SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212928. October 3, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO DIOQUINO Y BALICOCO ALIAS "DANNY HABA," accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 03 October 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 212928 — People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, v. Danilo Dioquino y Balicoco alias "Danny Haba," accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the appeal to be lacking in merit. We adopt the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
We agree with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements for the crime of murder, to wit: "1. [t]hat a person was killed; 2. [t]hat the accused killed him; 3. [t]hat the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 [of the Revised Penal Code]; [and], 4. [t]he killing is not parricide or infanticide." 1 In this case, it is beyond cavil that Jake Pascual, the victim, was killed; that appellant Danilo Dioquino y Balicoco, in conspiracy with the two accused, killed the victim; that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery; and that the killing was not parricide or infanticide.
We find no merit in appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy. In People v. Carandang, 2 the Court held that —
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.
"Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy [for] it may be deduced [from] the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the crime." 3 In the case at bench, conspiracy among the three accused was deduced from the following acts: together, they barged into the house of the victim; appellant and accused Deogenes Banares y Bacunawa simultaneously fired shots at the victim while accused Danny Galvan y Haboc acted as a look-out; and after shooting the victim, all three accused fled the crime scene.
The courts below also properly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and, (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed." 4 The prosecution satisfactorily established that prior to the shooting, the victim was merely resting inside his house after a day's work at the construction site. All three accused suddenly barged into the house and immediately fired shots at the victim. The latter was unarmed; he was completely unaware of the impending attack; and he had no opportunity to repel the attack or defend himself. AcICHD
Appellant's alibi was properly disregarded by the trial court and the appellate court. "We reiterate the principle that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. . . . [D]enial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim." 5 In the case at bench, prosecution witnesses Zaldy Garcia and Rowena Pascual positively identified appellant as one of the trio who barged into the victim's house that fateful night of December 30, 2005. They both testified that appellant shot the victim at close range at his chest resulting to his death. Significantly, appellant could not impute any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses.
In fine, the trial court and the appellate court properly found appellant guilty of the crime of murder. There being no other qualifying or aggravating circumstance aside from treachery, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was proper. However, there is a need to modify the monetary awards to conform to current jurisprudence. As modified, appellant must pay the heirs of the victim the following: P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is maintained. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, we ADOPT the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed November 28, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04997 which affirmed with modification the January 25, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 15, in Crim. Case No. 864-M-06 finding appellant Danilo Dioquino y Balicoco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is directed to pay the heirs of Jake Pascual P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is maintained. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. TAIaHE
SO ORDERED.(Carpio, J., on official leave; Brion, J., on leave)"
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. People v. Dela Cruz, 626 Phil. 280, 288 (2010).
2. 669 Phil. 59, 74 (2011). Citation omitted.
3. People v. Campos, 668 Phil. 315, 330 (2011).
4. Id. at 329.
5. People v. Villamor, 675 Phil. 53, 65 (2011).