THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200335. September 10, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERANIO GUTIERREZ y RAMOS, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 10, 2014, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 200335 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus ERANIO GUTIERREZ y RAMOS, accused-appellant.)
Before the Court is an appeal from the May 26, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which modified the judgment 2 of conviction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, in Quezon City, and found appellant guilty of the crime of simple rape committed against AAA. 3
Appellant Eranio Gutierrez y Ramos was charged with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape in an Information 4 dated March 21, 2002. Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented AAA, her mother BBB, and P/Insp. Pierre Paul Carpio, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City. Briefly stated, their testimonies proved the following facts:
Appellant was AAA's boyfriend in 1999 and their relationship lasted for a year. 5 On March 12, 2002, at about 4:45 in the afternoon, then 17-year-old AAA left her school to have some reviewers photocopied. Before she reached her destination, she was waylaid by the appellant and the latter's companion, who was identified only as a certain Bot. At gunpoint, AAA was forced to board a waiting taxi and was made to sit between appellant and Bot at the backseat. 6 Bot threatened her not to seek help, otherwise, something bad will happen to her.
They proceeded to the Victory Liner terminal in Caloocan City and there boarded a bus bound for Zambales. Again, she was made to sit between appellant and Bot and was threatened that something terrible will happen to her if she asked for help. AAA nonetheless struggled and tried to free herself during the trip. Bot subdued her by threatening her once more with his gun. The appellant also slapped AAA to prevent her from struggling further. 7
At around 9:00 p.m., they reached Zambales. They rode a tricycle to Bot's house. 8 There, AAA was brought to a room which she was forced to share with appellant. AAA pleaded to be released, but appellant refused and instead told her to sleep since it was getting late. When AAA refused, appellant told her that she could not leave Zambales. 9
At around 11:00 in the evening, appellant forced AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. He pinned her thighs with his knees and her neck with his arm. AAA tried to kick and push appellant but she was overpowered by him. When AAA continued to struggle and shout, appellant got angry and hit her in the chest, causing her to fall down. 10 With that, appellant succeeded in ravishing AAA. The following morning, AAA felt pain in her vagina and found blood in her underwear. 11
On March 19, 2002, or the seventh day of confinement, BBB and AAA's aunt, accompanied by the barangay captain of the area, arrived at Bot's house looking for AAA. 12 At first, appellant refused to release AAA but eventually relented when AAA's aunt threw invectives at appellant. 13
On March 19, 2002, AAA was examined by P/Sr. Insp. Pierre Paul F. Carpio. As stated in his report, 14 AAA's hymen had a shallow, healed laceration at the 3 o'clock position and deep, healed lacerations at the 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions which he opined were caused by the penetration of a blunt object, possibly a penis. 15HSaEAD
For his part, appellant interposed the "sweetheart defense" and claimed that he and AAA have been romantically involved with each other since 1999. Regarding the abduction, appellant alleged that on March 12, 2002, AAA voluntarily went with him to Zambales. They had no companion. At Zambales, they stayed at the house of a certain Edwin Ermita for a week and had sexual intercourse. Appellant averred that AAA was not restrained of her liberty during the entire time. When AAA's mother and aunt fetched her, AAA allegedly told him not to worry because she would fight for their love. Then he went with AAA, BBB, and AAA's aunt. When they arrived at Blumentritt, however, two policemen arrested him. 16
To bolster his sweetheart defense, appellant presented 38 love letters, 17 one of which he claimed was sent to him by AAA in 2002. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that the letters were sent to him by AAA when she was still in fourth year high school in Mindoro and that the last one was sent to him in 2000. 18
The RTC found the appellant guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages. The RTC ruled that AAA's testimony was credible and that the elements of the charge of forcible abduction with rape had been duly established by the prosecution. The court did not consider appellant's sweetheart theory and ruled that based on the evidence presented, it was clearly established that AAA and appellant were no longer romantically involved at the time appellant committed the offense.
The CA, as aforesaid, modified the decision of the RTC and found appellant guilty only of the crime of simple rape. The CA sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and affirmed the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. The CA, however, deleted the award of exemplary damages due to the absence of any aggravating circumstance.
The CA found no cogent reason to depart from the trial court's conclusion that AAA gave a candid and straightforward narration of her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant. The CA noted that AAA gave a categorical and clear narration of how she was abducted and raped by appellant. However, the CA ruled that the forcible abduction was absorbed in the crime of rape as the circumstances of the case reveal that the real objective of the accused was to rape the victim. 19
As regards appellant's "sweetheart defense," the CA ruled that based on the evidence, it is clear that at the time of the commission of the rape, appellant and AAA were no longer in a romantic relationship. Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, the CA said that a love affair does not justify rape. 20
Aggrieved by the CA's decision, the appellant filed a notice of appeal before this Court to have the entire case reevaluated.
After judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court reinstates the trial court's decision. The Court finds no compelling reason to overturn appellant's conviction and the lower courts' findings of fact, particularly insofar as both lower courts declared that the raping incident indeed happened. Factual findings of the trial court are given great weight by this Court for it is the trial court judge who had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and determine whether they were telling the truth or not. 21 Absent any showing that the lower courts overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated significant facts which if properly considered could change the result, the Court will not disturb their findings and the assessment of witnesses. However, as regards the crime actually committed, this Court does not agree with the appellate court's finding that the appellant's real objective was simply to rape AAA and that the appellant should be convicted only of simple rape instead of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. To recall, the three elements of forcible abduction are (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status or reputation, (2) that the abduction be against her will and (3) the abduction is with lewd designs. 22 The crime of forcible abduction with rape, on the other hand, is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the abducted woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. 23
In the instant case, the prosecution sufficiently alleged and proved the elements of forcible abduction with rape. The evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that AAA was abducted against her will and she only went with the appellant and Bot because she was held at gunpoint. She was brought by appellant and his companion to Zambales which took several hours of travel from Sta. Mesa, Manila, where she was abducted. At Zambales, she was forced to stay in the same room as appellant. Then, after two hours of their arrival, appellant raped AAA with force and intimidation, proving that the abduction was motivated by lewd designs. 24 AAA was not allowed to leave the room and it was only on the seventh day that she was able to get out when her mother and aunt fetched her. Clearly, the CA erred when it convicted the appellant only for simple rape. ESHcTD
We likewise disagree with the CA in deleting the award of exemplary damages, in view of the use of a gun by appellant's companion, Bot, when they abducted AAA. As we held in People v. Sabadlab:25
Although the CA deleted the RTC's award of exemplary damages because of the "absence of aggravating circumstance (sic)," we reinstate the award in view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." The Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." Present here was the need for exemplarity. Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement to exemplary damages of AAA on account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of no moment that the use of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information. As fittingly explained in People v. Catubig:
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. 26
The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is thus reinstated but the same is increased to P30,000 27 in conformity with current jurisprudence.
Also, we impose interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded in this case reckoned from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The May 26, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04008 is SET ASIDE and the February 3, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. Q-02-108388 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATIONS in that the award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000. Appellant is further ordered to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded in this case reckoned from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
With costs against the accused-appellant. (Jardeleza, J., no part, due to his prior action as Solicitor General; Leonardo-De Castro, J., designated Member per Raffle dated September 3, 2014.)
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Francisco P. Acosta concurring. The assailed decision was rendered in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04008.
2. CA rollo, pp. 9-15. Penned by Presiding Judge Roslyn M. Rabara-Tria on February 3, 2009 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-108388.
3. The victim's real name and other personal circumstances, as well as any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, are withheld per People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703, 709 (2006).
4. Records, pp. 1-2.
5. TSN, February 17, 2003, p. 2; TSN, November 18, 2002, p. 3.
6. TSN, November 18, 2002, pp. 4-5; TSN, June 27, 2006, pp. 5-8.
7. Id. at 5-9.
8. Id. at 7-9.
9. Id. at 10-11.
10. Id. at 12-13.
11. Id. at 13-14.
12. TSN, September 22, 2003, pp. 5-6.
13. Rollo, pp. 5-6; TSN, November 18, 2002, pp. 16-17.
14. Exhibit "B," records, p. 72.
15. TSN, September 27, 2004, p. 7.
16. TSN, August 17, 2005, pp. 2-7.
17. Exhibits 1-38.
18. TSN, May 22, 2006, p. 3; TSN, May 8, 2000, pp. 2-3, 7-9.
19. Citing People v. Rapisora, 403 Phil. 194 (2001).
20. Citing People v. Baldo, 599 Phil. 382 (2009).
21. See People v. Kulais, 313 Phil. 863, 868-869 (1995).
22. Alberto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 182130 & 182132, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 104, 142; People v. De Lara, 389 Phil. 756, 776 (2000).
23. People v. Ballenas, 386 Phil. 729, 746-747 (2000).
24. See People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 762 (2003); People v. Garcia, 428 Phil. 312, 328 (2002); People v. Ablaneda, 409 Phil. 552, 557 (2001); People v. De Lara, supra note 22, at 776-777.
25. G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 237.
26. Id. at 250-251.
27. See People v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 200080, September 18, 2013, p. 4.