FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229214. August 27, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CCC, *accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 27, 2020 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 229214 (People of the Philippines v. CCC)
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 dated December 18, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07060 affirming appellant's conviction for one (1) count of rape and two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness committed against his own daughter.
Antecedents
The Charges and Plea
Appellant was charged in three (3) separate Informations for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 2 in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 1 3 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act (RA) 8369, 4viz.:
Criminal Case No. 146961
On or about or sometime in May 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, taking advantage of his moral authority, ascendancy and influence, being the father of the offended party, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 12 years old, minor, against her will and consent; the said crime having been attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and abuse of superior strength, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 146962
On or about or sometime in June 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, taking advantage of his moral authority, ascendancy and influence, being the father of the offended party, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 12 years old, minor, against her will and consent; the said crime having been attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and abuse of superior strength, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 146963
On or about or sometime in August 29, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, taking advantage of his moral authority, ascendancy and influence, being the father of the offended party, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 12 years old, minor, against her will and consent; the said crime having been attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and abuse of superior strength, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 261, Pasig City. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. Trial ensued.
Prosecution's Version
AAA testified that she was only twelve (12) years old when she was repeatedly abused by appellant, her own father as shown in her birth certificate.
The first incident occurred in May 2011, about 11 o'clock in the evening, in the part of their house where she slept with her mother BBB and siblings. Appellant touched her thigh and put his hand inside her clothes to touch her breasts and private part. He only stopped when she evaded his acts. 5
In June 2011, around 11 o'clock in the evening in their house, she woke up from sleep when appellant touched her breasts and then inserted his penis in her vagina. When she realized what was happening, she immediately removed his penis and avoided him. 6
On August 29, 2011, also about 11 o'clock in the evening in their home, she woke up when appellant inserted his hand inside her clothes to caress her breasts. She avoided him to make him stop. She was with her mother and her siblings at that time.
She did not immediately tell BBB about her father's abuses because she was afraid of him. She only reported the incidents to BBB after they left their house in September 2011. Thereafter, BBB accompanied her to the Women's Desk to file a complaint. There, the staff advised her to have a medical checkup. After her medical examination, she was issued an initial medical report.
She filed the cases against appellant to get justice for what he did to her. She confirmed that the perpetrator in all three (3) incidents was her father and identified him in open court. She was ashamed of what had happened and felt anger towards appellant. The prosecution had it put on record that AAA and appellant were both in tears during AAA's testimony. 7
On cross, AAA affirmed that she did not immediately report what appellant had been doing to her for fear he would kill BBB and her siblings. 8
BBB, AAA's mother and appellant's wife, testified that she accompanied her daughter to the Women's Desk and identified her (BBB's) signature on AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay. She also identified the medicolegal report and AAA's birth certificate previously marked by the prosecution.
On August 29, 2011, around 11 o'clock in the evening, she and her family were all sleeping beside each other, but she was awakened when she felt her husband's arm on her chest. When she tried to sense where his fingers were, she realized that his hand was inside AAA's t-shirt and was holding AAA's breast. She stood up and kicked appellant but he pretended to be asleep. She fell back asleep afterwards as she was also so tired.
In the days that followed, she kept on talking to her daughter about what she saw. Eventually, AAA admitted that appellant had been doing something to her. When BBB confronted her husband, he vehemently denied any wrongdoing. Upon further questioning, however, AAA told BBB everything — that her father was always holding her breast and vagina, that he inserted his finger in her vagina and even tried to insert his penis in her vagina. So BBB assisted AAA in filing a case. 9
The testimony of P/Supt. Bonnie Chua, Chief Medico Legal Officer, was dispensed with when the parties stipulated on the due execution of the Initial Medico-Legal Report dated October 18, 2011 and the fact that P/Supt. Chua had no personal knowledge of the incidents involved in the criminal cases. 10
Defense's Version
In his defense, appellant claimed that all of AAA's charges were fabricated and he did not know why his daughter would make such wild accusations against him. 11 He asserted that AAA usually stayed with his mother-in-law. He and his family slept in the second floor of their house because the first floor is a store. 12 In May and August 2011, he did not sleep at their house in Pinagbuhatan but in their place in Pineda. He admitted though that he sometimes stayed in Pinagbuhatan in June 2011. 13
The Trial Court's Ruling
In Decision dated July 30, 2014, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 146961, accused [CCC] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to stiffer the penalty of imprisonment of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum to 6 years of prison correctional, as maximum.
2) In Criminal Case No. 146962, accused [CCC] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 146963, accused [CCC] is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum to 6 years of prison correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court found appellant guilty of one (1) count of rape and two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness. It held that the prosecution failed to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim for the incidents in May and August 2011 as AAA only testified that appellant touched her thigh, breasts and/or her private part. Hence, appellant was found guilty only of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. 146961 and 146963.
As for the incident in June 2011 (Criminal Case No. 146962), the trial court held that AAA's categorical testimony that appellant inserted his penis in her vagina was reinforced by the medico-legal report stating that she had "deep healed lacerations at 4 and 6 o'clock positions" in her hymen.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
In his appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering a verdict of conviction. He vigorously argued that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crimes charged.
On the charge of rape, appellant insisted that the courts below erred in (a) not accepting his alibi that he was staying in Pineda and not Pinagbuhatan during the material times in question; and (b) giving weight to the Initial Medico-Legal Report when the person who examined AAA did not testify.
As for the two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness, the prosecution failed to establish his supposed acts were performed with the criminal intent "to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person" as required under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610 (or the Child Abuse Law).
Aside from stressing his defenses of denial and alibi, appellant averred it was impossible for him to commit the lascivious acts AAA complained of in the presence of his own wife. Finally, AAA's failure to offer any resistance to his alleged sexual advances or even shout for help cast doubt on her credibility as witness.
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defended the verdict of conviction. The OSG maintained that AAA gave a candid, plain and straightforward account of her traumatic experiences in such a manner as to manifest her honesty and defeat accused-appellant's weak defenses. Too, AAA's Initial Medico-Legal report corroborated her testimony that appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By Decision dated December 18, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It gave no credit to appellant's defense of alibi and denial and held that his uncorroborated statements could not overcome his daughter's positive testimony regarding the incidents. The appellate court also noted that Pinagbuhatan and Pineda were situated in the same city with a relatively short distance between them. Hence, it was not impossible for appellant to have gone to his family and spent the night with them at their house on the dates of the incidents.
The Present Appeal
In response to the Court's Resolution dated March 22, 2017, appellant and appellee both manifested that they were no longer filing supplemental briefs and merely adopted their briefs filed with the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellant's conviction for rape and two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness?
Ruling
The Court resolves to DENY the appeal for failure to sufficiently prove that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision dated December 18, 2015, affirming appellant's conviction for one (1) count of rape and two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness, as to warrant the exercise of the Count's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
First, the courts below properly disregarded appellant's denial and alibi.
Denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. More, for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed as he must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 14
Here, the Court of Appeals aptly noted that (a) appellant's bare denial cannot overcome his daughter's straightforward and categorical testimony and (b) Pineda and Pinagbuhatan were situated in the same city with a relatively short distance between them so it was not impossible for appellant and his family to have spent the night together during the time period material to these cases.
Second, it is immaterial that the medico-legal officer who examined AAA did not testify in court. For one, the trial court dispensed with the medico-legal officer's testimony after the parties agreed to stipulate on the due execution and authenticity of her Initial Medico-Legal Report. For another, the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. Thus, we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character. 15
Third, AAA's failure to immediately report the sexual abuses committed against her and/or to have herself medically examined did not diminish her credibility as a witness. The Court has acknowledged that such hesitation may be attributable to the victim's age or appellant's moral ascendancy over her. As it was, AAA testified that she did not immediately report what her father had done to her as she was afraid of him and feared that he would kill her mother and her siblings.
To understand fully how victims act after an abuse, we should be reminded that (a) different people react differently to a given type of situation, there being no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience; and (b) it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected from mature persons under similar circumstances. 16 Indeed, there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation than your own father — one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person since birth. 17
Fourth, appellant's contention that it was unlikely for him to have committed the acts of sexual abuse in question in the presence of his wife cannot exonerate him either. Jurisprudence has long recognized that lust is no respecter of time and place; rape can thus be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. 18
Last, appellant impliedly admits that his acts fall within the ambit of Section 5 (b) of RA 7160 when he cites as defense the prosecution's alleged failure to prove the element of intentional touching with "intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person" as required under the implementing rules of said statute. This argument is both disingenuous and bereft of merit. Appellant's habitual acts of touching the victim's thigh, breasts and/or vagina clearly demonstrates his deliberate and depraved intent to abuse, degrade, and use his own child for his sexual gratification.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming appellant's convictions for rape and two (2) counts of lascivious conduct. We must, however, modify the assailed ruling for the purposes of properly designating the offenses and amend the penalties and the civil damages imposed in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
We start with appellant's conviction for rape. The courts below failed to appreciate and discuss the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority which were plainly alleged in the Information and duly proved during trial. Hence, in Criminal Case No. 146962, appellant should be found guilty of qualified rape for which the penalty is death. Abiding by RA 9346, however, we instead sentence appellant to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of death, 19 and direct him to pay P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. 20
Moving on to the two (2) convictions for acts of lasciviousness against appellant, it is settled that where an accused is charged with rape through carnal knowledge of a minor under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the RPC but the element of carnal knowledge was not proved, the accused may still be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. 21 This, however, does not foreclose an indictment under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 as well. People v. Tulagan22 supported this view when it cited with approval the following discussion in People v. Dimakuta: 23
Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall be liable for:
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts through abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No. 7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion or influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which was done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself front abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. (Original underscoring and emphasis omitted; present emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex. Such acts are punished as sexual abuse under RA 7610, whose elements under Section 5 of the law are: (1) the accused commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 24 In the context of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. 25
Here, appellant's acts of touching his daughter's thigh, breasts and/or her private parts without her consent, through force and intimidation or through coercion or influence and in clear abuse of his parental authority over her satisfy the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Still pursuant to the guidelines laid down in Tulagan, 26 the proper designation of the offenses committed here (where the victim is 12 years old or below 18) is lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 which is punishable with reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In accordance with Section 31 (c) and (f) 27 of RA 7610 and our ruling in People v. Caoili, 28 we impose the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine pegged at P15,000.00 since the perpetrator is the father of the offended party. We, therefore, find it proper to grant civil awards for each count of lascivious conduct as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. 29 So must it be.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 30, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 146961, 146962, and 146963, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 18, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07060, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION:
1) In Criminal Case No. 146961, appellant is found GUILTY of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000.00. He is further ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages each in the amount of P75,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 146962, appellant is found GUILTY of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole. In addition, he is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages each in the amount of P100,000.00.
3) In Criminal Case No. 146963, appellant is found GUILTY of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000.00. He is likewise ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each.
These amounts are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."Reyes, J., Jr., J., took no part; Leonen, J., designated Additional Member per Raffle dated June 29, 2020.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
CAGUIOA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur partly in the result, particularly with respect to the conviction of the appellant CCC for the crimes he was charged with. 1
However, I express my disagreement with the ponencia's resolution to modify the nomenclature of the crimes in Criminal Case Nos. 146961 and 146963 from "Acts of Lasciviousness" punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to "lascivious conduct" punishable under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7610, 2 following my Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in People v. Tulagan3 where I posited that Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 only applies to cases where there is allegation and proof that the minor victim was "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" (EPSOSA). In all other instances, the provisions on Acts of Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault under the RPC shall apply.
As I stated in my dissent in Quimvel, if the intention of R.A. 7610 is to penalize all sexual abuses against children under its provisions to the exclusion of the RPC, it would have expressly stated so and would have done away with the qualification that the child be "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse." Indeed, it bears to stress that when the statute speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it: meaning, Section 5(b), R.A. 7610 is a provision of specific and limited application, and must be applied as worded — a separate and distinct offense from the "common" or "ordinary" acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC.
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The letter of Section 5(b), R.A. 7610 is clear: it only punishes those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. There is no ambiguity to speak of that necessitates the Court's exercise of statutory construction to ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the law.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, for a person to be convicted of violating Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, the following essential elements need to be proved: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse"; and (3) the child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 4 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Here, the appellant was found guilty of two (2) counts of lascivious acts against his daughter, who was, at the time of the offense, a minor. However, the Informations did not allege that the child was EPSOSA. Neither was it proven that the victim engaged in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct either for a consideration, or due to the coercion or influence of any adult.
To be clear, I do not dispute the finding of CCC's guilt. However, the nomenclature of the crime for which he was convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 146961 and 146963 should be maintained as Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and punished under Article 336 of the RPC.
Finally, I concur as regards the resolution to affirm the conviction of the appellant in Criminal Case No. 146962 for the crime of Qualified Rape, punishable under Article 266-A (1), in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353.
Based on these premises, I vote to DENY the instant appeal and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
(SGD.) ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Footnotes
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 which mandates that the complete names of the women and children victims be replaced by fictitious initials. Also, People v. Manjares, G.R. No. 185844, November 23, 2011, decreed: "In line with Section 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld. For purposes of discussion, the private offended party and her immediate family members shall be referred to using initials. See People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419) and People v. Guillermo (G.R. No. 173787, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 597)."
1. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Nina C. Antonio Valenzuela and Jhosep Y. Lopez.
2. Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is Committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
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3. Article 266-B. Penalties. — x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
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4. SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. — The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code"; x x x (Family Courts Act of 1997, October 28, 1997).
5. TSN dated February 20, 2013, pp. 5-9.
6.Id. at 10-11.
7.Id. at 12-19.
8.Id. at 20-21.
9. TSN dated September 11, 2013, pp. 6-17.
10. RTC Order dated June 19, 2013; records at p. 72.
11. TSN dated June 18, 2014, p. 7.
12.Id. at 11-12.
13.Id. at 9-10.
14.People v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 224584, September 4, 2019.
15.People v. Laog, 674 Phil. 444, 463 (2011).
16.People v. Umayam, 450 Phil. 543, 563 (2003).
17.People v. Pacayra, 810 Phil. 275, 293-294 (2017).
18.People v. CCC, G.R. No. 239336, June 3, 2019.
19. In A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, the Court clarified that "[w]hen circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of [RA] 9346, the qualification of 'without eligibility for parole' shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for [RA] 9346."
20. See, People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 846 (2016).
21. See, People v. Pareja, 724 Phil. 759, 783 (2014).
22.People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.
23. 771 Phil. 641, 669 (2015).
24.Awas v. People, 811 Phil. 700, 708-709 (2017).
25. See Ramilo v. People, G.R. No. 234841, April 10, 2019.
26.Supra note 20.
27. SECTION 31. Common Penal Provisions. —
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(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;
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(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
28. 815 Phil. 839, 897 (2017).
29.People v. Tulagan, supra note 20.
CAGUIOA, J., concurring and dissenting:
* The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA No. 9262, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729 Phil. 576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013]. See also Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USING FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017); People v. XXX, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018, 871 SCRA 424.
1. CCC was charged in three (3) separate Informations for the crime of Rape, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 146961, 146962, and 146963. He was convicted of Rape for Criminal Case No. 146962, and two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness for Criminal Case Nos. 146961 and 146963.
2.Ponencia, pp. 9-10.
3. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65020>.
4.Id., citing People v. Abello, 601 Phil 373, 392 (2009).