People v. Dela Cruz y Mammuad

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 245250. December 6, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE DELA CRUZ y MAMMUAD, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated December 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 245250(People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Vicente Dela Cruz y Mammuad, Accused-Appellant). — This Court resolves an appeal 1 from the Decision 2 dated 23 October 2018, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR No. 09132. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated 27 September 2016, rendered by Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, in Criminal Case Nos. 15677 and 15678, finding accused-appellant Vicente dela Cruz y Mammuad (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 4 otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

Antecedents

Accused-appellant was indicted in two (2) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 15677-13

That on or about the (sic) 9:40 P.M. of September 23, 2013 in the City of Laoag and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to a police poseur-buyer two (2) small heat sealed plastic sachet (sic) containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as 'shabu,' a dangerous drug with an aggregate weight of 0.0736 grams, without any license or authority; in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Criminal Case No. 15678-13

That on or about 9:40 P.M. of September 23, 2013 in the City of Laoag and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession, custody and control, one (1) pc. heat sealed plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as 'shabu,' a dangerous drug, weighing 0.0935 grams; without any license or authority; in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Consequently, pre-trial and trial on the merits then ensued. 7

Version of the Prosecution

At around 9:40 in the evening of 23 September 2013, a male police asset visited the Laoag Police Station. He informed Police Officer 3 Arnel Saclayan (PO3 Saclayan) that a certain Vic-Vic, later identified as accused-appellant, sold him illegal drugs, which the latter would deliver at LC's Miki located at P. Gomez Street, Brgy. 8, Laoag City. Thereupon, PO3 Saclayan organized a buy-bust team, headed by Police Officer 2 Lawrence Ganir (PO2 Ganir), the designated poseur buyer, with Police Officer 1 Engelbert Ventura (PO1 Ventura) as one of the backup officers. After preparation, the buy-bust team and the asset went to the target area. Their vehicle parked around 20 meters away from the place of the transaction while PO2 Ganir and the asset went on foot toward LC's Miki. 8

At LC's Miki, PO2 Ganir and the asset met accused-appellant, then accompanied by his brother-in-law, Patrick Dimaya (Patrick). After a brief exchange of pleasantries, the asset asked accused-appellant about his order. The asset also informed accused-appellant that it was PO2 Ganir who would purchase the order. 9 Accused-appellant thus brought out two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and handed the same to PO2 Ganir in exchange for the marked money amounting to Php1,000.00. 10 DHITCc

PO2 Ganir put the items in his pocket 11 and immediately grabbed the hands of accused-appellant and arrested the latter. He then conducted a body search on accused-appellant and obtained from the latter another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Meanwhile, the backup officers rushed to the scene and chased after Patrick, who was trying to flee. 12

Subsequently, the police officers brought accused-appellant and Patrick to the police station for investigation. PO2 Ganir turned over the confiscated items to Senior Police Officer 1 Jonathan Alonzo (SPO1 Alonzo), the evidence custodian of the Laoag Police Station. 13 Later, SPO1 Alonzo brought the seized items to the crime laboratory and turned over the same to Police Officer 3 Melvin Reyes for examination. He placed his marking MRR on each plastic sachet before turning them over to the forensic chemist, Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro (P/Insp. Navarro), for medical examination. 14 The confiscated items turned out positive for the presence of "shabu." 15 After the examination, P/Insp. Navarro resealed the seized items and marked them each with "D-109-2013-IN," her signature, date of examination, and labels of the specimen "A-1" to "A-3." After that, she turned them over to Police Officer 3 John Edwin Padayao (PO3 Padayao), the evidence custodian of the crime laboratory, who eventually delivered the confiscated items to the court. 16

During his testimony, PO2 Ganir claimed, among other things, that the buy-bust team did the marking, photographing, and inventory at the police station because the buy-bust took place at night time, and there was not enough lighting in the area. Moreover, despite earnest efforts exerted to secure their presence, the required witnesses were unavailable that night to witness the buy-bust operation and inventory. 17

The parties agreed to dispense with the testimonies of PI Navarro and PO3 Padayao. 18

Version of the Defense

Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him. He insisted that no buy-bust took place and that a certain Karen Ventura (Karen) framed her because she owed her money from the furniture he sold her. 19

According to accused-appellant, on the night he was arrested, he and Patrick were on their way to a wake to gamble. He received a call from Karen, who then told him to drop by her house to get her payment for the debt she owed him. Consequently, they decided to drop by her place first. When he and Patrick reached LC's Miki, someone flagged them. Karen told them to park their motorcycle at the side and wait outside. However, right after Karen left, two (2) men, who turned out to be PO2 Ganir and PO1 Ventura, came out of nowhere and grabbed him and Patrick. The police officers accused them of selling shabu in the area. They denied the allegation, but the police officers still handcuffed and frisked them. The police officers then boarded them in a vehicle and brought them to the police station. There, he and Patrick were separated. Despite accused-appellant's claim of innocence, the police officers showed him a sachet of shabu, took pictures of him, and put him in jail. 20

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Vicente dela Cruz y Mammuad GUILTY as charged in both cases and is accordingly sentenced to suffer as follows:

(1) for illegal sale of shabu as charged in Criminal Case No. 15677, the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php500,000.00); and

(2) for illegal possession of shabu weighing 0.0935 gram as charged in Criminal Case No. 15678, the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php300,000.00)

The three plastic sachets of shabu are forfeited for proper disposition as the law prescribes.

SO ORDERED. 21

The RTC held that accused-appellant was validly arrested without a warrant as he was caught in flagrante delicto selling prohibited drugs. 22 It found the testimonies of the police officers credible enough despite some noticeable, albeit minor, discrepancies and inconsistencies. 23 According to the trial court, accused-apellant's version is not only self-serving but also fabricated as it was effectively refuted by the testimony of Patrick, his own witness, who testified that Karen wanted to meet them at a convenience store, not at LC's Miki. 24 In addition, the RTC pointed out that accused-appellant betrayed his own defense by admitting that he once accompanied Karen in buying shabu. Finally, the RTC found it difficult to believe that Karen would implicate accused-appellant in a serious case just because she could not pay her debt to him. 25 cEaSHC

Regarding the chain of custody of the confiscated items, the RTC noted the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, but pointed out that the police officers adequately preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items. Also, the police officers gave a sufficient justification for their deviation. As testified to by PO2 Gamir, while the required witnesses were not available, there were some media personalities at the police station, although the police officers no longer let them sign the inventory. 26

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 27

Like the RTC, the CA found accused-appellant's story unfounded and thus brushed aside his defenses of denial and frame-up. On the other hand, it gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers who were presumed to have regularly performed their duty. The CA likewise agreed with the RTC that accused-appellant failed to show ill-motive on the part of the police officers in arresting him and charging him with serious offenses. 28

Insofar as the chain of custody rule was concerned, the CA echoed the findings of the RTC. Moreover, it held that PO2 Ganir adequately explained the police officers' deviation from the strict requirements of the law. 29 It further emphasized that the failure of the police officers to follow the rules strictly was of no moment considering that they had sufficiently preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. 30

Issue

The issue for this Court's resolution is whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is granted.

In drug cases, case law consistently instructs that the identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. 31 Conviction is on shaky grounds if there is lingering doubt on the identity of the drugs in question. 32 If the identity and integrity of the seized drugs are questionable at inception, then the manner in which they are subsequently handled becomes irrelevant as lingering doubt would always follow the corpus delicti. 33

Since the accused-appellant allegedly committed the offenses on 23 September 2013, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) shall apply to determine whether the prosecution sufficiently established the corpus delicti. 34

The law mandates, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law further requires that the said inventory and photographing of the items seized be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official. 35 Moreover, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. This is to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs. 36

Compliance with these requirements forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering with evidence in any manner. Non-compliance, on the other hand, is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, thus, engendering the acquittal of an accused. 37

In this case, both the RTC and CA noted the police officers' palpable non-compliance with the strict requirements of Section 21, particularly with the marking and inventory at the place of arrest, as well as the presence of the required witnesses. As PO2 Ganir himself confessed during the testimony, he did the marking and inventory at the police station during trial on the merits because it was already nighttime, and there was hardly illumination at the place of arrest. Moreover, considering that it was already nighttime and given that the buy-bust operation was done at the spur of the moment, there was not enough time for them to secure the presence of any of the required witnesses during the buy-bust operation and the inventory at the police station.

Based on the established facts and evidence, the excuse given by the police officers is unacceptable.

To be sure, the Court has repeatedly held that the first link in the chain of custody is breached when the buy-bust team failed to immediately mark the seized drugs, to conduct a physical inventory, and to photograph the same after the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. 38 It puts into question whether the drug may have been switched, tampered with, altered, or substituted. 39 It is only when the marking at the place of arrest is not practicable that the IRR allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the apprehending team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending police officer/team. 40

Consequently, the prosecution is thus obligated to establish that the deviations from these explicit requirements were done due to extraordinary circumstances which would threaten the safety and security of the apprehending officers and/or the witnesses required by law or of the items seized, such as: that their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; that their safety during the inventory and photography of the seized illegal drugs were threatened by immediate retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault; or that the elected public officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended. 41 CTIEac

In this case, no extraordinary circumstance warranted a deviation from the rules. That it was nighttime did not justify the police officers' failure to mark the evidence immediately at the place of arrest. Marking of the confiscated item is a pretty straightfoward process. It is implausible that PO2 Ganir could not do it at the place of arrest, there being no threat to his safety. If there was poor illumination, he ought to have been resourceful under the circumstances if he really intended to comply with the exacting standard of the law. Besides, even assuming it to be true, for the sake of argument, that he was precluded from complying with the stringent requirement only because of insufficient illumination in the area, this fact would even militate against the prosecution. Verily, if PO2 Ganir could not do the marking because of insufficient lighting, it is undoubtedly much more highly improbable for him to identify with reasonable accuracy the minuscule content of the sachets purportedly handed by accused-appellant to him.

The unjustified non-compliance by the police officers with this rule allows doubt to permeate the Court's mind as to the truth and legitimacy of the conduct of the entrapment operation and the identity evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. As the seized items remain unmarked on the way to the police station, tampering, alteration, or substitution was very likely or possible. This doubt is all the more heightened considering that none of the required witnesses accompanied the entrapment team during the buy-bust operations. Neither were the required witnesses present during the marking and inventory.

It must be emphasized that the requirement to conduct the inventory and take photographs "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the required witnesses must also be present during the seizure. 42 The presence of the insulating witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation would have belied any doubt about the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. 43 Considering that they were not around during the buy-bust operations, it became crucial for the police officers to strictly comply with the marking and inventory requirements to help eliminate serious doubt about the identity and integrity of the seized items.

Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR provides that "non-compliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." However, for this provision to apply, the prosecution must (1) recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and (2) be able to justify the same. 44

However, the prosecution cannot successfully invoke the saving clause in this case given the prosecution's failure to offer a justifiable ground for the buy-bust team's flagrant non-observance of Section 21 of RA 9165. Even considering for the sake of argument that the absence of all the required witnesses may have been justified in view of the time constraint and urgency of the matter, there was completely no justification for the police officers for their failure to comply with the marking and inventory requirements.

The Court emphasizes again that proof beyond reasonable doubt is imperative to sustain a conviction in criminal cases. 45 This requisite quantum of proof is borne by the constitutional imperative of due process. It is also in keeping with the presumption of innocence of an accused until the contrary is proved. 46 Consequently, the prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presumption. 47 While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not demand absolute, impeccable, and infallible certainty, it still requires moral certainty. 48 The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged. 49

Corollarily, it is well-settled that the conviction of an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense. 50 Hence, the duty is on the prosecution to justify any lapse in the chain of custody regardless of the failure of the defense to question the same. The prosecution's failure to comply cannot simply be rectified by casually applying the presumption of regularity of the performance of official duty in favor of the arresting officers as this presumption cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. 51 Furthermore, the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty, 52 not when there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police officers, 53 such as in this case.

When the identity of corpus delicti is jeopardized by non-compliance with Section 21, as in this case, critical elements of the offense of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs remain wanting. It follows then, that this non-compliance justifies an accused's acquittal. 54

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 23 October 2018, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 09132, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Vicente Dela Cruz y Mammuad is hereby ACQUITTED for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. SaCIDT

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. He is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.

The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this Resolution, and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED." (Inting, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated 15 November 2021; Vice Carandang, J., who recused herself for having penned the Court of Appeals Decision.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 17-19; Notice of Appeal, 12 November 2018.

2. Id. at 3-16; Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari Carandang (now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a member of this Court) of the Court of Appeals, Third (3rd) Division, Manila.

3. CA rollo, pp. 82-103; Penned by Presiding Judge Philip Salvador.

4. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on 23 January 2002.

5. Rollo, p. 4.

6. Id.

7. CA rollo, p. 83.

8. Rollo, p. 6.

9. Id. at 63-64; See pp. 08-09 of Accused-Appellant's Brief, citing TSN dated 02 July 2014 (not attached to the petition).

10. Id. at 6.

11. Id. at 65; See p. 10 of Accused-Appellant's Brief, citing TSN dated 02 July 2014.

12. Id. at 6-7.

13. Id. at 5.

14. CA Rollo, p. 100.

15. Rollo, pp. 5, 7.

16. CA Rollo, pp. 60, 101.

17. Rollo, p. 13; See also CA rollo, p. 67.

18. Id. at 5.

19. Id. at 8.

20. Id.

21. CA Rollo, p. 103.

22. Id. at 86.

23. Id. at 92-94.

24. Id. at 95.

25. Id. at 96.

26. Id. at 99.

27. Rollo, p. 15.

28. Id. at 10-11.

29. Id. at 11-12.

30. Id.

31. People of the Philippines v. Saidamen Olimpain Mama, G.R. No. 237204, 01 October 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].

32. See People of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 241950, 10 April 2019 [Per J. Reyes, J. Jr.].

33. Id.

34. RA 9165 was later amended by RA 10640, otherwise known as "AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'" approved on July 15, 2014. In People v. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018), RA 10640, the Court noted that the amendatory law, which was approved on 15 July 2014, stated that it shall "take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation." A copy of the law was then published on 23 July 2014 in the respective issues of "The Philippine Star" (Vol. XXVIII, No. 359, Philippine Star Metro section, p. 21) and the "Manila Bulletin" (Vol. 499, No. 23; World News section, p. 6). Hence, RA 10640 became effective on 07 August 2014.

35. See People of the Philippines v. Baradi, G.R. No. 238522, 01 October 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].

36. See People of the Philippines v. Patacsil, G.R. No. 234052, 06 August 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].

37. See People of the Philippines v. Adobar, G.R. No. 222559, 06 June 2018 [Per J. Caguioa]; Citations omitted.

38. See People of the Philippines v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 228893, 26 November 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo]; Emphasis supplied.

39. See People of the Philippines v. Cupcupin, G.R. No. 236454 (Notice), 05 December 2019.

40. See People of the Philippines v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 229046, 11 September 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].

41. See People of the Philippines v. Sioson, G.R. No. 242686, 07 July 2020 [Per J. Reyes, J. Jr.].

42. Supra at note 34.

43. See People of the Philippines v. Tomawis, 830 Phil. 385 (2018), G.R. No. 228890, 18 April 2018 [Per J. Caguioa].

44. See People of the Philippines v. Ordiz, G.R. No. 206767, 11 September 2019 [Per J. Caguioa]; Emphasis in the original.

45. De Guzman v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240475, 24 July 2019 [Per J. Leonen].

46. Id.

47. People of the Philippines v. Baya, G.R. No. 240428 (Notice), 11 September 2019.

48. Supra at note 41.

49. See Daayata v. People of the Philippines, 807 Phil. 102 (2017), G.R. No. 205745, 08 March 2017 [Per J. Leonen].

50. See People of the Philippines v. Bartolini, G.R. No. 215192, 27 July 2016 [Per J. Carpio].

51. See People of the Philippines v. Reyes, 797 Phil. 671 (2016), G.R. No. 199271, 19 October 2016 [Per J. Bersamin].

52. See People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749 (2014), G.R. No. 192432, 23 June 2014 [Per J. Bersamin].

53. See People of the Philippines v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603 (2012), G.R. No. 189330, November 28, 2012 [Per J. Bersamin].

54. SeePeople of the Philippines v. Que, 824 Phil. 882 (2018), G.R. No. 212994, 31 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen].