FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 248008. September 29, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. LEO DIAZ, JR. A.K.A. "NEGRO",accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 248008 (People of the Philippines v. Leo Diaz, Jr. a.k.a. "Negro"). — Before Us is an Appeal 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated February 27, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10466, which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated May 16, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court _____________________ (RTC), convicting Leo Diaz, Jr. a.k.a. "Negro"(Diaz) for the crime of Statutory Rape in Crim. Case No. 10446-G (I.S. No. 116-07-G).
In an Information 4 dated July 25, 2008, Diaz was charged with statutory rape, to wit:
That on April 8, 2007, in the house of a certain [AAA], 5 a nine[-] year[-]old female child, _________________________________________, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, knowingly and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the said child by inserting his penis inside her vagina, without her consent, and to her damage and prejudice.
That the accused, in order to commit the said offense and while not being a resident of the said victim's house, entered the said house and the child's sleeping quarters without the consent of its occupants.
Contrary to law, aggravated by Dwelling. 6
Upon arraignment on October 18, 2010, Diaz entered a plea of not guilty. 7 Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented private complainant, AAA, her father, BBB, and Dr. Maria Victoria Veloso (Dr. Veloso). Their combined testimonies established the following:
On the evening of April 8, 2007, nine-year-old 8 AAA was sleeping on the floor inside the bedroom she shared with her siblings in their home located in _______________________________________. She woke up when she smelled liquor on her face and felt someone remove her garter shorts and panty. AAA was surprised to see that it was Diaz, who reeked of liquor, and that he was already taking off his pants and briefs. He placed himself on top of her, kissed her and then inserted his penis into her vagina. He had sexual intercourse with AAA, while her siblings slept nearby. When he finished, Diaz removed his penis from her vagina and started to put on his clothes. AAA took this opportunity to start kicking Diaz who immediately ran away. 9 acEHCD
When BBB arrived home at around 11 o'clock in the evening, he saw Diaz sleeping on a bench by the balcony of his house. BBB woke him up and asked him what he was doing there. He was very surprised because despite being a neighbor and a brother of AAA's godfather, it was the first time that Diaz slept there. When the visibly drunk Diaz woke up, he appeared to be surprised at something and he immediately stood up. He did not answer any of BBB's questions. When BBB noticed that AAA was still awake, he called her to him and asked if Diaz went inside their bedroom. When AAA answered "yes," he proceeded to ask her what Diaz did. AAA told her father that Diaz undressed her and had sex with her ("iniyot"). Upon hearing this, a furious BBB promptly instructed AAA to go to the house of the barangay secretary. While they were talking, Diaz quickly and quietly left. 10
BBB reported the incident to the barangay 11 and from there, he and AAA proceeded to the police station to report the incident. 12
On April 11, 2007, Dr. Veloso examined AAA at the ________________. She observed redness in AAA's vaginal introitus, with a little discharge. However, no tearing or laceration was found. 13
For the defense, Diaz and his uncle, Nilo Diaz (Nilo), took the witness stand. Diaz told the trial court that, on April 8, 2007, he was alone at his house located at ____________ for the whole day. It was a quiet day for him and he went to sleep at around 11 o'clock that evening. Pressed if he knew the child victim, he admitted that he knew her because she is a relative from his mother's side and her family lived about 50 meters away. Diaz then told the court that he was very surprised when he was suddenly arrested for rape, but he also admitted that he made no effort to confront BBB. 14
In his testimony, Nilo, who also happened to be Diaz's neighbor, claimed that his nephew was at his (Nilo's) house at the time of the alleged rape. He also admitted that his house was only about five arms' lengths away from the victim's house. 15
In a Judgment 16 dated May 16, 2017, the RTC found Diaz guilty of the crime of rape as alleged, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused LEO DIAZ, JR., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Accused is further directed to pay the private complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 for moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 17
Upon appeal, the CA rendered its Decision 18 dated February 27, 2019 affirming the conviction, but modifying the damages awarded to the complainant, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the May 16, 2017 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of ____________________________, finding accused-appellant Leo Diaz, Jr. a.k.a. "Negro" in Criminal Case No. 10446-G (I.S. No. 116-07-G) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that said accused-appellant is hereby ORDERED to PAY private complainant AAA the increased amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages with six percent (6%) interest from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 19
Hence, Diaz filed his Notice of Appeal, 20 which was given due course in a Resolution 21 dated April 12, 2019. In a Resolution 22 dated August 19, 2019, We noted the records of the case forwarded by the CA and notified the parties to file their respective Supplemental Briefs.
In separate Manifestations, the Office of the Solicitor General 23(OSG) and Diaz, 24 through counsel, stated that they were adopting their respective Briefs, in lieu of Supplemental Briefs. Meanwhile, in a Letter 25 dated November 14, 2019, the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) confirmed Diaz's detention at its Muntinlupa facility.
Issues
I.
Whether no grave error was committed in giving credence to private complainant AAA's testimony; and
II.
Whether no grave error was committed in convicting Diaz of statutory rape despite the prosecution's failure to prove the elements thereof.
The Court's Ruling
The Appeal should be denied.
Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. 26 The elements necessary in every prosecution for statutory rape are: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse of authority. Proof of force, intimidation, or consent is unnecessary because they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. 27 In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of statutory rape, and this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these findings. SDHTEC
The tender age of AAA was established by her Birth Certificate 28 and by the positive testimonies given in open court by AAA and BBB. Notably, the defense did not, in any instance, raise any question as to her age at the time the alleged rape occurred.
As to the second element, there is no doubt that carnal knowledge occurred between the accused-appellant and AAA. Her testimony that she woke up because of the strong liquor smell on her face and then saw the undressed accused-appellant who placed himself on top of her before inserting his penis into her vagina 29 is, without an iota of doubt, clear, straightforward and categorical.
As to whether there was force, threat or intimidation, these are presumed in the instant case particularly because AAA was below 12 years old at the time of the rape. 30 It is well-established that if the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but because the absence of free consent is presumed. 31 Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven as in the instant case. Thus:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good. 32
As regards the defense's contention that no physical evidence supported the claim of rape, We find this untenable. In cases of rape, mere proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum or lips of the female organ is sufficient to constitute a basis for conviction. 33 Moreover, rupture of the hymen or vaginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be consummated and an intact hymen does not negate a finding of rape. 34 Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest of contact is deemed rape.
In AAA's case, the medico legal found the entry into her vagina swollen almost three days after the rape. While this finding is not conclusive proof that rape was committed, it also does not support the claim that no rape occurred. However, the unwavering testimony of the child victim persuades Us without a doubt that she was indeed raped by the accused-appellant in the late hours of April 8, 2007. When a young girl like private complainant cries rape, she is saying in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed, 35 and jurisprudence holds that the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserves full credence and full probative weight. 36 In People v. Garcia, 37 it was explained that:
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction. 38
Moreover, there is nothing to show that AAA or her family were actuated by any ill motive to testify against accused-appellant. She simply stated that she knew him because they were neighbors and there is nothing in the records which would indicate that she was propelled by malice or forced into making the claim that she was sexually abused by the accused-appellant. Significantly, no young girl would concoct a sordid tale, undergo an invasive medical examination then subject herself to the stigma of embarrassment of a public trial if her motive was other than her fervent desire to seek justice. 39
Accused-appellant could only pose the twin defenses of denial and alibi against the minor victim's positive identification of him as her assailant. Set against AAA's positive testimony, the defense fails especially because denial and alibi are weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness. 40 Accused-appellant was unable to prove that he was not at the place of the crime when it occurred and he also failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place at the time of rape. He merely insisted that he was at his own home on the night of April 8, 2007. Even the defense witness' testimony was inconsistent with this claim. Contrary to accused-appellant's declaration that he was at his own house on that fateful night, his uncle testified that accused-appellant slept with him at his house because the latter usually accompanied him overnight. Regardless, both houses still placed accused-appellant only meters away from AAA's house. In addition, his uncle admitted that he was already asleep at the time the rape occurred and so even if accused-appellant did indeed stay at his house, he could not say with certainty if his nephew did not step out.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that all the elements of statutory rape have been proven in the instant case. The conviction of accused-appellant must be upheld.
Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A, of the RPC categorically states that the imposable penalty for statutory rape is reclusion perpetua. Hence, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, properly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant. AScHCD
With regards to the damages to be awarded, in rape cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the Court generally awards three kinds of damages: civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages. 41 Civil indemnity is mandatory 42 and jurisprudence has set it at P75,000.00. 43
Once the fact of rape is duly established, moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. 44 The amount of P75,000.00 is proper in keeping with recent jurisprudence. 45
While, ordinarily, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling would serve to increase the imposable penalty, the appropriate penalty in this case would still be reclusion perpetua because Article 63 of the RPC provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the deed." The exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 46 shall be awarded instead to set a public example and deter others from similar conduct.
Finally, all these amounts, as properly granted by the CA, shall earn interest of six percent (6%) perannum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10466, holding Leo Diaz, Jr. a.k.a. "Negro" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape, is AFFIRMED. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ORDERED to PAY private complainant AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 17.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi concurring; id. at 3-16.
3. CA rollo, pp. 33-52.
4. Records, pp. 2-3.
5. The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; R.A. No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children, effective November 15, 2004.
6. Records, p. 2.
7.Id. at 27.
8.Id. at 9.
9. TSN, AAA, September 20, 2011, pp. 3-8.
10. TSN, BBB, November 16, 2011, pp. 3-5.
11.Id. at 5.
12. TSN, AAA, September 20, 2011, pp. 9-10.
13. TSN, September 10, 2013, pp. 3-6; records, p. 12.
14. TSN, February 8, 2015, p. 4; TSN, June 1, 2015, pp. 3-4.
15. TSN, December 6, 2016, p. 7.
16. CA rollo, pp. 33-52.
17.Id. at 52.
18.Rollo, pp. 3-16.
19.Id. at 15.
20.Id. at 17-18.
21.Id. at 21.
22.Id. at 23.
23.Id. at 34-35.
24.Id. at 29-30.
25.Id. at 26.
26.People v. Brioso, 788 Phil. 292, 306 (2016).
27.People v. Deliola, 794 Phil. 194, 205 (2016).
28. Exhibit "C", Folder of Exhibits, p. 15.
29. TSN, September 20, 2011, p. 12.
30.People v. Gaa, 810 Phil. 860, 867 (2017).
31.People v. Bagsic, 822 Phil. 784, 797-798 (2017).
32.People v. Ronquillo, 818 Phil. 641, 684 (2017); People v. Arpon, 678 Phil. 752, 773 (2011). (Emphases ours)
33.People v. Bormeo, 292-A Phil. 691, 704 (1993).
34.People v. Tampos, 455 Phil. 844, 858 (2003).
35.People v. Balunsat, 640 Phil. 139, 158 (2010).
36.People v. Delos Reyes, 443 Phil. 782, 802 (2003).
37. 695 Phil. 576 (2012).
38.Id. at 588-589.
39.People v. Cuaycong, 718 Phil. 633, 645-646 (2013).
40.People v. Descartin, Jr., 810 Phil. 881, 894 (2017).
41.People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019; People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 849 (2016).
42. Revised Penal Code, Art. 100; People v. Teodoro, 704 Phil. 335, 358 (2013).
43.People v. Ronquillo, supra note 32, at 654.
44.People v. Ogan, 637 Phil. 468, 487 (2010).
45.People v. Tulagan, supra note 41; People v. Jugueta, supra note 41.
46.People v. Pagkatipunan, G.R. No. 232939, August 14, 2019.