ADVERTISEMENT
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117472. September 2, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs. LEO ECHEGARAY,accused-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated September 2, 1997.
G.R. No. 117472 (People vs. Leo Echegaray). — In a letter dated March 4, 1997 of Atty. Vicente G. Vinarao, Director of the Bureau of Corrections, two queries are addressed before us, to wit:
(a)What should be the reckoning point from which the execution of the death penalty be carried out?; and
(b)Does the acceptance of an appointment as phlebotomist, tasked in administering lethal injection to persons meted with the death sentence by medical technologists, doctors, dentists, nurses or other medical practitioners warrant revocation of their licenses to practice as such?
As regards the first query, Atty. Vinarao asks whether the reckoning point be from June 25, 1996 which is the date of our decision affirming the judgment of the lower court or from February 7, 1997 which is the date of the denial of accused-appellant's motions for reconsideration.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8177 (Death Penalty Law), it is provided that:
"The death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment has become final and executory without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." (Emphasis ours)
It is well-settled that a judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. (Adez Realty Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 623 [1992]; Cachola Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 496 [1992]; City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 362 [1991]. In criminal cases, Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states the circumstances when a judgment becomes final. However, we cannot specifically apply these tenets to judgments imposing the death penalty which is imposed or affirmed by this Court itself since, obviously, no appeal lies therefrom. Thus, it is only but proper that a judgment of this Court imposing the death sentence becomes final and executory after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from service of a copy thereof on counsel of the accused-appellant, or on the latter if so ordered by this Court, and no motion for reconsideration (or, where allowed by this Court, a motion for new trial [see Helmuth, Jr. v. People, 112 SCRA 573 [1982]; People v. Amparado, 156 SCRA 712 [1987] has been filed by accused-appellant, or no ground has supervened which would justifiably interrupt or warrant the suspension of the running of the reglementary period for finality. Where a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the finality of such resolution shall be substantially subject to the same rule.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that the accused-appellant received on February 12, 1997 (Rollo, p. 289) a copy of our Resolution dated February 7, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration. Applying the aforecited rule, we must reckon the fifteen (15) day period from February 12, 1997 and so rule that the judgment imposing the death sentence on accused-appellant became final and executory on February 27, 1997.
Considering that it is premature for this Court to make any pronouncements on the position of PAMET and PASMETH regarding the appointment of a medical technologist as a phlebotomist in the absence of a judicial controversy before us in relation thereto, We refer this matter to the Department of Justice for its opinion thereon.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We RESOLVE that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections carry out the death sentence not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months from February 27, 1997 without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times.
As to the acceptance of an appointment as phlebotomist by a medical technologist, doctor, dentist, nurse or other medical practitioner, as the case may be, We FURTHER RESOLVE that the query be REFERRED to the Department of Justice for its perusal and opinion. llcd
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA B. VILLARAMA
Assistant Clerk of Court