THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 239143. February 20, 2019.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FELIPE IGAYA, JR. y SAUQUILLO @ "JUN," CRISOLITO DELOS SANTOS y BERLIN @ "CRIS," RADEN DELA CRUZ @ "KIRAT," REX DELA CRUZ AND CHARLIE DELOS SANTOS, accused; CRISOLITO DELOS SANTOS y BERLIN @ "CRIS", accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 20, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 239143 (People of the Philippines vs. Felipe Igaya, Jr. y Sauquillo @ "Jun," Crisolito Delos Santos y Berlin @ "Cris," Raden Dela Cruz @ "Kirat," Rex Dela Cruz and Charlie Delos Santos, accused; Crisolito Delos Santos y Berlin @ "Cris," accused-appellant). — Before the Court is an appeal 1 from the Decision 2 promulgated on November 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07638, affirming with modification accused-appellant Crisolito Delos Santos y Berlin's (Crisolito) conviction from the Decision 3 dated June 28, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, in Criminal Case No. 05-0390, for the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
The Facts
Appellant Crisolito, accused Felipe Igaya, Jr. (Felipe), Raden Dela Cruz (Raden), Rex Dela Cruz (Rex), and Charlie Delos Santos (Charlie) were indicted in an amended Information for Murder under Article 248 of the RPC. The accusatory portion of the Information 4 reads:
The undersigned Prosecution Attorney II accuses FELIPE IGAYA, JR. y SAUQUILLO @ JUN, CRISOLITO DELOS SANTOS y BERLIN @ CRIS, RADEN DELA CRUZ @ KIRAT, REX DELA CRUZ and CHARLIE DELOS SANTOS of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2005 in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, without any justifiable cause and with the use of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab, suddenly and without warning, one Benjamin Mosquera y Alvarez @ Mosque, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wound which caused his death. ISHCcT
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Accused Felipe and Crisolito were brought to court and arraigned on June 9, 2005 based on the original information. The rest of the accused remained at large.
Version of the Prosecution
On March 13, 2005, at around 7:00 p.m., victim Benjamin Mosquera (Benjamin) and Queen Palomares (Queen) were at the house of Danny Dologomanding (Danny). Victim Benjamin heard that Felipe wanted to see him. So, Benjamin went to Felipe's house. 6
When Benjamin arrived at the house of Felipe, the latter, Crisolito, Raden, Rex, and Charlie were drinking alcohol. Felipe pushed Benjamin. Crisolito stabbed Benjamin with a knife at the upper portion of the left arm, and punched Benjamin on the right side of the face thrice. Charlie then stabbed Benjamin at the right side of the stomach with a knife. Raden hacked Benjamin with a samurai sword at the side of Benjamin's body. Thereafter, Charlie ran away, while Crisolito went inside his (appellant Crisolito's) house. Benjamin ran to the house of Danny. 7
At the house of Danny, Queen heard somebody shouting, "Danny, Danny, may tama ako." Queen went out, and saw Benjamin holding the left side of his body, because Benjamin had been disemboweled. Queen asked Benjamin who stabbed him. Benjamin answered, "si Cris, si Charlie, at yong magkapatid na Rex at Kirat."8
Roberto Pabiles brought Benjamin to the hospital. Per the Certificate of Death, Benjamin expired on March 15, 2005 due to "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest; Multi organ failure; Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wound." 9
Version of the Defense
At around 4:00 p.m., March 13, 2005, Crisolito went home to sleep after participating in the election of the homeowners' association. At around 7:00 p.m. of the same day, Crisolito was awakened by a commotion outside his house. Crisolito was about to go outside the house, when his wife, Luz prevented him. Later, Crisolito heard somebody outside their house call out, "Lumabas ka diyan, lumabas ka dyan." Crisolito went outside, and saw police officers outside his house. The police officers arrested and brought Crisolito to the police station. At the police station, a woman whom Crisolito did not know at the time (later identified as Queen) pointed to Crisolito as the person who stabbed her husband Benjamin. 10
In a Decision 11 dated June 28, 2013, the RTC convicted Crisolito of the crime charged, but acquitted Felipe. The trial court opined that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the latter. The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Court —
1. ACQUITS [Felipe] of the crime of Murder.
2. FINDS [Crisolito] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under the above-quoted Amended Information and sentenced to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 248 of the [RPC].
3. ORDERS that warrants of arrest be issued against the other accused at-large: [Rex], [Charlie], and [Raden].
4. ORDERS [Crisolito] to pay the heirs of [Benjamin] the following amounts:
a) P161,500.00 as actual damages for hospitalization, funeral and burial expenses incurred;
b) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. CAacTH
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis in the original)
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision 13 dated November 16, 2017 reads:
We MODIFY the Decision dated 28 June 2013 of the [RTC], Branch 253, Las Piñas City, in Criminal Case No. 05-0390, as follows:
1. We find [Crisolito] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentence him to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua;
2. We order [Crisolito] to pay the heirs of victim [Benjamin] the following sums: a) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; b) Php75,000.00 as moral damages; c) Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and d) Php50,000.00 as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
IT IS SO ORDERED.14 (Emphases and italic in the original)
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of the appellate court and affirms the conviction of Crisolito for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC.
With respect to the penalties, however, the Court held in People v. Jugueta15 that for the crime of Murder where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the proper amounts should be Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, actual damages in the amount of Php161,500.00 should likewise be reinstated to compensate for all the hospitalization, funeral and burial expenses incurred.
In line with the Court's pronouncement in People v. Dion, 16 the Court likewise affirms the CA's imposition of interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards for damages, from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
Time and again, it has been held that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the courts will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court especially when the trial court's findings are fully supported by the evidence on record. 17
The Court affirms the factual findings of both lower courts in appreciating the element of abuse of superior strength in the killing.
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfil the common design to kill the victim. 18
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 19 IAETDc
In the present case, conspiracy among the malefactors and abuse of superior strength were established and proven, to wit:
Conspiracy was manifest from the joint attack successively made by appellant Crisolito, accused Charlie, and accused Raden, against the victim [Benjamin]. Further, the victim [Benjamin] identified his attackers in his dying declaration as appellant Crisolito, accused Charlie, accused Rex, and accused Raden.
Witness Richard positively identified appellant Crisolito as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Witness Richard testified: accused Felipe pushed victim [Benjamin]; appellant Crisolito stabbed the victim [Benjamin] with a knife at the upper portion of the left arm, and punched victim [Benjamin] three times; accused Charlie stabbed the victim [Benjamin] at the right side of the stomach with a knife; accused Raden hacked victim [Benjamin] at the side with a samurai sword. Per Autopsy Report N-05-213, and the testimony of Dr. San Diego, victim [Benjamin's] death was caused by "stab wound, back, left side." 20 (Citations omitted)
A dying declaration is the statement which refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death, made under the consciousness of an impending death. 21 It is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule 22 because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death makes it impossible for him to take the witness stand 23 and trustworthiness, for when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. 24 The requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration are: (1) the death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify; (4) the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry. 25 In the present case, all the requisites were met. The victim's declarations pertained to the identities of his assailants. At that time, he was bleeding with three stab wounds and his intestines were already coming out. He was a competent witness at the time of death. Thus, absent any showing that he suffered from any disqualification that would render his dying declaration inadmissible, the trial court correctly ruled on this matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07638, finding accused-appellant Crisolito Delos Santos y Berlin @ "Cris" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
Accused-appellant Crisolito Delos Santos y Berlin @ "Cris" is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Benjamin Mosquera y Alvarez the following amounts: 1) civil indemnity of Php75,000.00; 2) actual damages of Php161,500.00; 3) moral damages of Php75,000.00; 4) exemplary damages of Php75,000.00; and 5) an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this Resolution until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity and damages awarded. DcHSEa
SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., no part as she concurred in the assailed Court of Appeals' decision; Jardeleza, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2624-I dated January 28, 2019.)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 16-19.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (now a Member of this Court) and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring; id. at 2-15.
3. Rendered by Presiding Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 57-65.
4.Id. at 131.
5.Id. at 57-58.
6.Id. at 132.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 132-133.
9.Id. at 133.
10.Id. at 133.
11.Id. at 57-65.
12.Id. at 65.
13.Rollo, pp. 2-15.
14.Id. at 14.
15. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
16. 668 Phil. 333 (2011).
17.People v. Jugueta, supra note 15, at 816.
18.People v. Quinao, 336 Phil. 475, 488-489 (1997).
19.People v. Beduya, et al., 641 Phil. 399, 410 (2010).
20.Rollo, p. 9.
21. F. B. Moreno, Phil. Law Dictionary (3rd Ed. 1988) 300, citing People v. Lagtu, 194 Phil. 704, 710 (1981).
22. SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception except as otherwise provided in these rules.
23. People v. Bautista, 344 Phil. 158, 170-171 (1997); and People v. Sion, 342 Phil. 806, 826-827 (1997).
24. People v. Amaca, 342 Phil. 900, 910-911 (1997).
25. Id.