SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218577. April 26, 2017.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ERIC CALDERON DALIT, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated26 April 2017which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 218577 (People of the Philippines v. Eric Calderon Dalit). — This is an appeal from the April 6, 2015 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06712, which affirmed the January 2, 2014 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, finding accused-appellant Eric Calderon Dalit (Dalit) guilty of lascivious conduct constituting child abuse under Section 5 (b), 3 Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 ("Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act").
Dalit was indicted for rape under Paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to R.A. No. 7610. The Information dated March 2, 2012 alleged: ATICcS
That on or about the 25th day of December 2011 at around 11:00 o'clock p.m. in Brgy. New San Juan, Municipality of Cabangan, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being the biological father of 13 year-old [AAA], did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, through force, intimidation and threat, have sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge with his daughter 13 year-old [AAA], against her will and without her consent, which act degraded and demeaned said [AAA] of her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, to her damage and prejudice. 4
In his arraignment, Dalit pleaded not guilty of the offense charged. Trial ensued subsequent to the conduct of the Preliminary Conference and Pre-Trial Conference.
Presented as witnesses for the prosecution were AAA and Dr. Mirian Abadilla-Dullas, while only Dalit testified for the defense. The factual findings of the RTC, which was adopted by the CA, are as follows:
[AAA] testified x x x: that she is 13 years old and now in the custody of the PREDA Foundation, Olongapo City; that she executed a sworn statement (Exh. "A"); that the Eric Dalit she accused of abusing her and mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7 of her sworn statement is her father (witness pointed to accused who was in court); and, that as stated in paragraph 7 of her sworn statement, her father inserted his private part in her private part (witness pointing to her private part). ETHIDa
The defense counsel did not cross-examine the complainant/witness.
DR. MIRIAN ABADILLA-DULLAS x x x was presented to testify: that she is the municipal health officer of Cabangan, Zambales; that she [examined] [AAA] on 09 January 2012; and, that she issued the corresponding medico-legal report (Exh. "D").
Defense counsel admitted the proposed testimony.
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In his defense, accused ERIC DALIT testified x x x: that he executed a judicial affidavit; that complainant is his daughter with Mylene Dalit; that he agreed that complainant was only 13 years old on 25 December 2011; that as alleged in his judicial affidavit, [his] daughter filed this case against him because sometimes he reprimanded her and sometimes whipped her with anything he could pick up (sic); that one occasion was when his (witness) mother told his wife, [AAA's] mother, that [AAA] stole money from her uncle Joel Dalit; that he asked his brother and his brother told him that [AAA] was the only person there tending his brother's store; that [AAA] was not paid for tending the store; and, that another reason why she filed this case was because of a quarrel between him and his wife. 5
The RTC found that Dalit committed only a lascivious conduct penalized under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 because the prosecution failed to show that he penetrated or entered AAA's private part. It was noted that, as gathered from her Sinumpaang Salaysay, AAA merely claimed that on December 25, 2011 her father laid on top of her ("dinaganan po niya ako"), remove her shortpants, and abused her ("inabuso po nya ako"). The trial court held that Dalit's defense of denial could not prevail over AAA's positive and credible testimony and that his claim of ill motive on the part of AAA and his wife was unsubstantiated. The fallo of the Decision reads:
IN VIEW THEREOF, accused Eric Calderon Dalit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused is ordered to pay complaining victim [AAA] the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages. 6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction. It opined that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of Sec. 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Dalit committed lascivious conduct against AAA, who was then 12 years old, by pulling her towards the bed, mounting himself on top of her, pulling down her shorts, and abusing her. He was able to consummate his lascivious design through coercion and with the use of his influence as AAA's father. His moral ascendancy and threats were more than sufficient to cow her into submission to the sexual abuse and intimidate her into not taking the necessary action to prevent the same. In the absence of any exceptional circumstance, which is wanting in this case, the appellate court accorded great weight and respect to the factual findings of the trial court. Likewise, the testimony of AAA, a minor whose chastity was abused, was given full credence. On the other hand, the CA was not swayed by Dalit's attempt to diminish and taint AAA's credibility by imputing ill motives on her and her mother. Similarly, his defense of alibi and denial were found to be without merit considering that, as opposed to AAA's positive identification of him as the assailant, no competent proof was adduced to corroborate the same. The CA disposed: TIADCc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 02 January 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in Crim. Case No. RTC 6785-I, finding accused-appellant Eric Calderon Dalit guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua n is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the accused-appellant is not eligible for parole; the award of moral damages is reduced to Php15,000.00; and he is further ordered to pay AAA the following amounts: Php15,000.00 as fine, Php20,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.7
Before Us, both the People, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dalit, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested that they would dispense with the filing of a Supplemental Brief and, in lieu thereof, adopt and replead the arguments raised in their respective Brief filed before the CA. 8
The appeal is dismissed.
In assailing the factual basis of his conviction, Dalit, in effect, questions the credibility of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as well as the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
We will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, as it was obviously in a better position to observe their demeanor, conduct, attitude, behavior, deportment or manner while testifying on the witness stand. 9 Moreover, the factual findings of the trial court were affirmed by the CA; hence, binding on us. 10 Nonetheless, there appears to be no facts of substance and value that were overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 11
Being of tender age and immature, the Court is inclined to lend credence to AAA's version of what actually transpired considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which she would be exposed if the matter about which she testified on were not true. 12 Indeed, no young and decent girl would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to medical examination and undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not motivated by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her. 13 As for AAA's mother, suffice it to say that it is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice if it will subject her to embarrassment and even stigma. By nature, no mother will stoop so low as to sacrifice her daughter's honor, damage her psyche, and mar her entire life by subjecting her to the hardships and shame attendant to the prosecution of an alleged sexual abuse just to assuage her own grudge or hurt feelings. 14
Here, all the elements of sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA No. 7610 were satisfied, to wit: (1) The accused committed the act of lascivious conduct; (2) The said act was performed with a child subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) The female child was below 18 years of age. 15 The prosecution established that AAA was born on December 30, 1998; that around 11:00 p.m. on December 25, 2011 Dalit woke her up and told her to urinate; that when she returned, he told her to go upstairs and he followed her; that he pulled her towards the wooden bed ("papag"), went on top of her ("dinaganan"), pulled down her shortpants, and abused her ("inabuso"). cSEDTC
The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child is engaged in any lascivious conduct through coercion, intimidation or influence. 16 AAA's submissiveness to Dalit's lascivious conduct does not exonerate him from criminal liability since the law does not require that physical violence be used against the person of the victim or that the offender be armed while committing the sexual abuse. 17 Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible; it is enough that some compulsion annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. 18 More importantly, in this case, moral coercion or ascendancy suffices. 19 As the biological father of AAA, Dalit exercised moral ascendancy over her. 20 It was a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation. 21
Dalit cannot hide behind his denial and alibi, which are common defenses in sexual abuse cases. If not supported by clear and convincing evidence or corroborated by credible and disinterested witness/es, these defenses are inherently weak and treated as self-serving assertions deserving no weight in law. 22 As negative defenses, they cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification and declaration of the complainant. 23
Finally, the CA correctly imposed the penalty for Dalit's lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse. Pursuant to Sec. 31 (c) of R.A. No. 7610, in relation to Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9346, reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the perpetrator is a parent of the victim and, in such case, the convict shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180 (Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended). In addition, considering that the penalty is reclusion perpetua and that in the case of People v. Jugueta24 if the crime committed is attempted rape, civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are fixed at P50,000.00. It is therefore just and proper that the complainant be granted the said amounts as damages. Further, the phrase "not eligible for parole" is deleted because it is only when the penalty of death cannot be imposed by reason of R.A. 9346 25 that there is a need to include the phrase "not eligible for parole." Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the monetary awards for damages, from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 26
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The April 6, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06712, which affirmed the January 2, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, finding accused-appellant Eric Calderon Dalit guilty of lascivious conduct constituting child abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, is AFFIRMEDwithModifications in that:
(1) The accused is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(2) The phrase "not eligible for parole" is deleted.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Melchor Q.C. Sadang concurring (Rollo, pp. 2-16; CA rollo, pp. 99-113).
2. CA rollo, pp. 48-52.
3. SECTION 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
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(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x.
4.Rollo, p. 3; CA rollo, p. 48.
5.Id. at 3-4; id. at 49, 100-101.
6. CA rollo, p. 52.
7.Rollo, p. 13; CA rollo, p. 110. (Emphasis in the original)
8.Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9.People v. Chingh, 661 Phil. 208, 217 (2011); People v. Abadies, 433 Phil. 814, 822 (2002); and People v. Larin, 357 Phil. 987, 1004-1005 (1998).
10.See Hanapin v. People (Notice), G.R. No. 193593, April 3, 2013 and Amployo v. People, 496 Phil. 747, 757 (2005).
11.People v. Chingh, supra note 9 and People v. Larin, supra note 9, at 1005.
12.People v. Brioso, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016 and People v. Chingh, supra note 9, at 218.
13.People v. Larin, supra note 9.
14. See People v. Leonardo, 638 Phil. 161, 195 (2010).
15. See Pinlac v. People, G.R. No. 197458, November 11, 2015, 774 SCRA 627, 637; People v. Barcela, 734 Phil. 332, 351 (2014); People v. Gaduyon, 720 Phil. 750, 768-769 (2013); People v. Leonardo, supra, at 187; People v. Montinola, 567 Phil. 387, 407 (2008); Cabila v. People, 563 Phil. 1020, 1027 (2007); Navarrete v. People, 542 Phil. 496, 510 (2007); Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421, 431 (2005); Amployo v. People, supra note 10, at 758; People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43, 90 (2001); Lavides v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 331, 343 (2000); and People v. Larin, supra note 9, at 997.
16.People v. Larin, supra note 9, at 998. See also People v. Barcela, supra, People v. Gaduyon, supra, at 769; People v. Leonardo, supra; People v. Montinola, supra, at 408; Cabila v. People, supra; Malto v. People, 560 Phil. 119, 135 (2007); Navarrete v. People, supra, at 511; Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, sputa, at 432; Amployo v. People, supra note 10, at 758; People v. Jalosjos, supra; and Lavides v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 344.
17.People v. Jimenez, 408 Phil. 628, 642 (2001) and People v. Larin, supra note 9, at 1008.
18. See People v. Leonardo, supra note 14, at 188; People v. Montinola, supra note 15, at 408; and Amployo v. People, supra note 10, at 759.
19.People v. Larin, supra note 9, at 1008.
20.People v. Abadies, 433 Phil. 814, 823 (2002).
21.People v. Jimenez, 408 Phil. 628, 643 (2001).
22. See People v. Chingh, supra note 9, at 219; People v. Leonardo, supra note 14; Navarrete v. People, supra note 15, at 513; and People v. Lubong, 388 Phil. 474, 491 (2000).
23. See People v. Chingh, supra note 9, at 219; People v. Leonardo, supra note 14; Navarrete v. People, supra note 15, at 513; and People v. Lubong, supra.
24. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
25. An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, June 24, 2006.
26. See Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, effective July 1, 2013, in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "pepetua" in the original document.