FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 252058. March 15, 2022.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. PAULO CINCUA y BALURAN, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 15, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 252058 (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Paulo Cincua y Baluran, Accused-Appellant).
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments presented in the Appellant's Brief 1 and Appellee's Brief, 2 which the parties adopted in lieu of supplemental briefs, the Court resolves to DISMISS the Appeal 3 for failure of Paulo Cincua y Baluran (accused-appellant) to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its assailed July 17, 2019 Decision 4 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 11223, to warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
In an Information 5 dated April 13, 2015, accused-appellant was charged with rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1), in relation to Art. 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. 6 The accusatory portion of said information reads:
That on or about March 29, 2015, in the x x x, Philippines, [the accused, Paulo Cincua y Baluran], with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, being then the common-law spouse of the victim's mother, [committed] sexual abuse and [lascivious] conduct upon one [AAA], 7 a minor, 12 years old, assisted by her father [FFF], by then and there removing her clothes, forcing her to lie down, inserting his penis into her mouth, removing her panty and inserting his penis into her private part, kissing her neck and lips and sucking her breast and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 8
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the RTC was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to the same. 9
The prosecution was able to establish the elements of qualified rape under Art. 266-A (1), 10 in relation to Art. 266-B (1), 11 of the RPC, viz.: (1) accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis in her vagina; (2) such act was accomplished through intimidation; (3) AAA was under 18 years of age at the time of the incident; and (4) accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of AAA's mother. CAIHTE
The minority of AAA, who was then 12 years and 4 months old, and her relationship with accused-appellant as her stepfather, were both alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial. Contrary to accused-appellant's assertion, the provision of Art. 266-A (1) and 266-B (1) still applies since AAA was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident. Indeed, the elements of the crime of qualified rape do not require the minor victim to be under 12 years old.
Despite the taxing cross-examination, AAA's testimony was consistent and definite. Indeed, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. AAA narrated in detail that accused-appellant ordered her to go inside the bathroom and remove her pants. Accused-appellant then instructed her to lie down on the bed where he removed AAA's clothes, and they both lay down naked. Accused-appellant then got on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina.
Although accused-appellant did not threaten or force AAA to engage in sexual congress with him, it is settled that where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. 12 AAA likewise recalled that she could not do anything while accused-appellant had his way with her because she was so scared of him. To repeat, although there was no showing of force, threat or intimidation, accused-appellant's moral ascendancy as AAA's stepfather took the place of violence or intimidation.
Contrary to accused-appellant's claim, his relationship with AAA was duly established. Notably, accused-appellant did not deny that he and AAA's mother, MMM, were lovers. He had extramarital relations with MMM after the latter separated from FFF, AAA's father. Accused-appellant himself admitted that he and MMM had an intimate relationship for about six years before the March 29, 2015 incident and that he had been frequenting her house wherein AAA likewise lived. Indeed, accused-appellant failed to controvert the allegation that he and MMM had been living together for years in the same household. AAA even referred to accused-appellant as her "stepfather."
It is evident that AAA feared accused-appellant, her stepfather, who can be reasonably expected to exercise moral authority over her, even prior to the rape incident. This fear caused her to be immobilized and unable to offer physical resistance to accused-appellant's advances. AAA's failure to run, shout or seek help does not negate rape; neither does her lack of resistance imply that she consented to the sexual act.
Anent the medical report issued by Dr. Sandra Stuart Hernandez, which indicated that there was "no evident injury at the time of anogenital examination," the same is not controlling. The Court has repeatedly held that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. 13 The medical examination of the victim or the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the commission of rape, as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character. 14 A medical report is not even material for the purpose of proving rape as it is merely corroborative in character and, thus, can be dispensed with accordingly. 15
With regard to accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi, the same deserve scant consideration. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. 16 Indeed, accused-appellant failed to utterly prove that it was physically impossible for him to commit the crime. Accused-appellant even admitted that he was with AAA at the time of the incident, but denied having entered the hotel, where the incident happened, with her. Given AAA's positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, and the lack of physical impossibility for said accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi must fail.
As to the penalty, the lower courts correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in view of R.A. No. 9346, 17 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The lower courts likewise aptly awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 each, in line with current jurisprudence. 18
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court AFFIRMS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the July 17, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 11223. Accused-appellant Paulo Cincua y Baluran is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a), in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY private complainant AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All the amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 28-60.
2.Id. at 88-113.
3.Id. at 201-203.
4.Id. at 117-134; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring.
5.Id. at 61.
6. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
7. In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703, 709 (2006), citing Section 40, Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children; and Section 63, Rule XI, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," the real names of the rape victims will not be disclosed. The Court will instead use fictitious initials to represent them throughout the decision. The personal circumstances of the victims or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities will likewise be withheld.
8. CA rollo, p. 61.
9.Melgar v. People, 826 Phil. 177,186 (2018).
10. Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation[.]
11. Article 266-B. Penalty. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim[.]
12.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235662, July 24, 2019, 910 SCRA 394, 410.
13.People v Prodenciado, 749 Phil. 746, 765 (2014).
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.People v. Palanay, 805 Phil. 116, 127 (2017).
17. Anti-Death Penalty Law.
18.People v. Ibañez, G.R. No. 231984, July 6, 2020; see also People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).