People v. De Asis y Bautista
This is a criminal case involving the violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." The case concerns the accused-appellant Rhoda De Asis y Bautista, who was convicted for possessing illegal drugs. However, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the conviction due to the failure of the police officers to comply with the mandatory three-witness rule and the mandatory requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. The Court held that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and inventory is mandatory to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. The Court also emphasized that the prosecution must strictly comply with the mandatory procedure outlined in Section 21, and any deviation therefrom must be acknowledged and explained or justified by the prosecution.
ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249992. February 15, 2022.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RHODA DE ASIS y BAUTISTA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 15, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249992 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versus RHODA DE ASIS y BAUTISTA, accused-appellant.
After a careful review of the records of the case and the issues submitted by the parties, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision 1 dated March 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City (CA), in CA G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02730, which affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Rhoda De Asis y Bautista (De Asis) for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," under the Decision 2 dated July 27, 2017 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 14-38956.
In the prosecution of crimes involving illegal drugs, aside from proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed, there must be proof of the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti — the dangerous drug itself. 3 There must be an accounting of the following links in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court. 4
In this regard, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, Section 21, 5 Article II of RA 9165 prior to its amendment by RA 10640, 6 outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination. 7 Strict compliance with Section 21 is mandatory, and any deviation therefrom must be acknowledged and explained or justified by the prosecution. 8 This is especially true where the quantity of illegal drugs is miniscule, such as in the present case, since the same is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. 9 CAIHTE
Furthermore, in a long line of cases, 10 the Court has held that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose. The presence of the said witnesses is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug, 11 and it is their insulating presence that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drugs. 12
In the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, resulting in the identity of the corpus delicti being compromised.
First, the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory three-witness rule.
As the prosecution witnesses testified, the marking and inventory of the seized drugs were witnessed by two elective officials, Barangay Kagawad Eduardo Galona, Sr. and Punong Barangay Lindy De Leon, and one representative from the media, Malou Flejoles. 13 Notably, while three witnesses were alleged to have witnessed and signed the inventory, no representative from the DOJ was present. 14
To reiterate, the law requires that the following witnesses should be present during the physical inventory and photography of the seized drugs: (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel; (b) an elected public official; (c) a representative from the media; and (d) a representative from the DOJ. However, the required representative from the DOJ was glaringly absent. Thus, it is clear that they failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of the law.
While this is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a justifiable ground exists to explain the police officers' failure to procure the presence of a DOJ representative. In People v. Gamboa, 15 the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the witnesses required under the law. Mere statements that the witnesses are unavailable, without any showing of genuine and serious attempts to contact them, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. Considering that a buy-bust is a planned operation, "police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time x x x to prepare x x x and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165." 16 They are therefore compelled "not only to state reasons for their non[-]compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstance, their actions were reasonable." 17
The records, however, do not show that the prosecution was able to establish a justifiable ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the DOJ representative. Worse, the prosecution did not even acknowledge such a defect.
Second, the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized 18 (Inventory) that was produced by the prosecution was likewise irregularly made and executed.
As mentioned, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation. As well, the said provision requires that the conduct of the inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of all the required witnesses.
Here, even assuming that the presence of the aforementioned witnesses sans the DOJ representative constitutes substantial compliance with Section 21, the various irregularities committed by the police officers nevertheless cast doubt on whether the inventory was indeed done "immediately after seizure or confiscation" and in the presence of said witnesses.
For one, it is readily apparent that the Inventory was computer-printed, and not handwritten, 19 indicating that the inventory was neither prepared immediately after the seizure, nor at or near the place of arrest. 20 Considering that the Inventory was prepared using a computer and then printed out, unless the buy-bust team brought with them a computer and a printer at the place of arrest, which is unlikely, it can only be surmised that the preparation and printing of such document was not made at the place of arrest, but rather, at the police station or elsewhere, and without the presence of De Asis and the said witnesses.
To be sure, for warrantless seizures, the arresting officers may accomplish the inventory at the nearest police station, or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, when the prevailing circumstances render it impracticable to do so at the place of arrest. 21 In the instant case however, PO1 Joeleen Lagundino (PO1 Lagundino) categorically claimed to have done the marking and inventory shortly after the conduct of the operation, 22 inside the sari-sari store of De Asis 23 which was "part of [her] house." 24 The prosecution likewise claimed that the inventory was completed and signed by the witnesses thereat. 25 As such, assuming PO1 Lagundino's assertions to be true, coupled with the fact that the inventory was computer-printed, then the only plausible scenario would be that the witnesses were not able to witness the actual conduct of the inventory. Rather, they were only made to sign, at De Asis' store, the Inventory which was previously prepared and printed out by the buy-bust team — clearly defeating the letter and purpose of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
Relevant to the instant case is the Court's ruling in People v. Gabunada. 26 In the said case, even though it "initially appear[ed] that the policemen complied with the witness requirement" considering that the inventory contained the signatures of the required witnesses, 27 the Court noted that "a more circumspect examination of the records would show" 28 that one of said witnesses was not actually present during the conduct of the inventory, and that the "arresting policemen already prepared the inventory form days before it was brought to [the said witness] for his signature." 29 Thus, the Court acquitted the accused in the said case for the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21. DETACa
As discussed, the witness requirement mandates the presence of the required witnesses during the actual conduct of the inventory, so as to ensure that the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence will be adequately prevented. Hence, non-compliance therewith puts the onus on the prosecution to provide a justifiable reason therefor, especially considering that the rule exists to ensure that protection is given to those whose life and liberty are put at risk. 30
For another, the Court also notes that the Inventory was undated. 31 While the Inventory indicates the date and time of the buy-bust operation, it does not indicate when the Inventory was actually made. Hence, the Court is left to speculate whether, as claimed by the prosecution, the Inventory was actually done immediately after seizure and in the presence of the aforementioned witnesses.
In People v. Del Mundo32(Del Mundo), the Court explained the significance of placing the date on the inventory of seized items, thus:
While the prosecution was able to present the inventory of the confiscated items, which was apparently prepared by PO3 Rodil, and attested to by Ocampo, Sr., of Kill Droga, the Court opines that the same could not be given any credence. Readily apparent from the said inventory is the fact that it is undated. Hence, the requirement that the inventory must be made immediately after seizure was not satisfied. 33
More recently, in People v. Villarta, 34 the Court reiterated Del Mundo and acquitted the accused based on its finding that the inventory of seized items was undated and did not contain the signatures of the required witnesses. 35
Here, that the Inventory was computer-printed, coupled with the fact that it was undated, certainly put in doubt the entire version of the prosecution as to what truthfully happened. Further, it lends credence to the version of the defense as testified to by De Asis — such that the witnesses simply signed the Inventory, but did not actually witness the same. This certainly puts in doubt the integrity, identity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs.
Third, the Court notes that the marking of the seized items was likewise irregularly done.
Under the 2010 PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operation and Investigation (2010 AIDSOTF Manual), the conduct of buy-bust operations requires the following:
Rule II — General Rules and Procedures
xxx xxx xxx
Section 13. Handling, Custody and Disposition of Drug Evidence. —
a. In the handling, custody and disposition of the evidence, the provision of Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR shall be strictly observed.
xxx xxx xxx
c. The seizing officer must mark the evidence with his initials indicating therein the date, time and place where the evidence was found and seized. The seizing officer shall secure and preserve the evidence in a suitable evidence bag or in an appropriate container for further laboratory examinations. 36
To emphasize, marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, which "serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or contamination of evidence." 37 Thus, in People v. Manabat, 38 the Court acquitted the accused based on, among others, the seizing officers' failure to include the time and place of the buy-bust operation in the markings, "in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for the conduct of buy-bust operations." 39
In the instant case, as incontrovertibly found by the lower courts, only the initials "RBD A," 40 with "RBD" being the initials of De Asis' name, 41 were inscribed on the seized items. Neither PO1 Lagundino's initials, nor the date, time and place of the buy-bust operation were indicated in the markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's own requirements as set out in the 2010 AIDSOTF Manual. To be sure, that the markings are yet again undated puts in doubt whether the marking, as well as the actual conduct of the inventory, were indeed done immediately after seizure or confiscation as required under Section 21, Rule II of RA 9165.
Fourth, there was a breach of the third and fourth links in the chain of custody.
The testimony of PO1 Lagundino, the prosecution's sole witness, is bereft of any details regarding the third and fourth links in the chain of custody. PO1 Lagundino, on direct examination, simply testified as follows:
Question-44: What happened next?
Answer-44: I retrieved the evidence box from my locker and hand-carried it and the letter request and proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory at 10:45 that morning.
Question-45: Were you able to received (sic) any laboratory result of the specimens submitted?
Answer-45: Yes. 42
From the foregoing, PO1 Lagundino simply indicated that he brought the seized drugs to the crime laboratory at 10:45 in the morning of May 7, 2014. PO1 Lagundino's testimony did not contain any information as to who at the crime laboratory received the seized drugs, and how the same was handled thereafter.
Apart from the foregoing, the only other pieces of evidence presented and offered by the prosecution regarding the third and fourth links are the following: (1) the Letter Request for Laboratory Examination dated May 7, 2014 43 (Letter Request) which appears to have been signed by a certain "PO3 Magbanua"; and (2) Chemistry Report No. D-154-2014 44 prepared by Police Chief Inspector Paul Jerome Puentespina (PCI Puentespina), the forensic chemist, indicating that the qualitative test was completed on the same day, at 4:30 in the afternoon. The testimony, however, of PCI Puentespina was dispensed with by the prosecution in light of De Asis' stipulation that she would "no longer confront PCI Puentespina regarding his findings in the chemistry report." 45 aDSIHc
Parsed, what can simply be derived from the foregoing is that the seized drugs were received by a certain "PO3 Magbanua" at the crime laboratory at 10:45 in the morning of May 7, 2014, and that sometime thereafter, PCI Puentespina conducted qualitative examination on the items, which examination was completed at 4:30 in the afternoon. Clearly, nothing in the records would show how the drugs were linked from the custody of the receiving personnel to the forensic chemist. As well, the records do not reflect the person who had custody of the drugs after they were examined by PCI Puentespina, the person who received the seized drugs for safekeeping pending their presentation in court, and lastly, the person who submitted the drugs to the trial court. 46 As such, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
Too, it bears stressing that the police did not, at all, execute a chain of custody form detailing the "movement of the evidence from the time [the drugs were] seized, inventoried and examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory and the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the same, the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence and the final disposition," 47 despite the clear mandate of the PNP's own internal rules of procedure requiring the same. 48
Moreover, the fact that the defense stipulated that it will not dispute PCI Puentespina's findings does not help the prosecution's cause. 49 As held in People v. Havana: 50
Nor can the prosecution gain from the testimony of the forensic chemist PCI Salinas. The records show that there is nothing positive and convincingly clear from the testimony of PCI Salinas. She did not at all categorically and straightforwardly assert that the alleged chemical substance that was submitted for laboratory examination and thereafter presented in court was the very same substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. If anything, the sum and substance of her testimony is that the alleged pack of shabu submitted to her for laboratory examination showed that it was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. She never testified where the substance came from. Her testimony was limited only on the result of the examination she conducted and not on the source of the substance. 51
In addition, it has been ruled that there is a gap or break in the fourth link of the chain of custody where there is absence of "evidence to show how the seized shabu [was] handled, stored, and safeguarded pending its presentation in court," 52 as in this case.
In sum, the chain of custody here had been broken from its incipience up until its final stages. Although a saving clause in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 allows deviation from established protocol, breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, if left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti would have been compromised. 53 After all, as held in People v. Enriquez, 54 "any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag, that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti." 55
Here, the arresting officers offered no valid explanation for any of the abovementioned procedural deficiencies. In fact, they did not even acknowledge said deficiencies. The Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from De Asis were compromised. De Asis must perforce he acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, in CA G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 02730 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant RHODA DE ASIS y BAUTISTA is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action taken. ETHIDa
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 5-24. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (a retired Member of the Court), with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 48-62. Penned by Executive Judge Raymond Joseph G. Javier.
3.People v. Barte, G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 10, 20.
4.Jocson v. People, G.R. No. 199644, June 19, 2019, 904 SCRA 537, 548.
5. The said Section provides:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
6. AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002," July 15, 2014.
As the Court noted in People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018, 884 SCRA 276, 285-286 and People v. Maganon, G.R. No. 234040, June 26, 2019, 906 SCRA 406, 415, RA 10640 appears to have become effective on August 7, 2014. The act subject of this case allegedly occurred on May 7, 2014, hence, before the effectivity of RA 10640.
7.See RA 9165, Art. II, Sec. 21 (1) and (2); People v. Sendad, G.R. No. 242025, November 20, 2019, 925 SCRA 707.
8.Limbo v. People, G.R. No. 238299, July 1, 2019, 907 SCRA 129, 139.
9.People v. Señeres, Jr., G.R. No. 231008, November 5, 2018, 884 SCRA 172, 192.
10.People v. Espejo, G.R. No. 240914, March 13, 2019, 897 SCRA 205; People v. Caranto, G.R. No. 217668, February 20, 2019, 894 SCRA 18; People v. Cabezudo, G.R. No. 232357, November 28, 2018, 887 SCRA 448; People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 225786, November 14, 2018, 885 SCRA 526; People v. Musor, G.R. No. 231843, November 7, 2018, 885 SCRA 154; People v. Bricero, G.R. No. 218428, November 7, 2018, 885 SCRA 1; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 225736, October 15, 2018, 883 SCRA 218 and People v. Tomawis, G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018, 862 SCRA 131.
11.People v. Tomawis, id. at 149.
12.Id. at 150.
13.Rollo, p. 11.
14.Id.
15. G.R. No. 233702, June 20, 2018, 867 SCRA 548.
16.Id. at 569-570; citation omitted.
17.Id. at 570; citation omitted.
18. Offered as Exhibit "K" of the prosecution. CA rollo, p. 51; Records (Criminal Case No. 14-38956), p. 14.
19. Records (Criminal Case No. 14-38956), p. 14.
20.See People v. Tomawis, supra note 10, at 147.
21.See id.; People v. Tomas, G.R. No. 241631, March 11, 2019, 896 SCRA 14; and People v. Galisim, G.R. No. 231305, September 11, 2019, 919 SCRA 257.
22. Records (Criminal Case No. 14-38956), p. 60; Judicial Affidavit of PO1 Lagundino dated January 26, 2015, id. at 55-64. PO1 Lagundino testified:
Question-31: What did you do with the items you recovered?
Answer-31: I brought them outside the room and placed them on the top of the table inside the store and arranged them accordingly together with the buy-bust item. x x x We then waited for the witnesses to arrived (sic).
Question-32: Did the witnesses arrive?
Answer-32: Yes. After thirty (30) minutes x x x.
Question-33: What happened next?
Answer-33: I proceeded with the marking of the recovered items in the presence of the witnesses and Rhoda De Asis. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Question-36: I am showing you a RECEIPT/INVENTORY OF PROPERTY SEIZED dated May 7, 2014 marked as Exhibit "K", do you recognize this document?
Answer-36: This is the inventory we prepared which was signed by Rhoda De Asis and the witnesses. Id. at 60-61.
23.Id. at 61.
24.Id. at 56-57. PO1 Lagundino testified:
Question-8: Describe the house of Rhoda De Asis.
Answer-8: The house is made of mixed materials x x x. There is a small sari-sari store which is part of the house. Id.
25.Rollo, p. 11.
26. G.R. No. 242827, September 9, 2019, 918 SCRA 254.
27.Id. at 266.
28.Id.
29.Id. at 269.
30.See People v. Cariño, G.R. No. 233336, January 14, 2019, 890 SCRA 346, 359-360, citing People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018, 853 SCRA 321.
31. Records (Criminal Case No. 14-38956), p. 14.
32. G.R. No. 208095, September 20, 2017, 840 SCRA 327.
33.Id. at 340; italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied.
34. G.R. No. 217887, March 14, 2018, 859 SCRA 193.
35.Id. at 220-221.
36. 2010 AIDSOTF Manual, Rule II, Sec. 13, emphasis and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original omitted. This Section is reproduced in Chapter IV, Rule 37 of the 2013 Revised Philippine National Police Operational Procedures, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE HANDBOOK PNPM-DO-DS-3-2-13. See also People v. Labsan, G.R. No. 227184, February 6, 2019, 892 SCRA 112, 137-139.
37.People v. Ismael, G.R. No. 208093, February 20, 2017, 818 SCRA 122, 134, citing People v. Coreche, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 350.
38. G.R. No. 242947, July 17, 2019, 909 SCRA 543.
39.Id. at 570.
40.Rollo, p. 16.
41. Records (Criminal Case No. 14-38956), pp. 60-61.
42.Id. at 62.
43. Exhibit "A" of the prosecution. CA rollo, p. 50; Records (Criminal Case No. 14-38956), pp. 37, 66.
44. Exhibit "F" of the prosecution. Id.; id. at 17, 38.
45. CA rollo, p. 75.
46.See People v. Plaza, G.R. No. 235467, August 20, 2018, 878 SCRA 231; People v. Veedor, Jr., G.R. No. 223525, June 25, 2018, 868 SCRA 99; People v. Mola, G.R. No. 226481, April 18, 2018, 862 SCRA 112; and People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 219955, February 5, 2018, 854 SCRA 116.
47. 2010 AIDSOTF Manual, Rule I, Sec. 7.
48.Id., Rule II, Sec. 13, which provides:
Section 13. Handling, Custody and Disposition of Drug Evidence. —
xxx xxx xxx
A — Drug Evidence
xxx xxx xxx
i. The seizing officer shall accomplish the Chain of Custody Form with the affixed signatures which shall accompany the evidence turned over to the investigator-on-case or the Crime Laboratory as the case may be.
xxx xxx xxx
C — Chain of Custody
xxx xxx xxx
d. The seizing officer shall accomplish and sign the chain of custody form which shall accompany the evidence up to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. (Emphasis in the original)
49.See People v. Villarta, supra note 34.
50. G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 524.
51.Id. at 536-537.
52.People v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 205148, November 16, 2016, 809 SCRA 204, 219.
53.People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 199271, October 19, 2016, 806 SCRA 513, 536-537; emphasis supplied.
54. G.R. No. 197550, September 25, 2013, 706 SCRA 337.
55.Id. at 354; emphasis supplied; People v. Labsan, supra note 36, at 136-137.
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