FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252352. June 23, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RANDY DE JESUS y POTENCIANO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 23, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252352 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randy De Jesus y Potenciano, Accused-Appellant.) Before the Court is an appeal 1 from the Decision 2 dated 17 September 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10515. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated 08 January 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43 of _____, Catanduanes finding accused-appellant Randy De Jesus y Potenciano (accused-appellant) guilty of two (2) counts of Rape.
Antecedents
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Rape under Article 266-A, in relation to Art. 266-B, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), under these two (2) separate Information:
Crim. Case No. 6020
That on or about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of December 20, 2015 at ____________________ (sic) __________, municipality of __________, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, while armed with a bolo, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the victim AAA 4 against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That the aforementioned act was committed with the aggravating circumstance described under par. 1 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., with the use of a deadly weapon. 5
Crim. Case No. 6021
That on or about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of November 10, 2015 at ___________________, (sic) __________, municipality of __________, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force and intimidation, while armed with a bolo, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the victim AAA against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That the aforementioned act was committed with the aggravating circumstance described under par. 1 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., with the use of a deadly weapon. 6
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At pre-trial, accused-appellant admitted having sexual relations with AAA with the qualification that the same was consensual since they were lovers. Thus, reverse trial ensued. 7
Version of the Prosecution
According to AAA, on 10 November 2015, she was washing clothes in the river when she saw accused-appellant walking by. He grabbed her and brought her to a grassy area. There, he covered her mouth, pointed a bolo to her throat, and started kissing and undressing her. He then removed his clothes and put himself on top of her. When accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, AAA felt pain. Afterwards, accused-appellant left, while AAA finished doing her laundry and afterward went home. 8
The next incident occurred at the same place and under similar circumstances. While doing AAA was doing her laundry at the river, accused-appellant dragged her to the grassy area and had carnal knowledge with her while holding a bolo to her neck. A few months after, however, she realized she was pregnant because she had stopped menstruating. She confided with her friend, Nilda Fernandez (Nilda), about what accused-appellant did to her. Nilda advised her to go to Malyn Sereno, the person handling violence against women and children (VAWC) in their barangay. Nilda also accompanied AAA to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). 9
Subsequently, AAA also told her mother about the incidents and they reported the same to the police. 10 AAA was also brought for physical examination, which confirmed that she was indeed pregnant. She also denied having a romantic relationship with accused-appellant considering the latter is already married. 11
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant averred that he had been living in their barangay for 15 years. His house is about 50 meters from AAA's, the live-in partner of his brother, who at the time of the incidents was incarcerated. Allegedly, AAA often went to his house to ask for rice, leading to a romantic relationship between them. Accused-appellant also claimed that they had sexual intercourse four (4) times, including the two (2) dates subject of the two (2) separate Informations, and they were all consensual. He maintains that it was AAA who went to his house and initiated their sexual encounters. Despite their relationship, however, accused-appellant could not offer to marry AAA as he is already married. 12 However, when asked during trial for the dates when they had sexual intercourse, accused-appellant answered that he could no longer recall the dates. 13
Ruling of the RTC
Accused-appellant was found guilty of two (2) counts of Rape, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding RANDY DE JESUS y POTENCIANO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt on two (2) counts of Rape and is sentenced as follows:
1. to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua on two (2) counts; and
2. to pay AAA, for each count, the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00), as civil indemnity, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00), as moral damages, and THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php30,000.00) as exemplary damages, all of which will earn an interest at the rate of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid. 14
The RTC held that accused-appellant failed to substantiate his defense based on the "sweetheart theory." Since he admitted to having sexual relations with AAA, he had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that their intercourse was consensual. However, accused-appellant's testimony was uncorroborated. Neither did he present any evidence to prove that he and AAA were lovers. 15
On the other hand, AAA's testimony on the sexual abuse was found to be credible and consistent, and the rape was done through force, threat, and intimidation, and with the use of a bolo. Moreover, based on the medical findings, it was highly probable that AAA became pregnant during the second incident of rape. 16
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC with modification as to the amount of monetary award:
WHEREFORE, premised considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated January 8, 2018 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case Nos. 6020 and 6021, finding accused-appellant Randy De Jesus y Potenciano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape, is AFFIRMED with modification as to the award of damages which is hereby affixed at Php75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages, for each count of rape.
All damages shall earn interest at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 17 (Emphases in the original)
The CA agreed with the trial court's finding that AAA narrated the incidents in a clear and straightforward manner. It also held that the RTC did not misappreciate the evidence on record. 18 Meanwhile, the CA noted that accused-appellant did not present any evidence — such as letters, messages, or gifts — to support his claim of having a romantic relationship with AAA. 19
Issue
The sole issue before the Court is whether accused-appellant is guilty of the two (2) counts of Rape.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Both the RTC and the CA found AAA's testimony to be clear and straightforward, and gave it more credence than accused-appellant's defense.
The Court has consistently adhered to the principle that when it comes to the credibility of witnesses and of their testimonies, the trial court is generally deemed to have been in a better position to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, especially when affirmed by the CA. 20 However, the Court has been equally steadfast in recognizing an exception when it finds that the trial court and/or the CA overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected the outcome of the case. 21 The case at bar falls under such exception.
In reviewing Rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 22
The general rule is that the lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for Rape, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. Yet, the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused demands no less than a moral certainty of his guilt free of reasonable doubt. Hence, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her own credibility must also be put on trial. 23
The prosecution failed to establish the
The gravamen of the crime of Rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will. 24 Specifically, rape committed under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A, 25 of the RPC have the following elements: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. 26
The first element is no longer at issue. Accused-appellant did not deny having sexual intercourse with AAA, but interposed the defense that their encounters were consensual since they were lovers. With the fact of carnal knowledge established by accused-appellant's own admission, the only matter to be determined is whether accused-appellant used force, threat, or intimidation in order to consummate the sexual act with AAA.
Force or intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission. 27
We find, however, that the prosecution failed to establish that accused-appellant employed force, threat, or intimidation in order to induce AAA into having sexual intercourse with him. Considering her answers on the alleged force employed by accused-appellant:
Q: And he removed his clothes by using his other hand since one of his hands was used in carrying the bolo, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it correct that he removed all his clothes, his upper and lower garments, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, Randy was naked at the time he allegedly inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And Randy was holding the bolo and at the same time pointed it at your neck, during the time he was removing his clothes, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Randy, never for a moment, dropped or put down the bolo on the ground, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And since Randy was on top of you, the bolo was pointing at your neck?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it correct, Madam Witness, that the clothing of Randy would have to pass his hand before he could entirely remove his clothes, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you testified earlier that never for a moment did Randy put down the bolo on the ground, correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: How could that happened (sic), Madam Witness, if he was pointing the bolo at your neck and then removed all his clothes, both the upper and lower garments, at that moment?
A: While Randy was removing his clothes, he did not put down the bolo. His shirt passed through the bolo.
Q: What about the hand of Randy, was it used in covering your mouth at that moment?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, how could Randy do all these things: removing his clothes, he was pointing the bolo at your neck and he was covering your mouth at the same time?
COURT
Q: Was it done at simultaneously?
A: No answer from the witness. 28
AAA also averred she did not tell anyone of the incident because accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she did. Yet, when directly asked about it during her testimony, AAA gave a different answer, to wit:
Q: And what happened after he abused you sexually?
A: He left, sir.
Q: What did he tell you, if any?
A: He did not say anything. He just left me behind at the river, sir.
Q: You mentioned in your affidavit that the accused threatened to kill you if you tell somebody else, which is true now, [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did he threaten you?
A: When I reported to the Barangay Captain, sir. 29
It must be noted that AAA made a report to the barangay months after the incident, and only when she had already found out that she was pregnant with accused-appellant's child. Thus, whether true or not, a threat made at that point in time carried significantly less weight than a threat made during or right after the incident itself because the act has been exposed and officially in the hands of authorities.
It is likewise baffling that when asked what she said to accused-appellant while he was sexually assaulting her, her reply was, "If I got pregnant he would take care of my child[.]" 30 AAA's life and body was supposedly under assault at that very moment, and yet, her first instinct was to make accused-appellant promise to take care of a child that may or may not result from the incident. Further, this negates the claim that she was feeling threatened or intimidated by accused-appellant, given that her response was to give the man, who was allegedly defiling her, responsibility for raising and caring for a child.
Contrary to the conclusion of the courts a quo, the contradictions and inconsistencies in her statement are not trivial. Indeed, these are substantial because they go into the very elements of the crime charged. In Rape cases alleged to have been committed by force, threat, or intimidation, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. 31
Reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. While no test definitively determines what is reasonable doubt under the law, the view is that it must involve genuine and irreconcilable contradictions based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts constituting the elements of the crime. 32
In cases of Rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A, the element of force, threat, or intimidation must be definitively established. Moreso, in this case where the fact of sexual congress is not even disputed by accused-appellant. When there is reasonable doubt on the element of force, threat or intimidation in this case, there is no moral certainty as to the crime of Rape to speak of. 33
Accused-appellant insists that AAA's actuations after the incidents disproves her allegations of Rape. Specifically, he points out that AAA stayed to do her laundry after their encounters, and that she even went to his house upon the invitation of his live-in partner to pull out the latter's gray hairs a few days after the first incident, even knowing that accused-appellant — whom she claims to have forced and intimidated her into defilement — negate AAA's claim of being angry at accused-appellant for raping her. 34 We agree. AAA could have easily refused or made up an excuse not to go to accused-appellant's house if she really was afraid or angry at him.
A woman's conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value in gauging the truth of her accusations. It must coincide with logic and experience. 35 Based on the discussion above, AAA's testimony falls short, the same being incredible, unconvincing, and inconsistent with human nature and the normal course of things. 36
Given the prosecution's failure to
It is a cardinal rule in criminal litigation that the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. 37 The prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. Nothing less than moral certainty is required to justify the conviction of accused-appellant. Failing this test, the Court has the constitutional duty to acquit accused-appellant. 38
As already discussed, the numerous contradictions in AAA's testimony on material points, considering that they pertain to the elements of the crime itself, raise a substantial cloud over its credibility. Under the Constitution, however, even the slightest possibility that the facts are not as the complainant claims — no matter how rare or unlikely — is more than sufficient basis for an acquittal. This is what it means to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, beyond reasonable doubt. 39
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 17 September 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 10515 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Randy De Jesus y Potenciano is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED to be immediately released from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prisons for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action he has taken.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 15; see Notice of Appeal dated 08 October 2019.
2.Id. at 3-13; penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin of the Twelfth (12th) Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. CA rollo, pp. 58-67; penned by Judge Lelu P. Contreras.
4. The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, including the names of her immediate family or household members, and the barangay and town of the incident, are withheld pursuant to SC Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.
5.Rollo, p. 4.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 4-5.
8. CA rollo, p. 61.
9.Id. at 62.
10.Rollo, p. 5.
11. CA rollo, p. 63.
12.Id. at 60.
13.Rollo, p. 6.
14. CA rollo, p. 67.
15.Id. at 65.
16.Id. at 66.
17.Rollo, pp. 12-13.
18.Id. at 7.
19.Id. at 12.
20.See People v. Dolandolan, G.R. No. 232157, 08 January 2020 [Per J. Caguioa].
21.See People v. XXX, 828 Phil. 770, 783 (2018), G.R. No. 229860, 21 March 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo], citing People v. Quintos, 746 Phil. 809, 820 (2014), G.R. No. 199402, 12 November 2014 [Per J. Leonen].
22.People v. YYY, G.R. No. 234825, 05 September 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo], citing People v. Patentes, 726 Phil. 590, 599-600 (2014), G.R. No. 190178, 12 February 2014 [Per J. Perez].
23.See People v. Rapiz, G.R. No. 240662, 16 September 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier], citing People v. Umanito, 784 Phil. 581, 586 (2016), G.R. No. 208648, 13 April 2016 [Per J. Perez].
24.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 225781, 16 November 2020 [Per J. Hernando].
25. Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxx xxx xxx
26.See People v. Talmesa, G.R. No. 240421, 16 November 2020 [Per J. Inting], citing People v. CCC, G.R. No. 231925, 19 November 2018 [Per J. Peralta].
27.People v. Briones, G.R. No. 240217, 23 June 2020 [Per J. Peralta].
28. TSN, 20 June 2017, pp. 4-5.
29.Id. at 15.
30.Id. at 10.
31.People v. Tionloc, 805 Phil. 907, 915 (2017), G.R. No. 212193, 15 February 2017 [Per J. Del Castillo], citing People v. Amogis, 420 Phil. 278, 292 (2001), G.R. No. 133102, 25 October 2001 [Per J. Buena].
32.People v. Carreon, G.R. No. 229086, 15 January 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier], citing People v. Ramos, 369 Phil. 84, 101 (1999), G.R. No. 124765, 02 July 1999 [Per J. Puno].
33.See People v. Rapiz, G.R. No. 240662, 16 September 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].
34.Supra at note 28 at 13.
35.Supra at note 33.
36.See People v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 229084, 02 October 2019 [Per J. Carpio].
37.See People v. CCC, G.R. No. 228822, 19 June 2019 [Per J. Carpio], citing People v. Tionloc, 805 Phil. 907 (2017), G.R. No. 212193, 15 February 2017 [Per J. Del Castillo].
38.Supra at note 21 at 783.
39.See People v. Dolandolan, G.R. No. 232157, 08 January 2020 [Per J. Caguioa].