FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 242813. September 16, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. JAYPEE FRIAS y JULIO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 16, 2020which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 242813 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,versus JAYPEE FRIAS y JULIO, accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals, Second Division (CA) did not err in promulgating the Decision 1 dated January 22, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08032. The facts, as borne out by the records, sufficiently support the conclusion that accused-appellant Jaypee Frias y Julio (accused-appellant Frias) is indeed guilty of two counts of Rape. The issues and matters raised before the Court, the same ones already raised in the CA, there being no supplemental briefs filed, were sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon by the CA.
It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. 2 Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the victim, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. 3
After a judicious examination of the records and transcripts of stenographic notes of the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the Regional Trial Court's 4 (RTC) appreciation of the evidence, which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
The Court agrees with the findings of the CA that the prosecution sufficiently established the element of force. AAA 5 explicitly stated in her cross-examination that against her will and consent and despite her futile efforts to keep her legs closed, accused-appellant Frias covered her mouth with a pillow, forced her legs open, and forcibly inserted her penis into her vagina at around 4:00 p.m. on April 30, 2014. 6 AAA then testified that accused-appellant Frias repeated the foregoing acts at around 2:00 a.m. on May 1, 2014, and that with more aggressiveness, and despite AAA's protestations, accused-appellant Frias inserted his penis and then his finger into AAA's vagina. 7 Undoubtedly, the element of force was sufficiently proven.
As regards the purported inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, the Court agrees with the CA that the same relate only to minor and irrelevant matters that do not at all affect the credibility of AAA. 8 The Court reiterates that errorless statements and testimonies cannot be expected, especially when a rape victim is recounting details of a harrowing experience. 9 In fact, minor inconsistencies are more consistent with human nature and experience and serve to strengthen rather than destroy a victim's credibility. 10 In any event, these inconsistencies were sufficiently explained by AAA during her cross-examination and re-direct examination.
As to the medico-legal's finding that AAA had a deep-healed laceration, the Court agrees with the CA that the mere fact that the laceration could have occurred a week ago, despite the fact that she was medically examined on May 2, 2014 does not negate AAA's claims. The medico-legal expressly stated that the injury could have also occurred within 24 hours 11 or between 36-48 hours. 12 Further, the CA correctly held that hymenal injury has never been an element of rape. 13 In fact, full penetration is not required to sustain a conviction for consummated rape.
In the same vein, accused-appellant Frias' defenses of alibi and denial cannot outweigh the detailed testimony of AAA that he had sexual intercourse with her against her will. The Court has oft pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 14 In this case, the RTC found AAA's answers to be categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, unpretentious, and frank 15 despite grueling cross-examination. In fact, the RTC categorically stated that based on AAA's demeanor, "there [was] no doubt in the mind of the court that she was telling the truth." 16 It bears reiterating that "[t]he testimonies of child victims of rape are generally accorded full weight and credit. When a child victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed x x x. As we have said in numerous cases, a young girl's revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give the details of her ignominy, cannot just be dismissed as a mere concoction." 17
In contrast thereto, accused-appellant Frias' claim that his friends were present from 3:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and that, thus, he could not have committed the first purported rape 18 was grossly inconsistent with the testimonies of his witnesses. Witness Jay-Ar Garciola stated that he arrived at around 5:00 p.m., 19 or after the purported rape. Witness Dexter Sampaga stated that he arrived at around 2:00 p.m. but admitted that he left the house soon after chatting with AAA. 20 Witness Lery Dantes clarified that he, Dexter Sampaga, and Darwin Sampaga arrived at around 2:00 p.m. and left soon after 3:30 p.m. 21 Even accused-appellant Frias' mother admitted that she was downstairs washing the dishes at or about the time of the first purported incident. 22 In any event, it is settled that "lust is no respecter of time and place; rape can thus be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping." 23
Accused-appellant Frias' claim that AAA's actuations after the rape incident belie her claim similarly lacks merit. "Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable." 24 This is all the more true for a child of only 15 years old, who is not even legally qualified to enter into basic contracts. The RTC correctly found that children cannot be reasonably expected to behave like adults, especially when faced with such a traumatic experience.
Finally, the defense's many attempts to portray AAA as a loose or promiscuous teenager deserves no consideration. People v. Navarro25 explains that "[t]he victim's character or reputation is immaterial in rape, there being absolutely no nexus between it and the odious deed committed. A woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape, the essence thereof being carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent." 26 AAA's claim that she was raped by accused-appellant Frias has nothing to do with the fact that she might have had many boyfriends in the past.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution proved accused-appellant Frias' guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court clarifies, however, that the monetary amounts imposed by the CA are to be awarded for each count of rape.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated January 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08032. The Decision finding accused-appellant Jaypee Frias y Julio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape, defined and punished under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the following amounts for each count of rape: 1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2) P75,000.00 as moral damages; 3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Further, all monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan Manahan and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Stephen C. Cruz.
2.People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 469, 478.
3.People v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 177749, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 509, 522.
4. See Joint Decision dated November 16, 2015 of the RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 in Criminal Case Nos. 557-V-14 and 558-V-14, penned by Judge Nancy Rivas-Palmones; CA rollo, pp. 13-23.
5. The identity of the victims or any information which could establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, titled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262, titled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN" (November 15, 2004). [See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 (2014), citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 (2013)]. See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, titled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017; and People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018.
6. CA rollo, pp. 18-19.
7.Id. at 8.
8.Rollo, p. 10.
9.People v. Lagramada, 436 Phil. 758, 771 (2002).
10.Id.
11. CA rollo, p. 15.
12.Id. at 10.
13.Rollo, p. 12.
14.People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).
15. CA rollo, p. 22, citing People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 222.
16.Id. at 21. Emphasis supplied.
17.People v. Fraga, 386 Phil. 884, 905 (2000).
18. CA rollo, p. 3.
19.Id. at 5.
20.Id.
21.Id. at 4.
22.Id. at 5-6.
23.People v. Traigo, G.R. No. 199096, June 2, 2014, 724 SCRA 389, 394.
24.People v. Patentes, G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014, 715 SCRA 106, 115.
25. G.R. No. 137597, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 395.
26.Id. at 406.