FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 253238. October 13, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ALEJANDRO CAPITLI y REYES, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 253238 — People of the Philippines v. Alejandro Capitli y Reyes
The appeal is DISMISSED.
The challenge against the prosecutor's
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, ether n because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of the same rule ordains:
Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; CAIHTE
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, an accused must move to quash the Information before entering his or her plea during the arraignment. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver on the part of the accused to raise any of the grounds found in Section 3, except those under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) thereof i.e., (1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (4) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his or her express consent. It means that a motion to quash based on any of these grounds may still be filed even after arraignment.
Here, Alejandro Capitli y Reyes' (appellant) objection does not refer to any of these excepted grounds, but rather to paragraph (d) of Section 3, "that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so." He argues that the filing of the alleged defective Information here amounted to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
But in Gomez v. People, 1 the Court clarified, in no uncertain terms, that a procedural infirmity regarding legal representation is not a jurisdictional defect or handicap which prevents courts from taking cognizance of a case, it is merely a defect which should not result to the quashal of an Information. As a result, objections or challenges pertaining to the supposed lack of authority of the handling prosecutor to file the Information may be waived by the accused through silence, inaction, or failure to register a timely objection. An Information filed by a handling prosecutor without the prior approval or authority of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor is merely quashable, until waived by the accused either expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when, as in here, appellant failed to timely move to quash the Information before he entered his plea to the charge. In such a case, the Information and all the proceedings emanating therefrom are binding on the defense with equal force as it is on the People itself. So must it be.
Appellant is guilty of murder
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
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Verily, murder requires the following elements:
(1) A person was killed;
(2) The accused killed him or her;
(3) The killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; 2 and DETACa
(4) The killing is not parricide or infanticide. 3
There is no question here regarding the presence of the first (1st) and fourth (4th) elements. The victim, Eduardo Ferrer, was killed. More, the killing is not infanticide or parricide.
We focus on the second (2nd) and third (3rd ) elements.
In her "Malaya at Kusang Loob na Salaysay" dated February 13, 2009, Aloha Inocencio y Ferrer (Inocencio) narrated in detail how appellant slayed her father:
Bali po sa nabanggit na oras, petsa, at lugar na pinangyarihan ay nagpunta po ako sa bahay ng aking ama upang duon matulog sa kadahilanang nagkaroon kami ng aking asawa ng tampuhan, at pagdating ko roon sa bahay ng aking ama ay kadadating pa lang niya galing daw siya sa pagsusugal, at bago kami pumasok ay umihi muna ito nang biglang dumating itong si ALEJANDRO na may dalang kahoy na hindi ko naman pinansin, pero nagulat na lang ako nang bigla na lang nitong pinalo sa likuran ang aking ama na nakatalikod na ikinabagsak nito sa lupa. x x x 4
In open court, Inocencio affirmed this statement, thus:
Q: While you were at the house of your father, was there anything unusual that happened at that time, Madam Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident, if there was any, Madam Witness?
A: He hit my father on the head, sir.
Q: When you said he hit your father on the head, whom are you referring to, Madam Witness?
A: Alejandro Capitli, sir.
Q: What was your position in relation to your father when you saw the accused Alejandro Capitli hit him on the head?
A: I was just near my father, sir. I was on the right side of my father.
Q: From where were you seated right now, Madam Witness, will you please tell the distance if we used (sic) this courtroom?
A: Five (5) meters, sir. 5
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Q: The accused struck your father with what, Madam Witness?
A: Piece of wood, sir.
Q: If you know, what part of the body of your father was hit, Madam Witness?
A: He was hit on the head, sir.
Q: When he was hit on the head, referring to your father, what happened after that?
A: He fell down, sir.
Q: Did he fell (sic) face forward or face backward, Madam Witness?
A: Face down, sir.
Q: When your father fell face down, what happened after that?
A: He still continued striking my father, sir.
Q: By the way, Madam Witness, what was the lighting condition at the time of the incident?
A: There was still lighting because the house is around (sic), sir. That place is a relocation site, sir.
Q: According to you, when the accused hit your father with a piece of wood on his head and he fell face forward, what happened after that?
A: He still continued hitting the head of my father until he broke (sic), sir.
Q: What happened after that when the accused continued hitting your father with a piece of wood on his head?
A: That's it, sir. He kept on hitting my father on the head until he died, and I screamed, shouted, and asked for help, sir. 6 aDSIHc
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Q: When you screamed for help, what happened next, Madam Witness?
A: I ran to our house and called my husband sir, and when we came back, my father was there lying flat on the ground blood[i]ed, sir.
Q: When you arrived and the incident happened, what happened next, Madam Witness?
A: We immediately lifted him and brought him to [the] nearest hospital, sir.
Q: And what happened at the hospital?
A: According to the doctor, my father was declared dead on arrival (DOA) because of the breaking of the skull, sir.
Q: Before this incident, do you already know the accused Alejandro Capitli?
A: Yes, sir. He grew up in our place and became the live-in partner of my cousin, sir.
Q: And for how long have you known him?
A: For a long, long time, sir. He even stayed in our house, sir.
Q: Do you have any quarrel with the accused?
A: None, sir." 7
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As shown, Inocencio testified in detail that her father just came home from a night of gambling and was urinating outside his house when appellant suddenly hit her father in the head with a piece of wood, causing him to fall on the ground. Even after the victim had already fallen on the ground, appellant did not stop hitting him in the head until the victim was no longer breathing. She positively identified appellant as the assailant. She had known him for a very long time as he grew up in their place and even became her cousin's live-in partner.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals uniformly gave credence to the testimony of Inocencio and found the same to be candid and consistent. It is settled that when the credibility of the eyewitnesses is at issue, due deference and respect shall be given to the trial court's factual findings, its calibration of the testimonies, its assessment of their probative weight, and its conclusion based on such factual findings, absent any showing that it had overlooked circumstances that would have affected the final outcome of the case. After all, it is the trial court which has the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. 8 This rule finds an even more stringent application where the trial court's findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals, 9 as in this case.
As it was, the credible testimony of Inocencio is not the only inculpatory evidence against appellant. It finds full collaboration in the medical findings of Police Chief Inspector Dr. Maria Anna Liza Dela Cruz (Dr. Dela Cruz), who did the autopsy on the victim. Dr. Dela Cruz found that Ferrer died due to severe traumatic injuries in the head, manifest external head injuries, multiple internal fractures and hemorrhage in the head, and scalp hematoma. Dr. Dela Cruz concluded that these injuries may have been inflicted by the use of a blunt object and that each injury was instantaneously fatal. 10 Indeed, such physical evidence is an eloquent manifestation of the truth. 11
Treachery attended the killing of Ferrer. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself or herself arising from the defense which the offended party might take. To prove treachery, the following elements must be established:
(a) The employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and ETHIDa
(b) That said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 12
Here, Ferrer was merely standing outside his house, urinating, when appellant suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood. Even after Ferrer had already fallen on the ground, appellant did not stop hitting him in the head. Clearly, in view of the sudden and unexpected attack by the armed malefactor on the unarmed and unsuspecting victim, there was no way the latter could have defended himself or even run away from his assailant. It simply shows that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of his attack to insure the commission of the crime, without posing any danger to himself that could have come from the victim's retaliatory acts. This is pure and simple treachery.
We come now to the penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 13
Except for treachery, which qualified the killing to murder, no other aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present. The lower courts, therefore, correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
As for damages, the Court of Appeals, too, properly awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00 each, and temperate damages of P50,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. 14
These amounts are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid. TIADCc
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 12045 dated February 26, 2020 is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Alejandro Capitli y Reyes is found GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of Eduardo Ferrer y Diego:
1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2) P75,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
These amounts are subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 2020.
2.Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation; and
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
3.People v. Padal, G.R. No. 232070, October 2, 2019.
4. Record, p. 11.
5.Rollo, p. 11.
6.Id. at 12.
7.Id. at 12-13.
8.People v. Yumol, G.R. No. 225600, July 7, 2020.
9.People v. Pigar, G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020.
10.Rollo, p. 5.
11.People v. Aleman, 715 Phil. 107, 120 (2013).
12.People v. Espina, G.R. No. 219614, July 10, 2019.
13.Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
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14.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.