People v. Gumban

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 245951. September 16, 2020.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JEFREL CONDIA GUMBAN, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 16, 2020 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 245951 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelleeversus JEFREL CONDIA GUMBAN, accused-appellant.

Upon an exhaustive review of the instant case, the Court GRANTS the appeal and REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision 1 dated September 28, 2018 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division (CA), in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02283 which affirmed the Decision dated June 9, 2016 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. OS-15-1084 and OS-15-1085, finding accused-appellant Jefrel Condia Gumban (Gumban) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," 3 as amended.

In a prosecution for illegal sale and possession of illicit drugs, there must be proof that these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The State must establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti. 4 The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 5

Generally, the prosecution must endeavor to establish four links in the chain of custody of the seized items: first, their seizure and marking, if practicable, by the apprehending officer; second, their turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, their turnover by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, their turnover and submission from the forensic chemist to the court. 6

The starting point in the custodial link is the marking which is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. 7 While Section 21 of R.A. 9165 does not expressly provide for the matter of marking, case law has established that this must be made immediately upon confiscation, or at the earliest reasonably available opportunity. 8

The immediate marking is crucial and indispensable because succeeding handlers of the seized illegal drugs will use that marking as reference. It thereby forestalls switching, planting or contamination of evidence by separating the seized items from other materials, from the time of their confiscation until the case is terminated. 9The Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. 10

As for the procedures in handling the seized items succeeding the marking, Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides an outline of the same. The provision was amended by R.A. 10640, 11 which was approved on July 15, 2014. As the offense in the instant case was committed on July 23, 2015, the amendatory law applies.

Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended, requires, among others, that: (1) the seized items be physically inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory, and photographing be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, and (c) a representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or a representative from the media, who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; and (3) the physical inventory and photographing be done at the (a) place where the search warrant is served, (b) nearest police station, or (c) nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure. 12

R.A. 9165 requires nothing less than strict compliance, as deviations from its prescribed procedures leave the door open for tampering, substitution, and planting of evidence. 13 Even acts which approximate compliance but do not strictly comply with Section 21 have been considered by the Court as insufficient. 14 This is because illegal drugs have the unique characteristic of becoming indistinct and not readily identifiable, especially when they are in miniscule quantities, thereby generating the possibility of tampering, alteration or substitution by accident or otherwise. 15 On the other hand, noncompliance is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity of the corpus delicti — an essential element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs — thus, engendering the acquittal of the accused. 16

However, infidelity to these initial custodial requirements may be excused under the saving clause of Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended, which provides that "noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." Hence, the law requires for exemption from strict compliance that the prosecution: 1) recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers, then 2) give justifiable grounds for the departure. 17

In the present case, the Court notes a number of unjustified lapses by the law enforcers.

First, the seized illegal drugs were not marked immediately after confiscation and seizure at the place of confiscation. Instead, the marking was deferred to a later time at the police station.

As discussed, unjustified delay in the marking of the seized drugs renders doubtful the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. This is especially true when, as in this case, the physical inventory and photographing — the processes succeeding the marking — were likewise delayed. 18 In these cases, the prompt marking ensures that the items seized from the accused are the same ones later subjected to inventory and photographing. 19

Second, the physical inventory and photographing, as mentioned, were likewise not immediately made after the seizure and confiscation at the place of arrest but were only done much later at the police station.

The lone witness for the prosecution, PO2 Jerwin Arado (PO2 Arado) who acted as the poseur-buyer, explained that the police officers had to conduct the custodial requirements at the police station because at the scene of arrest and seizure, the buy-bust team felt threatened by four male and one female relatives of Gumban. 20 Allegedly, these people were "grumbling against" 21 them and that the female relative even held PO2 Arado's hand and embraced Gumban to prevent the police officers from taking him. 22

The Court cannot take this explanation as a justifiable ground to depart from the immediate marking, inventory, and photographing requirement. It does not render impracticable the conduct of these requirements at the place of confiscation and seizure. PO2 Arado himself testified that he had three armed back-up officers who successfully prevented the male relatives from going near the scene of seizure by warning them not to approach. 23 Likewise, PO2 Arado was able to remove his hand from the female relative and even scolded her when she tried to intervene. From these allegations, it appears that the police officers were capable of managing the situation and complying with the prompt requirements of the law.

Third, there was failure to comply with Section 21 as to the presence of the mandatory witnesses during the inventory and photographing. The required media or NPS representative was missing. Hence, even assuming that the delay in the conduct of the Section 21 requirements was justified by the commotion created at the scene of arrest and confiscation, there remains this third lapse.

PO2 Arado tried to explain this blunder in this wise: "Our chief of police called up the office of the media and DOJ but according to them they were not available during the time." 24 The Court cannot accept this explanation as sufficient to justify the absence of the required witnesses. Mere statement of unavailability of the witnesses, absent any earnest and reasonable effort to secure their attendance, will not suffice to trigger the saving clause, especially in buy-bust operations. 25 This is because such operations are, by their very nature, planned; hence, police officers are normally given enough time — from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused to the time of his arrest — to prepare and make the necessary arrangements to comply with Section 21. 26 As expounded by the Court in People v. Crispo: 27

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of [R.A.] 9165 must be adduced. x x x These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of [R.A.] 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must, in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 28

In sum, the failure of the police officers in complying with the mandatory procedures of case law and R.A. 9165, as amended, in the seizure and handling of seized illegal drugs, and their corresponding failure to adduce justifiable grounds for such lapses, create reasonable doubt on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, hence, reasonable doubt on the very guilt of Gumban. As such, he must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated September 28, 2018 of the Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 02283 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant JEFREL CONDIA GUMBAN is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, for immediate implementation, the Superintendent of the Bureau of Corrections, who is hereby ORDERED to REPORT his/her actions taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 6-31. Penned by Associate Justice Louis P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga.

2. CA Rollo, pp. 37-41. Penned by Judge James Stewart Ramon E. Himalaloan.

3. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.

4.See People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 208095, September 20, 2017, 840 SCRA 327, 338 citing People v. Gayoso, G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017, 821 SCRA 516, 527 and People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 402 (2010).

5.People v. Gayoso, supra note 4 at 527.

6.People v. Villarta, G.R. No. 217887, March 14, 2018, 859 SCRA 193, 212.

7.People v. Gayoso, supra note 4 at 529.

8.People v. Sabdula, 733 Phil. 85, 95 (2014).

9.See People v. Lumaya, G.R. No. 231983, March 7, 2018, 858 SCRA 114, 131-132.

10.People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 232 (2015).

11. Entitled "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS A CT OF 2002.'"

12. See Sec. 21, Article II of R.A. 9165.

13.People v. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018, 853 SCRA 487, 509.

14.Id.

15.People v. Nepomuceno, G.R. No. 216062, September 19, 2018, 880 SCRA 440, 451.

16.People v. Dahil, supra note 10 at 226.

17. See People v. Alagarme, 754 Phil. 449, 461 (2015).

18. See People v. Beran, 724 Phil. 788 (2014) where the Court held that the marking shall be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation.

19.Id. at 819-820.

20.Rollo, pp. 22-24.

21.Id. at 23.

22.Id. at 22-24.

23.Id. at 23.

24.Id. at 24.

25.See People v. Patacsil, G.R. No. 234052, August 6, 2018, 876 SCRA 348, 367.

26.Id. at 367-368.

27. G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018, 859 SCRA 356.

28.Id. at 376-377. Emphasis supplied; underscoring omitted.