FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 222650. December 5, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MUMAR ESTOYA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 5, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 222650 — People of the Philippines vs. Mumar Estoya
Before Us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Mumar Estoya, assailing the Decision 1 dated August 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01689, which found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The appeal has no merit.
"The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide." 2 In this case, We are in accord with the findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and CA that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime of murder. It is undisputed that the victim was killed and that the witness testified that the accused-appellant was his assailant. The killing was neither parricide nor infanticide as there was no relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim.
We likewise agree with the findings of the RTC and CA that the crime of murder in this case was qualified by treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make." 3 "For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted." 4 The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. 5
The following circumstances in this case demonstrate the presence of treachery: (1) the victim was squatting on the ground in front of his house grilling fish with his back from the house and facing the bonfire when the accused-appellant arrived thereat; (2) the victim could not have expected to assume that he was at risk of an impending danger when he was only grilling fish outside his house; (3) the victim was unarmed at the time of the shooting; (4) the accused-appellant strategically and intentionally positioned himself somewhere hidden from the victim; and (5) the attack resulted in a gunshot wound sans any slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
Moreover, We find that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present in this case. CAIHTE
"For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary." 6 "The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture." 7
In De Vera v. De Vera, 8 We explained that the surrounding facts of the case are relevant in determining the voluntariness of the surrender, to wit:
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up. 9 (Citation omitted)
In this case, the warrant of arrest was received by the police on June 26, 2008. On the same day and before the receipt of said warrant, the accused-appellant submitted himself to the police. 10 Like in De Vera and Oco, the surrender preceded the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Thus, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, there is a qualifying circumstance of treachery, no aggravating circumstance, and one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this note, Article 63, paragraph 3 11 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
As to damages, We modify the same in line with jurisprudence 12 in that the amount of exemplary damages shall be increased to P75,000.00 and, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall be awarded.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01689, which found accused-appellant Mumar Estoya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accordingly, the exemplary damages awarded is increased to P75,000.00 and temperate damages in lieu of actual damages is awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. An interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Francisco and Edward B. Contreras; rollo, pp. 4-14.
2.People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 743 (2012).
3.People v. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 639-640 (2010).
4.Id. at 640.
5.SeePeople v. Guzman, 542 Phil. 152, 172 (2007).
6.People v. Oco, 458 Phil. 815, 851 (2003).
7.People v. Garcia, 577 Phil. 483, 505 (2007); Mendoza v. People, 561 Phil. 70, 99 (2007).
8. 602 Phil. 877 (2009).
9.Id. at 888-889.
10.Rollo, p. 12.
11. Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
xxx xxx xxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
12.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).