THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 236459. November 23, 2020.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. CHITO CAUILAN y TAMBAUAN, accused-appellant,
CHRISTOPHER LITTAUA ALIAS "KITKIT," DIKDIK GUNDAN, KEVIN DELA CRUZ y BLAQUERA, AND TWO (2) JOHN DOES, accused.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 23, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 236459 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. CHITO CAUILAN y TAMBAUAN, accused-appellant; CHRISTOPHER LITTAUA alias "KITKIT," DIKDIK GUNDAN, KEVIN DELA CRUZ y BLAQUERA, and two (2) JOHN DOES, accused). — The defenses of alibi and denial are inherently weak, and these cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the positive testimony of the prosecutions' witnesses.
This is an appeal assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 affirming with modification Chito T. Cauilan's (Cauilan) conviction 2 for murder. The Court of Appeals imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and ordered the payment of damages.
In an Information, accused-appellant Cauilan, along with Christopher Littaua alias Kitkit (Littaua), Dikdik Gundan (Gundan), Kevin Blaquera dela Cruz (Kevin), and two (2) John Does, were charged with the murder of Elmer Baligod (Elmer):
That on July 18, 2008, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, CHITO CAUILAN y TAMBAUAN, CHRISTOPHER LITTAUA alias KITKIT, and an unidentified companion who were on board a motor scooter, together with DIKDIK GUNDAN, [KEVIN] DELA CRUZ y Blaquera, and another unidentified companion who were on board a separate motor scooter, by conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with unlicensed handguns, with intent to kill and qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the use of motor vehicles, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shoot the victim ELMER G. BALIGOD, father of the private complainant EDWARDSON BALIGOD, that caused the untimely death of the victim.
That the incident resulted to the apprehension of accused CHITO CAUILAN y TAMBAUAN by members of the PNP assigned at Tuguegarao City Police Station and 203rd Provincial Mobile Group, Cagayan PPO, this City.
That the crime was aggravated by the fact that the killing was perpetuated with the use of unlicensed firearms.
Contrary to law. 3 (Citation omitted, emphasis in the original)
Initially, the trial court only acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cauilan. During his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. 4
The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses: (1) SPO2 Dennis Matias (SPO2 Matias); (2) Police Senior Inspector Samuel Fernando (PSI Fernando); (3) Edwardson Baligod (Edwardson); (4) Junnifer Baligod alias Peng (Peng); (5) Elisa Baligod (Elisa); (6) Erwin Baligod (Erwin); and (7) Dr. Rowena Soliman. 5
The prosecution witnesses' testimonies established that at around 10:00 p.m. on July 18, 2008, Elmer and his two (2) sons, Edwardson and Erwin, were in front of their house along Del Rosario Street in Tuguegarao City, when six (6) persons on two (2) motorcycles passed them by and fired multiple shots at Elmer, "causing him to fall prostrate to the ground." 6
The shooters were identified by Edwardson as Littaua and Gundan, with Littaua seated at the rear end of the first motorcycle while Gundan occupied the same position on the second. 7 Edwardson added that Gundan had kept "firing shots at Elmer while [he] was already lying on the ground." 8 As for the shooters' companions, Edwardson identified Cauilan as the middle rider of the first motorcycle and Kevin as the driver of the second. 9
Further, Edwardson claimed that he and Peng chased the shooters, tailing them up to Mayor Raul dela Cruz's (Mayor dela Cruz) house along Tobias Street, where the shooters hid. 10 From there, they went to the police station to report the shooting incident. 11
Erwin caught up with Edwardson at the police station, in time to join the police in going to Mayor dela Cruz's house. 12 Upon reaching the house, negotiations were made between the police officers and the mayor "for the purpose of identifying the suspects in the shooting incident." 13 Mayor dela Cruz eventually cooperated with the police, bringing out the "male persons inside his residential compound." 14 From the men presented, both Edwardson and Erwin identified Cauilan as one of the six (6) participants in the shooting incident. 15 Hence, the police officers arrested Cauilan, and brought him back to the police station for investigation. 16
Meanwhile, Elmer, who had been rushed to the People's Emergency Hospital, died due to the gunshot wounds he sustained. 17
During the time that the prosecution was presenting its evidence against Cauilan, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Kevin. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. 18
For their part, the defense presented a total of nine (9) witnesses: (1) Gaspar Danao (Gaspar); (2) Engr. Gil Baccay (Engr. Baccay); (3) Violeta Lagua; (4) Jose B. Danao (Jose); (5) Willy Palingayan, Jr.; (6) Agnes dela Cruz; (7) Rowena Baloran (Rowena); (8) Kevin; and (9) Cauilan. 19
Cauilan's main defenses were denial and alibi. He testified that since July 17, 2008, he had been bedridden with influenza and that on July 18, 2008, since he was still sick, he stayed in bed "in a nipa hut inside the mayor's compound." 20 It was only when the police came and asked for a line-up of "all the men inside the mayor's premises," that he went out. 21 Gaspar, who was Mayor dela Cruz's head carpenter, and Rowena, a house help in the mayor's compound, directly corroborated Cauilan's claims, asserting that he had been in bed in his quarters at the time of the shooting. 22
Kevin invoked similar defenses and said that he was in Poblacion Rizal, Cagayan, on July 18, 2008, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. He claimed that he was in the project site for a road concreting and line canal project, working as Engr. Baccay's timekeeper. 23
Further, upon clocking out of his job, he went straight to his in-laws' house in Iluru, Rizal, and never left Cagayan. His claim that he had been in Cagayan at the time of the shooting was corroborated by Engr. Baccay, his mother-in-law Violeta Lagua, the incumbent Barangay Chairman of Poblacion Rizal, Cagayan, Jose, and his mother Agnes Dela Cruz. 24 Finally, Kevin stressed that "[h]e did not know Edwardson Baligod, Erwin Baligod and his co-accused Cauilan, Littaua and Gundan." 25
In a February 16, 2016 Judgment, 26 the Regional Trial Court convicted Cauilan of murder. It found that treachery attended killing, and that all the riders of the two (2) motorcycles conspired to kill Elmer. The dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, accused CHITO CAUILAN y Tambauan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the offense of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Elmer Baligod the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Accused KEVIN DELA CRUZ y Blaquera is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The City Warden is directed to release him from custody unless he is detained for other lawful cause/s.
The case against accused DIKDIK GUNDAN, CHRISTOPHER "KITKIT" LITTAUA and two (2) JOHN DOES is ordered archived.
SO ORDERED. 27
Cauilan then appealed to the Court of Appeals, but his appeal was dismissed. In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained Cauilan's conviction, with modification:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, of Tuguegarao City in Criminal Case No. 12260 dated February 16, 2016 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that: Accused-Appellant shall not be eligible for parole; the award of temperate damages shall be increased to Php50,000.00; and award of exemplary damages in the amount of Php75,000.00 shall be granted; and all the monetary awards shall have an interest rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 28
Thereafter, Cauilan appealed his conviction. 29 This Court required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs. 30
In its Manifestation and Motion, 31 plaintiff-appellee stated that it is dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief. For his part, accused also filed a Manifestation 32 saying that he will no longer file a supplemental brief. Both parties adopted their arguments contained in their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant argues, in the main, that his alibi should have been upheld because, when it came to where he was actually seated on the motorcycle, the prosecution witnesses' testimonies conflicted one another. 33
Accused-appellant further says that Erwin "only had a fleeting glimpse of the culprit's face" on top of "ha[ving] ill-motive to implicate the accused-appellant." 34 Elaborating, he insists that Erwin was convinced that "the killing was politically motivated," with Mayor dela Cruz ordering the hit on Elmer, since Mayor dela Cruz was the rival of Mayor Joel Rumal, Elmer's cousin. 35 This, he said, made him a convenient suspect for Erwin, who he alleged mistook him as one of Mayor dela Cruz's bodyguards, when he was actually just a carpenter hired to renovate the mayor's house. 36
On the matter of treachery, accused-appellant insists that the prosecution has not proven its existence. 37 He argues that the shooting's mere suddenness does not do away with the prosecution's burden of "prov[ing] that [he had] consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack to insure execution without risk to himself." 38
Accused-appellant also disputes the finding of conspiracy, stressing that even if he and Littaua had been on the same motorcycle, that alone did not mean he had personally agreed to kill Elmer. 39
Plaintiff-appellee counters, first, that there was no error committed in disregarding accused-appellant's alibi in favor of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. 40 To plaintiff-appellee, the discrepancies in the testimonies were only on trivial matters and did "not detract from the central fact that Erwin and Edwardson witnessed accused-appellant as part of the group . . . who attacked Elmer." 41 Neither did accused-appellant "satisfy the required physical impossibility" needed for a defense of alibi to prosper. 42
Moreover, on treachery, plaintiff-appellee contends that the elements were properly established. 43 First, "the perpetrators gunned down Elmer while he was preoccupied [with] fixing their barbecue stall" and therefore not only "absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assault" but also "in no position to defend himself or to repel the aggressors[;]" and second, "when Elmer was already on the ground, the assailants on the second motorcycle again fired at [him]." 44
Finally, plaintiff-appellee also asserts that conspiracy has been adequately proven. 45 According to plaintiff-appellee, accused-appellant would not have been riding with the shooters if he had not "acquiesced or agreed to cooperate in the killing of Elmer." 46 More importantly, plaintiff-appellee stresses, if he had not been in on the killing, he should have reported it to the police, but he did not. 47
The main issue in this appeal is whether or not accused-appellant Chito T. Cauilan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, given his defense that he was bedridden at a nipa hut inside the mayor's compound during the commission of crime.
The appeal is dismissed.
There is no merit to accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi.
This Court has consistently maintained that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses. 48 For them to prosper, the accused must "prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed" and "that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." 49
In addition, witnesses for the defense must be unimpeachable — "denial and alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses." 50 Also, substantiation must be done with clear and convincing evidence. 51 If even a single one of these conditions are unmet by the accused, denial and alibi simply become "self-serving[,] deserv[ing] no weight in law[.]" 52
Accused-appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. He was unable to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place of the incident when it occurred. At the same time, he had no truly disinterested witnesses backing his claims. This Court finds no fault in the Court of Appeals' evaluation of these matters as merely self-serving. 53
Moreover, neither denial nor alibi can be accorded "greater evidentiary value over the testimony of witnesses who testified on positive points." 54 As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, accused-appellant was unable to discredit the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him as having taken part in the shooting. 55
As to treachery, the prosecution sufficiently established it as the qualifying circumstance for murder. The Court of Appeals ruled:
Without a doubt, Elmer had neither the time to escape nor sufficient means to defend himself as he did not expect the attack since he was not even facing the assailants. To make it worse, they shot him from behind while he was tending to his barbeque stand during nighttime, when there would be less probability of people witnessing the attack. Withal, Elmer could not be considered as the aggressor because he was the one who was assaulted without warning while he was outside his house preoccupied with his barbeque stand. Additionally, the prosecution witnesses affirmed that the perpetrators attacked the victim without provocation. They even designated who the shooters will be, and probably which motorcycle should drive by first in order to ensure Elmer's demise. Worse, one of the perpetrators shot Elmer again even when he was already on the ground to ensure that he could not fight back, or to make sure that he was dead. The fact that the perpetrators did not even bother to go down from their motorcycles revealed their plan to escape as fast as they could in order to lessen the risk to themselves. It just so happened that Edwardson and Peng were able to follow them after the attack. 56
This Court also agrees with the Court of Appeals' finding regarding conspiracy.
Direct proof is not necessary to prove conspiracy, since "it may be shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged." 57
In fact, "the prosecution need not establish that all the parties thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime or that they were actually together at all stages of the conspiracy." 58 It is sufficient if it can be deduced from the individual acts of each accused that they had a common plan to commit the crime. 59 Once proven, all of them will be held liable as principals. 60
Here, the prosecution met these standards by offering positive and convincing evidence. 61 The Court of Appeals correctly settled this point:
In relation to this finding of guilt against all the Accused, this Court has likewise deduced that there was conspiracy among them, as aptly found by the RTC. Conspiracy happens when "two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Said conspiracy "arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it." Thus, the moment that all the Accused took advantage of nighttime riding together on their motorcycles to ensure immediate escape, and used a gun to shoot Elmer when he was not looking or expecting anything, conspiracy was clearly shown.
It has been held that "[W]hen conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. Accordingly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests." In the case at bench, the actions of all the Accused distinctly demonstrated a unity in purpose. This is because they all went aboard the two motorcycles and designated at least two persons to shoot Elmer while the others looked on, Consequently, they are all equally liable as co-principals regardless of their roles or participation in the shooting. Specifically for Cauilan, even if he did not pull the trigger, being aboard one of the motorcycles undoubtedly established his concurrence in the commission of the crime. In other words, the act of one is the act of all. That fact, Cauilan could not escape, 62 (Citations omitted)
All in all, accused-appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
As to civil indemnity, accused-appellant should also be made to pay the heirs of Elmer Baligod civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at P75,000.00 each, and the costs of the suit, pursuant to this Court's pronouncement in People v. Jugueta. 63 Moreover, in line with current jurisprudence, interest on these damages shall accrue at the rate of 6% per annum.
WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the Court of Appeals' findings of fact and conclusions of law. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08299 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Chito Cauilan is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, 64 and is ordered to pay the heirs of Elmer Baligod P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until the same has been fully paid. 65
SO ORDERED." (Delos Santos, J., on wellness leave.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-22. The August 31, 2017 Decision docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08299 was penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now Associate Justice of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Mario V. Lopez (now Associate Justice of this Court) of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
2. CA rollo, pp. 58-76. The February 16, 2016 Judgment docketed as Criminal Case No. 12260 was penned by Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran of Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao City.
3.Id. at 58-59.
4.Id. at 59.
5.Id.
6.Rollo, p. 3.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 3-4.
16.Id. at 4.
17.Id.
18. CA rollo, p. 60.
19.Id. at 65-71.
20.Rollo, p. 4.
21.Id.
22.Id.
23.Id.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26. CA rollo, pp. 58-76.
27.Id. at 75-76.
28.Rollo, p. 21.
29.Id. at 23.
30.Id. at 29.
31.Id. at 31-32.
32.Id. at 34-36.
33. CA rollo, pp. 46-49.
34.Id. at 49.
35.Id.
36.Id.
37.Id. at 50-51.
38.Id. at 51, citing People v. Magbanua, 472 Phil. 674 (2004) [Per J. Azcuna, First Division].
39.Id. at 51-52.
40.Id. at 94-97.
41.Id. at 95.
42.Id. at 96.
43.Id. at 94.
44.Id.
45.Id. at 92-93.
46.Id. at 93.
47.Id.
48.People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 865 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc] citing People v. Andal, 344 Phil. 889 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
49.People v. Bagsit, 456 Phil. 623, 630-631 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
50.People v. Castro, 588 Phil. 872, 891 (2008) [Per J. Reyes, R.T., En Banc].
51.People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 865 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
52.Id.
53.Rollo, p. 19.
54.People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 865 (1999) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
55.Rollo, pp. 19-20.
56.Id. at 20.
57.People v. Tividad, 126 Phil. 913, 918 (1967) [Per J. Castro, En Banc] citing People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, 96 [Per J, Malcolm, En Banc].
58.People v. Nacua, 107 Phil. 861, 868 (1960) [Per J. Gutierrez David, En Banc].
59.Id.
60. See People v. Gregorio, 325 Phil. 689 (1996) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
61. See People v. Tividad, 126 Phil. 913 (1967) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
62.Rollo, pp. 18-19.
63. 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
64. Pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, the use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole" qualifying reclusion perpetua does not apply in cases where the death penalty is not warranted.
65. See Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].