THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 220760. January 24, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. SAMUEL CATIGAY y PANDAY a.k.a. SAMUEL LATIGAY y PATROCINIO, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 24, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 220760 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL CATIGAY y PANDAY a.k.a. SAMUEL LATIGAY y PATROCINIO, Accused-Appellant.) — The accused seeks the review and reversal of the affirmance by the Court of Appeals (CA) through the decision promulgated on February 26, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. CEB CR HC No. 01524 1 of his conviction for murder under the judgment rendered on August 22, 2012 but promulgated on September 3, 2012 in Criminal Case No. 20281, whereby the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, in Dumaguete City imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 2
Antecedents
The accused was charged with murder for the premeditated killing of the late Antonio Baguio y Abueva under the following information filed in the RTC, viz.:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2010, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused SAMUEL CATIGAY y PANDAY with evident premeditation and with intent to kill one ANTONIO BAGUIO y ABUEVA a.k.a. "Nonoy," armed with a gun did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said ANTONIO BAGUIO y ABUEVA with the said gun, there(b)y inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds which directly caused his death.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
Contrary to law. 3
At the trial, the Prosecution presented six witnesses, namely: Lorenzo Brumo, Conigonda Baguio, Dr. Virgilio De Guzman, Police Officer Derek Alcoran, Dr. Sarah Talla, and SPO1 Rachel Portada. On the other hand, only the accused testified in his defense. The assailed decision of the CA rendered the following summary of the evidence of the parties, to wit:
On the evening of December 24, 2010, witness Lorenzo Brumo was at his house in Purok Gumamela, Brgy. Bagacay, Dumaguete City, when victim Antonio Baguio called out his name and asked for him to open the gate. Lorenzo let Antonio in and inquired what happened. Antonio told Lorenzo that he had an argument with somebody. Moments later, accused-appellant Samuel Catigay came to the gate of the house thrusting a square bar at Antonio. Lorenzo advised Antonio to get out of his house through the back door. As Lorenzo was talking to Samuel, Antonio arrived from behind and pushed the head of Samuel to the steel gate. Thereafter, Antonio immediately ran away. Samuel immediately went home to have his bleeding head treated.
The following day, or on December 25, 2010, at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, Lorenzo was at the waiting shed in front of his house sipping coffee when he noticed Samuel went out of his house (located around one hundred [100] meters from Lorenzo's house), board[ed] his tricycle and drove off. Few minutes later, Samuel returned, parked his motorcycle in front of his house, pulled out a firearm and fired the gun at the direction of the riverbank. Samuel then approached Lorenzo and uttered "do" if Antonio Baguio will arrive, I will kill him." Lorenzo advised Samuel not to do it, but the latter ignored him. Lorenzo then saw Antonio walking towards their direction so he shouted for the latter to stop and go back. Samuel looked at the direction of Antonio and uttered "do," I am going to kill you." Antonio ran off. Samuel shot Antonio, hitting the latter at the back and causing him to fall down. Samuel fired another shot. The wounded Antonio stood up and ran towards the house of their policeman neighbour. Samuel proceeded home, boarded his motorcycle and drove off.
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Accused Samuel Catigay or Latigay testified that at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of December 25, 2010, he went out of his residence at Purok Gumamela, Brgy. Bagacay, this City, to purchase some pandesal. As he was walking on his way towards the highway and at a distance of around 120 meters away from his house, the deceased suddenly waylaid him and mauled him. He then instinctively also struck him back and a fistfight ensued between them.
In order to obviate further trouble, he immediately rushed home, but as he was nearing the gate of his house, he saw Lorenzo Brumo, his neighbour and co-worker at the construction site, sitting at the waiting shed, a few meters away from his house. In view thereof, he decided not to enter his house because he wanted to tell Lorenzo that the deceased had waylaid him again and had boxed him. As he approached Lorenzo in order that he could talk to him about the matter, the deceased caught up with him and attempted to box him again; and so he instinctively pulled out his firearm and levelled the same at the lower portion of his body, and fired shots at him without intending to harm him.
He averred that after he shot the deceased, he immediately sought the aid of Police Provincial Director Lyndon Lawas so that he could surrender and place himself under his custody, but he met instead Police Officer Derek Alcoran, the close-in security detail of Col. Lawas, and so he readily surrendered to him. 4 aScITE
Judgment of the RTC
As stated, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused SAMUEL CATIGAY OR SAMUEL LATIGAY Y PATROCINIO, is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased, Antonio Baguio y Abueva, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 5
Decision of the CA
The accused appealed to the CA, assigning the following errors to the RTC, to wit:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VINDICATION OF A WRONG, SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
III. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO IMPOSE THE CORRECT PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 6
On its part, the OSG countered that the RTC did not err in convicting the accused as charged, his guilt for murder having been established beyond reasonable doubt.
As stated, on February 26, 2015, the CA promulgated the assailed decision affirming the RTC, with modification of the civil liability, 7 ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE the Decision dated August 22, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 39, Dumaguete City in Criminal Case No. 20281 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of temperate damages is hereby increased to P30,000.00. Exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is hereby imposed. The civil indemnity and damages shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his detention.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal, with the parties respectively reiterating their submissions in the CA. 9
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit
The main contention of the accused is that the State did not establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of evident premeditation.
In traversing the contention of the accused, the CA observed:
We do not agree with appellant.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.
The above elements have been duly established in the instant case as shown by the following testimony of the eyewitness to the crime, Lorenzo Brumo, to wit:
PROS. ASENIERO:
Q. In the morning of December 25, 2010 at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, where were you?
A. I was at the place called waiting shed.
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Q. After Samuel went somewhere else, what happened next, if any?
A. After a while, Samuel returned.
Q. Where dis he goes (SIC)
A. Samuel proceeded home. He stopped his motorcycle and turned off the engine. He pulled our his firearm and fired it at the direction to the riverbank.
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Q. At the time when Samuel fired his gun at the direction of the riverbank, where was he standing?
A. Right in front of his house, sir.
Q. And after that, what happened next?
A. He came near me.
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Q. Now, you said Samuel approached you at the waiting shed where you were sitting, what happened there, if any?
A. He went near me and he told me, "do" if Antonio Baguio will arrive, I will kill him.
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Q. Now, you said that you saw Antonio Baguio approached you, what happened next, if any?
A. I told Antonio Baguio to go back from where he came from, but he did not listen my call. Instead, he continued to approach me.
Q. And what happened next, if any?
A. Then Samuel Latigay looked the direction of Antonio Baguio and said "do," I am going to kill you." HEITAD
Q. And what happened next, if any?
A. And with that, Antonio Baguio turned around and ran off and Samuel Latigay shot him.
Q. Was Antonio Baguio hit by the shot made by Samuel Latigay?
A. Yes, he was hit at the back, sir.
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Q. And what happened after Samuel shot Antonio for the first time?
A. Antonio ran off, he fell down, and another shot was fired.
The above testimony clearly indicated that first thing in the morning of that fatal day, appellant was determined and had planned to kill the victim; that appellant had armed himself with a gun, a clear indication that he was indeed determined to kill. In fact, he even tested the gun by firing it towards the direction of the riverbank. In addition to that, he even declared to Lorenzo that he will kill the victim. He also told the victim of his intent to do so.
There was also sufficient lapse of time between appellant's apparent determination to kill and the actual killing as Antonio was not there yet when appellant did all the scheming. Lorenzo even had time to discourage appellant from executing his plans but the latter persisted and insisted on killing the victim to the point of shooting the latter at the back as he tried to run away. Hence, the planning and the preparation stages prior to the killing was clearly shown by the prosecution.
Added to this is the fact that the night before the killing, herein appellant appeared to have chased the victim towards the house of the eyewitness, where the latter sought refuge, and there, thrust a square bar at the victim. The victim was able to hit back and this must have angered appellant. All these circumstances, taken together, indicate the presence of evident premeditation. 10 x x x
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We adopt the foregoing observations of the CA, which we consider to be in full accord with the law and the evidence. Indeed, the records unquestionably showed that the accused, having decided to assault the victim, had time to reflect on the consequences of his decision, but still persisted on it. Such actuations on his part manifested the attendance of evident premeditation in the criminal killing of the victim.
We see no need or practical value to discuss the presence of any mitigating circumstances like provocation and voluntary surrender. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing of another person with the attendance of evident premeditation constitutes murder, unless the crime is either parricide or infanticide. Although the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the prohibition to impose the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 11 practically rendered reclusion perpetua as the only penalty for murder, which penalty, being indivisible, could not be graduated in consideration of any modifying circumstances. 12
With regard to the civil liability of the accused, we raise the amounts allowed in order to conform to People v. Jugueta. 13 Accordingly, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages shall each be in the amount of P75,000.00, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall further be granted in lieu of actual damages for the burial of the victim's remains. All such amounts shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on February 26, 2015, subject to the MODIFICATION that the accused shall pay to the heirs of the late Antonio Baguio y Abueva the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as temperate damages; plus interest of 6% per annum on all such amounts reckoned from the finality of this resolution until full satisfaction.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit. (Martires, J., on wellness leave.)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 4-14; penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles, with the concurrence of Associate Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
2. CA rollo, pp. 15-20; penned by Presiding Judge Arlene Catherine A. Dato.
3.Id. at 13.
4.Rollo, pp. 6-7.
5. CA rollo, p. 20.
6.Rollo, p. 7.
7.Supra note 1.
8.Rollo, p. 14.
9. CA rollo, pp. 40-52.
10.Supra note 1, at 7-9.
11. Entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, repealing Republic Act 8177 otherwise known as the Act Designating Death By Lethal Injection, Republic Act 7659 otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and All Other Laws, Executive Orders and Decrees, whose Section 1 states:
Sec. 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. — Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
12. See Article 63, Revised Penal Code.
13. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.