FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 241633. June 23, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JURADO CARAGAY y BAUTISTA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 23, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 241633 — (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. JURADO CARAGAY y BAUTISTA, accused-appellant). — Before this Court is an appeal of the Resolution 1 dated May 11, 2017 and Resolution 2 dated September 14, 2017 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in People of the Philippines v. Jurado Caragay y Bautista docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07814. In the Resolutions, the CA declared as abandoned the appeal of accused-appellant Jurado Caragay y Bautista (Caragay) for failure to seasonably file an Appellant's Brief.
Facts
As culled from the records, specifically the Partial Decision 3 dated August 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, the trial court determined the facts as follows:
Sometime on October 5, 2005, at around 11:00 p.m., Edward delos Santos (delos Santos), Roland Untal (Untal), Eric Fernandez (Fernandez), Felimon Ramos (Ramos), Rodel Ventinilla (Ventinilla), and Ian Sison (Sison), were having a drinking session inside the compound owned by Marietta Sison in Barangay Malabago, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The group was later joined by Caragay and accused Peter Ballesteros (Ballesteros), while Sison and Ramos left to go to the población. 4
Not soon after Sison and Ramos left the group, Caragay challenged Fernandez to a fistfight. The latter, however, keen on keeping the peace with Caragay, refused. This notwithstanding, Caragay struck the former twice in the head, and then proceeded to restrain Fernandez by holding his hands behind his nape. Simultaneously, Ballesteros grabbed a 10-inch knife (from a table) and stabbed Fernandez several times in the chest and other parts of the body. 5
In the course of the attack, Fernandez struggled and was eventually able to wrest himself from Caragay's grasp. He then dashed towards the gate of the compound. As a result, Caragay fled, while Ballesteros gave chase and eventually managed to stab Fernandez in the back as the latter fled. 6 As Fernandez fell to the ground, the following events simultaneously occurred:
1. Fernandez managed to call for his ninong Bisukol, whose house was approximately 20 meters from where he laid;
2. Ventinilla ran to the house of Jaime Fernandez, father of the victim, to inform him that his son was attacked; and
3. Ballesteros fled from the scene of the attack — evidently throwing the 10-inch knife at a nearby canal as he fled. 7
At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that for most of the attack, Untal, delos Santos, and the rest of the group, shocked at the events unfolding before them, remained utterly motionless and unable to offer assistance to Fernandez. 8 Delos Santos testified that he "could not remember how many times [Ballesteros] stabbed [Fernandez] x x x as it happened so fast and so sudden[,]" 9 but that he was only one meter away from Fernandez at the time that he was being attacked by Ballesteros. He adds that he was unable to render assistance to Fernandez in view of Ballesteros's larger build and the fact that Ballesteros threatened to attack him should he be so inclined to intervene.
Eventually, the brother of Jaime Fernandez arrived to help Fernandez. He carried Fernandez's bloodied body inside his tricycle and rushed him to the Bolingit Hospital (now known as the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital), which is located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Thereat, the attending physician, Dr. Reynaldo Fernandez (Dr. Fernandez), declared that Fernandez was "about to expire" insofar as his blood pressure and cardiac beat are zero. He expired within five minutes from examination by Dr. Fernandez. 10
The Postmortem examination of Fernandez's body showed that he suffered 21 stab wounds and expired by reason of Hypovolemic Shock due to Massive Bleeding, Multiple Stab Wounds. 11 The stab wounds suffered by Fernandez were located in various parts of his body, viz.: CAIHTE
1. Anterior Chest (R) 2nd ICS;
2. Anterior Chest (R) 4th ICS;
3. Anterior Chest (R) Parasternal line 8th rib;
4. Lateral Chest (R) posterior axillary line 9th rib;
5. Lateral Chest (R) Mid axillary line 9th rib;
6. (R) chest anterior axillary line 7th rib;
7. (R) sub-costal area;
8. Posterior chest (R) axillary line 8th rib;
9. (R) Forearm posterior lateral aspect M/3;
10. (R) Arm posterior D/3;
11. (R) Arm posterior D/3;
12. (R) Arm posterior medial D/3;
13. (R) Arm posterior medial D/3;
14. (L) Forearm posterior;
15. (L) posterior chest posterior axillary line 5th rib;
16. (L) posterior chest 5th rib;
17. (L) posterior chest scapular area;
18. (L) posterior chest sub scapular area;
19. (L) Vertebral area 6th thoracic;
20. (L) Infra scapular area; and
21. (R) Leg anterior later P/3. 12
Caragay offers a different narrative. According to him, while admitting that he was at the drinking session with the group and Ballesteros, it was Ballesteros and the victim that got into a disagreement, which disagreement was followed by a fistfight. Further, Caragay insists that he, together with Untal and Ventinilla, had attempted to pacify Ballesteros and Fernandez. In particular, Caragay intervened "by placing himself in between them and pushing both of them away from each other." 13
Caragay further testified that delos Santos, during the course of the confrontation between Ballesteros and Fernandez, left the area but immediately returned with a piece of wood. Evidently, delos Santos had tried to beat Ballesteros with it, but the latter picked up a knife from a round table which the group used during the drinking session, and then threatened everyone not to come close. Subsequently, Ballesteros stabbed Fernandez. At this point, Caragay testified that he once again approached the two in an attempt to pacify Ballesteros; however, the latter also attacked him with the 10-inch knife. Caragay adds that because of the wounds he suffered, he was likewise brought to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital. 14 The following injuries were suffered by Caragay:
STABBED WOUND LEFT FOREARM MEDIAL
STABBED WOUND LEFT FOREARM LATERAL
STABBED LEFT THIGH P/3 POSTERIOR LATERAL
STABBED WOUND LEFT GLUTEAL AREA 15
At the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Caragay narrates that his ante-mortem statement was taken by the police officers since they were concerned that he might not make it. Caragay was confined in the hospital for three days, on October 5-7, 2005.
Proceedings before the RTC
As a result of the foregoing events, an Information 16 dated November 29, 2005 was filed charging Ballesteros and Caragay, acting in conspiracy with each other, with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
Ballesteros did not participate in the trial as he remained at large all throughout the proceedings. During the arraignment on September 28, 2009, Caragay pleaded not guilty to the commission of the offense charged. 17 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting: (1) Mary Jane Fernandez; (2) Untal; (3) Dr. Fernandez; (4) Marilyn Cano (Cano); (5) Jaime Fernandez; (6) Marietta Sison; (7) delos Santos; and (8) Senior Police Officer Julfre Ayson, as well as other documentary exhibits. For Caragay's part, and in addition to documentary exhibits, he offered the testimonies of himself and Ventinilla. 18
After trial, the trial court found Caragay guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JURADO CARAGAY @ "Jury" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Eric Fernandez Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, loss of earning capacity in the amount of Php960,000.00 and Php45,000.00 as actual damages for the expenses incurred during the wake and burial of Eric Fernandez.
xxx xxx xxx
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 19
Proceedings before the CA
Unperturbed by the adverse finding of the trial court, Caragay filed a Notice of Appeal 20 dated September 29, 2015, with the same being granted by the trial court in an Order 21 dated October 2, 2015. Consequently, on May 26, 2016, the CA directed Caragay, through counsel, to file his Appellant's Brief within 30 days from notice, and for the People of the Philippines, through the Office of Solicitor General (OSG), to file its Appellee's Brief within the same period. 22
On July 11, 2016, Caragay filed a Motion for Extension of Time (To File Appellant's Brief) praying for an additional period of 60 days from July 14, 2016, or until September 13, 2016, within which to file his Appellant's Brief. 23 The said Motion was granted by the CA in a Resolution 24 dated July 28, 2016.
On September 21, 2016, Caragay filed a Motion for New Trial 25 dated August 31, 2016 asseverating that he had discovered new evidence, i.e., (1) an undated Letter 26 by Ballesteros addressed to Caragay's brother and sister "wherein he narrated that [Caragay] has no participation in the incident subject of the present case" 27 and (2) a Sinumpaang Salaysay28 dated August 31, 2016 in which Ballesteros "narrated that [Caragay] was only pacifying and actually protecting the victim from him at the time of the alleged incident." 29 Simply stated, the newly discovered evidence asserted by Caragay is the testimony of Ballesteros, which testimony could not be secured during trial since the latter was thought to be at large. 30 Evidently, Ballesteros was, at the time of discovery, "serving sentence in the National Bilibid Prison for another offense." 31 The OSG filed a Comment dated November 25, 2016 thereto. 32
From the records, it would appear that despite the extension of time given to Caragay to file his Appellant's Brief, he nevertheless failed to do so. Thus, in a Resolution 33 dated November 4, 2016, the CA directed Atty. Rafael T. Martinez, counsel of Caragay, to explain why he "failed to file the brief x x x within the period granted by [the CA]."
In compliance with the above-mentioned directive of the CA, counsel for Caragay filed a Compliance with Motion to Admit Appellant's Brief 34 dated November 14, 2016 in which he explained that he "was of the belief that the filing of the appellant's brief [was] not yet necessary in view of the pendency of the motion for new trial." Nevertheless, counsel for Caragay prayed for the CA's indulgence that should he be mistaken, he be still allowed to file the Appellant's Brief dated November 14, 2016 which is attached to the compliance. 35
The CA issued a Resolution 36 dated May 11, 2017. In the Resolution, the CA found that the Motion for New Trial was unmeritorious considering that the testimony of Ballesteros is "merely corroborative of the testimonies of the witnesses for [Caragay]" and will not likely change the outcome of the case. 37 The CA adds that the Motion for New Trial was also filed out of time since the same "must be filed before a judgment of conviction becomes final, i.e., within the 15-day period to take an appeal." 38 DETACa
Likewise, in the Resolution dated May 11, 2017, the CA declared that the appeal of Caragay has been deemed abandoned for his failure to timely file an Appellant's Brief. It gave no credence to the excuse proffered by Caragay's counsel, thus:
As regard the counsel's failure to file the Appellant's Brief on time, the Court finds the excuse unacceptable.
When accused-appellant's counsel sought an extension of time to file Appellant's Brief, he committed himself to file the same within the period he prayed for notwithstanding any subsequent motion or pleading. It is improper for the counsel to assume and claim that the Brief was not yet necessary because of his filing of a Motion for New Trial. As he categorically sought an extension of his period to file a brief and the motion was granted by the Court, of which he was duly notified, it became his bounden duty to comply within the period allowed the Court. His failure therefore to file the appellant's brief on time constitutes negligence which binds his client. 39
Insistent on being granted the privilege to prove his innocence further, Caragay filed a Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated May 25, 2017 which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution 41 dated September 14, 2017.
The Instant Appeal
In view of the adverse Resolutions, Caragay came before this Court by way of a Notice of Appeal 42 dated September 27, 2017, wherein the following grounds were invoked:
a) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN SPITE OF THE GLARING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES AND THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.
b) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THE APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED ABANDONED IN SPITE OF THE PENDENCY OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND THE FILING OF THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
c) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OF THE ACCUSED.
The above-mentioned Notice of Appeal was given due course. Consequently, in a Resolution 43 dated November 5, 2018, this Court required "the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice." Caragay, however, in a Manifestation dated January 31, 2019, opted not to file a Supplemental Brief since "the issues raised in [the] appeal have been sufficiently discussed in the Appellant's Brief and Motion for Reconsideration x x x filed before the CA." 44 The OSG seized the opportunity given by this Court and filed its Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee 45 dated June 21, 2019.
In the Appellant's Brief, Caragay faults the trial court for finding him guilty on the basis of the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In particular, he points out that while Cano, who was likewise present in the drinking session, testified that he held the hands of Fernandez above the latter's head, another prosecution witness, Untal, said that he held the victim's hand behind the victim's head. 46
Likewise, Caragay insists that the narration of the facts by the prosecution is inconsistent with the physical evidence, i.e., with the injuries suffered by him during the incident. He offers the theory that "Fernandez must have parried the blows delivered by Ballesteros that is why [Caragay] sustained injuries on his right and left forearm and on his right arm." 47 Needless to state, he insinuates that since Fernandez probably parried the blows of Ballesteros, it was impossible that he held the arms of Fernandez.
With respect to his entitlement to a new trial, Caragay argues in his Motion for Reconsideration that the testimony of Ballesteros is an admission of guilt which belies the finding that he acted in conspiracy with him. In addition, he stresses that it "corroborates the physical evidence showing that [he] did not act the way the prosecution witnesses portrayed during the trial." 48
For its part, the OSG argues in its Appellee's Brief that the testimonies of eyewitnesses of the prosecution, Untal and delos Santos, were candid, clear, categorical, and consistent (with each other, as well as the physical evidence), that Caragay, acting in conspiracy with Ballesteros, killed Fernandez with treachery. The OSG insists that these testimonies must prevail over the bare denial proffered by Caragay.
Ruling
We find the instant appeal to be unmeritorious.
The Motion for New Trial
A Motion for New Trial is governed by Rule 121 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. One of the grounds in which new trial may be sought (which ground is specifically invoked by Caragay) is if "new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment." 49
But what would constitute newly discovered evidence sufficient to warrant a re-opening of a decision already on appeal? In Ladines v. People, 50 this Court provided clear guidelines that newly discovered evidence can only be considered as such upon the concurrence of the following requisites, viz.:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. 51
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is apparent that the testimony of Ballesteros could not be considered newly discovered evidence within the meaning of the law.
The substance of the testimony of Ballesteros can be distilled into three assertions: (1) that Ballesteros, alone, killed Fernandez; (2) that Caragay had no participation in the fatal attack against Fernandez; and (3) that Caragay's only participation in the incident was to attempt to intervene and settle the peace between Ballesteros and Fernandez.
Incidentally, these three assertions are exactly the defenses offered by Caragay during the trial. 52 This is not insignificant as the testimony of Ballesteros can thus rightfully be characterized as corroborative. Indeed, corroborative evidence pertain to those which are offered as a supplement to that already given, and which tends to strengthen, confirm, or support it. 53 As aptly put by the CA in its Resolution: "[t]he proposed testimony of Ballesteros, being corroborative x x x will definitely not alter in any way the Court's decision." 54 Simply stated, since the testimony adds nothing new to what has already been offered by Caragay and passed upon by the trial court, it is inconceivable that the same will alter the outcome.
Additionally, it bears mentioning that for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, Caragay must satisfactorily demonstrate that the alleged new evidence was either not available during the trial or that diligence was employed in attempting to secure the same during the course of the trial. 55 This Caragay failed to show. In fact, conspicuously, the Motion for New Trial of Caragay is bereft of any showing of the efforts he, either by himself or through counsel, undertook to secure the asserted newly discovered evidence.
From the foregoing, it is thus patent that the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the testimony of Ballesteros cannot be considered as "newly discovered" since (1) the testimony is merely corroborative, and (2) there was no showing that reasonable diligence was made to secure the same. Ineluctably, therefore, at least two of the four requisites for a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is absent. aDSIHc
As a final point, Caragay, his counsel, as well as the Bench and the Bar are reminded that Motions for New Trial are to be subjected to immense scrutiny, most especially if the same is filed on appeal. This is because granting any such motion would necessarily require the courts to re-open a case and thus inflict some degree of inefficiency in the administration of justice. 56 Accordingly, litigants in filing any such motion must ensure that the requisites as provided in case law must be undoubtedly present, while the Bar must make sure that any such motion be granted only under the most meritorious circumstances.
The Abandonment of the Appeal
At the outset, it bears to mention that the failure to timely file an Appellant's Brief is not a jurisdictional defect. 57 Nevertheless, the failure to file the Appellant's Brief on time is pregnant with consequences. Rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that "[t]he Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed." 58 Additionally, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules. 59
The period to file an Appellant's Brief is not automatically suspended by reason of the filing of a Motion for New Trial. In this regard, Tan v. Court of Appeals60 is instructive. In that case, this Court categorically held that one "cannot assume that the filing of the motion for new trial automatically suspended the running of the period within which to file the appellants brief, since such assumption is not supported by the Rules of Court or any other authority." 61
Here, it is not disputed that Caragay failed to timely file his Appellant's Brief within the period provided in the rules, as well as in the extended period given by the CA. 62 The only excuse that Caragay offered is that "[t]he filing of a motion for new trial pending appeal should also produce the effect of [suspending] the filing of a motion for new trial[,] 63 which assertion, as mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph, is inconsistent with case law. Accordingly, the failure to timely file Caragay's Appellant's Brief can be attributed to simple negligence of his counsel, which thus binds him. 64Apropos is the holding of the CA in the Resolution dated May 11, 2017, to wit:
When accused-appellant's counsel sought an extension of time to file Appellant's Brief, he committed himself to file the same within the period he prayed for notwithstanding any subsequent motion or pleading. It is improper for the counsel to assume and claim that the Brief was not yet necessary because of his filing of a Motion for New Trial. As he categorically sought an extension of his period to file a brief and the motion was granted by the Court, of which he was duly notified, it became his bounden duty to comply within the period allowed by the Court. His failure therefore to file the appellant's brief on time constitutes negligence which binds his client.
It is an ethical duty of a lawyer to render his services properly and promptly at all times, especially if his client's liberty is at stake. The least that counsel could have done was to file a Manifestation or a Motion to [S]uspend the filing of the required brief pending resolution of the Motion for New Trial. He should not have allowed the period to file the brief to lapse without the proper motion or extension. This, he failed to do and it was only when he was directed by the Court to explain his failure to file the required Appellant's Brief did he explain the circumstances to this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
From the expiry of the extended period to file the brief on September 12, 2016, almost four (4) months passed before accused-appellant filed his Brief via the pending Motion to Admit. Clearly, the period to file the Appellant's Brief had long expired. x x x. 65 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is beyond cavil that the CA committed no reversible error in declaring the appeal of Caragay as abandoned. In brief, there is simply no rule that suspends the period for filing an Appellant's Brief upon the filing of a Motion for New Trial. The failure of counsel for Caragay to file the Appellant's Brief is binding upon him. Indeed, "[t]his proceeds from the agency created between the client and the counsel, pursuant to which the acts of the counsel are considered within the scope of the express or implied authority of the client[,]" including the mistakes of the counsel in the application of procedural rules. 66
No Grounds to Reverse the Trial Court
In any event, even if We should be so inclined to consider the substantive arguments raised in the Appellant's Brief, We find and so hold that the trial court committed no reversible error in finding Caragay guilty of murder under Article 248 of the RPC.
First, as a rule, inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. 67 As a matter of fact, "these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or rehearsed." 68
In this case, the inconsistency asserted by Caragay can be found in the testimonies of Cano and Untal. In particular, Cano's testimony with respect to Caragay's participation in the killing of Fernandez is that of holding the victim's hand above his head; on the other hand, Untal's testimony narrates that Caragay held the hands of Fernandez behind his nape. However, these inconsistencies are only minor and does not affect the substance of their declaration, i.e., that Caragay held the hands of Fernandez in such a way that he would be unable to defend himself against the assault of Ballesteros. In other words, Caragay provided the means by which Fernandez can be attacked with minimal risk to the attacker.
Second, the assertion of Caragay that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are inconsistent with the physical evidence on record — specifically, that of the injuries of Caragay — fails to inspire belief. To recall, in the Appellant's Brief, Caragay asserts:
From the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses, the hands of the victim Fernandez was allegedly held upward by accused Caragay while he was being stabbed by Peter Ballesteros. How then did Eric Fernandez suffer the six stabbed wounds on his right and left forearm and on his right arm? The victim Eric Fernandez must have parried the blows delivered by Peter Ballesteros that is why he sustained injuries on his right and left forearm and on his right arm. Obviously, the physical evidence is in conflict with the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution for if the hands of the victim was held upward he could not have sustained injuries on his right and left forearm and right arm. There is here an evident conflict between the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses and the physical evidence x x x. 69
However, contrary to the averments of Caragay, the injuries suffered by him is not as divergent from human experience and common sense as he would have this Court believe. Indeed, as rightfully held by the trial court:
While it may be said that Caragay sustained injuries during the same incident, it is probable that he sustained the same while Eric was moving and trying to avoid the thrust and to extricate himself from Caragay's hold while being stabbed by Ballesteros.
This is bolstered by the locations of the wounds sustained by the victim as reflected in the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Reynaldo Fernandez. Injuries one (1) to seven (7) are located in front of the body of the victim while injuries nine (9) to fourteen (14) are located at the back of his forearm showing that the said injuries were sustained by the victim while he was being stabbed by Ballesteros who was in front and his two (2) hands are being held by Caragay at the back of his nape. 70
In other words, and as correctly found by the trial court in its Partial Decision, the injuries sustained by Caragay was sustained during the struggle of the victim to break free from his grasp. It bears recalling that "[t]he rule is well-settled that the conclusion reached by a trial court on the question of credibility is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily by respected, as it is in a better position to decide such matter, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their behavior and manner of testifying, unless a fact or circumstance of weight or influence has been overlooked and its significance misinterpreted." 71 From the records, there appears to be no fact and/or circumstance which the trial court appeared to have overlooked and/or its significance misinterpreted, neither has Caragay aptly demonstrated such in his submissions before this Court and the CA. Thus, we are constrained to uphold the findings of the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. ETHIDa
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 81-86; penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of this Court) and Edwin Sorongon, concurring.
2.Id. at 101-105.
3.Id. at 69-79.
4.Id. at 70.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 71.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 70.
9.Id. at 71.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 71-72.
12.Id. at 72.
13.Id. at 73.
14.Id. at 73-74.
15.Id. at 74.
16.Id. at 69.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 73.
19.Id. at 79.
20.Id. at 9-10.
21.Id. at 11.
22.Id. at 18.
23.Id. at 19-21.
24.Id. at 23.
25.Id. at 24-26.
26.Id. at 27.
27.Id. at 24.
28.Id. at 28.
29.Id. at 24.
30.Id.
31.Id.
32.Id. at 40-51.
33.Id. at 32.
34.Id. at 52.
35.Id.
36.Id. at 81-86.
37.Id. at 83.
38.Id. at 83-84.
39.Id. at 84.
40.Id. at 88-99.
41.Id. at 101-105.
42.Id. at 8-9.
43.Id. at 11-12.
44.Id. at 21-23.
45.Id. at 43-63.
46. CA rollo, pp. 61-65.
47.Id. at 65.
48.Id. at 89.
49. RULES OF COURT, Rule 121, Section 2 (b).
50. 776 Phil. 75 (2016).
51.Id. at 84-85.
52. CA rollo, p. 59.
53.People v. Mallari, 369 Phil. 872, 882 (1999). See Santos v. Sandiganbayan, 400 Phil. 1175 (2000).
54. CA rollo, p. 102.
55.Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194, 205 (2005); De Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, 485 Phil. 368, 388-389 (2004); People v. Evaristo, 121 Phil. 186, 200 (1965).
56.Luzon Hydro Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 721 Phil. 202, 215 (2013).
57.Sibayan v. Costales, 789 Phil. 1, 9 (2016).
58. RULES OF COURT, Rule 124, Section 8.
59.Id., Rule 50, Section 1.
60. 288 Phil. 185 (1992).
61.Id. at 188.
62. CA rollo, pp. 32, 52-54. Rollo, pp. 5-6.
63.Id. at 96.
64.Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, 752 Phil. 15 (2015).
65.Rollo, pp. 5-6.
66.Alcancia v. People, G.R. No. 238938, July 3, 2019.
67.People v. Hilet, 450 Phil. 481, 490 (2003).
68.Calma v. People, 820 Phil. 858, 866 (2017).
69. CA rollo, p. 65.
70.Id. at 76.
71.People v. Godoy, 164 Phil. 73, 78 (1976).