People v. De Jesus

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239001. December 6, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.VIRGILIO P. DE JESUS, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 239001 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. VIRGILIO P. DE JESUS, accused-appellant). — A total absence of the mandatory third-party witnesses, a belated marking of the seized drugs, and an unwarranted dispensing with the taking of inventory and photographs all work against the identity and integrity of the seized drugs being established, for which the accused must be acquitted.

This Court resolves the appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision 1 affirming the Regional Trial Court's conviction 2 of Virgilio De Jesus y Patalinghog (De Jesus) for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

In two Informations, De Jesus was charged with violating Sections 5 3 and 11 4 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 2011-39

That on or about the 10th day of January 2011, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, for and in consideration of the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously sell to a confidential informant posed as buyer one (1) small plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the aforesaid law. CAIHTE

Contrary to law. 5

Criminal Case No. 2011-38

That on or about the 10th day of January 2011, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then and there knowingly, willfully and illegally possess two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.01 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 6

When arraigned, De Jesus pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial then ensued. 7

The prosecution presented Police Senior Inspector Zaide Fausto Abrera (Senior Inspector Abrera), Police Officer 2 Jessalyn Nantes (PO2 Nantes), and Senior Police Officer 3 Ferlito Mangubat (SPO3 Mangubat) as witnesses. They testified that on the afternoon of January 10, 2011, an informant came to the police station and reported how a certain "Bornok" — later identified to be De Jesus — was selling shabu in Purok 5, Barangay Dalahican, Lucena City. A buy-bust operation was planned, with PO2 Nantes as the poseur-buyer. A P500.00 bill was prepared as marked money. 8

At around 4:45 p.m. that day, 9 a team of five police officers, 10 together with the informant, went to Purok 5 for the buy-bust operation. PO2 Nantes and the informant proceeded to De Jesus's house, where the informant told De Jesus that he was interested in buying shabu. De Jesus handed a transparent plastic sachet over to the informant, who gave it to PO2 Nantes. In exchange, PO2 Nantes gave De Jesus the marked P500.00 bill. 11 PO2 Nantes then untied her hair, signaling to the other police officers that the sale was made. 12

Immediately, SPO3 Mangubat approached De Jesus and recovered the marked money from him. He also frisked De Jesus and obtained a matchbox with two plastic sachets of shabu. De Jesus was then arrested, and the police officers brought him to the police station. 13

At the police station, the sachet seized from the buy-bust operation was marked as "VDP 10Jan11 Buy bust," while the sachets seized from the body search were marked "1-VDP 10Jan11 Poss" and "2 VDP 10 Jan Poss." 14 Afterward, a Request for Laboratory Examination and a Request for Drug Test were prepared. PO2 Nantes and SPO3 Mangubat brought the seized items to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Nakar, Lucena City for examination by Senior Inspector Abrera. The seized items tested positive for shabu. 15

De Jesus was the sole witness for the defense, denying the material allegations against him. He recalled how on January 10, 2011, he was waiting for the arrival of his grandfather's remains from the morgue. Two of his friends invited him over to their house where they had a drinking session. Suddenly, SPO3 Mangubat and PO2 Nantes arrived at the house. SPO3 Mangubat instructed everyone to lie down and face the floor. Shortly after, other police officers arrived. SPO3 Mangubat inquired about a certain girl that De Jesus and his friends did not know. The other police officers then searched the house and performed body search on De Jesus and his two friends, but found nothing on them. 16

De Jesus also narrated that eventually, the police allowed him and his friends to leave one by one, until De Jesus was the last inside the house. SPO3 Mangubat told him, "Dumali ka na naman," to which he replied that he was not doing anything wrong. In response, SPO3 Mangubat kicked, handcuffed, and dragged De Jesus outside the house. He was arrested and brought to the police station, where he learned that he was being charged again with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, as he had been charged before, but this time with a charge of illegal possession. 17

In its June 12, 2015 Joint Decision, 18 the Regional Trial Court found De Jesus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It found no irregularity in the chain of custody of the seized items, ruling that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the buyer and seller, and how De Jesus was involved in the sale. 19 DETACa

However, De Jesus was acquitted of the illegal possession of dangerous drugs due to insufficiency of evidence. To the trial court, the prosecution failed to prove that De Jesus had possessed two more sachets of shabu when he was already apprehended by the police officers after the sale. 20 The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, in Criminal Case No. 2011-39, this Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 2011-38, for insufficiency of evidence, the accused is hereby acquitted. No cost.

SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, De Jesus argued that he should be acquitted for the prosecution's failure to establish the corpus delicti since there were glaring gaps in the chain of custody, and its failure to prove compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. 22 He noted that the marking was done at the police station and not at the place where De Jesus was arrested — a fact that, he pointed out, was admitted by SPO3 Mangubat and PO2 Nantes during trial. 23 De Jesus added that both officers testified that no inventory and photographs were taken, and none of the mandatory third-party witnesses were present during the arrest and even at the police station. 24

In its Decision, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's findings. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The June 12, 2015 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lucena City, Branch 55, which found accused-appellant Virgilio P. De Jesus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 in Criminal Case No. 2011-39 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 26

According to the Court of Appeals, all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present and the prosecution successfully established the corpus delicti. It found no showing of a broken chain of custody and regularity in the police officers' performance of duties. Thus, the Court of Appeals said, the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized from De Jesus were properly preserved. 27 Against these and the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, De Jesus's lone defense of mere denial and frame-up failed. 28

De Jesus filed his Notice of Appeal, 29 and the Court of Appeals accordingly forwarded the case records to this Court. 30 In a June 11, 2018 Resolution, 31 this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals and allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs. However, both plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and accused-appellant manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs, as noted by this Court. 32

The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Virgilio P. De Jesus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

To warrant a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the elements that must be established are settled: "(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." 33

Integral to any conviction for the offense is the proof of the integrity and identity of the dangerous drug, which is the corpus delicti of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. 34 aDSIHc

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 covers the rules governing the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Section 21 was amended by Republic Act No. 10640, but since accused-appellant's arrest and the seizure of items happened on January 10, 2011, the law's original formulation applies. It reads in part:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis in the original)

Here, the sheer number of evident deviations from the requirements of Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165 — which remain unjustified by the prosecution — taints the corpus delicti.

First, the actual arrest and seizure were not witnessed by any one of the three required witnesses, namely: (1) a representative from the media; (2) an elected public official; and (3) a representative of the Department of Justice. These third-party witnesses must be present as early as the time of apprehension. In People v. Tomawis, 35 this Court stated:

Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. In addition, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative of the [Department of Justice], the media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. And only if this is not practicable, the IRR allows that the inventory and photographing could be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. By the same token, however, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the buy-bust team has enough time and opportunity to bring with them said witnesses.

xxx xxx xxx

The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.

The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs. ETHIDa

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."36 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The lack of the required witnesses at the time of seizure casts doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs. That this was a buy-bust operation makes it worse. Such operations are pre-planned, which means the witnesses' attendance could have been secured beforehand. 37 At the very least, the prosecution must have shown that the arresting officers exerted earnest efforts to invite the required witnesses. 38 However, in this case, the prosecution was unable to explain why the witnesses were not secured, or prove that the buy-bust team even attempted to contact them.

Second, marking was not done at the place of arrest and seizure. Marking, as the "starting point in the custodial link[,]" 39 must be accomplished immediately after seizure of the dangerous drugs. The essence of marking in safeguarding the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti was explained in People v. Dahil: 40

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of evidence.

It must be noted that marking is not found in [Republic Act No.] 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed [Republic Act No.] 9165, however, this Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. 41 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

This Court does not hesitate to overturn convictions when the prosecution fails to observe proper marking of the seized drugs done immediately after arrest and seizure. 42

Here, the police officers marked the seized sachets only at the police station, not at the place where accused-appellant was arrested. Worse, the prosecution offered no justification for the belated marking. In effect, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are put into question. 43

Third, there was no inventory and photographing that the prosecution could speak of, leading to a complete lack of independent guarantee of the identity and integrity of items. This is true from the time the items were allegedly seized from accused-appellant, to the time they were in transit, and ultimately, until their arrival at the police station. The Court of Appeals summarized these events:

PO2 Jessalyn Nantes testified that after the arrest of the accused-appellant, the latter and the items were brought to the Lucena City Police Station for purposes of inventory and marking. PO2 Jessalyn Nantes marked the specimen seized from the buy bust with 1-VDP 10 Jan 11 BUY BUST. At the Lucena City Police Station, PO2 Jessalyn Nantes turned over the item to SPO3 Ferlito Mangubat. SPO3 Ferlito Mangubat prepared the request for laboratory and signed by PSUPT. Alex Abellanida Orfanel for the laboratory examination of the items seized from accused-appellant, which request was received by PCI Zaide Fausto-Abrera, who acknowledged receipt of the seized items from SPO3 Mangubat. 44 (Citations omitted) cSEDTC

This Court has previously emphasized the need for taking inventory and photographs immediately at the place of seizure:

Section 21 mandates the conduct of inventory and taking of photographs "immediately after seizure and confiscation," which means that these must be done at the place of the arrest. Que explained:

What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing. Instead, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence. . . .

Section 21 (1)'s requirements are designed to make the first and second links foolproof. Conducting the inventory and photographing immediately after seizure, exactly where the seizure was done, or at a location as practicably close to it, minimizes, if not eliminates, room for adulteration or the planting of evidence[.] 45 (Citation omitted)

Here, the prosecution failed to account for precautions, if any at all, that the arresting officers took to preserve the integrity of the allegedly seized items. All they offered were self-serving statements in an attempt to guarantee that the allegedly seized items were exact same specimens offered in evidence before the court.

In People v. Holgado, 46 this Court explained that the strict requirements of Section 21 were put in place to prevent tampering of evidence:

In Mallillin v. People, this court explained that the exactitude required by Section 21 goes into the very nature of narcotics as the subject of prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165:

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin — was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession — was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases — by accident or otherwise — in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. SDAaTC

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner. 47 (Citations omitted)

If in Holgado, where the accused were acquitted, the allegedly seized drug amounted only to 0.05 gram, more so will this Court not let escape attention the amount of the allegedly seized drugs is in this case — 0.02 gram. Such minuscule amount is not a ground for acquittal by itself, but it is this very detail that demands strict compliance with Section 21. 48

The Court of Appeals' reliance on the presumption of regularity in the police offers' performance of official duty is plainly misplaced. This Court has made it clear that such presumption does not apply in the face of irregularities on how the operations were conducted. In People v. Kamad: 49

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

We rule, too, that the discrepancy in the prosecution evidence on the identity of the seized and examined shabu and that formally offered in court cannot but lead to serious doubts regarding the origins of the shabu presented in court. This discrepancy and the gap in the chain of custody immediately affect proof of the corpus delicti without which the accused must be acquitted. 50 (Citation omitted)

Further, in People v. Lim, 51 this Court ruled that the presumption of regularity is "negated" when there are clear procedural lapses in the chain of custody in the seizure of illegal drugs:

In People v. Orteza, the Court did not hesitate to strike down the conviction of the therein accused for failure of the police officers to observe the procedure laid down under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Law, thus:

First, there appears nothing in the records showing that police officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. acEHCD

xxx xxx xxx

IN FINE, the unjustified failure of the police officers to show that the integrity of the object evidence-shabu was properly preserved negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official duties.

The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act requires nothing less tha[n] strict compliance. Otherwise, the raison d'etre of the chain of custody requirement is compromised. Precisely, deviations from it leave open the door for tampering, substitution and planting of evidence. 52 (Citations omitted)

While this Court, on appropriate occasions, tolerates excusable deviations from the requirements of Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165, the prosecution still "bears the burden of first acknowledging procedural lapses and specifically plead justifiable grounds for these lapses. It must also plead specific safety measures taken in view of the deviations made from the chain of custody requirements." 53 Here, the prosecution tendered no justifications at all for the lapses that abounded accused-appellant's arrest.

Due to the arresting officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements, reasonable doubt exists as to the identity and integrity of the drugs presented as evidence. For the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant must be acquitted.

To end, this Court reiterates that in this case, the allegedly seized drugs amounted to 0.02 gram. An amount as minuscule as this calls for heightened scrutiny in the police's handling of the seized drugs. In Holgado:

Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in cases where an accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in this case, a speedier resolution would have been handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established.

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers. we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels. 54

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' November 29, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07822 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Virgilio P. De Jesus is ACQUITTED of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director General is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Resolution. For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. SDHTEC

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the sachets of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 2-15. The November 29, 2017 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Elihu A. Ybañez of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

2. CA rollo, pp. 29-40. The Joint Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Agripino R. Bravo of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55.

3. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 5 states in part:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

4. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11 states:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

5. CA, rollo, p. 30.

6. Id. at 30-31.

7. Rollo, p. 4.

8. Id. at 4-5.

9. CA rollo, p. 33.

10. Rollo, p. 5.

11. CA rollo, p. 33.

12. Rollo, p. 5.

13. Id.

14. CA rollo, p. 34. "2 VDP" was written as "2-VDP" on the same page of the RTC Joint Decision. The CA Decision indicates a slight variation of how the items were marked as well.

15. Rollo, pp. 5-6.

16. Id. at 6.

17. Id. at 7.

18. CA rollo, pp. 29-40.

19. Id. at 38-39.

20. Id. at 39.

21. Id. at 40.

22. Id. at 60-71.

23. Id. at 60-62.

24. Id. at 67-71.

25. Rollo, pp. 2-15.

26. Id. at 14.

27. Id. at 10-13.

28. Id. at 13-14.

29. Id. at 16-17.

30. Id. at 16-18.

31. Id. at 22-23.

32. Id. at 42-43.

33. People v. Morales, 630 Phil. 215, 228 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

34. People v. Saunar, 816 Phil. 482, 491 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

35. 830 Phil. 385 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].

36. Id. at 404-409.

37. People v. Jaafar, 803 Phil. 582 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

38. People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400/> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

39. People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 232 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

40. 750 Phil. 212 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

41. Id. at 232.

42. People v. Orteza, 555 Phil. 701 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

43. People v. Año, 828 Phil. 439 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

44. Rollo, pp. 11-12.

45. People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65518> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

46. 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

47. Id. at 92-93.

48. Id. at 99.

49. 624 Phil. 289 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

50. Id. at 311.

51. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64400/> [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

52. Id.

53. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

54. People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78, 100 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].