THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200956. August 9, 2017.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. SOTERO CARINGAL y MENDOZA alias "TURING", accused appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated August 9, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 200956 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOTERO CARINGAL y MENDOZA alias "TURING," Accused-Appellant.) — The accused hereby assails the affirmance by the Court of Appeals (CA) of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Batangas City for two counts of rape as defined under Article 266-A and penalized under Article 266-B of the RevisedPenalCode, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, committed against AAA, 1 his own daughter. The RTC had sentenced him to suffer reclusionperpetua for each count. The CA also modified the civil liabilities of the accused.
The informations follow:
That sometime in the month of June, 2000, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, at La Paz Street, Poblacion 2, Municipality of Bauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threat, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge with one AA[A], accused's legitimate daughter then an eleven (11) year old minor, against her will and consent, which acts debased, degraded or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said AA[A], as a human being. AIDSTE
Contrary to law.
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That on or about (sic) 31st day of August, 2006, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, at La Paz Street, Poblacion 2, Municipality of Bauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threat, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge with one AA[A], accused's legitimate daughter then a seventeen (17) year old minor, against her will and consent, which acts debased, degraded or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said AA[A], as a human being.
Contrary to law. 2
On the first count, the Prosecution showed that in June 2000, AAA, then 11 years old, was roused from her sleep by the accused, her own father, who had moved to her side as she lay sleeping with her two younger siblings. He raised her shirt, removed her bra and kissed her. He took off his briefs, mounted her, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull movements for five minutes. 3 She felt a stinging pain in her private organ (mahapdi) the morning after.
Other rapes were committed against her by the accused, but the last one is the subject of the second count. It was committed on August 31, 2006 at a new house, and AAA was already 17 years of age. She was with her father that evening, and her siblings were in another room. When he forced himself on her, she cried and tried to shove him off but he was too strong for her. She submitted because he choked her at times. But she could not keep her silence anymore. She told her best friend; then her cousin, Tess; and then her Tita Omeng, her late mother's sister. Thus, the rapes came to be reported to the barangay, and then to the police. She underwent physical examination at the Batangas Regional Hospital, 4 where the examining physician found healed lacerations in her vagina. 5
The accused denied the accusations. He conceded that he could not imagine of any reason why AAA had complained against him except that he had scolded her for having a boyfriend. 6
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused of two counts of rape as charged, and meted the penalty of reclusionperpetua for each count. 7 It ordered him to pay in each case P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the costs of suit. 8
On appeal, the CA, through the assailed decision promulgated on September 8, 2011, affirmed the RTC, but modified the civil liabilities by increasing the moral damages to P75,000.00. 9
Hence, this appeal, in which the accused contends that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. SDAaTC
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the accused did not show whether the CA ignored or misapprehended any fact or circumstance that, if considered, would alter the adverse outcome herein. We reiterate that that we accord great weight to the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of AAA and of her testimony because the trial judge, having personally observed her conduct and demeanor as a witness, was thereby enabled to discern if she was telling the truth or merely concocting a false story. Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, now binds the Court, and it becomes the burden of the accused to project to us in this appeal facts or circumstances of weight that were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted which, when duly considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case differently. 10
Verily, the common assessment by the RTC and the CA of the credibility of AAA as a witness is unassailable. That a minor daughter like her who was totally dependent on her father for support because her mother had already passed away would come out to denounce him for his very gross and grave crimes against her could only reflect her desire to finally reveal the truth about him. She had no other motive except to seek justice for herself. As we observed in People v. Felan: 11
x x x We do consider to be highly inconceivable for a daughter like AAA to impute against her own father a crime as serious and despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was the plain truth. In fact, as we observed before, it takes "a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame."
On the other hand, the accused's mere denial of the accusations did not prevail over AAA's positive, firm and consistent testimony recounting the rapes and directly imputing the crimes to him. His explanation about her resentment of his objecting to her relationship with a boyfriend, being too flimsy, did not bolster his denial. Such defense has been discredited many times. As the Court has pointed out in People v. Anguac: 12
x x x the resentment angle, even if true, does not prove any ill motive on AAA's part to falsely accuse Anguac of rape or necessarily detract from her credibility as witness. Motives, such as those arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the Court from giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor complainants who remained steadfast throughout their direct and cross-examination. 13
Neither did it mean much that, as contended in the appellant's brief, "in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results." 14 For one, the contention was legally unfounded considering that the medical and physical examinations of the victim and the production of medical certificates are not indispensable to the successful prosecution of rape because they are not elements of the felony. 15 Also, the testimonies of the physicians who undertake the medical and physical examinations and the production of the medical certificate are essentially merely corroborative evidence. No law requires a medical or physical examination for the successful prosecution of the rapist. 16 Controlling is the proof showing beyond reasonable doubt that rape was committed. In that regard, the conviction of the accused can rest even on the sole testimony of the victim herself provided the testimony is credible.
The CA correctly opined that the failure of AAA to report the rapes immediately did not diminish the credibility of the charges if there were credible explanations for the omission. In this case, the omission was credibly explained by the fact that she and her siblings had been totally dependent on the accused for their sustenance and support after the death of their mother; and by the fact that he had actively threatened AAA and her siblings should she expose and denounce his criminality. For sure, the failure of AAA to immediately report the rape because of such circumstances was in accord with human experience and behavior, and should not be held to indicate fabrication; neither should it diminish the fact that rape had been actually committed. 17 acEHCD
The accused was properly convicted of two counts of qualified rape and justly punished with reclusionperpetua. The law in force at the time of the commission of the rapes — Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the RevisedPenal Code, as amended — clearly set death as the penalty for qualified rape, viz.:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. — x x x.
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The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
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Yet, the intervening passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, repealing Republic Act 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees)18 has saved him from the supreme penalty. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. — Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Nonetheless, Section 3 19 of Republic Act No. 9346 requires that the accused shall be sentenced instead to suffer the penalty of reclusionperpetua without eligibility for parole. EcTCAD
Consistent with People v. Jugueta, 20 we increase the amounts of the damages in each count to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and impose interest of 6% perannum on such damages from the finality of this decision until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the appeal; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 8, 2011, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the penalty of reclusionperpetua without eligibility for parole is imposed on accused-appellant SOTEROCARINGALyMENDOZA for each count of qualified rape; and (b) his civil liabilities for each count of qualified rape are increased to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest on such damages at the rate of 6% perannum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full satisfaction.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violenceagainst Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, the real names of the victim and of her immediate family members are withheld, and a fictitious designation is instead used to represent her, to protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, 502 SCRA 419, 425.
2.Rollo, p. 3.
3.Id. at 4.
4.Id. at 5-6.
5.Id. at 13.
6.Id. at 8.
7. CA rollo, pp. 12-20; penned by Judge Florencio S. Arellano.
8.Id. at 19.
9.Rollo, pp. 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon.
10.People v. Felan, G.R. No. 176631, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 449, 453.
11.Id. at 453-454, citing People v. Javier, G.R. No. 126096, July 26, 1999, 311 SCRA 122, 133.
12. G.R. No. 176744, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 716.
13.Id. at 723.
14. CA rollo, p. 46, citing People v. Arce, Jr., G.R. Nos. 139064-66, September 6, 2001, 364 SCRA 550, 565.
15.People v. Juntilla, G.R. No. 130604, September 16, 1999, 314 SCRA 568, 582.
16.People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 142662, August 14, 2001, 362 SCRA 778, 788.
17. See People v. Publico, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2001, 648 SCRA 734, 743.
18. The law was signed on June 24, 2006.
19. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides:
Sec. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusionperpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusionperpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
20. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.