People v. Canillo-Prospero

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 212399. November 26, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FELIPE KATU CONSTANTINO (deceased), MARGIE PURISIMA RUDES (deceased), CORNELIO CALLUENG MARTINEZ, JR. (acquitted), EUGENE LAREZA ALZATE, LELIBETH LEDRES CANILLO, HERNANDO LALISAN SIBUGAN, JUANITO HERMINIA PURISIMA, PYANG LUCAS SINGCONG (deceased), MARLIND LOPEZ MARCELO, REDEMPTO YAP ABISO, TEODORICO FEDERICO DIAZ (at large), JESUS HUSAIN DESEDILLA, MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY (at large) and AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, accused; LELIBETH L. CANILLO-PROSPERO, • JESUS H. DESEDILLA, •• and REDEMPTO ABISO, accused-appellants.

[G.R. No. 212874. November 26, 2018.]

EUGENE L. ALZATE, HERNANDO L. SIBUGAN, and MARLIND L. MARCELO, petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated26 November 2018which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 212399 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, versusFELIPE KATU CONSTANTINO (deceased), MARGIE PURISIMA RUDES (deceased), CORNELIO CALLUENG MARTINEZ, JR. (acquitted), EUGENE LAREZA ALZATE, LELIBETH LEDRES CANILLO, HERNANDO LALISAN SIBUGAN, JUANITO HERMINIA PURISIMA, PYANG LUCAS SINGCONG (deceased), MARLIND LOPEZ MARCELO, REDEMPTO YAP ABISO, TEODORICO FEDERICO DIAZ (at large), JESUS HUSAIN DESEDILLA, MARIA DEPOSO CAMANAY (at large) and AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, accused; LELIBETH L. CANILLO-PROSPERO, JESUS H. DESEDILLA, and REDEMPTO ABISO,accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 212874 — EUGENE L. ALZATE, HERNANDO L. SIBUGAN, and MARLIND L. MARCELO,petitioners, versusPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.

For resolution of the Court are the following: (i) Motion to Grant Bail to Accused Alzate under Rule 114, Section 16, of the Rules of Court in Relation to R.A. 109511 dated October 30, 2017 (First Motion) and Urgent Supplemental Motion for Petitioner's Admission to Bail and for His Immediate Release from Detention [in Earnest and Supplication Submitting Added Legal Supports]2 dated October 10, 2018 filed by petitioner Eugene L. Alzate (Alzate), and (ii) Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Discretionary Bail Applying R.A. 10951 or "An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property or Damage on Which Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed under the Revised Penal Code." Without Prejudice to the Resolution of the Case on the Merits Pending Appeal3 dated December 4, 2017 (Second Motion) filed by accused-appellants Redempto Y. Abiso (Abiso), Lelibeth Canillo-Prospero (Canillo-Prospero) and Jesus H. Desedilla (Desedilla) (collectively, Accused-Appellants).

Briefly stated, the antecedent facts are as follows: EcTCAD

In a Decision 4 dated January 30, 2014, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in Criminal Case No. 28328 convicted herein petitioners and Accused-Appellants of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. Therein, the SB found them liable as co-conspirators for illegal disbursements totaling Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P475,000.00) in favor of a certain "Wenilo Bravo," the alleged Chairman of Sea Angels Aqua Marketing Cooperative. Petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants were all Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sarangani during the time the said disbursements were made.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads in part:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Accused CORNELIO C. MARTINEZ, JR., EUGENE L. ALZATE, LILEBETH (or LELIBETH) L. CANILLO-PROSPERO, HERNANDO L. SIBUGAN, JUANITO H. PURISIMA, MARLIND L. MARCELO, REDEMPTO Y. ABISO, JESUS H. DESEDILLA and AMELIA CARMELA C. ZOLETA are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171 paragraph 2, and Article 48 of the same Code, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua[.] 5 (Additional emphasis supplied)

On the same date, petitioner Alzate and accused-appellants Abiso and Desedilla were committed to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City (NBP), while accused-appellant Canillo-Prospero was committed to the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City.

While in detention, petitioner Alzate, together with his co-petitioners Hernando L. Sibugan and Marlind L. Marcelo (collectively, Petitioners), and accused-appellant Abiso filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion 1.) For Reconsideration of the Decision Promulgated on January 30, 2014; 2.) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 30 January 2014; and 3.) To Allow Accused Eugene L. Alzate, Redempto Y. Abiso, Hernando L. Sibugan and Marlind L. Marcelo, to Post Cash Bond Double the Amount of their Original Bail Bond and Be Released on Bail Pending the Resolution of Their Instant Omnibus Motion and/or Appeal dated February 4, 2014, while accused-appellants Canillo-Prospero and Desedilla filed an Urgent Motion for Bail dated March 9, 2014. 6

In a Resolution 7 dated May 5, 2014, the SB denied the foregoing motions, which, inter alia, sought to allow petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants to post bail, as follows:

As to the plea for temporary liberty upon posting of bail, the Court is constrained to deny the same in view of Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. HSAcaE

In the case of Leviste v. Court of Appeals, the Honorable Supreme Court imposed a "tough on bail pending appeal" policy and pronounced that an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. 8

On July 4, 2014, Petitioners filed the instant Petition 9 (G.R. No. 212874), which included a prayer for their re-admission to bail. On April 10, 2015, Petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Petitioners' Application for Re-Admission to Bail10 dated April 9, 2015 (Motion for Re-Admission to Bail).

In a Resolution 11 dated July 15, 2015, the Court denied Petitioners' Motion for Re-Admission to Bail for lack of merit. 12 In the same resolution, the petition was ordered consolidated by the Court with G.R. No. 212399. 13

On January 5, 2015, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its Comment (On the Petition for Review on Certiorari). 14 Petitioners filed their Reply to Respondent's Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 29 December 201415 on May 14, 2015. Meanwhile, Accused-Appellants filed their Reply Brief16 on September 21, 2015.

In a Resolution 17 dated November 9, 2015, the Court denied Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration 18 of the Resolution dated July 15, 2015. AScHCD

Republic Act No. 10951

On August 29, 2017, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 19 was signed into law and took effect on September 13, 2017, amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) on the amount of property and damage on which penalties for selected crimes are based. Pertinently, Article 217 of the RPC, which defines and punishes the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, was amended, as follows:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (P40,000).

2. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).

3. The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000).

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than Two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000).

5. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount involved is more than Four million four hundred thousand pesos (P4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million eight hundred thousand pesos (P8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

Following the enactment of R.A. No. 10951, petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants respectively filed the First and Second Motions (Subject Motions).

The First Motion

In the First Motion, petitioner Alzate prays for his provisional release based on the retroactive application of R.A. No. 10951. Petitioner Alzate claims that the evidence tends to prove that he received only Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00); thus, the extent of his alleged participation in the conspiracy is only up to such amount. 20 Hence, in praying for his release, petitioner Alzate invokes the first paragraph of Article 217, as amended, which imposes the penalty of prisión correctional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000). 21 Petitioner Alzate argues that he had already served the duration of prisión correccional in its medium period as he has been committed and detained at the NBP since January 30, 2014. 22 AcICHD

In any case, even if the entire amount of Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P475,000.00) were to be considered, the maximum penalty imposable will only be prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which renders the offense bailable, albeit discretionary. 23

Further, petitioner Alzate manifests that none of the disqualifications under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (Section 5, Rule 114) is present in his case and that he is willing to report monthly to the Parole and Probation Office of the Province of Sarangani to ensure to the Court that he is not a flight risk. 24

The Second Motion

Similarly, in the Second Motion, Accused-Appellants claim that the provisions of R.A. No. 10951 should apply to them retroactively, its provisions being favorable to them. 25 They argue that the granting of bail had since then become discretionary, prescinding from the previously non-bailable nature of the offense as found by the SB in the Decision dated January 30, 2014. 26 Accused-Appellants likewise aver that none of the bail-negating circumstances under Section 5, Rule 114 is present in their case. 27

In addition, accused-appellants Abiso and Desedilla pray for their release due to medical concerns, citing Enrile v. Sandiganbayan28(Enrile). 29

Consolidated Comment of the OSP

On May 25, 2018, the OSP, representing the People, filed its Consolidated Comment30 (Comment) of even date.

In its Comment, the OSP argues for the denial of bail notwithstanding the enactment of R.A. No. 10951. The OSP posits that since the duration of the penalty for prisión mayor is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, following Article 48 31 and Article 76 32 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for the crime involving the amount of Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P475,000.00) is ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. 33 Thus, the OSP invokes Section 5, Rule 114, which mandates the denial of bail when the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. caITAC

Anent the prayer of accused-appellants Abiso and Desedilla for release based on medical considerations, the OSP counters that their reliance on Enrile is misplaced as the circumstances therein are unavailing in this case; the purpose for the grant of bail in Enrile was to ensure that the accused was healthy enough to participate in the trial of his case and guarantee his appearance in court. 34 Here, there is no trial to speak of as the case is merely pending appeal. 35

On July 23, 2018, Accused-Appellants filed a Reply Re: The OSP's Consolidated Comment, dated, May 25, 2018 [with Leave of the Honorable Court]36 of even date.

Issue

Whether petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants are entitled to be released on bail.

The Court's Ruling

The Subject Motions are granted.

This is a case of special circumstance. Since the RPC took effect in January 1, 1932, its provisions on the amount or value of property and damage on which penalties are based have eluded amendment. Thus, while the intention of the RPC to graduate penalties according to the degree of damage remained intact, the monetary values from the 1930s have likewise remained unchanged.

Almost 90 years later, the Legislature deemed it proper to adjust the outdated values in the RPC through the enactment of R.A. No. 10951. Of significance is the fact that the law expressly mandates the retroactivity of its provisions to the accused and to those already serving sentence by final judgment:

SEC. 100. Retroactive Effect. — This Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that it is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence by final judgment. 37

It was in Hernan v. Sandiganbayan38(Hernan) that the Court first had the occasion to apply the provisions of R.A. No. 10951 to one already serving sentence by final judgment. The Court therein issued the following directive:

On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed. ICHDca

Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine if there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime charged against them based on the penalties imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial; and (4) Lastly, all courts, including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged imprisonment. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Here, the Subject Motions, while preceding Hernan, proceed from the same animus, that is, to accord to accused and convicts alike the full benefit of R.A. No. 10951 as if it were the law prevailing at the time their penalties were meted. 40 To this end, the Court shall now apply the provisions of R.A. No. 10951 in determining whether petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants may be allowed provisional release on bail.

As discussed above, the SB found petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants guilty as co-conspirators for allegedly misappropriating the entire amount of Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P475,000.00). In this regard, the applicable penalty should be determined using such amount, following the settled rule that conspiracy renders a collective liability for the acts of all, irrespective of individual participation. TCAScE

Article 217 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10951, thus states:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000). (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the new law, the penalty imposable for the said amount — which was previously reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua — has been significantly reduced to prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.

Parenthetically, the OSP's remarks in its Comment regarding the imposable penalty is therefore inaccurate. 41 It is not the entire duration of prisión mayor (i.e., six [6] years and one [1] day to twelve [12] years) that is applicable to this case, only the minimum and medium periods thereof. 42

It must be recalled that petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants were denied bail by the SB in its Resolution dated May 5, 2014 for the reason only that the penalty imposed on them was reclusion perpetua:

As to the plea for temporary liberty upon posting of bail, the Court is constrained to deny the same in view of Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

In the case of Leviste v. Court of Appeals, the Honorable Supreme Court imposed a "tough on bail pending appeal" policy and pronounced that an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. 43 (Emphasis supplied)

However, with the advent of R.A. No. 10951, Section 5, Rule 114 is now the applicable provision in this case:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. cTDaEH

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The provision is clear: after conviction by the trial court of an offense not punishable by either (i) death, (ii) reclusion perpetua, or (iii) life imprisonment, admission to bail is subject to the discretion of the court. Further, in cases where the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, as in the instant case, bail shall be denied only upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, that any of the foregoing circumstances is present. The plain import of the provision is that the prosecution carries the burden of proving through evidence any circumstance that tends to prejudice the accused's appearance before the court.

In Leviste v. Court of Appeals, 44(Leviste) the Court further explained:

x x x [A]ny application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant's case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. cSaATC

On the other hand, if the appellant's case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court's stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. 45 (Emphasis in the original)

Bearing the foregoing in mind, considering that the imposable penalty exceeds imprisonment of six (6) years, the next question is: was the prosecution able to show any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 114? If ruled in the negative, then bail remains discretionary with the Court.

After due consideration of the records and the submissions of the parties, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 114.

In its Comment, other than the OSP's claim that petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants are flight risks, there was no sufficient showing that any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 5, Rule 114 is applicable:

13. Clearly, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as quoted above — as the imposable penalty even after the application of R.A. 10951 exceeds six (6) years, considering further the conviction of the movants by the Sandiganbayan which naturally make them a flight risk, bail should still be denied. In other words, this bail-negating condition persisted in this case notwithstanding R.A. 10951, and pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of this bail-negating condition mandate the denial of bail pending appeal such that this circumstance is deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. 46 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)

The Court is unconvinced, for the simple reason that a conviction by the SB does not ipso facto make one a flight risk. The situation regulated by Section 5, Rule 114 is one where the accused has already been convicted. In other words, when the rule enumerates in sub-paragraph (d) the flight risk as a consideration in granting or denying bail, the rule envisions some other circumstance to indicate this other than the fact of conviction. To construe otherwise is to render sub-paragraph (d) illusory; that once convicted, an accused will always be a flight risk. This construction is plainly absurd.

In other words, absent any other circumstance on record, the Court has no basis in fact to deny bail based on probability of flight. cHDAIS

In this regard, following Leviste, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, shall now use a less stringent approach in determining whether to grant discretionary bail.

The Court notes that petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants have exhibited behavior indicating respect for criminal processes. Throughout their trial, they faithfully participated in meeting the allegations against them despite their continuous plea for temporary liberty at the SB level. Even more, upon their conviction by the SB, petitioner Alzate and accused-appellant Abiso immediately requested to be allowed to post a cash bond double the amount of their original bail bond, if only to reduce even further their likelihood of flight. 47 Indeed, the Court cannot find any indication in the records of a desire to flee as, in fact, petitioner Alzate even filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. 48 The same can be said about Accused-Appellants who have not shown any behavior showing intent or a propensity to flee; both accused-appellants Abiso and Desedilla are already sixty-five (65) years old and disease-stricken, 49 while accused-appellant Canillo-Prospero has maintained a good record and reputation while remaining productive during her incarceration. 50

More importantly, the Court observes that petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants are now entitled to the benefit of Act No. 4103, 51 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) — a benefit that they had been previously deprived of — considering that the imposable penalty is now prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, applying Section 1 52 of the ISL, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC. In this case, the minimum term would therefore be anywhere within the range of prisión correccional in its medium to maximum periods, that is, within two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years53 — assuming arguendo that their conviction is affirmed.

In this regard, the Court observes that petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants were placed in confinement beginning January 30, 2014. Hence, to date, they have been deprived of liberty for four (4) years and ten (10) months, or close to five (5) years already. It would therefore appear that petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants have already served the minimum and medium of the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence (i.e., two [2] years, four [4] months, and one [1] day to four [4] years, eight [8] months and twenty [20] days). Moreover, even if the Court were to impose the maximum of the minimum term (i.e., four [4] years, eight [8] months and twenty-one [21] days to six [6] years), that would mean that they are merely one (1) year away from being eligible for parole, in accordance with Section 1 of the ISL. This is significant because if they have practically served the majority of the minimum term, then it is highly unlikely that they would now attempt to evade their sentence and thereby risk losing the benefits of the time that they had already served in confinement. ISHCcT

At this juncture, the Court reiterates that the right to bail emanates from the accused's right to be presumed innocent. 54 Thus, in cases of bail pending appeal, the purpose of the same is for the accused to avoid the potential hardships of prison, while at the same time prevent his flight from custody and to ensure the protection of the community from potential danger. 55 As discussed above, the Court sees no real risk of flight of petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants. Neither does the Court perceive a risk of repetition of the crime involved considering that the same was allegedly committed at the time they were still public officers.

Thus, in view of the foregoing and in light of the beneficial application of R.A. No. 10951, the Court finds it proper to grant petitioner Alzate and Accused-Appellants provisional liberty pending resolution of the instant appeal. Anent the amount of the bail bond, considering that the original bond recommended by the prosecution is Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00), 56 the Court finds an amount double the same to be the just and equitable bond under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Subject Motions are hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Eugene L. Alzate and accused-appellants Redempto Y. Abiso, Lelibeth Canillo-Prospero and Jesus H. Desedilla are hereby ORDERED PROVISIONALLY RELEASED upon posting of a cash bond of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) each, unless they are being detained for some other lawful cause.

This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. DHITCc

SO ORDERED. (PERLAS-BERNABE, J., on wellness leave)"

Very truly yours,

MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

• Also referred to as "Lilebeth Ledres Canillo" and "Lilibeth" in some parts of the records.

•• Also spelled as "Desidilla" in some parts of the records.

1. Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, pp. 1698-1706.

2. Id. at 1900-1909, excluding Annex.

3. Id. at 1764-1787, excluding Annexes.

4. Id. at 1788-1820. Penned by Associate Justice Efren N. De La Cruz, with Associate Justices Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Rafael R. Lagos concurring.

5. Id. at 1818-1819.

6. Id. at 1821-1822.

7.Id. at 1821-1836.

8.Id. at 1835.

9.Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. I, pp. 56-180, excluding Annexes.

10.Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, pp. 1572-A to 1575.

11.Id. at 1600-1602.

12.Id. at 1601.

13.Id. at 1600.

14.Id. at 1528-1570.

15.Id. at 1582-1595.

16.Id. at 1607-1658. Denominated as "Appellants' Reply-Brief."

17.Id. at 1676.

18.Id. at 1659-1675.

19. AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY IS BASED, AND THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE REVISED PENAL CODE," AS AMENDED, August 29, 2017.

20. See rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, p. 1701.

21. See id.

22.Id. at 1699, 1701.

23.Id. at 1701.

24.Id. at 1702-1703.

25.Id. at 1771-1772.

26. See id. at 1772.

27.Id. at 1773-1775

28. 767 Phil. 147 (2015).

29.Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, pp. 1775-1778.

30.Id. at 1875-1883.

31. ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

32. ART. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. — The legal period of duration of divisible penalties shall be considered as divided into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner shown in the following table:

xxx xxx xxx

33.Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, p. 1878.

34.Id. at 1879.

35.Id.

36.Id. at 1891-1897.

37. R.A. No. 10951.

38. G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017.

39.Id. at 15-16.

40. See Venezuela v. People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018.

41. See note 33.

42. Under R.A. No. 10951, the penalty is not composed of three periods (prisión mayor), but only prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of damage is more than P40,000.00 but does not exceed P1,200,000.00. Prisión mayor in its maximum period is already in the next paragraph, where the amount of damage is more than P1,200,000.00 but does not exceed P2,400,000.00, which prescribes the penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The OSP was therefore incorrect to "lump together" prisión mayor in its entirety when the law prescribes otherwise.

43. Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, p. 1835.

44. 629 Phil. 587 (2010).

45. Id. at 602-603.

46. Rollo (G.R. No. 212874), Vol. III, p. 1878.

47. See id. at 1740-1741.

48. Id. at 1758-1759.

49. Id. at 1776-1777.

50. Id. at 1778-1779, 1849-1852.

51. AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, December 5, 1933.

52. SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be less than the minimum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum term which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law; and where the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the court shall sentence the accused to such maximum as may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly imposed under the present rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense. Except as provided in section two hereof, any person who shall have been so convicted and sentenced and shall have served the minimum sentence imposed hereunder, may be released on parole in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

53. See Nizurtado v. Sandiganbayan, 309 Phil. 30, 43-44 (1994).

54. People v. Escobar, G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017, 833 SCRA 180, 195.

55. See Leviste v. Court of Appeals, supra note 44, at 593-594.

56. Rollo (G.R. No. 212399), p. 201.