People v. Falsario y Fajanil

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 252539. January 5, 2022.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VILLAMOR FALSARIO y FAJANIL, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated05 January 2022which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252539 (People of the Philippines v. Villamor Falsario y Fajanil). — For resolution is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated August 9, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10762. The assailed CA ruling affirmed the Decision 2 dated February 23, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of _____________ Branch 124, in Criminal Case No. C-90309 convicting accused-appellant Villamor Falsario y Fajanil (Falsario) for the crime of Rape.

The antecedent facts

An Information was filed charging Falsario with the rape of AAA, 3 a minor, as penalized under Article 266-A (1) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. The accusatory portion of the Information states:

That on or about the 21st day of June, 2013 in _____________ Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, threats, violence and intimidation employed upon the person of Private Complainant AAA, minor, 17 years old, but with chronological age of 7 years and 3 months, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lie and had carnal knowledge upon the said private complainant against her will and without her consent.

Contrary to law. 4

Falsario pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on September 25, 2013. Trial on the merits ensued.

The facts of this case and the parties' respective arguments were summarized by the CA in its Decision 5 as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

In the afternoon of 21 June 2013, minor [AAA] (hereafter, Victim) was invited by her friend, Kenneth, to accompany him in selling pan de sal. They dropped by a house being constructed in ________________________ City. Kenneth requested her to ask for the number of one of the workers, Villamor Fajanil Falsario aka Jack (hereafter, Falsario) and after exchanging numbers with him, the Victim and Kenneth proceeded home. Later, Falsario called her up and invited her to visit him at the construction site, telling her that they were going into a dark room. When she arrived there, Falsario was waiting for her. Some of his co-workers were also there. Once Falsario brought her into one of the rooms in the building being constructed, he instructed her to undress and to be quiet. Falsario also took off his clothes and then he told the Victim to lie down on the bed. He joined her on the bed and positioned himself on top of her. He kissed her breasts before inserting his penis into her vagina. She felt pain but he told her not to make a sound. She was not able to scream or shout for help because he threatened her with harm if she did.

After about two hours, Falsario escorted her home. At home, she experienced bleeding and searing pain in her vagina when she urinated. She told her mother, [BBB], that there was blood in her urine, so her mother asked her what happened. The Victim then relayed to her mother her encounter with Falsario. Upon realizing what happened, BBB explained to her daughter that she was raped by Falsario. They then lost no time in bringing her daughter to the _________ Police Sub-Station 5 ________ Police Station (hereafter, __________ Police Station) to report the rape.

They arrived at around 6:45 o'clock in the evening and after reporting the incident, the police officers accompanied mother and daughter to ________________ so the Victim could identify Falsario. There, the Victim pointed to Falsario as the man who raped her. Senior Police Officer 4 Henry Banez (SPO4 Banez) told him that he was being accused of rape and informed him of his constitutional rights while Police Officer 3 Michael Ambi handcuffed him. After this, they brought Falsario to the ___________ Police Station. He was subsequently detained at the ___________ City Police Station.

Upon their arrival at the police station, Senior Police Officer 1 Learni L. Albis (hereafter, SPO1 Albis) of the Women and Children Protection Desk conducted an investigation by interviewing the arresting police officers, the Victim and her mother. The next day, BBB took the Victim to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a medical examination. The examination conducted by Police Chief Inspector Charyl P. Escaro (hereafter, PCI Escaro) yielded the following results:

FINDINGS:

HYMEN: Presence of deep-healed laceration at 7 o'clock position

POSTERIOR: Abraded

FOURCHETTE:

ANUS: Unremarkable

BODY: No signs of external injury

CONCLUSION: Medical evaluation shows recent blunt force trauma to the posterior fourchette and clear evidence of blunt penetrating trauma to the hymen.

PCI Escaro noted that the injuries sustained by the Victim may have been caused by any blunt hard object including an erect penis. Since these were already healed, then the injuries may have been inflicted days before. As to the abrasions, she testified that these may have been produced by the rubbing of the fourchette which, because they were still visible, may have occurred within 24 hours before the time of the examination. PCI Escaro observed that the Victim was coherent and cooperative in answering her questions.

xxx xxx xxx

Dr. Ermenilda L. Avendaño (hereafter, Dr. Avendaño), the neurodevelopmental physician who evaluated the Victim's mental health, testified that she first examined the Victim when she was only 7 years old. She was brought by her parents for an examination because even though she was well-behaved in school, she had difficulty in language. Using the Griffiths Mental Developmental Scale which measured the skills of developmental ages in locomotor skills, personal-social interaction, hearing and speech abilities, and eye and hand coordination, Dr. Avendaño was able to determine the Victim's development age, to wit:

Developmental age — 5 years and 8 months

Personal and social interaction — 5 years and 10 months

Hearing and speech coordination — 3 years and 4 months

Eye and hand coordination — 5 years and 10 months

Performance — 5 years

Practical reasoning — 4 years and 2 months

Dr. Avendaño concluded that the Victim's overall developmental performance x x x only placed her development at only 4 years and 10 or 11 months compared to her chronological age of 7 years and 3 months.

When she was asked about the possibility that the Victim's global development delay might improve, Dr. Avendaño stated that it was possible with proper care. However, since she had not examined the Victim since 2002, then she could not say with certainty if the Victim's developmental age has already caught up with her chronological age.

Version of the Defense

Falsario, on the other hand, testified that he met the Victim on 04 May 2013. She and her friend, Kenneth, at that time were selling pan de sal and went to the construction area where he was working and they got to know each other. They exchanged numbers and soon he was courting her. He saw her every single day because she always dropped by for a few minutes at the construction site. He professed that he did not notice anything extraordinary in her behavior. They allegedly became sweethearts on 14 June 2013. The next day, he invited her to visit his place of work and when she arrived, he brought her to his room in the barracks. He then asked her if they could have sex and the Victim allegedly gave her consent. He knew that she was 17 years old then but she told him that she was turning 18 next month. He did not think that she was acting differently.

After having sex, they got to talk more and he promised the Victim that he would take full responsibility if she got pregnant. They stayed in the room for about two hours before he brought her home. He stated that there was nothing out of the ordinary in their conversation and he did not observe anything amiss in her behavior. The next time he saw the Victim was on 17 June 2013 when she visited him at the construction site.

At around 8 o'clock in the evening on 21 June 2013, he was surprised when the Victim arrived in a police vehicle. The police officers who were with her allegedly asked his co-workers to vacate the property. Then Falsario saw the Victim who made a pointing gesture at him. This caused the police officers to arrest him and to bring him to the _________ Police Station. 6

The RTC Ruling

The RTC rendered its Decision 7 convicting Falsario for the crime of rape and sentencing him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua: CAIHTE

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused VILLAMOR FALSARIO Y FAJANIL @ "JACK" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Further, the accused is hereby adjudged civilly liable to AAA. Accordingly, he is hereby ordered to pay said private complainant: a) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; b) Php75,000.00 as moral damages; c) Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.8

The RTC noted that Falsario himself admitted that he had carnal knowledge of AAA. The issue raised of whether the sexual incident occurred on June 15 or 21, 2012 is immaterial because the exact date is not an element of the crime.

It concluded that AAA suffered from a mental deficiency which was evident from her demeanor during trial and the manner by which she answered questions. Hence, Falsario's warning to her not to shout during the incident otherwise he would hurt her ("sinabihan ako na huwag sisigaw kasi sasaktan niya ako")9 was sufficient force, threat, and intimidation to accomplish the rape.

Falsario's defense of "sweetheart theory" was denied for being self-serving and uncorroborated by a disinterested third-party witness.

Aggrieved, Falsario filed a Notice of Appeal. 10

Falsario filed a Brief for the Accused-Appellant 11 arguing that the prosecution failed to prove AAA's mental age at the time of the incident. Dr. Ermenilda L. Avendaño (Dr. Avendaño) did not conclusively determine AAA's mental age because she was not able to test her. The prosecution also did not adduce any evidence to establish her mental age. The RTC erred when it merely assumed that AAA lacked the mental capacity to consent to or oppose the sexual intercourse. 12

Having failed to prove AAA's mental age, the totality of evidence proves that she consented to the sexual intercourse with Falsario. There was nothing in AAA's testimony that would show that Falsario made any kind of force, threat, violence, intimidation, or physical harm before, during, or after their sexual intercourse. AAA also did not deny the allegation that they were lovers. On the contrary, AAA admitted that she asked for Falsario's cellphone number, exchanged text messages with him, had a conversation with him before the sexual intercourse, agreed to remove her clothes and lie down in bed, and let him insert his penis into her vagina. Hence, the sexual intercourse was with AAA's free will and consent. 13

Lastly, AAA's testimony was patently incredible. She alleged that the sexual act happened on the night of June 21, 2013. However, she was examined on June 22, 2013, barely a few hours after the alleged incident, and the results showed the presence of a deep healed laceration at the 7 o'clock position in her hymen. If she was telling the truth, the laceration would have been freshly healed. 14

The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 15 It primarily asserted that the prosecution proved all the elements of rape through AAA's testimony which was further corroborated by medical findings. AAA's testimony was straightforward, positive, credible, and corroborated on all material points by other prosecution witnesses. 16 It was also established that AAA suffered from neurodevelopmental delay. This was confirmed by the RTC which had the opportunity to observe her demeanor and behavior during trial. 17 This evaluation by the trial court is entitled to great respect and finality.

Falsario filed a Manifestation 18 that he will no longer file a reply brief since his brief for the accused-appellant already exhaustively and judiciously discussed all the assigned errors.

The CA Ruling

The CA rendered its Decision 19 denying Falsario's appeal and sustaining his conviction: DETACa

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 23 February 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, of ______________ finding Accused-Appellant Villamor Falsario y Fajanil guilty of Rape in Criminal Case No. C-90309 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-Appellant [Villamor Falsario y Fajanil] is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to Private Complainant [AAA] the following amounts:

1. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P75,000.00 as moral damages; and,

3. P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Interest of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.20

The CA affirmed that AAA had an underdeveloped mental maturity based on the RTC's observation of her behavior and demeanor during trial. It was clear from AAA's testimony that she did not fully understand the nature of the sexual act and did not consent to it. The RTC was in the best position to assess AAA's credibility as a witness and its findings are accorded great weight absent any arbitrariness or oversight. 21 It also rejected Falsario's defense of the "sweetheart theory" for being self-serving and unsubstantiated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. 22

Undeterred, Falsario filed a Notice of Appeal 23 of the foregoing decision.

This Court acted on the appeal and issued its Resolution 24 dated September 9, 2020 ordering the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs.

Falsario filed a Manifestation 25 that he will no longer be filing a supplemental brief as his brief for the accused-appellant already exhaustively and judiciously discussed all the assigned errors.

The OSG failed to file a supplemental brief within the prescribed period. This Court issued a Resolution 26 dated September 13, 2021 declaring that its right to file a supplemental brief has been deemed waived.

Issue

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether or not Falsario is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of AAA.

Ruling of this Court

The appeal is denied. Falsario's conviction is affirmed.

The crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended, which provides in part:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is Committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

The prosecution must prove all the elements of rape which are (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or demented. 27

The mental retardation of a victim of rape affects the proper classification of the crime. The rape of a retardate with a mental age below 12 years old was previously considered rape of a woman deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 266-A of the RPC. 28 The term "deprived of reason" was construed to encompass those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.

In recent jurisprudence, this Court departed from its previous rulings and held that when the victim of rape is a retardate with a mental age below 12 years old, it is considered statutory rape under paragraph 1 (d) instead of paragraph 1 (b) of Article 266-A of the RPC. 29 This resulted from clarifying the differences between the terms "mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled" from the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented" as used under paragraphs 1 (b) and 1 (d) of Article 266-A of the RPC. The pertinent discussion in People v. Quintos30 is instructive:

The term, "deprived of reason," is associated with insanity or madness. A person deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that affect his or her reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist, make decisions, and give consent.

The term "demented," refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called dementia. Dementia refers to the deterioration or loss of mental functions such as memory, learning, speaking, and social condition, which impairs one's independence in everyday activities.

We are aware that the terms, "mental retardation" or "intellectual disability," had been classified under "deprived of reason." The terms, "deprived of reason" and "demented," however, should be differentiated from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled." An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or she is deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal independence and social responsibility."

Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established. 31 (Citations omitted)

This shift was significant since in statutory rape, the existence of force, threat, intimidation, or physical injury on the victim are irrelevant considerations. The only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge took place. 32 The victim's consent is immaterial because a mental retardate cannot give valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act. 33 aDSIHc

However, in several cases, the victim's mental retardation was appreciated as a factor in evaluating the degree of force, threat, or intimidation as an element of Rape under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC. In People v. Dumanon34(Dumanon), the accused who raped a retarded minor was charged and convicted under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC. The Court utilized the victim's mental retardation only as a circumstance in evaluating the degree of the force and intimidation exerted by the perpetrator:

It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When the victim is a retardate the force required to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against a normal adult. Thus, the degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile.

With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly convicted of rape under the first circumstance of Article 335, i.e., by the use of force or intimidation. Once the elements of force and intimidation were properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this case, the conviction becomes a matter of course. As correctly assessed by the OSG, the conviction for rape decreed by the trial court was not based on the fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate, but on the use of force and intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a circumstance which the trial court considered in evaluating the degree and extent of the force and intimidation. 35 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

It was affirmed in People v. Moreno36 that the degree of force necessary to overwhelm and commit rape against a retardate is less than what is required for a normal woman. The force required is always relative and must be evaluated in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It was elucidated:

The force necessary in rape is relative, depending on the age, the size and the strength of the parties. Hence, it has been held that "for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted, it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule."

It is well to stress that the victim in this case was not "normal"; she was a retardate with the mental age of a six-year-old. Because her mental faculties are different from those of a fully functioning adult, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is less. Hence, a quantum of force, which may not suffice when the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile. Appellant's acts may not have intimidated a normal person. But Jocelyn was not normal; she was a retardate with the mind of a six-year-old child. From her perspective, appellant's acts were sufficient to engender fear in her mind. Jocelyn's testimony sufficiently demonstrated that the sexual act was forced on her. Moreover, a normal person could have offered a more vigorous resistance to the assault of appellant. But Jocelyn was different; being a retardate, she could not muster the mind or the will to resist, for she was already afraid. It is clear that appellant committed the outrage against her will — with minimal force, but force nonetheless. 37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

Nevertheless, the victim's mental retardation must always be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, it bears stressing that "courts are not entirely dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation." 38 The Court in People v. Butiong39(Butiong) gave weight to the observations of the trial court and concluded that the victim had a deficient mental condition based on the totality of evidence presented: ETHIDa

Here, the State's witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests conducted to establish AAA's mental retardation with the mentality of a six- or seven-year-old. The trial judge himself reached a conclusion on AAA's mentality from his close personal observation of her as a witness in court, noting that she manifested a difficulty in responding to the questions, especially those bearing on her being sexually abused. The trial judge's observation to the effect that she had no notion of the wrong that had been done to her was validated by the clinical findings. As such, the totality of the evidence presented by the State established beyond reasonable doubt AAA's deficient mental condition. 40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citation omitted)

It was similarly held in Dumanon that the absence of expert testimony to prove the victim's mental retardation would only be material if the "conviction for rape was based on a finding that her retardation was of such an extent that she was deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a child of less than 12 years old." 41 The Court in Dumanon held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical evidence and can be based on the trial judge's personal observation:

On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as correctly pointed out by the defense, no expert testimony was offered to prove that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But, this matter gains importance if, in fact, the trial court's conviction for rape was based on a finding that her retardation was of such an extent that she was deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a child of less than 12 years old. As will be shown later, such is not the situation obtaining in the case at bar, for we agree with the trial court's finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the use of force and intimidation.

It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical evidence. Thus, it is our considered opinion that for purposes of determining whether ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the mental capacity of a normal person, the personal observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining the impact on her of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to prove the commission of the crime of rape.

The original complaint, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte by Dominga Anib on behalf of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The translation of the affidavit of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in support of the original complaint, alleged that ANACURITA is "not mentally normal." During the preliminary examination Dominga testified that ANACURITA is mentally retarded. The Resolution of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically declared that "by merely looking upon the victim," ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman."

The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on ANACURITA's mental condition. When she first testified, the trial court ordered to "make it on record the physical appearance of the witness [ANACURITA] having [a] hard time in understanding the question of the interpreter," and that she is "mentally deficient." As she continued with her testimony, it further observed that she had difficulty answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it allowed leading questions during her direct examination. 42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

Guided by the foregoing, We find no compelling reason to reverse Falsario's conviction.

In this case, the Information filed against Falsario was sufficient to charge him with Rape under either paragraphs 1 (a) or 1 (d) of Article 266-A of the RPC. It alleged that the rape was committed "by means of force, threats, violence and intimidation," 43 but also included AAA's mental deficiency since she allegedly had a "chronological [mental] age of 7 years and 3 months" 44 despite being 17 years old on the date of the incident. The RTC, affirmed by the CA, eventually convicted Falsario of Rape under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC.

AAA's mental retardation was

The prosecution in this case failed to present sufficient expert testimony and medical evidence to prove that AAA's mental age was under 12 years old on the date of the incident. Dr. Avendaño 45 could not determine AAA's actual mental age on such date because it had been over a decade since she last examined her. She also did not conduct any recent Intelligence Quotient test or other tests on her.

However, as correctly held by both the RTC and the CA, other evidence could be appreciated to prove AAA's mental retardation. For one, Dr. Avendaño's testimony gave an important historical background of AAA's mental condition. Although she could not determine AAA's exact mental age on the date of the incident, her earlier findings showed that AAA, from a young age, already suffered a mental deficiency and lagged in overall development. AAA was determined to be underdeveloped in terms of her personal and social interaction, hearing and speech coordination, overall performance, and practical reasoning. 46

This was corroborated by BBB who testified that they learned that AAA was a special child when she was diagnosed by Dr. Avendaño as having ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) and being five years behind in development than her actual age. 47 She alleged that despite their guidance and care for AAA, they observed no change or improvement in her condition, especially with regard to her control over emotions and academic performance. 48

Lastly, the RTC witnessed AAA's demeanor and behavior during the three trial dates she appeared in court and found her mental retardation apparent. It noted that AAA acted like a child and not a normal 18- or 19-year-old woman. Her mental retardation was also evident in the manner by which she answered the questions propounded to her. The RTC pertinently observed: cSEDTC

Notwithstanding the lack of medical evidence, however, that would have established the developmental age or mental age of AAA, particularly before or at the time the accused had sexual intercourse with her on June 15, 2013 and/or June 21, 2013, the court rules that AAA lacked the mental capacity that would have enabled her to validly consent to or oppose the carnal act committed against her by the accused. The testimony of AAA was presented on three dates or on April 1, 2014, June 18, 2014, and November 25, 2014. When AAA testified on April 1, 2014, AAA was already eighteen (18) years old, but she only reached Grade 5. Also, of note, is that during the scheduled hearing on April 1, 2014, as soon as AAA saw the accused entering the courtroom, she looked scared and leaned down to hide her face from the accused. The court likewise observed during the entire time that AAA was testifying that she did not appear like any other normal eighteen or nineteen-year old woman. Although, she looked like a fully-grown young adult, AAA, however, acted like a child. For which reason, the court allowed the Public Prosecutor to ask leading questions. Further, in the course of her testimony, AAA kept on pointing to the accused and at one point, during the presentation of her testimony on April 1, 2014, she went berserk and was howling while pointing to the accused and saying "He kissed my breast!" The unexpected outburst on the part of AAA prompted the Public Prosecutor to move for a continuance. That AAA is suffering from mental or intellectual deficiency which renders her incapable of giving legal consent to a sexual intercourse can also be gleaned from the manner AAA answered the questions propounded to her in the course of her cross-examination, x x x. 49 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Significantly, both the RTC and the CA observed from AAA's testimony that she did not fully understand the nature of the sexual act and what had happened to her on account of her mental deficiency. It is clear that AAA could not have intelligently consented to engaging in the sexual act. AAA testified:

Q: By the way Madam Witness, I will ask you what do you know between sex and rape, if you know?

A: In rape you will be dragged.

Q: And how about sex?

A: Papasukin lahat ang body mo sa kanya.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you say Rape it is forcible, when he forced you to do something against your will, is that it?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: When in sex, you defined sex as something that he will insert something into your body?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And you characterized the incident between you and Jack as sex?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Is rape bad?

A: Yes, ma'am. It is bad.

Q: How about sex?

A: Bad too, ma'am.

Q: And who told you that?

A: My mother, ma'am. 50

The totality of evidence thus established the fact of AAA's mental retardation. To reiterate, courts are not entirely dependent on clinical examinations to establish mental retardation. Similar to Butiong and Dumanon, the observations of the RTC relating to AAA's demeanor and behavior during trial are entitled to great weight, and are deemed sufficient to prove the fact of her mental retardation.

The prosecution established all the

Falsario argued that AAA's testimony was incredible and insufficient to support his conviction. This hinged on the supposed discrepancy in the date of their sexual intercourse. AAA alleged it was on June 21, 2013 while Falsario claimed it was on June 15, 2013. AAA's claim was allegedly belied by the results of her medical examination conducted on June 22, 2013, which indicated the presence of a deep-healed laceration at the 7 o'clock position in her hymen. This suggests that the sexual intercourse occurred a few days before the medical examination and exposed the falsity of AAA's testimony.

We are not persuaded.

This argument is inconsequential since the exact date and time of the rape is not an element of the crime. 51 Besides, a victim with mental retardation such as AAA cannot be expected to recall with absolute certainty the exact date and time of such a traumatic and harrowing experience. It is recognized that "since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in one's testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness." 52

Contrary to Falsario's claim, the medical findings support AAA's testimony. He conveniently failed to mention that the conclusion in the medical examination "shows recent blunt force trauma to the posterior fourchette and clear evidence of blunt penetrating trauma to the hymen." 53 Police Chief Inspector Charyl P. Escaro testified that these abrasions "may have been produced by the rubbing of the fourchette which, because they were still visible, may have occurred within 24 hours before the time of the examination." 54 This medical finding is more consistent with AAA's narration of the incident and contradicts Falsario's allegations. SDAaTC

Hence, Falsario's attack on AAA's credibility as a witness must fail. This is bolstered by the settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies should be given the highest respect. 55 It had the unique opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of witnesses on the stand which makes it in the best position to determine their truthfulness. The reviewing court is generally bound by these findings absent substantial reasons to warrant its reversal. This rule is even more stringently applied if such findings have been affirmed by the CA. 56

It is further emphasized that mental retardation does not, by itself, disqualify a person from becoming a credible witness. 57 The Court in People v. Monticalvo58 recognized that "[m]ental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court. If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court."

In this case, both the RTC and the CA concluded that AAA was a credible witness who gave a clear, straightforward, and positive testimony worthy of credence. No cogent reasons have been alleged, much less proved, to reverse this ruling.

Consequently, We affirm that AAA's testimony, as substantiated by medical findings and the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses, was sufficient to prove all the elements of rape under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC. This is consistent with the established doctrine that a conviction for rape can stand on the sole testimony of the victim that is credible and untainted with serious uncertainty, especially when corroborated by medical findings or physical evidence. 59

The first element of rape is present that Falsario had carnal knowledge of AAA. Falsario himself admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA inside a room at the construction site. AAA likewise testified and narrated how Falsario forced himself upon her to have sexual intercourse, thus:

Q: Now let us go back to the scenario where you were already brought inside a dark room. x x x Were you told by him or you were pulled, were you holding hands?

A: He held my hands, ma'am.

Q: And he is quite ahead of you?

A: We were walking side by side, ma'am.

Q: Was that the first time for you to reach that dark room?

A: That was my first time, ma'am.

Q: So when you reached that dark room, Madam Witness, what happened?

A: He told me to remove my dress and my shorts, ma'am.

Q: And did you obey to that?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And then what happened after that?

A: He told me to be quiet, ma'am.

Q: So because you obeyed Madam Witness to his order to undress yourself, so you were nude totally already at that time?

A: Yes, ma'am. (The witness is nodding)

Q: And him, how about his clothes Madam Witness, what did he do to that?

A: He also removed his clothes, ma'am.

Q: So you must have seen his body?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And same him to you also?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And then after that, what did he do to you when you were already naked, both of you?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina, ma'am. (The witness is pointing to the accused)

Q: What was your position at that time when the accused, the person that you [were] pointing to earlier, who is the accused, inserted [his] penis into your vagina?

A: He was on top of me while I was lying, ma'am.

Q: You were [lying] face up?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many times did he insert his penis into your vagina, Madam Witness?

A: Twice, ma'am.

Q: And what was your reaction to that?

A: It was painful, ma'am.

Q: After that what happened?

A: When he was through with me I went home and then I went inside the CR and my stomach was aching, ma'am.

Q: How about your vagina was it also painful?

A: I felt a searing pain in my vagina and bleeding, ma'am.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when you arrived at your house, by the way, how did you go home, did you walk only or boarded?

A: He escorted me out, ma'am.

SACP Gravino:

We manifest that the witness is crying, your Honor.

A: He kissed my breast.

SACP Gravino:

We manifest that the witness is howling, Your Honor, saying "he kissed my breast" while pointing to the accused. And she is being comforted by her mother. Maybe we will just ask for a continuance, your Honor. 60

The second element of rape was also present that Falsario used force, threat, and intimidation. The evaluation of what constitutes sufficient force must take into consideration the victim's peculiar circumstances and determined on a case-to-case basis. It was thus recognized in Dumanon that a lesser degree of force may suffice when the victim is a retardate compared to when the victim is a normal person. 61

Accordingly, We concur with the finding of the RTC that Falsario's warning to AAA not to shout otherwise he would hurt her ("sinabihan ako na huwag sisigaw kasi sasaktan niya ako")62 was sufficient force, threat, and intimidation to prevail upon her. This is clear from AAA's following testimony where she alleged that she felt pain during the rape and wanted him to stop, but she was rendered helpless by his orders to keep quiet: acEHCD

Q: Was it also painful when he already inserted his private part?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Very painful?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Did you cry because it was painful?

A: He told me not to scream, ma'am.

Q: When did he tell you that, when he already inserted his private part?

A: He told me to keep quiet about the thing that we did.

Q: Not to make any sound?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: When he inserted his private part to you, did you try to tell him to stop?

SACP Gravino:

May we seek clarification your Honor being the counsel saying "private part," does she mean the penis?

ATTY. GABOY:

Yes Your Honor, when I mentioned private part I am referring to the penis.

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: You are now saying Madam Witness that you [were] telling him to stop because it was painful?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Did he stop?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: He continued what [he was] doing at that time?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And then he stopped after a minute?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Was it still painful after that 1 minute?

A: Yes, ma'am. 63 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

AAA's testimony was corroborated by the medical findings which indicated the presence of a deep-healed laceration at 7 o'clock position in her hymen which was caused by blunt penetrating trauma. There were also abrasions in the posterior fourchette caused by rubbing. It was concluded that these injuries could have been caused by a blunt hard object such as an erect penis. These findings were consistent with and strongly support AAA's testimony of the rape incident.

Falsario's "sweetheart theory"

It has been ruled that the "sweetheart theory" in rape is not credible if based solely on the accused's bare testimony. This is an inherently weak and self-serving defense that requires strong corroboration. 64 The alleged relationship should be proved by the testimonies of disinterested witnesses or other documentary or object evidence such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos and the like. 65

In this case, Falsario failed to discharge his burden to prove that he and AAA were lovers. His claim relied primarily on his self-serving testimony that is unworthy of belief. He could have presented other evidence such as their alleged text messages to each other as lovers or the testimonies of third parties who saw them act as lovers at the construction site. His utter failure to do so leaves the Court with no choice but to deny his "sweetheart theory" defense for lack of substantial corroboration.

All told, We conclude that the prosecution established all the elements of rape beyond reasonable doubt. Falsario's defenses of denial and "sweetheart theory" cannot prevail over AAA's credible testimony, corroborated by medical findings and the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses. SDHTEC

With regard to the penalty imposed, Rape under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, is punishable by reclusion perpetua:

ART. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

There being no qualifying circumstances, the penalty imposed by the CA of reclusion perpetua was proper.

The amount of civil damages awarded by the CA is likewise upheld consistent with prevailing jurisprudential guidelines. 66

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 9, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10762 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Villamor Falsario y Fajanil is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, against AAA. The Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ORDERS him to pay the victim, AAA, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 3-18. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas concurring.

2. CA rollo, pp. 61-89. Penned by Presiding Judge Glenda K. Cabello-Marin.

3. The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; Republic Act No. 9262, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes"; Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children," effective November 15, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006); and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.

4. Records, p. 2.

5. Rollo, pp. 3-18.

6. Id. at 4-7.

7. CA rollo, pp. 61-89.

8. Id. at 89.

9. Id. at 87.

10. Id. at 153-155.

11. Id. at 38-60.

12. Id. at 53-54.

13. Id. at 51-52.

14. Id. at 55.

15. Id. at 106-128.

16. Id. at 122.

17. Id. at 114-115.

18. Id. at 130-133.

19. Rollo, pp. 3-18.

20. Id. at 17.

21. Id. at 10-11.

22. Id. at 16.

23. Id. at 19-21.

24. Id. at 24-25.

25. Id. at 35-39.

26. Id. at 43.

27. People v. Suansing, 717 Phil. 100, 109 (2013).

28. People v. Monticalvo, 702 Phil. 643, 659-660 (2013).

29. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020; People v. Deniega, 811 Phil. 712, 721 (2017).

30. 746 Phil. 809 (2014).

31. Id. at 829-831.

32. People v. Deniega, supra note 29.

33. People v. Nerio, 764 Phil. 565, 572 (2015).

34. 401 Phil. 658 (2000).

35. Id. at 674.

36. 356 Phil. 231 (1998).

37. Id. at 243-244.

38. People v. Butiong, 675 Phil. 621, 639 (2011).

39. Id.

40. Id. at 640.

41. People v. Dumanon, supra note 34 at 669.

42. Id. at 669-670.

43. Records, p. 2.

44. Id.

45. TSN, May 28, 2015.

46. CA rollo, pp. 65-67.

47. Id. at 84-86; TSN, April 23, 2015, pp. 2-4.

48. Id. at 64-65.

49. Id. at 77-78.

50. TSN, November 25, 2014, pp. 19-20.

51. People v. Butiong, supra note 38 at 629.

52. People v. XXX, G.R. No. 229836, July 17, 2019.

53. Rollo, p. 5.

54. Id.

55. People v. Tayaban, 821 Phil. 391, 403 (2017).

56. People v. Sanchez, 681 Phil. 631, 636 (2012).

57. People v. Moreno, supra note 36 at 245-246.

58. Supra note 28 at 663-664.

59. People v. Rodriguez, 781 Phil. 826, 834-835 (2016).

60. TSN, April 1, 2014, pp. 10-12.

61. People v. Dumanon, supra note 34 at 674.

62. CA rollo, p. 87.

63. TSN, November 25, 2014, pp. 15-16.

64. People v. Nogpo, Jr., 603 Phil. 722, 742 (2009).

65. People v. Quinto, G.R. No. 246460, June 8, 2020.

66. People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).