THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232250. January 13, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. TEODORO CAGUIOA y DE GUZMAN, MARLON CAGUIOA y ABRAGON, and VICTOR CAGUIOA y ABRAGON, accused-appellants.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 13, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232250 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. TEODORO CAGUIOA y DE GUZMAN, MARLON CAGUIOA y ABRAGON, and VICTOR CAGUIOA y ABRAGON, accused-appellants). — This Court resolves the appeal assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction of Teodoro, Marlon, and Victor, all surnamed Caguioa (accused-appellants) for the crimes of murder and slight physical injuries.
Two Informations were filed — one for the murder of Albert M. Suarez (Albert), and the other for the slight physical injuries inflicted on Albert's sister, Marineth M. Suarez (Marineth). They read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 2997-M-2008
That on or about the 18th day of May, 2008, in San Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an unknown caliber gun and bladed weapon, with intent to kill one Albert M. Suarez @ Ambet, and with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot, hack and stab with the use of the said gun and bladed weapon the said Albert M. Suarez @ Ambet, hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 2998-M-2008
That on or about the 18th day of May, 2008, in San Jose del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with bladed weapon, with intent to kill one Marineth M. Suarez, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of murder directly by overt acts, that is by attacking, assaulting and stabbing with the use of a bladed weapon the said Marineth M. Suarez, hitting her in the left forearm, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries, and if the said accused did not accomplish their purpose, that is to kill the said Marineth M. Suarez, it was not because of their involuntary desistance, but due to the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Marineth M. Suarez which prevented her death.
[Contrary to law.] 2
Accused-appellants seek their acquittal by arguing that the testimonies of Marineth and Arlene, the victim's sisters, were conflicting as to the number of shots fired by accused-appellant Victor; the origin of the gunshot wounds sustained by Albert; and the number of people present during the incident. 3 Moreover, they assert that the death certificate only proves the fact, and not the cause, of Albert's death. 4 They add that treachery was not present because an altercation preceded the incident and Albert himself was armed with a bladed weapon. 5 Finally, they say that the prosecution has not established conspiracy among them. 6 CAIHTE
This Court affirms accused-appellants' conviction.
The facts, as borne out by the records, sufficiently support the conclusion that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of murder and slight physical injuries. The issues and matters raised before this Court were the same as those raised in the Court of Appeals, which have been sufficiently addressed and correctly ruled upon.
To warrant a conviction of murder under Article 248 7 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the prosecution must prove: first, that a person was killed; second, that the accused killed them; third, that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and lastly, that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 8
The prosecution's version of the facts contradicted with that of the defense, but the trial court believed the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses over the alibi and denial of accused-appellants. It ruled that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were "straightforward and reliable." 9 On this, the Court of Appeals agreed. This Court, therefore, finds no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court, which had the "opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand." 10
As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victim's sisters, the lower courts correctly held that these matters pertain to collateral facts without material significance in determining accused-appellants' guilt. 11 These alleged inconsistencies are not relevant to the elements of the crime charged. In People v. Dimapilit: 12
A witness' inconsistency on minor details does not affect his or her credibility as long as there are no material contradictions in his or her absolute and clear narration on the central incident and positive identification of the accused as one of the main assailants. Any inconsistency, which is not relevant to the elements of the crime, "is not a ground to reverse a conviction." 13 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, whether the gunshot wounds on the victim were inflicted by accused-appellant Victor or Teodoro does not detract from the eyewitness accounts of Albert's sisters that accused-appellants were present and took part in committing the crime. Such detail is of little consequence, since the victim did not die from a single shot wound. Instead, there existed a conspiracy among all accused-appellants to kill the victim.
As regards accused-appellants' second contention, the death certificate states that Albert died on May 18, 2008 14 from a "massive hemorrhage due to different wounds[.]" 15 As a public document, the death certificate is prima facie evidence of facts stated in it. 16 Furthermore, accused-appellants' admission of the existence and due execution of the death certificate has already settled the fact of the victim's death.
This piece of evidence — taken together with the pictures showing the wounds sustained by the victim and the prosecution witnesses' testimonies positively identifying accused-appellants as the assailants — sufficiently established their participation in Albert's death.
Furthermore, treachery attended Albert's killing. This Court has ruled:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. 17 (Citations omitted)
Here, accused-appellants, who were heavily armed, waited for Albert outside his house and chased him as soon as they saw him coming out of his house. Albert tried to escape, but they fired shots at his back and he fell to the ground. Not contented, they hacked him with a karit, hit him with a stone, and stabbed him several times with a knife — all while he was already helplessly lying on the ground. They stopped their attacks only when they saw Albert already drenched in blood. 18
Accused-appellants' simultaneous attacks deprived Albert — already weak and lying on the ground — of any chance to defend himself. This ensured Albert's death without risk to themselves. They knowingly employed the means to ensure that Suarez would not survive the attack. Collectively, their actions establish treachery.
To be sure, "[t]reachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." 19 Here, despite the victim's helpless and vulnerable condition, accused-appellants still hacked him repeatedly, guaranteeing that he would not survive the attack. Treachery attended the killing. 20 DETACa
Finally, the prosecution successfully established conspiracy among accused-appellants, proving that they acted in a common design to kill Albert. Their acting in concert was undeniably shown when they waited together, heavily armed, along the road outside Albert's house, chased him, shot and attacked him, and fled together after the assault. There being conspiracy, each of them is guilty as a principal perpetrator of the crime. 21
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 22 Direct evidence is not essential to show conspiracy. Proof of conduct before, during, and after the crime, showing a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments is sufficient. 23 It may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, 24 as where all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim. 25 In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 26
All told, this Court finds no reversible error in the Court of Appeals Decision convicting accused-appellants. However, in view of People v. Jugueta, 27 the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are increased to P75,000.00 each. Additionally, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages of P50,000.00 must be awarded to the victim's heirs.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The January 25, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07108 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Teodoro Caguioa y De Guzman, Marlon Caguioa y Abragon, and Victor Caguioa y Abragon are GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and slight physical injuries. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua on account of their conviction for murder, and in addition, arresto menor medium on account of their conviction for slight physical injuries. They are further DIRECTED to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages worth P75,000.00 each, and temperate damages worth P50,000.00.
All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-12. The January 25, 2017 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
2.Id. at. 3.
3. CA Rollo, pp. 46-47.
4.Id. at 47.
5.Id. at 49.
6.Id. at 51.
7. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 248 provides:
Article 248. Murder — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
8.People v. Dimapilit, 816 Phil. 523, 540 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing People v. Las Piñas, 739 Phil. 502, 524 (2014) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].
9. CA rollo, p. 17-A, RTC Decision.
10.People v. Dimapilit, 816 Phil. 523, 540-541 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing People v. Harovilla, 436 Phil. 287, 293 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
11.Rollo, p. 7.
12. 816 Phil. 523 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
13.Id. at 527-528.
14. CA rollo, p. 96.
15.Id. at 130.
16.People v. Silvestre, 314 Phil. 397 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
17.People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookself/showdocs/1/65294> [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
18. CA rollo, p. 126.
19.People v. Villonez, 359 Phil. 95, 112 (1998) (Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
20.People v. Teston, 388 Phil. 1079 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
21.People v. Feliciano, Jr., 734 Phil. 499 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
22. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 8.
23.People v. Las Piñas, 739 Phil. 502, 525 (2014) [Per J. De Castro, First Division].
24.People v. Pondivida, 705 Phil. 201, 207 (2013) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
25.Talay v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 256 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
26.People v. Feliciano, Jr., 734 Phil. 499 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
27. 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].