People v. De Juan y Rico

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 252864. September 29, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NESTOR DE JUAN y RICO, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252864 — People of the Philippines v. Nestor De Juan y Rico

The appeal must fail.

Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 1viz.:

Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

5. With evident premeditation.

Murder requires the following elements: 1) a person was killed; 2) the accused killed him or her; 3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and 4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 2

There is no question here as to the presence of the first and fourth elements. Ireneo Adao (Ireneo) and Montano Adao (Montano) were killed and appellant (Nestor De Juan y Rico) had no relation to the victims that could have otherwise resulted in the crime of parricide or infanticide. We, therefore, focus on the second and third elements.

Elena Adao positively identified appellant

Prosecution's lone witness Elena Adao (Elena) positively identified appellant and one Allan Placido (Allan) as the persons who killed Ireneo and Montano: 3 AScHCD

Q: Madam Witness, do you know Nestor De Juan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How about Allan Placido?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why do you know them?

A: Because they are from San Pedro, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro and I used to meet them during those times that I was selling, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: If Nestor De Juan is in court, would you be able to identify him?

A: (witness points at a person who when asked of his name identified himself as Nestor De Juan)

xxx xxx xxx

Q: On June 13, 2000 at around 9:30 in the evening, can you tell where were you on that time and date?

A: I was inside our house at that time, sir.

Q: How about your husband Ireneo Adao, do you know where he was at that time and date?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where was he?

A: My husband Ireneo at that time had just arrived in our house on said time and date from my mother's house when accused Allan Placido and Nestor De Juan suddenly arrivedand while my husband was entering my house in order to go to sleep, the two (2) accused alternately hacked my husband, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You want to tell us that after your husband was hacked inside the house, he ran outside the house where he was continuously hacked x x x?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: When you heard your husband asking for help, where was your son Montano at that time?

xxx xxx xxx

A: My son Montano went outside the house ahead of me, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When your son Montano was already outside the house, what happened to him?

xxx xxx xxx

A: Allan Placido hit my son with the butt of the firearm on his nape once and hacked him twice, Your Honor.

Q: While your son Montano was hit with the butt of the gun and hacked with the use of a bolo what [did] the other accused Nestor De Juan do?

A: Nestor De Juan at that time was standing by the door of our house and was waiting for me to get also outside the house, Your Honor.

Q: When you were about to get outside the house, what did Nestor De Juan do?

A: Nestor De Juan clubbed me with the use of a piece of wood but I was able to parry away and I ran away and he again clubbed me on the back of my head and I fell in the canal and los[t] consciousness, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Before you los[t] consciousness, did you see what were the positions of your husband and your son?

A: Before I los[t] consciousness, what I saw was the accused Allan Placido was on top of my husband, with respect to my son, I was not able to see where he was, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While Allan Placido was on top of him, what was Allan Placido doing?

A: While he was on top of my husband, he was hacking him, Your Honor.

(Emphasis supplied)

To be sure, Elena did not waver in her narration and remained consistent in her positive identification of appellant and his co-accused as perpetrators of the killing. Sans any ill motive to implicate appellant to this gruesome crime, Elena's credibility must, perforce, be upheld. 4 Her credible and positive identification of appellant, even standing alone, is already sufficient to convict him of the crime charged. 5

As it was though, the credible testimony of Elena is not the only inculpatory evidence against appellant. It finds full corroboration in the medical findings of Dr. Ma. Virginia Valdez (Dr. Valdez) who confirmed that she did an autopsy on the bodies of the victims. In her post-mortem examination report, 6 she stated that Ireneo died of hypovolemic shock due to multiple hack wounds severing the major blood vessels. On the other hand, Montano's death was caused by hypovolemic shock due to cerebral hemorrhage caused by a depressed fracture in the occipital region. In Bautista v. CA and the People, 7 the Court was convinced that it was the accused who killed the victim because the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained fatal wounds firmly corroborated the eyewitness' account regarding the killing.

Appellant, nonetheless, asserts that Elena could not have actually seen the assailants' faces considering that their house was only illuminated by a kerosene lamp, while outside, there was only moonlight.

The argument fails.

Visibility is indeed a vital factor in determining whether an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. When conditions of visibility are favorable, and a witness does not appear to be biased, his or her assertion regarding the identity of the malefactor is worthy of credence. 8 The Court also invariably ruled that illumination produced by kerosene lamp or even moonlight are sufficient to allow identification of persons. 9 Thus, considering the sufficient illumination from the kerosene lamp as well as the moonlight, and Elena's proximity to her family and the assailants, she could have easily seen and recognized the killers who mercilessly attacked her and her family. 10

In any event, as against the positive identification of Elena, and the medical findings of Dr. Valdez, appellant merely offered the defense of denial. Appellant insists that on June 13, 2000, he went to his sister's house and stayed there because he was harvesting palay. 11 Around 9:30 in the evening, he heard someone screaming for help. About ten (10) meters away from his sister's house, 12 he noticed two (2) lifeless bodies. He also saw a person carrying a bolo and a firearm. 13 He later realized that the armed person was Allan, his co-worker. 14 The following day, he immediately fled and went to Roxas, Oriental Mindoro because Allan allegedly threatened to kill him and his family if he would testify against him. AcICHD

Appellant's bare denial fails to persuade.

We reiterate that a positive identification of the accused necessarily prevails over the defense of denial 15 which is inherently weak and easy to concoct. 16 Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law as in this case. 17

Notably, appellant's abrupt disappearance from the crime scene is contrary to his professed innocence but highly indicative of his guilt. 18 He learned about his indictment in 2000. Yet, he only came forward in 2008 or eight (8) years later to purportedly seek protection from Barangay Captain Ronel Sescar. As keenly noted by the trial court:

The asseverations of the accused Nestor de Juan that he fled from the crime scene immediately after the killing incident and went to the municipality of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro because his co-accused Allan Placido was threatening to cause harm on him and will kill his family is unbelievable and not worthy of credit. To the mind of the Court, what said accused should do was to immediately report what he saw to the police authorities in order that his co-accused will be immediately arrested instead of hiding. The Honorable Supreme Court in a litany of cases pronounced that the flight of an accused is considered as competent evidence to indicate his guilt. 19 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the wicked flees when no man pursueth, but the innocent is as bold as a lion. 20

Treachery qualified the killing to murder

As a qualifying circumstance, treachery requires two (2) elements: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 21

Here, appellant and Allan launched a surprise attack on the victims. 22 Ireneo was about to retire the night inside his home 23 when appellant and Allan, both armed, suddenly barged in. They wasted no time and swiftly took turns in hacking Ireneo. Though Ireneo was able to run a few steps outside the house, appellant and Allan easily caught up and continued to attack him. Allan also shot him several times. Evidently, he had zero chance to parry the successive and fatal attack of his assailants. 24 The fact that he shouted for help also showed his loss of hope 25 over the multiple hack wounds and gunshot wounds purposefully inflicted to finish him.

Meanwhile, Montano who was only 12 years old at that time, absolutely had no opportunity to defend himself, much less, the strength to overcome the attack on his fragile person. 26 His mother testified that as soon as her son stepped out of the house, Allan hit him in the nape and hacked him twice. To be sure, Montano could not be expected at all to put up a defense against the sudden attack of an armed adult in the middle of the night. At any rate, when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender age, treachery definitely exists. 27

Verily, the swift unfolding of the events did not allow Ireneo and Montano any opportunity to effectively repel or escape from the onslaught coming as it did from appellant and Allan. 28 Both Ireneo and Montano were unsuspecting victims, completely oblivious of the impending danger to their lives coming from their assailants. The sudden attack 29 on their persons rendered them totally defenseless. 30 Notably, although Ireneo managed to run a few steps away outside his home, it was short lived as the assailants easily caught up and continued to attack him relentlessly. This is treachery, pure and simple.

As for abuse of superior strength, the same is deemed absorbed in treachery. 31People v. Kalipayan32 is in point:

With this finding that treachery is present, the conclusion that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed therein necessarily follows. Even without a definite finding as to whether it exists in this case or not, it is beyond cavil that treachery, as a qualifying circumstance, absorbs the aggravating circumstance [of] abuse of superior strength even though the latter was alleged in the information. Thus, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not be appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance. (Emphasis supplied)

So must it be.

Evident premeditation was not proven

As regards evident premeditation, the following elements must concur: (1) the time when the accused was determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) the sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. 33 TAIaHE

Here, there is no showing that appellant and his cohort previously planned to kill the victims 34 or that the commission of the crime was a result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempts on their part. 35 Notably, the prosecution's evidence was focused only on the actual commission of the crime and the events that occurred thereafter. 36 Hence, in the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. 37

Appellant and Allan Placido conspired

Appellant and Allan acted in concert to hurt, disable, and eventually kill the victims. They were both present in the locus criminis wielding lethal weapons; they took turns in hacking Ireneo; Ireneo ran but they got hold of him and continued the attack; Montano went outside their house only to be hit in the nape and hacked in the head; Elena herself got struck by appellant but before she passed out, she saw Allan mounted on her husband and still hacking him; thereafter, appellant and Allan together fled the scene. Allan remained at large while appellant hid for eight (8) years.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 38

Penalty and Pecuniary Liability

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Here, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua for each count of murder, 39 there being no attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstance. 40

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 41 we sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages, for the death of Ireneo and Montano each. 42 These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated December 13, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10679 is AFFIRMED. Appellant Nestor De Juan y Rico is guilty of two (2) counts of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. He is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua for each count.

He is further required to pay the heirs of Ireneo Adao and Montano Adao the following amounts corresponding to each death:

a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b) P75,000.00 as moral damages;

c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.

These amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

The Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation and motion pursuant to the Resolution dated February 1, 2021, stating that all the matters and issues raised in the brief for accused-appellant filed before the Court of Appeals have already been extensively discussed in the brief for the appellee and upon the assailed Court of Appeals' decision, and there appears no cogent or compelling reason for the modification, much less reversal, of the said decision, is NOTED and GRANTED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, December 13, 1993.

2. See People v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 592 (2016).

3. TSN, September 23, 2000, pp. 3-10.

4. See People v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021; People v. Mallari, 452 Phil. 210, 219 (2003).

5. See People v. Nunez, 819 Phil. 406, 441 (2017).

6. Record, p. 15.

7. See 351 Phil. 411, 418 (1998).

8. See People v. Cogonon, 331 Phil. 208, 219 (1996) as cited in People v. Adoviso, 368 Phil. 297, 306 (1999).

9. See People v. Fabrigas, Jr., 330 Phil. 137, 150 (1996); People v. Penillos, 282 Phil. 563, 573 (1992); People v. Loste, 286 Phil. 1, 8 (1992); People v. Villaruel, 330 Phil. 79, 89 (1996); People v. Adoviso, 368 Phil. 297, 306 (1999).

10. See People v. Prieto, 454 Phil. 389, 402 (2003).

11. TSN, March 17, 2014, p. 13.

12.Id. at 5.

13.Id.

14.Id. at 7.

15. See People v. Galicia, 719 Phil. 337, 351-352 (2013).

16. See People v. Alemania, G.R. No. 201612, July 29, 2015.

17. See People v. Vitero, 708 Phil. 49, 63 (2013).

18. See People v. Lobrigas, 442 Phil. 382, 392 (2002); People v. Tubongbanua, 532 Phil. 434, 448 (2006).

19. Record, p. 177.

20.People v. Mores, 712 Phil. 480, 495 (2013).

21. See People v. Lagman, 685 Phil. 733, 745 (2012); People v. Torres, 671 Phil. 482, 491 (2011).

22. See People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 819 (2016).

23.Rollo, p. 4.

24. See People v. Advincula, 829 Phil. 516, 532-533 (2018).

25. See People v. Dearo, 719 Phil. 324, 335 (2013).

26. See People v. Dizon, G.R. No. 225505 (Notice), September 11, 2019.

27.Id.; Supra note 21.

28. See People v. Bugarin, 807 Phil. 588, 600-601 (2017).

29. See People v. Ampo, G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019.

30. See People v. Sumilhig, 739 Phil. 702, 713-714 (2014).

31. See People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529, 568 (2012).

32. 824 Phil. 173, 191 (2018) as cited in People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 248181 (Notice), May 5, 2021.

33. See People v. Villalba, 746 Phil. 270, 288 (2014).

34. See People v. Carabbay, G.R. No. 248872 (Notice), October 5, 2020.

35.Id.

36. See People v. Rebucan, 670 Phil. 363, 390-391 (2011).

37. See People v. Dadivo, 434 Phil. 684, 689 (2002) citing People v. Chua, 357 Phil. 907, 921 (1998).

38. See Arroyo v. People, 790 Phil. 367, 424 (2016).

39. See People v. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 230122 (Notice), January 15, 2020; People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018; Supra note 21 at 832-833 (2016); People v. Bagcal, G.R. No. 181634 (Notice), September 24, 2014; People v. Nelmida, 694 Phil. 529, 577 (2012); People v. Rebucan, 670 Phil. 363, 394-395.

40. See People v. Ampo, G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019; People v. Jaen, G.R. No. 241946, July 29, 2019.

41.Supra note 21 at 847-848.

42. See People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018.