FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209586. June 28, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROSENDO CACAYON, DIOSDADO ROMAGOS, PERFECTO ROMAGOS, JR. and ALBERT YAÑEZ, accused-appellants.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 28, 2016, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 209586 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSENDO CACAYON, DIOSDADO ROMAGOS, PERFECTO ROMAGOS, JR. and ALBERT YAÑEZ,Accused-Appellants.
In the Decision 1 dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00767-MIN, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Rosendo Cacayon, Diosdado Romagos, Perfecto Romagos, Jr. and Albert Yañez," the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 2 dated November 9, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39 of Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental in Criminal Case No. 2004-763, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Appellants now seek the reversal of their conviction through the present petition.
The Information 3 dated August 9, 2004 detailed the criminal charge in this wise:
That on the 5th day of February, 2004 at about 9:00 . . . in the morning, more or less at Sitio Bodiongan, Barangay Malanang, Municipality of Opol, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength and with deliberate intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit one Nicolas Payla y Salvador with stones in the head, which caused him to slump to the ground, and while helpless on the ground, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of a bolo stab said Nicolas Payla y Salvador in the body and thereafter slash his neck, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death. EATCcI
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On October 13, 2004, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge during their arraignment.
In the assailed June 28, 2013 Decision, the appellate court restated the prosecution's evidence presented during the trial, thus:
Dionisio Yangco (Yangco) testified that he was residing with his mother in the house of his stepfather Rosendo Cacayon (Rosendo) at Malaurong, Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 5 February 2004 at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Rosendo told him that he will go to the house of Nicola's Payla (Nicolas) located at Bodiongan, Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental. Yangco expressed his desire to go along with Rosendo as he was fond of Nicolas whom he called "Tay Kolas." Rosendo did not permit him saying that he will come back immediately. Unknown to Rosendo, Yangco followed him. Yangco claimed that Rosendo brought with him a bolo.
Rosendo went to the place where Nicolas used to tether his cow. Rosendo, then, proceeded to the house of Nicolas and hid in the grassy area beside the road. As Nicolas went out of his house, another person, whom Yangco identified in court as Perfecto Romagos, Jr., came out and hit Nicolas in the nape with a piece of wood. Nicolas fell down with his face facing to the side. Thereafter, Yangco saw another person, whom he identified in court as Diosdado Romagos, struck the forehead and the mouth of Nicolas using bantiles stones. While Nicolas was unconscious and lying on the ground, another person, whom Yangco identified in court as Albert Yañez (Albert), came towards Nicolas. Albert lifted Nicolas and stabbed him in the side using the bolo given to him by Rosendo. Albert hacked several times both the shoulders of Nicolas and thereafter slashed his throat. Yangco claimed that he was about fifteen (15) meters or less from the three appellants while they were doing the act.
Upon arriving home, Rosendo told Yangco that they will go to Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City. They arrived at Mambuaya on 5 February 2004 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. They stayed for the night at the house of Rosendo's sister. On 7 February 2004, Yangco went to [his] grandmother's house at Lunocan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon where he stayed for one month. Thereafter, they went to the police station of Opol, Misamis Oriental to report the incident.
The Death Certificate issued by Dr. Tammy Lim revealed that Nicolas Payla died of "severe hemorhage (sic), stab wounds, hacked wounds and slashed wounds."
Wella Payla Daanoy, daughter of the deceased Nicolas Payla, testified as regards the expenses she spent for the wake and burial. She claimed to have spent a total amount of P70,000.00. 4
The conflicting narrative of the defense was also summed by the appellate court as follows:
Esterlita Cahapon testified to prove that Yangco could not have been at Bodiongan, Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental on the date and time of the incident because Yangco was at her house at Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City. On 3 February 2004, Yangco went to her house at Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City and requested her to massage his body. Yangco, requesting for another body massage, went again to her house on 5 February 2004 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
Peter Rosario testified to prove that on 5 February 2004 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw Yangco at the house of David Molawan at Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City. Rosario claimed that he saw Yangco, whom he claimed as his nephew, sitting and was covered with blanket because of fever.
Appellant Rosendo Cacayon interposed alibi as defense. He testified that he was a resident of Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City and a member of Tribal Farmers Association Uno (TRIFA UNO). On 5 February 2004 at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at a TRIFA meeting at Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental where he signed an attendance sheet. When the meeting was adjourned at about 12:00 noon, he went home to Mambuaya, Cagayan de Oro City and returned on 9 February 2009 to Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental.
Appellant Diosdado Romagos asserted that on 5 February 2004 at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 12:00 noon, he and his wife and children were at the meeting place of TRIFA UNO at Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental. When the meeting adjourned at 12:00 noon, they went home together where a certain Tolentino Legaspi walked with them. His alibi was corroborated by his wife Teofila Romagos. She testified that she was with her husband on the date of the incident attending the TRIFA UNO meeting at Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental. They left their home at around 6:30 in the morning and arrived at 7:00 o'clock in the morning. Thereafter, they went home for lunch at around 11:30 in the morning when the meeting adjourned.
The defense also presented Clementino Legaspi, a member of TRIFA UNO. He testified that on 5 February 2004 around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at the meeting place at Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental where he saw appellants Diosdado Romagos and Rosendo Cacayon. He claimed that both stayed for the whole duration of the meeting from 9:00 o'clock in the morning to 12:00 noon. This was corroborated by Jerry Jabla, president of TRIFA UNO, who testified that on 5 February 2004, he saw appellants Diosdado Romagos and Rosendo Cacayon during the whole duration of the meeting from 8:30 to about 11:00 o'clock in the morning and that he did not see them leave the venue until the meeting ended. DHITCc
Appellant Perfecto Romagos, Jr. claimed alibi as defense. On 5 February 2004 at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning he stayed at his house at Malaoro, Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental claiming that he had been sick from 4 February 2004 to 6 February 2004.
Appellant Albert Yañez likewise interposed alibi. He claimed that on 5 February 2004 at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at Bayog Island in Iligan City where he had been residing since the year 2000. He claimed that he was gathering tuba with a certain Ricky Iroy in the land owned by Erlito Echavez from 5:00 to 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 5 February 2004. Thereafter, he went to the house of his aunt and stayed there from 9:00 o'clock in the morning up to the morning of the next day. He claimed that he only knew of the charge against him when he was arrested in Iligan City on 14 April 2004. His testimony was corroborated by Rosita Mariquit who claimed that appellant Albert Yañez was at her home on 5 February 2004 at Bayog, Iligan City. She claimed having seen Albert Yañez gathering tuba from 5:30 to 9:30 in the morning. Thereafter, he stayed at her house and did [not] anymore leave. 5
At the end of due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment against appellants, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROSENDO CACAYON, PERFECTO ROMAGOS, Jr., DIOSDADO ROMAGOS and ALBERT YAÑEZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim Nicolas Payla the following sums:
a.) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Nicolas Payla;
b.) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c.) P25,000.00 as nominal damages; and
d.) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the cost. 6
When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, it affirmed with modifications the ruling of the trial court and disposed of the appeal in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated 9 November 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39 of Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental in Criminal Case No. 2004-763 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to damages. In addition to the damages awarded by the court a quo, appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of Nicolas Payla temperate damages, in lieu of nominal, in the amount of P25,000.00.
An interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral, exemplary and temperate damages to be reckoned from this date until fully paid. 7
In the present appeal, appellants reiterate the following errors on the part of the trial court:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONTRADICTORY AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYE-WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE ACCUSED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 8
In addition, they proffered the following ground in their Supplemental Brief:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALSO THAT TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE EYEWITNESSES THAT THE PROSECUTION'S EYEWITNESS WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE LOCUS CRIMINIS AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. 9
In essence, the conviction of the appellants in this case for the murder of Nicolas S. Payla (Payla) rests upon the belief bestowed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the testimony of Dionisio Yangco (Yangco), who is the lone eyewitness for the prosecution. It is mainly on the basis of Yangco's testimony that the trial court convicted appellants Rosendo Cacayon (Cacayon), Perfecto Romagos, Jr. (Perfecto), Diosdado Romagos (Diosdado), and Albert Yañez (Yañez). In pursuit of their exoneration, appellants argue that Yangco's testimony which contained improbable and contradictory statements created serious doubts that impaired Yangco's credibility. Furthermore, they emphasize that the trial court gave undue consideration to Yangco's testimony despite the presentation of multiple defense witnesses who testified that appellants were not present at the scene of the crime during the time the murder of Payla occurred. For these reasons, appellants plead that their conviction be overturned because their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal is without merit.
The Court cannot accept the assertion that the testimony of a single eyewitness cannot be relied upon as basis for conviction for lack of corroboration by other witnesses to the crime. We held in a previous case that, for although the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive testimony of a single witness. 10 Thus, we find no error in the trial court's decision to uphold Yangco's testimony over the opposing statements made by the four appellants and their respective corroborating witnesses. cEaSHC
Furthermore, the appellate court correctly ruled that the alleged inconsistencies in Yangco's testimony were not significant enough to erode the trustworthiness of the same as found by the trial court. Considering the young age of Yangco at the time of the incident and his apparent fond relationship with the murder victim, it is not unsurprising that Yangco's emotional state may have affected his recollection of the circumstances surrounding Payla's horrific killing. It is axiomatic that minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of the testimony, even enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that the testimony was contrived or rehearsed. 11 Accuracy in accounts had never been applied as a standard to which the credibility of witnesses are tested since it is undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions and the passage of time. 12
We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witness Yangco, especially in light of the Court of Appeals' concurrence with said findings. In People v. Ramos, 13 we held:
It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded utmost respect since trial courts have first hand account on the witnesses' manner of testifying in court and their demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility. Moreover in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, and especially when the findings of the judge have been affirmed by the CA as in this case, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. . . . .
In contradiction to Yangco's positive identification, appellants interposed the defense of alibi. Each one of the appellants along with their respective corroborating witnesses presented in court a narrative that would place them somewhere else when the murder of Payla occurred. However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not give credence to these exculpatory assertions and rightfully so because the defense of alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of a clear identification of the accused. In People v. Cuesta, 14 we ruled:
In any case, the positive identification of the appellant by witnesses destroys the defense of alibi. Alibi warrants the least credibility, or none at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses. Absent any ill motive on the part of witnesses, their positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime prevails over the defense of denial or alibi.15
It bears repeating that appellants were unable to prove that Yangco was motivated by ill will towards them when he accused them of killing Payla. Furthermore, the stories concocted by appellants failed to negate the physical impossibility of their presence at the locus criminis or the scene of the crime at the time of Payla's murder.
It is axiomatic that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove (1) that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and (2) that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 16 A review of the individual accounts proffered by each appellant reveal that the distance between the locus criminis and their claimed whereabouts does not negate the possibility of them being at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity when Payla was killed. We quote hereunder the discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter:
Here, appellants failed to satisfy the said requisites more specifically the second. The prosecution established the following, to wit:
1. The distance between the meeting place of the TRIFA-UNO where appellants Rosendo Cacayon and Diosdado Romagos claimed to be at the time of the incident and Sitio Bodiongan, Malanang, Opol, Misamis Oriental where the crime transpired is "about two (2) kilometres" or about thirty (30) minutes" of walk;
2. Nicolas Payla was residing in the same sitio as Perfecto Romagos, Jr. The distance of their houses can be negotiated in a one-hour hike; and
3. As regards Albert Yañez, the scene of the crime is accessible by the national and provincial roads and it will take him about an hour by bus to be there from Iligan City where he allegedly resided.
Appellants only attempted to prove that they were at different places when Nicolas Payla was killed. The defense failed to adduce clear and convincing proof to establish appellants' physical impossibility of being present at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. Worse, what they sought to establish was that witness Yangco was not at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. Clearly, this is immaterial to the appellants' defense of alibi. 17
Anent the question of whether appellants did indeed conspire to kill Payla, we rule that the prosecution was able to establish this fact. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." We have previously held that conspiracy having been established, evidence as to who delivered the fatal blow is no longer indispensable because each of the offender is equally guilty of the criminal act since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 18 Thus, the dissimilar actions committed by each appellant in the murder of Payla will not help them escape uniform liability for his death. Again, we quote with approval the following disquisition of the appellate court with regard to conspiracy: CTIEac
In this case, prevalent was the pre-conceived plan of the appellants to kill [Payla]. First, Perfecto Romagos, Jr. came out and hit [Payla] in the nape with a piece of wood causing him to fall down. Second, Diosdado Romagos, struck the forehead and the mouth of [Payla] using bantiles stones knocking him out from consciousness. Third, Rosendo Cacayon handed his bolo to Albert Yañez. Fourth, Albert Yañez came towards [Payla], lifted and stabbed him in the side using the bolo given by Rosendo, hacked several times both his shoulders, and thereafter slashed his throat. Truly, the acts of the appellants were "knitted seamlessly together in a web of a single criminal design," that is, to kill [Payla]. 19
Likewise, we agree with the finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the killing of Payla by appellants was attended by taking advantage of or abuse of superior strength so as to qualify the felony committed to murder. Article 248 (1) of the Revised Penal Code states that "[a]ny person who, . . ., shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder . . . if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With . . ., taking advantage of superior strength, . . . ." We have held that abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 20 In the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was undeniably established since appellants utilized a bolo and bantiles stones along with their superior numbers to slay Payla who was both alone and unarmed.
It is a settled rule that when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. 21
In light of our recent ruling in People v. Jugueta, 22 we find the award of damages by the trial court to be insufficient in some respects. To conform to current case law, we increase the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 and the amount of exemplary damages from P25,000.00 to P75,000.00. 23
WHEREFORE, the assailed June 28, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS in order to increase the amount of damages to be paid to the heirs of Nicolas S. Payla in addition to the temperate damages, as follows:
a. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
c. P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
An interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the awards of damages to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-25; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco with Associate Justices Jhosep Y. Lopez and Oscar V. Badelles concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 33-43.
3. Records, p. 1.
4. Rollo, pp. 5-7.
5. Id. at 7-10.
6. CA rollo, p. 43.
7. Rollo, p. 25.
8. CA rollo, pp. 14-15.
9. Rollo, p. 39.
10. People v. Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 103-104 (2013).
11. Ambagan, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14, 2015.
12. People v. Tolentino, 570 Phil. 255, 282 (2008).
13. 715 Phil. 193, 208 (2013).
14. G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015.
15. Id.
16. People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 351, 358.
17. Rollo, pp. 20-21.
18. People v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 191060, February 2, 2015, 748 SCRA 674, 682-683.
19. Rollo, pp. 21-22.
20. Fantastico v. Malicse, Sr., G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015, 745 SCRA 123, 141-142.
21. People v. Rarugal, 701 Phil. 592, 604 (2013).
22. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
23. Id.