug amounted to 0.05 gram, it likewise does not escape the attention of this Court how miniscule the amount of the alleged confiscated drug in this case is — 0.082 and 0.013 gram. "While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal," 37 it is the very same fact that demands strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21.
This Court has previously expressed dissatisfaction towards self-serving guarantees of the allegedly seized items. In People v. Sultan, 38 the act of the police officer keeping the alleged seized items inside his pocket from the time of seizure to the time they were taken to the barangay hall, failed to impress this Court:
Here, the prosecution established that from the place of seizure to the barangay hall, PO2 Hechanova had sole custody of the supposedly confiscated items. But this alone cannot be taken as a guarantee of the items' integrity. On the contrary, an officer's act of personally and bodily keeping allegedly seized items, without any clear indication of safeguards other than his or her mere possession, has been viewed as prejudicial to the integrity of the items.
In People v. Dela Cruz, this Court reprehended the act of a police officer who, having custody of the sachets seized from a buy-bust operation, recklessly kept them in his pockets until they were supposedly turned over for examination:
The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation until the seized items' turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been nowhere else but in his own pockets.
Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that PO1 Bobon took the necessary precautions, we find his actions reckless, if not dubious.
Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21, common sense dictates that a single police officer's act of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the crux of offenses penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught with dangers. One need not engage in a meticulous counter-checking with the requirements of Section 21 to view with distrust the items coming out of PO1 Bobon's pockets. That the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both failed to see through this and fell hook, line, and sinker — for PO1 Bobon's avowals is mind-boggling.
Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the slightest justification for dispensing with the requirements of Section 21.
Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic) these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." Plainly, the prosecution has not shown that — on September 14, 2004, when dela Cruz was arrested and the sachets supposedly seized and marked — there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. All that the prosecution has done is insist on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachets has, despite all its lapses, nevertheless been preserved.
In Dela Cruz, this Court did not approve of the incautious keeping of allegedly seized narcotics even as the prosecution averred separating them in different pockets as a supposed measure to preserve integrity. With greater reason should this Court, in this case, reject PO2 Hechanova's claim. The bare assertion that PO2 Hechanova had possession of the items, without so much as a simulation of safekeeping measures such as the segregation in Dela Cruz, is a blatant gap in the chain of custody. The dearth of specific and detailed descriptions of how the allegedly seized items had been preserved while in transit amounts to a broken, unreliable chain of custody. This is fatal to the prosecution's case. 39 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers' official duty, but such reliance is misplaced. This Court is clear that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty will not arise in the presence of irregularities surrounding the manner by which the operations were conducted. In People v. Lim: 40
Even the customary presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot suffice. People v. Kamad explained that the presumption of regularity applies only when officers have shown compliance with "the standard conduct of official duty required by law[.]" It is not a justification for dispensing with such compliance:
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they retied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted.
From the constitutional law point of view, the prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of the crime and to identify the accused as the perpetrator signify that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must forthwith issue. . . .
Jurisprudence has thus been definite on the consequence of non-compliance. This Court has categorically stated that whatever presumption there is concerning the regularity of the manner by which officers gained and maintained custody of the seized items is "negate[d]":
In People v. Orteza, the Court did not hesitate to strike down the conviction of the therein accused for failure of the police officers to observe the procedure laid down under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law, thus:
First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.
xxx xxx xxx
IN FINE, the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the object evidence-shabu was properly preserved negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official duties.
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less tha[n] strict compliance. Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement is compromised. Precisely, deviations from it leave open the door for tampering, substitution and planting of evidence.
Even the performance of acts which approximate compliance but do not strictly comply with the Section 21 has been considered insufficient. People v. Magat, for example, emphasized the inadequacy of merely marking the items supposedly seized: "Marking of the seized drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough to comply with the clear and unequivocal procedures prescribed in Section 21 of [Republic Act] No. 9165"[.] 41 (Citations omitted)
While it is true that this Court has sustained convictions despite deviations from the requirements of Section 21, for such exception to arise, "the prosecution bears the burden of first acknowledging procedural lapses and specifically plead justifiable grounds for these lapses. It must also plead specific safety measures taken in view of the deviations made from the chain of custody requirements." 42 In case of absence of at least one of the mandatory third-party witnesses, such circumstance must be alleged and "demonstrated that earnest efforts were undertaken to secure their attendance." 43 In People v. Lim, 44 this Court explained:
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a shoving of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 45 (Citations omitted)
Other than their self-serving assertions, the police officers were unable to provide specific justifying grounds for the lack of the required witnesses from the time of arrest and seizure.
Another egregious point was how the illegal drugs in possession of the accused-appellant, exactly at the time she was approached by the informant and PO1 Biala, were solely the illegal drugs she had with her, and amounted exactly to the needs of PO1 Biala. It is quite incredulous how, without being informed beforehand of the demands of the buyer, accused-appellant would have ready in her possession the amount PO1 Biala would later require.
For the several deviations from the chain of custody requirements and the prosecution's inability to provide grounds for such deviations, doubt exists on the identity and integrity of the shabu, the corpus delicti, which is at the core of the case. Reasonable doubt remains on accused-appellant's guilt, and for such reason, she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the October 31, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07965 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Kristin Gutlay y Zamoranos is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs for the prosecution's failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City for immediate implementation. The Superintendent is directed to report to this Court, within five days from receipt of this Resolution, the action she has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.
Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 22-23.
2. Id. at 3-21. The October 31, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07965 was penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Elihu A. Ybañez of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. CA rollo, pp. 14-24. The October 26, 2015 Decision was penned by Presiding Judge A. Florentino R. Dumlao, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 42.
4. Id. at 12.
5. Rollo, p. 4.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5-6.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id. at 9.
14. CA rollo, pp. 14-24.
15. Id. at 24.
16. Rollo, p. 10.
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id. at 3-21.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id. at 20-21.
22. Id. at 22-23.
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id. at 27-28.
25. Id. at 36-39.
26. Id. at 41-42.
27. 630 Phil. 215 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
28. Id. at 228 citing People v. Darisan, 597 Phil. 479 (2009) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
29. 830 Phil. 385 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
30. Id. at 408-409.
31. CArollo, p. 48.
32. Rollo, p. 7.
33. Id.
34. People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65518/> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
35. 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
36. Id. at 92-93.
37. Id. at 99.
38. People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65518> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
39. Id.
40. People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400/> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
41. Id.
42. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph./thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
43. Id.
44. People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400/> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
45. Id.