People v. De Jose

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 248173. April 26, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. MELISSA DE JOSE, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 26, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 248173 (People of the Philippines v. Melissa De Jose). — This appeal assails the Decision 1 dated January 30, 2018 and the Resolution 2 dated June 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08125 which affirmed with modifications the conviction of Melissa De Jose (accused-appellant) for six counts of qualified theft.

Antecedents

On July 19, 2012, Charus Credit Services, Inc. (Charus Credit Services) filed six Informations against accused-appellant and her husband, Joesel De Jose (Joesel) for qualified theft with the following accusatory portions:

In Criminal Case No. 19625-2012-C(P):

That from the period of June to August of 2011 in the Municipality of Los Baños and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused being then the employees of Charus Credit Services, Inc., as such having complete access thereat, with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (Php167,790.00) which represent the unremitted amount of money from 12 customers of Charus Credit Services, Inc. and which amount belongs to complainant Charus Credit Services, Inc. represented by CATALIUNO N. ARAGON without his consent and knowledge to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

In Criminal Case No. 19626-2012-C(P):

That from the period of May to August of 2011 in the Municipality of Los Baños and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused being then the employees of Charus Credit Services, Inc., as such having complete access thereat, with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to TWENTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (Php26,360.00) which represent the amount of cash advances released to fictitious borrowers and which amount belongs to complainant Charus Credit Services, Inc. represented by CATALIUNO N. ARAGON without his consent and knowledge to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 CAIHTE

In Criminal Case No. 19627-2012-C(P):

That from the period of July 2011 in the Municipality of Los Baños and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused being then the employees of Charus Credit Services, Inc., as such having complete access thereat, with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to TWO THOUSAND NINETY PESOS (Php2,090.00) which represent the unremitted payment for cash advances and which amount belongs to complainant Charus Credit Services, Inc. represented by CATALIUNO N. ARAGON without his consent and knowledge to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

In Criminal Case No. 19637-2012-C(P):

That from the period of August 1 to 24 of 2011 in the Municipality of Los Baños and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused being then the employees of Charus Credit Services, Inc., as such having complete access thereat, with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to FIFTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE PESOS AND FIFTY THREE CENTAVOS (Php59,179.53) belonging to complainant Charus Credit Services, Inc. represented by CATALIUNO N. ARAGON without his consent and knowledge to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

In Criminal Case No. 19638-2012-C(P):

That from the period of February to August of 2011 in the Municipality of Los Baños and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused being then the employees of Charus Credit Services, Inc., as such having complete access thereat, with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY THREE PESOS AND EIGHTY CENTAVOS (Php72,823.80) which represent the total amount of unremitted money from 21 customers of Charus Credit Services and which amount belongs to complainant Charus Credit Services, Inc. represented by CATALIUNO N. ARAGON without his consent and knowledge to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 7

In Criminal Case No. 19639-2012-C(P):

That on or about May 15, 2011 in the Municipality of Los Baños and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused being then the employees of Charus Credit Services, Inc., as such having complete access thereat, with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php35,500.00) which represent the total amount of unremitted money paid by 10 employees of Sangguniang Barangay of Lalakay who are all customers of Charus Credit Services and which amount belongs to complainant Charus Credit Services, Inc. represented by CATALIUNO N. ARAGON without his consent and knowledge to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant in the aforementioned sum.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 8

During the arraignment of accused-appellant, the Court, upon motion of the private prosecutor, ordered the amendment of all the Informations to include in the allegations the respective positions held by accused-appellant and Joesel as Branch Manager and Head Cashier and Credit Collector. 9 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses including: (1) Teresita Caparas (Caparas); (2) Catalino Aragon (Aragon); (3) Antonieta Aldueza (Aldueza); and (4) Gertrudes Jimena (Jimena). 10

Caparas testified that she was the Branch Manager of Charus Credit Services in the Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna and the Sales Operations Manager of the company. As Sales Operations Manager, she ensures the smooth flow of the day-to-day transactions and business of Charus Credit Services. She also monitors the status of sales per branch regularly. According to Caparas, on August 24, 2011, she received a call from Jimena. Caparas learned from Jimena that Joesel approached Jimena for financial help to cover the amount taken by accused-appellant in the Los Baños branch. Upon learning this, she called the Chief Executive Officer of Charus Credit Services, Eduardo Magpantay (Magpantay), to report the problem and to ask for permission to go to the Los Baños branch to conduct an audit. Hence, on the same day, she went to the Los Baños branch of Charus Credit Services where accused-appellant was the branch manager. Caparas stated that by getting a computer-generated report showing the client account analysis of the Los Baños branch for the August 1 to 29, 2011 period, it was discovered that the P167,790.00 payment of 12 customers for their loans was not remitted by accused-appellant to Charus Credit Services. Caparas also noticed that the automated teller machine cards of the 12 customers were no longer in the custody of Charus Credit Services. This means that they have fully paid their loans. However, despite fully paying, the company records disclosed that the 21 customers still have loan balances. Caparas claimed that accused-appellant admitted to her that she took the amount missing and lent the same to Sherilyn Tiburcio. 11 DETACa

The second witness for the prosecution, Aragon, who is the legal and collection officer of Charus Credit Services, testified that on August 25, 2011, he attended a meeting together with CEO Magpantay, Aldueza, Aquino, accused-appellant, and Joesel regarding the problems in the collection of funds in Charus Los Baños branch. After the meeting, he was instructed by Magpantay to conduct a comprehensive audit of the Los Baños branch. In addition to the missing P167,790.00 discovered by Caparas the day before, Aragon's audit yielded the following findings:

1. The missing cash on hand amounting to P59,179.53:

According to Aragon, he documented the missing P59,179.53 by preparing a cash flow of Charus Los Baños branch covering the period of August 1 to 24, 2011. Accused-appellant even acknowledged that the cash on hand is indeed P59,179.53. However, when asked to turn over the same to Charus Credit Services, she failed to do so. 12

2. The unremitted collection from 21 customers amounting to P72,823.80:

Aragon further discovered that a total amount of P72,823.80 paid by 21 customers of Charus Credit Services to accused-appellant cannot be found in the collection of the branch. Aragon documented the missing P72,823.80 by preparing a "Customers with Arrears" list for the payment period covering August 1 to 29, 2011 which highlighted the names of 21 customers whose payments were not remitted by accused-appellant. 13

3. The unremitted collection from 10 customers amounting to P35,500.00:

Aragon also found that accused-appellant failed to remit to Charus Credit Services the amount of P35,500.00 paid by their customers who are employees of the Sangguniang Barangay of Lalakay, Los Baños. To further investigate this missing amount, Aragon went to Lalakay, Los Baños where it was confirmed that the customers paid their arrears through salary deduction which was allegedly personally received by accused-appellant. 14

4. Cash advances for fictitious borrowers amounting to P26,360.00:

During the audit, Aragon learned that accused-appellant took P26,360.00 from the collection of Charus Credit Services by making it appear that the said amount was borrowed as cash advances by 17 customers. However, upon interviews with these 17 customers, Aragon found that the said customers did not request or apply for cash advances. When asked to produce the cash vouchers for the cash advances, accused-appellant failed to do so. 15

5. Unremitted payment for cash advance amounting to P2,090.00:

Lastly, Aragon found that there were customers of Charus Credit Services who paid their cash advances in the amount of P2,090.00 but accused-appellant failed to remit the same to the company. 16

In sum, Aragon and Caparas discovered the total amount of P363,743.33 missing in their collection. They demanded from accused-appellant to return the aforesaid amount but to no avail. 17

The third witness for the prosecution was Aldueza, Finance Manager of Charus Credit Services who testified that she was present during the meeting called by CEO Magpantay on August 25, 2011. 18

The last witness for the prosecution, Jimena, Branch Head of Charus Main Office at Banay-Banay, Cabuyao, Laguna, testified that in the morning of August 24, 2011, Joesel went to her to ask if he could borrow money because his wife, accused-appellant, had shortage in her cash on hand in the Los Baños branch. According to Jimena, she advised Joesel to just report the matter to Caparas. Jimena relayed to Caparas what Joesel told her. She learned later that Caparas went to the Los Baños branch on the same day to conduct an audit. 19

The defense on the other hand, presented Joesel and accused-appellant as its witnesses. 20

Joesel denied the accusations against him as the prosecution failed to present documents to prove his participation in the alleged theft. 21

Accused-appellant admitted that as branch manager of Los Baños, she was authorized by the company to handle the money of Charus Credit Services. She claimed that the prosecution witnesses have no personal knowledge of what really transpired in the case because they were all based in the main office of the company in Cabuyao, Laguna. 22

After the formal offer of evidence, the parties filed their respective Memoranda. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 13, 2016, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Laguna, Branch 34, rendered its Decision 23 acquitting Joesel of the crimes charged for insufficiency of evidence but finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft. The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua and ordered her to pay Charus Credit Services the amount of P363,743.33 as actual damages with 6% interest per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid. 24

The RTC found that all the elements of qualified theft are present in the case. The RTC noted that accused-appellant is a confidential employee of Charus Credit Services as the head of its Los Baños branch. Hence, she committed the theft with grave abuse of confidence. 25 The RTC gave credence to the audit undertaken by Caparas and Aragon in proving the existence of the unlawful taking. For the RTC, Caparas and Aragon clearly and categorically testified on how accused-appellant took the total amount of P363,743.33 by: (a) failing to remit the same to Charus Credit Services; (b) making it appear that customers requested for cash advances when they did not; and (c) failing to turn over the cash on hand upon demand. 26 The RTC noted that the data used by Caparas and Aragon as basis for the complaint against accused-appellant were fully substantiated by the records of Charus Los Baños branch and confirmed by the clients and customers of Charus Credit Services themselves. 27 aDSIHc

Aggrieved, accused-appellant elevated the case to the CA.

In her Brief, 28 accused-appellant claimed that the first and third elements of theft are absent. Accused-appellant claimed that the prosecution witnesses did not have personal knowledge of what really transpired in the Los Baños branch. Hence, their testimonies should not have been given probative weight by the RTC. 29

In the Brief for the Appellee 30 on the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that all the elements of the crime of qualified theft were established by the prosecution. 31 The OSG asserted that the prosecution witnesses clearly showed how the audit and investigation of the Charus Los Baños branch was set in motion. The testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution duly proved the commission by accused-appellant of qualified theft. The OSG pointed out that it is not necessary for direct evidence to establish that accused-appellant committed the crime because circumstantial evidence in this case led to the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant indeed committed the crime of qualified theft. 32

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 30, 2018, the CA rendered its Decision 33 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant but modified the penalty to conform with the provisions of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10951 or "An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, Otherwise Known as "The Revised Penal Code," as Amended." The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 13 January 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Calamba City, finding Melissa De Jose GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of the crime of Qualified Theft is AFFIRMED with modifications that the penalty is revised to as follows:

(a) For Criminal Case No. 19625-2012-C(P), accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum;

(b) For Criminal Case No. 19626-2012-C(P), accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum;

(c) For Criminal Case No. 19627-2012-C(P), accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of one (1) year as minimum up to three (3) years as maximum;

(d) For Criminal Case No. 19637-2012-C(P), accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum;

(e) For Criminal Case No. 19638-2012-C(P), accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum;

(f) For Criminal Case No. 19639-2012-C(P), accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years as minimum up to ten (10) years as maximum;

The service of accused-appellant's successive sentences shall be subject to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED. 34 (Emphasis in the original)

Like the RTC, the CA was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of qualified theft in this case. 35 The CA also held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold the guilt of accused-appellant. 36 The audit investigation undertaken by prosecution witnesses and substantiated by the testimonies and documents offered by the prosecution are sufficient to prove the guilt of accused-appellant. 37

Insisting on her innocence, accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal. Both accused-appellant and the OSG adopted their respective Briefs filed before the CA as their Supplemental Briefs. 38

Ruling of the Court

After a perusal of the records of the case, this Court resolves to dismiss the appeal for failure of accused-appellant to show that the CA committed a reversible error in convicting her of six counts of qualified theft.

First, it must be noted that the appeal by notice of appeal filed by accused-appellant to question the ruling of the CA was improper. The CA modified the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant in conformity with the provisions of R.A. 10951. Thus, the CA no longer imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as stated in the RTC decision but the reduced divisible penalties under R.A. 10951. Since the penalty imposed by the CA was not death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the mode of review to the Court should have been via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on pure questions of law. This finds support in the following provisions of Rules 122 and 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Section 3. How appeal taken. —

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. ETHIDa

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.

(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 13 of Rule 124:

Section 13. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.

Hence, accused-appellant improperly filed a mere notice of appeal to question the ruling of the CA which did not impose a penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

Even if the substantive aspect of the case is considered, accused-appellant's appeal should be dismissed.

Theft is consummated when three elements concur: (1) the actual act of taking without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of the owner's consent. Moreover, for qualified theft to be committed, the following elements must concur:

1. taking of personal property;

2. that the said property belongs to another;

3. that the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. that it be done without the owner's consent;

5. that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;

6. that it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 39

The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that all the elements for qualified theft were duly proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant insists that the witnesses of the prosecution did not have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime. Hence, she should be acquitted.

Accused-appellant's argument is without merit.

The corpus delicti in theft includes the following elements: (1) that the property was lost by the owner; and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking. 40Corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. 41 In this case, while there was no eyewitness presented who personally saw accused-appellant in the act of taking the missing P363,743.33 from Charus Credit Services, the testimonies of Caparas and Aragon, who conducted an audit of the Charus Los Baños branch, to which accused-appellant was the manager, substantiated by the records, documents, and letters from the customers of Charus Credit Services, all point out to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes charged against her.

Thus, the conviction of accused-appellant for six counts of qualified theft was proper.

Penalties

The penalties imposed for Criminal Case Nos. 19625-2012-C(P), 19626-2012-C(P), 19637-2012-C(P), 19638-2012-C(P), and 19639-2012-C(P) are proper. In each of the enumerated case, the value of the property stolen is over P20,000.00 but does not exceed P600,000.00. The penalty under of Article 309 (3), as amended by R.A. 10951, is prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods. By virtue of Article 310 of the RPC, as amended, qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees which is prisión mayor in its medium period and maximum which has a prison term of 8 years and 1 day to 12 years. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prisión mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or from 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to 10 years and 8 months. Thereafter, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should be imposed is anywhere within the period of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period which has a range of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years. Therefore, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the CA of 6 years, as minimum, to 10 years, as maximum, is within the range prescribed by law. cSEDTC

However, there is a need to modify the indeterminate penalty imposed by the CA in Criminal Case No. 19627-2012-C(P). Considering that the value of the property stolen in said case is over P500.00 but does not exceed P5,000.00, the imposable penalty under Article 309 (5), as amended by R.A. 10951, is arresto mayor to its full extent. Pursuant to Article 310 of the RPC, as amended, the penalty is raised two degrees higher which is prisión mayor which has a prison term of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prisión mayor in its medium period which has a range of 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term should be imposed is anywhere within the period of prisión correccional which has a range of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. In this case, the CA imposed an indeterminate penalty of 1 year, as minimum, to 3 years, as maximum, which is not within the range prescribed by law. Therefore, the Court modifies the indeterminate penalty in Criminal Case No. 19627-2012-C(P) to 1 year, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum.

Since accused-appellant was convicted of 6 counts of qualified theft with 6 corresponding prison sentences, Article 70 of the RPC on successive service of sentences shall be observed, the pertinent portion of which states:

Article 70. Successive service of sentences. — x x x

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding; the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum of those imposed equals the said maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

Despite the three-fold rule in Article 70, this should not affect the imposition of the appropriate penalties. Speaking through the ponencia of former Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in People v. Santos y Parajas, 42 the Court explained that:

However, it must be emphasized that the application of Article 70 of the RPC should not yet to be taken into account in the court's imposition of the appropriate penalty. Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted." Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty." It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years. Thus, courts should still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions. 43 (Citations omitted)

Accordingly, the Court will still impose the proper penalties for each count of Qualified Theft duly proven.

WHEREFORE, instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 30, 2018 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08125 are AFFIRMED. However, in Criminal Case No. 19627-2012-C(P) the prison sentence is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant Melissa De Jose is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas Jr. and Soccorro B. Inting; rollo, pp. 3-5.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Apolinario O. Bruselas; CA rollo, pp. 242-245.

3.Rollo, pp. 4-5.

4.Id. at 5.

5.Id. at 5-6.

6.Id. at 6.

7.Id. at 6-7.

8.Id. at 7.

9. CA rollo, p. 33.

10.Id. at 34.

11.Id. at 34-35.

12.Id. at 39-40.

13.Id. at 40.

14.Id. at 40-41.

15.Id. at 41-42.

16.Id. at 42.

17.Id.

18.Id. at 44-45.

19.Id. at 46.

20.Id. at 47.

21.Id. at 47.

22.Id. at 48.

23.Id. at 30-59.

24.Id. at 59.

25.Id. at 53.

26.Id. at 54-57.

27.Id. at 58.

28.Id. at 76-95.

29.Id. at 90.

30.Id. at 132-150.

31.Id. at 142.

32.Id. at 145.

33.Rollo, pp. 3-45.

34.Id. at 43-44.

35.Id. at 13.

36.Id. at 15.

37.Id. at 16.

38.Id. at 57, 65.

39.People v. Mejares, 823 Phil. 459, 456 (2018).

40.Gulmatico v. People, 562 Phil. 78, 88 (2007).

41.Villarin v. People, 672 Phil. 155, 175 (2011).

42. G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020.

43.Id.