People v. Diaz y Indino

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 186490. June 28, 2017.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. NILO DIAZ Y INDINO, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated28 June 2017which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 186490 (People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee v. Nilo Diaz y Indino, accused-appellant)

We resolve the appeal of the decision 1 dated 31 July 2008, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02700 affirming the trial court's decision.

Charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275 of Las Piñas City were accused-appellant Nilo Diaz y Indino (Nilo) and his brother Nelson I. Diaz (Nelson) in an information that reads: HTcADC

That on or about August 9, 1998, in the City of Las Piñas and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab Rolando Elegino with the use of a screw driver, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and as a result thereof, said Rolando Elegino died instantly, and with cruelty by deliberately outraging or scoffing at the victim's person or corpse by burying his body and thereafter dug the bones and dumped them into a river. 2

In its 30 March 2006 decision, 3 the trial court found Nilo guilty of the crime of murder, defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Nelson, on the other hand, was acquitted by the trial court for insufficient evidence.

The case for the prosecution hinges on the extrajudicial confession of Nilo as there were neither eyewitnesses nor any physical evidence to corroborate the surrounding circumstances of the crime.

At around 11:30 p.m. of 8 August 1998, Nilo, intent on killing Margarito Carangue (Margarito), who was then in his house at Better Living Subdivision, Bicutan, Parañaque City, went there to talk to Rolando Elegino (Rolando), the caretaker. Shortly after, they each got hammers and struck Margarito who was sleeping on the couch. To conceal the crime, they decided to chop the body into parts which they then dumped into the septic tank.

Thereafter, Rolando asked Nilo to drop him off at the airport. On their way, Nilo chanced upon Nelson walking home. He got out of the car and talked to Nelson and confided to him what happened and said he also needed to kill Rolando. Nelson agreed and rode in the car.

On their way to the airport, Nilo made a turn to CAA Road, Las Piñas City. As soon as they entered a dark area, Nilo and Nelson took turns stabbing Rolando with a screwdriver. When they realized that Rolando was already dead, they proceeded back to the Carangue residence. Nelson alighted earlier as Nilo told him that he would take care of the body. CAIHTE

Thereafter, Nilo wrapped Rolando's body in a plastic bag and buried the body at the back portion of the house. More than two (2) months later, Nilo came back to retrieve the body only to throw it into the nearby river.

After his narration in the statement dated 2 January 1999, 4 Nilo said that he killed Margarito because he and his family were evicted from the house; and he killed Rolando because he needed to conceal the killing of Margarito.

In his defense, Nilo denied committing the crime claiming that he was detained at the time of the alleged incident. He adduced evidence proving that he was detained from 5 to 6 August 1998, at the Western Police District Station 5; and from 6 to 10 August 1998, at the Manila City Jail. He was only discharged from jail on 10 August 1998, two (2) days after the crime happened.

Nilo likewise argued that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence because it was a direct result of his illegal arrest, interrogation without counsel and valid waiver, torture, and undue delay in bringing him for inquest. He points out that his confession clearly reflects that the advice given by the police investigators consisted of long questions following his monosyllabic answers — with no effort to determine if he actually understood what was being explained to him.

In his testimony, Nilo narrated how police officers, without a warrant of arrest, arrived at his house and invited him for questioning for the murder of Margarito. Although he initially refused, Nilo, along with his wife and his son, went with the police officers to the police station because they were threatened with harm.

At the police station, Nilo and his family were interviewed by the police officers and by Mayor Alfredo Lim, who was then the television host of Katapat. It was to Mayor Lim that he first confessed to the murder of Margarito. His wife was also interviewed and she said that Nilo killed Margarito with the help of Rolando. She later explained that she had said this because Nilo was being tortured in front of her and their son.

In sum, Nilo claimed that he was wrongfully implicated and was forced to admit a crime that he did not commit.

The Trial Court Ruling

After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Nilo on account of his confession and its previous disposition on the existence of the corpus delicti5 It considered the extrajudicial confession valid since the lawyer who assisted Nilo testified to the fact that he had properly appraised Nilo of his rights. Moreover, Nilo had every opportunity to retract his confession and to report the maltreatment to the public prosecutor during the preliminary investigation. The presence of the signature of his counsel and that of the public prosecutor, before whom Nilo subscribed to the veracity of his allegations, and the details in his confession are earmarks of the voluntariness of his statements. aScITE

The trial court concluded that Nilo was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the heirs of Rolando the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnification.

The CA Ruling

In the assailed decision, the CA ruled that Nilo's extrajudicial confession was procured in accordance with law. All the requisites for the validity of an extrajudicial confession were complied with: (1) he was assisted by a counsel of his own choice; (2) his responses were full, detailed, and informative; and (3) contrary to his claim, there was no evidence of compulsion, duress, or violence on his person. Otherwise, he would have complained against the investigator concerned.

The CA did not give much credence to Nilo's defense that he was detained because the documents he adduced were belied by the positive statements of the private complainants that they saw him at the crime scene on 8 August 1998. Another witness even testified that he heard Nilo planning the killing of Rolando. More importantly, Nilo's confession was freely and consciously executed. All together, the CA found these to be hard and concrete evidence that he was able to leave the place where he was being detained.

On 8 July 2015, in G.R. No. 176736, 6 this Court held that Nilo's confession was deemed inadmissible as evidence because he was deprived of the right to counsel at the start of the custodial investigation. Nevertheless, Nilo's conviction for the murder of Margarito was affirmed based on pieces of evidence, which substantially established the same matters contained in his extrajudicial confession. This judgment became final and executory on 26 October 2015.

OUR RULING

Nilo's appeal is without merit.

Once again, we are asked to evaluate and weigh the prosecution's evidence against Nilo with his defense of alibi. We likewise resolve the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession.

An extrajudicial confession must be (a) voluntary, (b) made with the assistance of counsel, (c) express, and (d) in writing, to be admissible as evidence against the accused. 7 This rule finds its roots from the constitutional rights of the accused and the rights of the accused under custodial investigation.

Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. DETACa

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (emphasis, italics and underlining supplied)

Simultaneously, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 8 categorically requires that "any person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." 9 Under this law, custodial investigation includes the practice of inviting a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed. 10 This law also states that an extrajudicial confession must be in writing and signed by the person under custodial investigation in the presence of his counsel.11

In the present case, there is no doubt that Nilo executed his sworn statement in the presence of his counsel. He even confessed before the media and his family members. However, it bears stressing that at the time he was subjected to questioning at the police station, there is no evidence on record that he was informed of his right to counsel and, as a result, was not equipped with one. Clearly, Nilo's rights were violated.

The records would show that immediately after being taken into custody on 29 December 1998, Nilo was already questioned about the death of Margarito. The only account when Nilo was apprised of his right to counsel was when he had already executed his sworn statement on 2 January 1999. Thus, prior to the later date, while Nilo was in the custody of his arresting officers and under investigation, he was not able to confer with any lawyer.

Under these circumstances, therefore, we are constrained to rule that Nilo's confession is inadmissible as evidence against him. In truth, these were the same sentiments of this Court when it ruled on Nilo's appeal from his conviction for Margarito's murder. The Court said:

Clear from the foregoing is the fact that the accused was not informed of his rights under Section 12 (1) Article III of the Constitution when he was invited to the police headquarters and questioned on December 29, 1999, i.e., when the period of custodial investigation commenced. The accused was deprived of his right to counsel at the start of the custodial investigation. Thus, the process that led to the execution of his extrajudicial confession on January 2, 1999 was flawed. As we held in a similar case, "(t]he constitutional requirement is not met properly where the lawyer is called in only when the accused is about to put his confession in writing." (People v. Delmo, 439 Phil. 212, 254 (2002)) In accordance with Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, the written extrajudicial confession of the accused dated January 2, 1999 is inadmissible in evidence against him. 12

We see no reason to deviate from this Court's earlier ruling that the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible, especially when this is already the law of the case. 13

The inadmissibility of his confession notwithstanding, given the earlier ruling of this Court, we likewise affirm Nilo's guilt for the murder of Rolando given that the lower courts have already evaluated the weight of his denial and alibi. With only this to offer for his defense, and due to the positive testimony of the prosecution's witnesses — thus, debunking his alibi — Nilo's conviction should stand. HEITAD

Well-settled is the rule that the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive to this Court absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the lower courts. 14 This is because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. 15 It is worth stressing that the CA affirmed the RTC's findings, according credence and great weight to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses.

In the case at bar, the courts a quo did not believe Nilo's claim that he was detained at the Manila City Jail during the period of time when the two (2) crimes were happening. Nilo was positively identified at the Carangue's residence twice: first, in the morning of 7 August 1998, when he began to work at the house; and second, in the afternoon of 8 August 1999, when he was instructed to return. Unfortunately, these were the dates when Nilo was supposedly detained and could not have been at the scene of the crime.

Then again, this would not be the first time for us to evaluate the merits of Nilo's defense. If we were to rule otherwise, we would have to overturn not only the lower courts' findings, but also this Court's earlier resolution on the same defense of alibi.

Lastly, we have held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses which cannot prevail against positive identification. 16 Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness, prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 17

All premises being considered, and with only his inherently weak alibi to offer, we affirm Nilo's conviction for the murder of Rolando.

Finally, we find it proper to modify the monetary awards granted by the trial court and, accordingly, impose the awards recommended in People v. Jugueta, 18 with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 19

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 July 2008, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02700, with the following MODIFICATION: Nilo I. Diaz is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Rolando Elegino P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. aDSIHc

SO ORDERED." (CARPIO, J., on official leave, PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2445 dated 16 June 2017.)

Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-12; penned by Associate Justice (now SC Justice) Mariano C. Del Castillo, and concurred in by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.

2. Records, p. 2.

3. CA rollo, pp. 48-59; penned by Presiding Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.

4. Records, pp. 11-14.

5. The trial court referred to its earlier disposition on the existence of the corpus delicti of the crime when it denied Nilo's petition for bail. It said that this is already the law of the case.

6. The appeal filed by Nilo assailing the CA decision in CA-G.R. No. CR-H.C. No. 00839 affirming Nilo's conviction for the murder of Margarito.

7.People v. Tuniaco, 624 Phil. 345, 352 (2010) citing People v. Gallardo, 380 Phil. 182, 194 (2000).

8. An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof.

9. R.A. No. 7438, Section 2, paragraph (a).

10.Ibid.

11.Id., paragraph (d).

12.Rollo (G.R. No. 176736), pp. 76-77.

13. Under this doctrine, whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before thee court. (Vios v. Pantangco, 597 Phil. 705, 718 (2009) citing Baes v. Lutheran Church in the Phils. 511 Phil. 458, 476 (2005). See also United Overseas Bank of the Phils. v. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, 560 Phil. 774, 786 (2007) citing Padillo v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 334, 351 (2001).

14.Sumbillo, et al. v. People, 624 Phil. 470, 477 (2010) citing People v. Alarcon, 546 Phil. 601, 608 (2007).

15.People v. Lalongisip, 635 Phil. 163, 173 (2010).

16.People v. Agcanas, 674 Phil. 626, 632 (2011) citing People v. Mapalo, 543 Phil. 651, 675 (2007); People v. Caraang, 463 Phil. 715, 749 (2003); People v. Caisip, 352 Phil. 1058, 1065 (1998).

17.People v. Caisip, 352 Phil. 1058, 1065 (1998).

18. G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016.

19. See People v. Amistoso, 701 Phil. 345, 364 (2013).