People v. Gumilao

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 208755. October 5, 2016.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIA NATIVIDAD GUMILAO, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 208755 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIA NATIVIDAD GUMILAO, Accused-Appellant.

For review is the April 18, 2013 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04560, which affirmed the July 7, 2010 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 09-272137 wherein accused-appellant Maria Natividad Gumilao (Gumilao) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

On November 9, 2009, an Information was filed against Gumilao, charging her with violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:

The undersigned accuses MARIA NATIVIDAD GUMILAO, of a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, committed as follows:

That on or about November 1, 2009, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with another whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts is still unknown and mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver, give away to another or dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly dispatch in transit or transport one (1) knot tied transparent bag sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing ninety-eight point one zero one one grams (98.1011) of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as "shabu", a dangerous drug. 3

During her arraignment on December 4, 2009, Gumilao pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The prosecution established the facts from the testimonies of its witnesses, i.e., (i) Forensic Chemist Jappeth M. Santiago (Forensic Chemist Santiago); (ii) Security Guard (S/G) Josephine Rañola (S/G Rañola); (iii) S/G Clarence C. Garcia (S/G Garcia); (iv) Investigation Agent (IA)1 Glenn C. Lagutan (IA1 Lagutan); and (v) members of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), namely, Seaman First Class (SN1) Feldimar Usman (SN1 Usman) and Ensign (ENS) Janus Robinson Sabas (ENS Sabas).

On November 1, 2009, Gumilao was a passenger bound for Cebu via the Super Ferry 12 at Pier 15, Eva Macapagal Terminal, South Harbor, Manila, where S/Gs Garcia and Rañola were on duty at the frisking and baggage inspection areas, respectively. As part of the routine security check-up at the gate, Gumilao was subjected to a body search by S/G Garcia. While frisking Gumilao, S/G Garcia felt something unusual in her brassiere. This prompted Gumilao to immediately brush away S/G Garcia's hand and flee. As S/G Garcia couldn't leave her post, her co-worker, who was the male frisker on duty, ran after Gumilao and requested assistance from ENS Sabas and SN1 Usman, who were then in front of the terminal gate. EcTCAD

SN1 Usman, upon instruction from ENS Sabas, went after Gumilao. SN1 Usman got hold of Gumilao, who requested to go to the comfort room. SN1 Usman waited outside the comfort room and escorted her over to S/Gs Garcia and Rañola at the frisking area to confirm if she was the one who fled after being frisked. S/G Garcia, however, asked for S/G Rañola's help when upon frisking Gumilao again, felt nothing unusual in Gumilao's brassiere area.

S/G Rañola then brought Gumilao near the baggage inspection area to frisk her. S/G Rañola felt something hard between Gumilao's legs and told her, "Day, ilabas mo na, huwag mo na akong pahirapan." Gumilao complied, placed the item, which was a hard transparent plastic sachet, on the table, and told S/G Rañola, "Ate, itago mo na iyan, makukulong ako."4

S/G Rañola thereafter turned over the plastic sachet to ENS Sabas, who marked the item with: "012130H NOV 2009 eva macapagal terminal JRS" to signify the time, date, place, and his initials. Thereafter, Gumilao was brought to their office for proper turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

On November 2, 2009, IA1 Lagutan, together with a fellow PDEA officer, Ryan Reyes, proceeded to the PCG Office at the Eva Macapagal Terminal after being informed that the PCG officers stationed there apprehended someone for transportation and seizure of suspected drugs. ENS Sabas and SN1 Usman turned over the person of Gumilao, the evidence, and all the supporting documents to IA1 Lagutan.

Gumilao was thereafter brought to the PDEA office by IA1 Lagutan, Officer Reyes, ENS Sabas, and SN1 Usman. Upon reaching the office, IA1 Lagutan wrote a request for laboratory examination 5 and submitted it together with the marked plastic sachet confiscated from Gumilao to the laboratory of the PDEA.

Forensic Chemist Santiago received the request and the "knot-tied transparent small plastic bag with markings '012130H NOV 2009 eva macapagal terminal JRS' containing white crystalline substance with a net weight of 98.1011 grams" which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride upon being subjected to a qualitative examination. 6

On the other hand, the defense presented Gumilao as its lone witness who narrated a different set of circumstances: that she was, indeed, bound for Cebu on that date, but a guard who frisked her instructed her to stay in a corner, where three to four coastguards approached her; that the coastguards asked if she knew a certain person whose name she could not remember; that, thereafter, she was told to go to the comfort room and when she got out, she was brought to the office of the head of the security guards, where she was again frisked by a guard, who also searched her bag; that after the frisk and search, she was brought to the PCG Office where a man was escorted inside; that she was asked if she knew him, to which she replied in the negative; and that they (she and the man) were both brought to the PDEA office for inquest proceedings.

In a Decision dated July 7, 2010, the RTC found Gumilao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However, the RTC held that there was nothing to show that Gumilao was conspiring with someone else to transport illegal drugs, in violation of Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The fallo of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused, Maria Natividad Gumilao, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, she is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The specimen is forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law and rules. 7 HSAcaE

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's judgment convicting Gumilao of the crime charged in a Decision dated April 18, 2013.

Gumilao is now before this Court, assigning the same errors she raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF HER ARREST.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS THEREOF.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING THE APPREHENDING TEAM'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE INTEGRITY AND IDENTITY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED SHABU. 8

This Court has reviewed the records of the case and has found no reason to overturn the decision convicting Gumilao of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

Warrantless Arrest and Search

Gumilao argues that her arrest does not fall within the ambit of a lawful warrantless arrest since there was no sufficient probable cause to justify searching her person on that day. She insists that the fact that she ran away while she was being subjected to the routine search done on all the passengers was not enough reason for her to be arrested and searched. AScHCD

This Court disagrees.

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

However, one of the instances when a warrantless search is valid is if it is incidental to a lawful inspection, such as those that are routinely done on passengers at airports, ports, or terminals. In other words, frisking done in airports, ports, or terminals is an authorized form of search and seizure. 9

Akin to the case at bar is People v. Johnson, 10 the ruling of which was applied in Sales v. People11 and People v. Canton. 12 In all these cases, this Court sustained the conviction of the accused for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 when they were found to be hiding in their body illegal drugs which were obtained from them in the course of a routine frisk at the airport, and were admitted in evidence. We explained in these cases that rationale for the validity of the airport frisking, thus:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

Thus, we rule that there was nothing irregular with the search conducted on Gumilao, who was only chased and searched again after she ran away when S/G Garcia felt something unusual in her brassiere during the routine frisk at the terminal gates. What was felt unusual in her brassiere during her initial frisk and her action of running away because of the discovery thereof gave the law enforcement agents enough probable cause to subject her to a more thorough body search, which yielded the transparent plastic bag with crystalline substance that tested positive for shabu. AcICHD

In People v. Mariacos, 13 we defined "probable cause" as follows:

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. (Citations omitted).

Gumilao's arrest stemmed from the routine frisking she was subjected to at the Eva Macapagal Terminal when she was about to board the ferry bound for Cebu. Since the search conducted on Gumilao was a valid search pursuant to routine port security procedure, she was also lawfully arrested without a warrant for being caught in possession of a contraband, thus, in flagrante delicto.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

The present case falls under paragraph (a) as quoted above. The authorities had all the reason to suspect that she was hiding something in her person, as S/G Garcia had already felt something unusual in Gumilao's brassiere, which prompted her to push away S/G Garcia's hand and flee the frisking area in the first place. The subsequent search conducted on Gumilao resulted in the discovery and confiscation of a small transparent bag with a white crystalline substance suspected to be a dangerous drug. Gumilao was then apprehended and turned over to the PDEA pending the outcome of the qualitative examination of the confiscated substance found hidden in her person.

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs

Gumilao was charged and convicted for transporting dangerous drugs, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The law provides:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. TAIaHE

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.

In the case at bar, Gumilao was caught with dangerous drugs in her possession while trying to board a ferry bound for Cebu. She was thus caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs. The Court, in the Mariacos case, has defined transport of drugs in this wise:

Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached. 14 (Citations omitted.)

Gumilao was apprehended inside the port terminal, as she was intending to board the ferry bound for Cebu with the dangerous drugs in her person, concealed in a transparent plastic bag inside her underwear. While it may be argued that she was yet to board the ferry, it cannot be denied that her presence at the port area was specifically for the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to another, from Manila to Cebu. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of her arrest, Gumilao was caught in flagrante carrying in her person the small transparent bag with white crystalline substance later on identified as shabu.

Chain of Custody of Evidence

Gumilao also argues that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the procedure in handling confiscated dangerous drugs and that the corpus delicti of the crime was not proven. 15

Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz.:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

The foregoing is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: cDHAES

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

This Court elucidated on the concept of "chain of custody" in People v. Llanita, 16 which, quoting People v. Kamad, 17 enumerated the different links that must be proven to establish it:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court had the opportunity to enumerate the different links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, namely:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;

Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;

Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and

Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. (Citations omitted.) TCAScE

In the case at bar, this Court, like the courts a quo, finds that the continuity in the chain of custody was sufficiently established, to wit: (a) S/G Rañola confiscated the dangerous drugs from Gumilao; (b) S/G Rañola gave the confiscated item to ENS Sabas, who then marked it with "012130H NOV 2009 eva macapagal terminal JRS," signifying the time, date, place, and his initials; (c) ENS Sabas thereafter turned over the seized item to IA1 Lagutan; (d) IA1 Lagutan, upon reaching the PDEA office, wrote a request for laboratory examination, which he sent to the PDEA Laboratory Service together with the seized plastic sachet; (e) Forensic Chemist Santiago received the request and the small knot-tied transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance with a net weight of 98.1011 grams; and (f) Forensic Chemist Santiago testified in open court, that the white crystalline substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride after being subjected to a qualitative examination.

It bears to stress that failure of the prosecution to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an arrest illegal or the items seized from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 18 Here, we hold that the prosecution sufficiently established that the chain of custody was not broken.

Moreover, Gumilao failed to show that there was bad faith or ill will on the part of the officers who apprehended her or that they had tampered or meddled with the evidence. Thus, "the presumptions that the integrity of such evidence had been preserved and that the police officers who handled the seized drugs had discharged their duties properly and with regularity remain." 19

This Court has always looked upon the defense of denial with disfavor as such is easily fabricated, and is a standard defense in prosecutions for violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Since Gumilao failed to give this Court anything but her bare assertions and self-serving claims, her defense of denial must necessarily be rejected.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the April 18, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04560 finding Maria Natividad Gumilao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

SO ORDERED." SERENO, C.J., on official leave.

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.

2. CA rollo, pp. 9-17; penned by Presiding Judge Alejandro G. Bijasa.

3. Records, p. 0001.

4. TSN, June 10, 2010, pp. 11-13.

5. Records, p. 0010.

6. Id. at 0011.

7. CA rollo, p. 17.

8. Id. at 28.

9. People v. Cadidia, 719 Phil. 538, 556 (2013).

10. 401 Phil. 734, 743 (2000).

11. 703 Phil. 133, 140 (2013).

12. 442 Phil. 743, 758-759 (2002).

13. 635 Phil. 315, 329-330 (2010).

14. Id. at 333-334.

15. CA rollo, pp. 35-37.

16. 696 Phil. 167, 181-182 (2012).

17. 624 Phil. 289, 304 (2010).

18. Sales v. People, supra note 11 at 145.

19. People v. Manalao, 703 Phil. 101, 114 (2013).