People v. Dela Paz

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 222475. * November 11, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs. CRISPIN DELA PAZ**AND GALICANO DATU III, respondents.

[G.R. No. 242343. November 11, 2021.]

CRISPIN DELA PAZ, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 11, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 222475 (People of the Philippines, petitioner v. Crispin Dela Paz and Galicano Datu III, respondents); and G.R. No. 242343 (Crispin Dela Paz, petitioner v. People of the Philippines, respondent).

Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which originated from the September 1, 2014 Orders, 2 granting the probation of respondents Crispin Dela Paz (Dela Paz) and Galicano Datu III (Datu), as well as the November 24, 2014 Resolution, 3 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution, all issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12-2065.

In G.R. No. 222475, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People, seeks the reversal of the July 8, 2015 4 and January 26, 2016 5 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138847 which denied petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) against the subject orders of the RTC. On the other hand, Dela Paz as the petitioner in G.R. No. 242343, appeals the March 1, 2018 Decision 6 and October 3, 2018 Resolution 7 of the CA which annulled and set aside same orders of the RTC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

Antecedents

The Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati City filed an Information dated November 27, 2012 before the RTC, charging Dela Paz, Datu and their co-accused Juan Alfonso L. Abastillas (Abastillas) and Osric M. Cabrera (Cabrera), with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), for conspiring to assault and fatally stab George Anikow (Anikow) with a knife. 8

Based on the witnesses' testimony, at around 4:00 in the morning of November 24, 2012, victim Anikow who was drunk, was denied entry at Gate Four of Bel-Air Village by Jose Saavedra (Saavedra), the security guard. Saavedra informed Anikow that he had to wait until 5:00 in the morning before he can enter. While Anikow was waiting at the gate, a Volvo Sports Utility Vehicle attempted to enter but Saavedra stopped the vehicle for identification and verification. Anikow suddenly interfered and told the driver of the vehicle, Abastillas, to present his ID. When Abastillas ignored Anikow and tried to move the vehicle forward, Anikow forcefully tapped the left side of the car. This prompted all the passengers of the vehicle, namely, Abastillas, Dela Paz, Datu and Cabrera, to alight therefrom. 9

After a heated verbal confrontation, Anikow threw a punch at one of the four men which resulted to a fight. Anikow ran towards the direction of Burgos Street, but Abastillas, Dela Paz, Datu and Cabrera chased him and tackled him to the ground. 10 Anikow fell to the ground after Dela Paz struck him. While Anikow was lying on prone position on the ground, Datu and Cabrera joined Dela Paz in striking him. Anikow was later found fatally stabbed on the neck. 11

Dr. Voltaire P. Nulud, who conducted the autopsy on Anikow and prepared the medico-legal report, testified that the cause of death was the stab wound on the neck that severed his carotid veins. 12 CAIHTE

Dela Paz and Datu claimed self-defense. 13 Abastillas presented four expert witnesses to prove that he was not the one who inflicted the fatal wound. 14 Cabrera did not present any evidence but merely adopted the evidence submitted by Dela Paz and Datu. 15

Ruling of the RTC

On July 2, 2014, the RTC acquitted Abastillas and Cabrera but found Dela Paz and Datu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of homicide. The fallo of the RTC decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused CRISPIN DELA PAZ y CHONG and GALICANO DATU III y SALAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of HOMICIDE, with the privilege mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender being appreciated in their favor, and the Court accordingly sentences them to suffer an indeterminate penalty from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, TO SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum, OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased GEORGE ANIKOW the following amounts: Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; Php300,000.00 as moral damages; Php25,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the costs.

For lack of evidence, accused OSRIC CABRERA y MALABANAN and JUAN ALFONSO ABASTILLAS y LOO are hereby ACQUITTED with costs de officio.

SO ORDERED. 16

On July 8, 2014, Dela Paz and Datu applied for probation. 17 On July 17, 2014, the RTC issued an order directing the Makati City Parole and Probation Office to conduct a post sentence investigation to determine whether Dela Paz and Datu were qualified and eligible for probation.

On August 29, 2014, Chief Parole and Probation Officer Lourdes C.F. Ballacillo (Ballacillo) submitted a post sentence investigation report (PSIR) of Datu favorably recommending that the latter be placed under probation for a period of three (3) years. 18 On September 1, 2014, Ballacillo submitted to the RTC another PSIR recommending that Dela Paz also be placed under probation for a period of three (3) years. 19

On September 1, 2014, the RTC issued three (3) orders, namely: (1) an order granting Dela Paz' application for probation; 20 (2) an order granting Datu's application for probation; 21 and (3) an order releasing the cash bail bond posted by Dela Paz and Datu.

On September 8, 2014, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Orders, 22 but the motion was denied by the RTC in its Resolution dated November 24, 2014. 23

Aggrieved, the People, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. 24 The People prayed for the nullification of the September 1, 2014 and November 24, 2014 RTC Orders and for the issuance of a TRO/WPI enjoining the RTC from enforcing the said orders for the release of Dela Paz and Datu on probation.

Ruling of the CA

On July 8, 2015, the CA issued a resolution denying the prayer for provisional injunctive relief because the act sought to be enjoined has already become fait accompli. 25 The CA held that under Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, the decision of the RTC had become final on July 8, 2014 when Dela Paz and Datu applied for probation. The People moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same through a Resolution dated January 26, 2016. 26

Not in conformity with the CA orders, the People filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 222475.

On March 1, 2018 and while G.R. No. 222475 remained pending before the Court, the CA rendered its decision on CA-G.R. SP No. 138847, annulling and setting aside the RTC orders which granted Dela Paz's and Datu's application for probation. 27 The CA ruled that while Dela Paz and Datu are not disqualified for probation under Sec. 9 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 968, 28 the trial court should consider the criteria set in Sec. 8 of the same law. The CA further held that probation is availed by penitent offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated. However, the CA noted that the PSIRs showed that both Dela Paz and Datu stood by their innocence. As such, they cannot be considered as penitent offenders. 29

Furthermore, the CA declared that the report of the Probation and Parole Office is not the only basis for the grant of probation since it is at best only persuasive. 30 It also held that probation is not granted if it will depreciate the seriousness of the crime committed, as in this case. 31 DETACa

The dispositive portion of the now assailed CA decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated September 1, 2014 and November 24, 2014 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is hereby directed to cause the arrest of CRISPIN DELA PAZ and GALICANO DATU III for them to begin service of their sentence as imposed in the Judgment dated July 2, 2014 in Criminal Case No. 12-2065 without further delay.

SO ORDERED. 32

Dela Paz and Datu moved for reconsideration 33 of the CA decision but their motion was denied by the CA through a Resolution dated October 3, 2018. 34

Undaunted, Dela Paz appealed the March 1, 2018 Decision and October 3, 2018 Resolution of the CA via a petition for review, now docketed as G.R. No. 242343.

On December 5, 2018, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 222475 and G.R. No. 242343, since both petitions involve identical parties and assail the resolutions and decision rendered by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 138847. 35

Issues

Whether the CA gravely erred in nullifying the September 1, 2014 Orders of the RTC which granted probation to Dela Paz and Datu on the ground that such orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling of the Court

The consolidated petitions are DENIED.

G.R. No. 222475 is denied for

It should be recalled that the People elevated the subject orders of the trial court to the CA by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with an additional prayer for the issuance of a TRO/WPI. On the other hand, the instant petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 222475, primarily assails the CA Resolutions dated July 8, 2015 and January 26, 2016 which denied the prayer for TRO/WPI enjoining the RTC from enforcing the order granting the application for probation of Dela Paz and Datu. There is no doubt that the CA resolutions being assailed are mere interlocutory orders.

Evidently, the petition deserves to be dismissed outright for being a wrong remedy. Rule 45 governs appeals from final orders, judgments or resolutions, not interlocutory orders. 36 An interlocutory order does not adjudicate the case with finality and leaves substantial proceedings still to be had. 37 The Court has distinguished certiorari under Rule 45, as a mode of appeal of final orders, judgment or decisions on the merits of the case, as compared to certiorari as an original action under Rule 65, which may be directed against interlocutory orders. 38 As such, the proper remedy of the People was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a petition for review under Rule 45.

Even if the Court exercises liberality and treats the instant petition as filed under Rule 65, it is still dismissible as it has been rendered moot and academic. There is nothing for the Court to resolve inasmuch as the matter of dispute has already been overtaken by subsequent events. 39 As borne by the records, the CA rendered a final judgment annulling the RTC orders which granted Dela Paz's application for probation, and consequently ordered the arrest of Dela Paz and Datu. In fact, Dela Paz filed a petition to question the revocation of his probation. Verily, G.R. No. 222475 should be dismissed.

The revocation of the probation

To put the case in proper perspective, the Court's jurisdiction in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is confined to determining whether the CA properly ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting Dela Paz's application for bail. 40 Notably, Dela Paz's petition prays for the determination of his qualification for probation, which is essentially a fact-finding function, which is beyond the ambit of the Court in the present petition for review on certiorari. While the Court may, at exceptional circumstances, delve into the re-assessment of the facts of the case, Dela Paz failed to raise any exempting circumstance. Moreover, upon careful evaluation, the Court finds no grave error on the part of the CA which would warrant the reversal of its decision.

The grant of probation is not a matter of right. Probation is a mere privilege granted to the convict based on the sound discretion of the court. Essentially, probation is an act of grace and immunity conferred by the state upon a deserving convict with the primary aim of reforming the probationer and at the same time ensuring that the end of justice and the best interest of the public are served. 41

The purpose of the Probation Law is embodied in Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 968, which states that: aDSIHc

Section 2. Purpose. — This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:

(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment;

(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and

(c) prevent the commission of offenses.

Relatedly, Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 968 provides for the criteria in placing an offender on probation. We quote:

Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. — In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:

(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or

(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or

(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.

In his petition in G.R. No. 242343, Dela Paz argues that the CA erred in revoking the probation granted by the RTC on the ground that he is a non-penitent offender and the grant of probation had depreciated the seriousness of the crime committed. Dela Paz asserts that his insistence of his innocence in delivering the fatal blow to Anikow does not mean that he is non-penitent of the death of Anikow considering that there is dearth of evidence which would prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was the one who inflicted the fatal blow on Anikow. Dela Paz bemoans that he is genuinely remorseful that Anikow died during the fateful incident. Dela Paz further claims that he has strictly and faithfully complied with all the terms and conditions of his probation and engaged in productive activities thus proving that he has been rehabilitated and reformed by the process thru probation. 42

Dela Paz's arguments fail to persuade.

It bears stressing that probation is granted only to the deserving. Under Philippine law, probation is granted to give opportunity to "penitent offenders" to reform and to rehabilitate. 43 Truly, offenders who pled not guilty to the offenses charged against them cannot be faulted from interposing evidence during trial to prove their innocence. Even those who were convicted in the trial courts and subsequently appealed the case with the objective of either assailing the propriety of the penalties or that he is only guilty of a lesser offense in order to reduce it to a probationable offense and not to profess guiltlessness may still be considered penitent offenders who may qualify for probation. 44

However, in the case of Dela Paz, he incessantly insisted on his innocence and the lack of sufficient evidence to support the fact that he killed the victim as shown in the PSIR and even in his present petition. Thus, there can be no error that may be ascribed to the CA in finding that Dela Paz's claim of innocence and assertion of lack of clear evidence that he stabbed the victim are inconsistent with the concept of "penitence" or remorse, repentance, contrition or guilt. 45 The rationale of the Probation Law is very clear: only qualified penitent offenders are allowed to apply for probation.

We likewise concur with the CA that the grant of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offense.

The potentiality of the offender to reform is not the only basis and most important consideration in the grant or denial of probation. Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest must also be observed. 46 Otherwise stated, judicial discretion in the grant of probation necessitates that the court must effect a sentence which will serve both the public and the penitent offender. In effect, in the determination of whether probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, there must be a balance between the privilege granted to the penitent offender on one hand, and the service of justice and the best interest of the public on the other. In the United States case of State v. Bingham, 47 it was held that the death of a victim is not in itself sufficient to deny alternative sentencing such as probation. There must be "evidence in the record that indicates that the circumstances of the offense, as committed, were especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature of the offense outweighs all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement."

Here, aside from the lack of remorse on the part of Dela Paz on his role in the death of Anikow, there is no doubt that the circumstances on how the offense or the killing of Anikow was committed are considered reprehensible, violent and so horrifying in nature, so as to outweigh all other factors that would have warranted the grant of probation. The findings and ratiocinations of the CA vividly described the violent death Anikow suffered under the hands of Dela Paz and Datu. We quote:

Here, the private respondents were found to have struck Anikow at his neck while on the ground with a knife. The stab wound was so lethal that it caused blood spurts of up to eight (8) feet high on the perimeter walls of Bel-Air Village and on the nearby Meralco post. The wounds sustained by Anikow were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. Considering the weapon used, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that the accused inflicted on Anikow, the respondent Court had no reasonable doubt about private respondents' intent to kill.

To allow respondents dela Paz and Datu to be placed under probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. The circumstances surrounding the killing of Anikow showed the gravity of the crime and to grant probation to the perpetrators would clearly diminish its seriousness. The evidence at the trial established that Anikow was stabbed, kicked and punched multiple times, even after he had disengaged from his attackers and unable to defend himself or retaliate, resulting in his death. The nature of the crime of homicide and the manner of its commission, is undoubtedly serious. 48

The Court likewise concurs with the CA that the grant or denial of an application for probation is not solely based on the report or recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only persuasive. 49 Noticeably, in granting Dela Paz's and Datu's application for probation, the RTC primarily relied on the favorable PSIRs submitted by Parole and Probation Officer II Ma. Rowena C. Cahandig. The RTC cannot merely rely on the PSIRs considering that it is granted the discretion and the power to fully decide on this matter. 50 The trial court must make its own findings on the merits of the application taking into account all the criteria set forth in Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 968. Had the RTC done so, other than merely relying on the PSIR and granting the application for probation based on the favorable recommendation of the probation and parole officer, it would have found Dela Paz unqualified for probation under the Probation Law. ETHIDa

Grave abuse of discretion connotes a whimsical, capricious and arbitrary judgment, done with manifest disregard of basic rules or procedures or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 51 In the light of the foregoing discussion, the CA properly ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting Dela Paz's application for probation.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Court hereby AFFIRMS the following:

(a) Resolutions dated July 8, 2015 and January 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138847, which denied the People's prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; and,

(b) Decision dated March 1, 2018 and Resolution dated October 3, 2018 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 138847, which nullified the grant of probation in favor of Crispin Dela Paz and Galicano Datu III for being issued by the Regional Trial Court with grave abuse of discretion.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

* Part of the Supreme Court Decongestion Program.

** Also appear as "Crispin Dela Paz, Jr." in some parts of the Rollo.

1. Rollo (G.R. No. 222475), pp. 11-25; rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 9-32.

2. Rollo (G.R. No. 222475), pp. 35-36 and 38-39; issued by Presiding Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

3. Rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 124-130; rendered by Presiding Judge Winlove M. Dumayas.

4. Rollo (G.R. No. 222475), pp. 30-32; penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.

5. Id. at 33-34.

6. Rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 37-52; penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.

7. Id. at 71-75.

8. Id. at 76.

9. Id. at 39-40.

10. Id. at 40.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 88.

13. Id. at 91.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id. at 102.

17. Rollo (G.R. No. 222475), pp. 195-196.

18. Id. at 202-209.

19. Id. at 211-218.

20. Id. at 35-36.

21. Id. at 38-39.

22. Id. at 221-225.

23. Rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 124-130.

24. Id. at 131-176.

25. Rollo (G.R. No. 222475), pp. 30-32.

26. Id. at 33-34.

27. Rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 37-52.

28. Id. at 47.

29. Id. at 48.

30. Id. at 49.

31. Id. at 50-51.

32. Id. at 51.

33. Id. at 58-70.

34. Id. at 71-75.

35. Rollo (G.R. No. 222475), p. 396.

36. Calleja v. Panday, 518 Phil. 801, 808 (2006).

37. Phil. Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 540 Phil. 142, 156 (2006).

38. Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 208283, June 19, 2019.

39. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.), 791 Phil. 243, 259 (2016).

40. Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 649 Phil. 331, 342 (2010).

41. Santos v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 642, 652 (1999).

42. Rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 18-25.

43. Dimakuta v. People, 771 Phil. 641, 663 (2015).

44. Id. at 666-667.

45. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/penitence (accessed October 1, 2021).

46. Tolentino v. Hon. Alconcel, 206 Phil. 79, 81 (1983).

47. 910 S.W.2d 448, 454 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

48. Rollo (G.R. No. 242343), pp. 50-51.

49. Id. at 49.

50. Ching v. Ching, G.R. No. 240843, June 3, 2019.

51. Pascua v. People, G.R. No. 250578, September 7, 2020.