FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 206412. July 20, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. ROMARICO V. BLAZA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 20, 2016, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 206412 — PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMARICO V. BLAZA, Accused-Appellant.
Before Us for review is the Decision 1 dated July 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03961, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision 2 dated November 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-109717 to Q-02-109719, finding accused-appellant Romarico V. Blaza 3 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of statutory rape.
Three Informations charged accused-appellant for the rape of AAA 4 allegedly committed on May 8, 11, and 22, 1992 as follows:
Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717
That on or about the 22nd day of May 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said [accused-appellant], by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undress said AAA, 9 years old, a minor, and put himself on top of her inside the house located at XXX, this City, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent. 5
Crim. Case No. Q-02-109718
That on or about the 11th day of May 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said [accused-appellant], by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undress said AAA, 9 years old, a minor, and put himself on top of her inside the house located at XXX, this City, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent. 6 AaCTcI
Crim. Case No. Q-02-109719
That on or about the 8th day of May 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said [accused-appellant], by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously undress said AAA, 9 years old, a minor, and put himself on top of her inside the house located at XXX, this City, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with her against her will and without her consent. 7
When arraigned on July 16, 2002, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, private complainant; BBB and CCC, AAA's aunts; Cristina Alfonso (Alfonso), a clinical psychologist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Neuro-Psychiatric Service (NPS); and Doctor Ida De Perio-Daniel (Dr. Daniel), the medico-legal officer who examined AAA. 8 The prosecution also submitted, among other documentary evidence, affidavits of its witnesses; NBI Disposition Form dated May 8, 2002, signed by Alfonso for Dr. Romel T. Papa, NBI-NPS Chief, stating the results of AAA's psychological examination; and Medico-Legal Report No. MG-02-314 dated April 30, 2002 issued by Dr. Daniel on her physical examination of AAA.
Below is the version of events based on the evidence of the prosecution.
DDD, AAA's mother, owned a house in which DDD lived with AAA and AAA's older sister, together with other relatives, including BBB, who is DDD's sister and AAA's aunt, and accused-appellant, who is DDD's nephew and AAA's first cousin. In May 1992, eight-year-old AAA was at home because it was summer vacation. On May 8, 1992, accused-appellant invited AAA to play in the attic. While playing wrestling, accused-appellant threw AAA on the bed and removed her shorts, saying that it was a new game. While AAA was lying on her back, accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina, causing her pain. Accused-appellant started pumping. Before he climaxed, accused-appellant withdrew his penis and masturbated until he ejaculated, splattering his semen all over AAA's private part and stomach. Accused-appellant wiped his semen off with a blanket, then told AAA that what had just happened would be their secret. AAA, who had no idea what transpired, went to the bathroom to wash her vagina as it was red and painful. The next day, AAA avoided accused-appellant out of fear.
On May 11, 1992, AAA went to the attic to get her toys. To AAA's surprise, accused-appellant was there, lying on the bed. Accused-appellant enticed AAA to play with his G.I Joe action figures. After playing for about 30 minutes, accused-appellant started touching and rubbing AAA's vagina. Accused-appellant removed AAA's panty and undressed himself. Accused-appellant asked AAA to spread her legs but AAA refused. Accused-appellant spread AAA's legs himself, lay on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. As accused-appellant was pumping, AAA could only grimace and cry in pain. Accused-appellant covered AAA's mouth with a pillow and continued pumping until he ejaculated. After accused-appellant was done with her, AAA put on her pants and locked herself in the adjacent room.
AAA was sleeping inside DDD's room on May 22, 1992 when she felt somebody touching her breasts. When she opened her eyes, AAA saw that it was accused-appellant. AAA tried to move but accused-appellant held her shoulders. Accused-appellant kissed AAA's mouth but she bit his lips. Accused-appellant removed AAA's panty, forcibly spread AAA's legs, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA tried to push away accused-appellant but she was overpowered by the latter. After ravishing AAA, accused-appellant left the room.
Two days later, AAA disclosed her ordeal to BBB saying, "Tita, tingnan mo yung ari ko. Namamaga po." AAA told BBB that her vagina was swollen, that she felt pain every time she urinated, and that there was blood in her urine. BBB asked what happened to her and AAA replied "Si Kuya Bong, ni-rape po niya ako."9 Shocked about AAA's revelation, BBB examined AAA's private parts and noticed that AAA's vagina was indeed swollen and there were hematoma on AAA's thighs and arms. BBB confronted accused-appellant the next morning, saying "Bong, alam kong may ginawa kang kalokohan. Alam mo yan, Bong. Hayup ka."10 Accused-appellant just feigned innocence. After pondering what to do considering that AAA and accused-appellant are her niece and nephew, respectively, BBB decided to keep the matter to herself. A week later, accused-appellant was sent to the province.
After nine years, on September 24, 2001, DDD received a call from the nanny asking her to come home because AAA was crying and contemplating on committing suicide. DDD asked her sister and AAA's aunt, CCC, to go to their house and check on AAA. When she arrived at the house, CCC immediately asked AAA what her problem was. AAA replied, "Why is it like this? Kung sino pa yung kamag-anak mo. Kung sino pa yung lagi mong kasama siya yung gagawa ng ganun sa iyo.'' 11 Upon CCC's prodding, AAA divulged that she had been raped by accused-appellant. When DDD also arrived at the house a few moments later, CCC relayed to her what happened to AAA. That same day, DDD called BBB who was then in Japan. BBB admitted to DDD that AAA had confided to her about being raped by accused-appellant but explained that she kept AAA's ordeal to herself because she was protecting the family. BBB called AAA on September 25 or 26, 2001. AAA was resentful to BBB, saying "Ikaw lang ang nakakaalam. Pinabayaan mo ako."12 BBB reassured AAA that she would support her if ever AAA decides to file a case against accused-appellant.
According to the NBI-NPS report, the psychological examination, evaluation, and interview of AAA "revealed no symptoms akin to psychosis or developmental disabilities," which, Alfonso explained, meant that AAA was not insane or suffering from mental retardation. Dr. Daniel, in her Medico-Legal Report No. MG-02-314, observed of AAA's hymen, "annular, estrogenized, with healed laceration, complete, at 6:00 o'clock position, base retracted"; which were "clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma." AAA and her mother next consulted a lawyer and sought the help of the NBI. EcTCAD
During its turn, the defense called to the witness stand accused-appellant himself; EEE, accused-appellant's mother; and FFF, an aunt of both AAA and accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant's defense is plain denial. Accused-appellant avowed his innocence and presented proof that he had always maintained a good relationship with AAA and her family and their other relatives.
Accused-appellant worked as a driver for AAA and her family from 1992 to 1997. Accused-appellant drove AAA to and from school. Accused-appellant pointed out that he was never confronted about AAA's alleged molestation in May 1992 and that DDD even allowed him to live in the same house with AAA and provided him with food and other necessities. Accused-appellant reasoned that if it were true that he abused AAA, he would have been kicked out of the house. Eventually, accused-appellant had to leave his job after getting married as it was his wife's wish to live in Pangasinan. 13
Accused-appellant alleged that even DDD, AAA's mother, believed he was innocent, as DDD visited him in jail several times and told him that she was no longer interested in pursuing the cases and that she would talk to the fiscal so the cases against him would be dismissed. Accused-appellant additionally averred that AAA had a boyfriend, whom he met once, and that his sister confided to him that something happened between AAA and her boyfriend and it was AAA's boyfriend who was responsible for the loss of AAA's virginity and for AAA's hymenal lacerations.
EEE and FFF corroborated accused-appellant's allegations, maintaining that there was no animosity between the families of AAA and accused-appellant. AAA's parents (DDD and AAA's stepfather) even shouldered accused-appellant's wedding expenses, with AAA and her stepfather serving as bridesmaid and principal sponsor, respectively, at accused-appellant's wedding. AAA also frequently visited Pangasinan and two photographs 14 showed AAA inside the compound in San Carlos City, Pangasinan where accused-appellant lived. Both EEE and FFF claimed that DDD likewise told them she was no longer interested in pursuing the cases against accused-appellant.
AAA died on October 4, 2003, during the course of the trial. The defense questioned the admissibility of AAA's direct testimony, arguing that said testimony should be expunged for being hearsay evidence as accused-appellant was not able to cross-examine AAA. 15 In an Order 16 dated July 20, 2005, the RTC directed that AAA's testimony be stricken from the record. However, acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration of the prosecution, the RTC issued an Order 17 dated March 9, 2006 setting aside its previous Order dated July 20, 2005 and reinstating AAA's testimony in the record of the case.
On November 28, 2008, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision, finding accused-appellant guilty as charged and imposing upon him the following penalties:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused ROMARICO V. BLAZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of the crime of Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each case. Further, in line with current jurisprudence, ROMARICO V. BLAZA is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of [AAA] the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages without need of pleading or proof. 18
Acting on accused-appellant's appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on July 27, 2012 affirming accused-appellant's conviction but modifying the civil liabilities. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88, Quezon City, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-109717-19, which found accused-appellant, Romarico V. Blaza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt on three (3) counts of Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each case is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accordingly, accused-appellant is ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim AAA in the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages and another Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00) as exemplary damages, for each of three (3) counts of rape. 19
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution 20 dated June 19, 2013, the Court directed both parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief since it had already exhaustively discussed the propriety of accused-appellant's conviction in its brief before the appellate court. Accused-appellant did not file a supplemental brief or any other pleading despite notice.
Accused-appellant bases his appeal on a lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN PLACING CREDENCE IN PURELY HEARSAY EVIDENCE. 21
Accused-appellant contends that the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which were hearsay: AAA's testimony was not subjected to cross-examination, while the testimonies of BBB and CCC on the purported rape incidents were not based on their own personal knowledge. The testimonies of Alfonso and Dr. Daniel were immaterial as they could not say when and with whom AAA had sexual intercourse. HSAcaE
In addition, accused-appellant argued that AAA's parents would not have entrusted AAA under his care and protection, allowed him to reside in the same house as AAA, continued to employ him as a driver, and given him special favors such as a grand wedding, if he had indeed raped AAA, as these would be inconsistent with normal human behavior.
Accused-appellant insisted that DDD, AAA's mother, knew that he was innocent. According to accused-appellant, the public prosecutor withdrew the presentation of DDD as a prosecution witness out of fear that DDD would tell the truth that accused-appellant did not rape AAA.
The appeal is without merit.
The rape in the case at bar were committed on May 8, 11, and 22, 1992, and accused-appellant was charged for violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to the amendments introduced by Republic Act Nos. 7659 22 and 8353. 23 Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code then provided:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
In People v. Pareja, 24 citing People v. Sanchez, 25 we set the guidelines in reviewing the factual findings and evaluation of testimonial evidence presented in courts a quo:
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts — and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." . . . .
In the instant case, the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, found that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of rape and accordingly convicted accused-appellant for three counts of rape committed against AAA.
The RTC, in its Joint Decision dated November 28, 2008, accorded weight and credence to the evidence of the prosecution, especially AAA's testimony detailing how accused-appellant raped her on three separate occasions. Pertinent portions of the RTC judgment is reproduced below:
In these cases, the prosecution has sufficiently established the fact that [accused-appellant] had carnal knowledge of [AAA], his cousin, on three (3) occasions: on May 8, 11 and 22, 1992, while still at a very tender age of eight years old. The Court gave due credence to the testimony of [AAA] who testified in a very spontaneous, candid, and straightforward manner detailing her experience as follows:
A. For the Rape committed on May 8, 1992
Q: And after he threw you on the bed, what happened next, Ms. Witness?
A: He removed my shorts madam.
Q: And after removing your shorts, what else happened, Ms. Witness?
A: I asked him what he was doing to me, ma'am.
Q: And what was his response, Ms. Witness?
A: He told me that it was a new game, ma'am.
Q: And after the (sic) responded do to you, what else happened?
A: He removed his shorts and then inserted his penis on my vagina, ma'am.
Q: And after he did that, Ms. Witness, how long did that last?
A: Until the time his sperm came out, ma'am.
Q: And after that, Ms. Witness, what did the accused do next after his semen came out? HESIcT
A: He told me it was just a secret but at that time I really didn't know what was happening and what he was doing, ma'am.
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B. For the Rape committed on May 11, 1992
Q: After you finished playing with your cousin Romarico Blaza for about 30 minutes, what happened next?
A: He started touching me.
Q: Which part of your body did your cousin Romarico Blaza who is the accused in this case touched you?
A: My vagina.
Q: How exactly did he go about doing that?
A: He was rubbing his hands on my vagina.
PROS. LLEDO:
The witness is making a motion of her right hand to and fro.
ATTY. GARCIA:
Q: Aside from Romarico Blaza touching your private part, or your vagina, with his right hand, as you illustrated, what else did he do to you?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: After he removed your panty, what else did he do next?
A: He also removed his short and brief.
Q: After accused Romarico Blaza took off his short and brief, what did he do next to you, if any?
A: He asked me to spread my legs.
Q: What did you tell him after he told you that?
A: I told him, "I don't like."
Q: When you refused to do what he told you, what did he do next?
A: He held my thighs and pulled it apart.
Q: After he was able to pull apart your thighs, what did he do next?
A: He laid on top of me and inserted his penis on my vagina.
Q: While he was inserting his penis inside your vagina, what motion did he do?
A: He was pumping in and out.
Q: When he was doing that, what were you doing meantime?
A: I cried because it was painful and I shouted.
Q: After you shouted, what was his reaction, if any?
A: Although he was terrified, he got a pillow and placed it on my mouth.
Q: Once Romarico Blaza put a pillow on your mouth, what else did he do?
A: Her continued what he was doing.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He continued pumping.
Q: And can you tell us, more or less, how long this pumping motion last?
A: Until he was able to ejaculate.
C. For the Rape committed on May 22, 1992
Q: And while you were sleeping at the room of your mother at the second floor of the house, what happened . . . what unusual incident happened Miss Witness?
A: I just felt that somebody was touching my breast.
Q: And who was this person who was . . . whom you felt was touching your breast?
A: My cousin Romarico V. Blaza.
Q: After you saw your cousin touching your breast, what happened next Miss Witness?
A: I could not move because . . . I could not move, ma'am, because [he] also held my shoulder.
Q: After he held your shoulder, what happened next Miss Witness?
A: He pressed my mouth. He was trying to kiss me. (witness is crying.)
ATTY. GINA GARCIA:
May we place on record that the witness is crying, your honor.
COURT:
All right.
ATTY. GINA GARCIA:
Q: When accused tried to kiss you in the mouth as you demonstrated with your hand, what did you do?
ATTY. RIO ESPIRITU:
Your honor, may I interrupt. I believe the sister of the complainant is inside the courtroom. May we know, your honor, if she will testify because she is one of the witnesses?
COURT:
All right. Any other prospective witness inside the courtroom? caITAC
The sister is requested to please step out for a while. The rest of the spectators are ordered out of the room except the officers of the Court.
ATTY. GINA GARCIA:
With the permission of this Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. GINA GARCIA:
Q: As you demonstrated earlier with your hands, what did you do Miss Witness?
A: I [bit] his lips.
Q: After [you] have bitten the lips of the accused, what happened next?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: After he removed your panty, what happened next Miss Witness?
A: He forced open my two (2) thighs and he inserted his penis on my private part.
Q: Now what happened when accused inserted his penis inside your private part Miss Witness?
A: He inserted his penis.
Q: How long that that last?
A: Up to the time he ejaculated.
xxx xxx xxx
Under existing jurisprudence, the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided in Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years of age at the time she was raped; proof of intimidation or force used on her, or lack of it, is immaterial. In the instant cases, it was established that [AAA] was 8 years old at the time of the incident which fact was never refuted by the defense.
Physical evidence of the assault was provided by the testimony of [BBB] who observed the bruised thighs of [AAA] and her swollen vagina. [AAA's] declarations also found support in the Medico-Legal Report containing the impression: "Clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma" which is consistent with her declaration that she was raped. Further, [AAA's] mental condition was found normal per findings of Cristina Alfonso, the Supervising Psychologist of the Neuro-Psychiatric Service of the National Bureau of Investigation as reflected in the Disposition Form she issued after psychological evaluation. AAA was found not to have symptoms akin to psychosis or developmental abilities or in simpler terms, [AAA] is not insane or suffering from mental retardation. 26
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Joint Decision of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals upheld the assessment on the credibility of the witnesses by the trial court in its Decision dated July 27, 2012, thus:
The trial court found complainant's narration of the alleged rape to be clear, convincing and straightforward. Such evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses is binding upon the appellate court, there being no showing that it was made arbitrarily, or that the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance which, if considered, could affect the result of the case. Accordingly, in resolving a rape case, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim's testimony.
Moreover, it has been held that the accused-appellant may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. As in this case, the testimony of AAA, detailing how she was raped by her own cousin, was clear, straightforward and convincing. Her narration was made with such richness of detailed specifics as only one telling the truth could do so. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
This court notes that AAA cried during her testimony. In this case, the crying eyes of AAA revealed the depth of pain and suffering she endured when her womanhood was violated by her own cousin, giving credibility to her testimony. No woman would cry rape, undergo a public trial and relate the details of her defilement, unless motivated by her quest to right an injustice done to her.
In a long line of rape cases, the Supreme Court has held that conviction for rape may ensue on the sole basis of a complainant's testimony where such testimony is found to be positive and credible. A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent is a credible witness. The candid and straightforward narration by the victim here of how she was raped, as borne out by the records and the transcript of stenographic notes, bears the earmarks of credibility. We are convinced that AAA, the complainant, is a credible witness and that her testimony is worthy of judicial acceptance. It is a settled jurisprudence that when the victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect everything that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.
Additionally, the testimony of AAA was strengthened by the medical findings of Dr. Ida De Perio-Daniel of the Medico Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Ma. Cristina Alfonso, psychologist of the Neuro-Psychiatric Service of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who both examined AAA. . . . . ICHDca
xxx xxx xxx
It is a settled rule that when the victim's testimony is corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. Also, the prosecution presented Cristina Alfonso, the supervising psychologist of the Neuro-Psychiatric Service of the NBI, to prove that after conducting a series of psychological examinations on AAA, she was not suffering from any mental disorder or psychosis. 27
Following the guidelines set in People v. Sanchez, 28 we find no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, especially the evaluation of witnesses' testimonies by said courts. AAA's testimony, particularly, deserved full credit as both the trial and appellate courts observed, she was able to narrate her painful experience at accused-appellant's hands in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and candid manner.
We cannot brush aside AAA's testimony for being hearsay just because accused-appellant was not able to cross examine AAA. Worthy of reiterating herein is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on the matter:
Records show that, prior to the death of AAA in September 2003, the prosecution presented her as the witness in three (3) separate hearings: March 31, 2003, May 7, 2003 and July 7, 2003, where she valiantly recounted the ordeal she underwent in the hands of the accused-appellant. The hearings of these cases were supposed to be continued on July 21, 2003 and August 27, 2003, where the accused-appellant had at least two (2) opportunities to cross-examine AAA, but failed to do so. The fact that the government prosecutor was not present during the aforesaid scheduled hearings did not prevent him from proceeding with his cross-examination since the private prosecutor, who was duly authorized by the Office of the City Prosecutor to appear in said cases under his direct control and supervision, was present thereat. Despite of AAA's failing health at that time, she was able to attend said dates of hearing. She only failed to attend the scheduled hearing of September 24, 2003, because she was already confined at the Philippine Heart Center.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. — All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the [direction] and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
In the case of People vs. Narca, et al., the Supreme Court held that the defense's failure to cross-examine the prosecution witness was occasioned by her supervening death. Lack of cross-examination due to the death of the witness does not necessarily render the deceased's previous testimony expungible. Thus, this Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, citing Fulgado v. CA, said that:
"The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only fault was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material loss. And more compelling so in the instant case where it has become evident that the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination but through his own fault failed to cross-examine the witness.
"Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has obtained in the direct examination."
Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine. The Supreme Court held that:
"The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the [right] of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
"The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. TCAScE
"The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has always been understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.
xxx xxx xxx
"The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make the appropriate move.
The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has always been understood as requiring, not necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. Where it has become impossible to produce again a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, as when the witness has died or is otherwise unavailable, his previous testimony in its entirety is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, particularly where the party against whom the evidence is offered had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness who gave the testimony. Besides, accused-appellant remained mute after judgment was rendered against him by the trial court. Neither did he file any petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated March 9, 2006, on the ground that there is a private prosecutor. It was only on appeal to this Court that accused-appellant averred for the first time that he was deprived of his right to cross-examine the victim AAA. It is now too late in the day for accused-appellant to do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent. 29
We stress that after AAA finished giving her direct testimony on July 7, 2003, the defense had two opportunities to conduct her cross-examination, particularly on July 21, 2003 and August 27, 2003. On both dates, AAA, assisted by the private prosecutor, was present and available for cross-examination. However, the defense counsel did not appear during the hearing on July 21, 2003 and gave no explanation to the RTC for his absence. During the hearing on August 27, 2003, the defense did not object to the postponement of the hearing because of the public prosecutor's absence. AAA died on October 4, 2003.
It is settled that while the right to confront and cross examine a witness is a fundamental right of every accused, it may nevertheless be waived expressly or impliedly. Relevant herein are our following pronouncements in People v. Escote, Jr.: 30
The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored on due process. It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. The right is a personal one and may be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. . . . .
No fault could be ascribed to the prosecution as to why AAA was not cross examined. AAA and the private prosecutor were present on the two dates when AAA was scheduled for cross-examination. The absence of the public prosecutor on said dates was irrelevant as the private prosecutor was authorized under OCP Authorization No. 30, 31 dated July 18, 2002, to handle the prosecution of Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-109717 to Q-02-109719. While it is true that OCP Authorization No. 30 was only submitted to the RTC on October 20, 2003, the private prosecutor had been actively participating in the court proceedings since accused-appellant's arraignment on July 2, 2002, without any opposition or protest from the defense. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCP Authorization No. 30 is presumed to have been regularly issued and is, thus, valid, since its issuance on July 18, 2002.
Accused-appellant made other attempts to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, but these were already satisfactorily addressed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated July 27, 2012, which we quote:
Accused-appellant insists that he should be acquitted of the rape charges because "the attitude and manifestations displayed by complainant and her relatives run contrary to the normal course of human experience."
The argument is specious.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a frightful experience. The victim's mien, rather than composure, could mean resignation, considering her continuing suffering, or apoplexy and numbness as aftermaths of her ordeal. Further, there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic experience — some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility. cTDaEH
In his Brief, accused-appellant further argues that the failure of AAA to immediately report the rape by her cousin for almost ten (10) years to her parents and to the authorities for unknown reasons casts doubt on her testimony.
We disagree.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune without loss of time to the authorities does not prove that the charges are baseless and fabricated. The victim would rather bear the ignominy and pain in private than reveal her shame to the world or risk the rapist's making good the threat to hurt her. It is not uncommon that young girls usually conceal for some time the assault upon their virtue because of the threats on their lives. Likewise, failure to immediately report a rape incident does not diminish the victim's credibility nor undermine her charge of rape. The silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is a fact of life that the victim would rather privately bear the ignominy and pain of such an experience than reveal her shame to the world or risk the rapist's making good on his threat to hurt her. It is doctrinally settled that delay in reporting a rape case due to threats is justified.
In many instances, rape victims simply suffer in silence. With more reason would a girl ravished by her own cousin keep quiet about what befell her. Furthermore, it is unfair to judge the action of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected of mature individuals under the same circumstances. . . . . 32
With regard to the non-presentation as prosecution witness of DDD, AAA's mother, suffice it to state that it was the prosecution's prerogative to ascertain, call, and limit its witnesses. The prosecution could include or exclude any witness as it might see fit. Based on the version of events established by the prosecution, DDD would not have been a competent prosecution witness for she had no personal knowledge of the rape incidents. Whatever DDD knew about the rape incidents would be based on what her daughter AAA and her sister BBB told her in 2001. Besides, if the defense truly believed that DDD's testimony was crucial in proving accused-appellant's innocence, the defense should have called or compelled DDD to testify as a defense witness through the coercive processes of the court. In People v. Silvestre, 33 we declared that:
The prosecution has discretion to decide on who to call as witness during trial and its failure to do so did not give rise to the presumption that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" since the evidence was at the disposal of both parties. If the defense believed that the testimony of Bernadette Matias was important to its case, it should have insisted on presenting her as a witness, or as the appellee points out, made a tender of excluded evidence of the witness in question under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The same may be said of Joanna Santiago, another supposed witness to the shooting, who was also not presented during trial.
Absent any ill motive, AAA's positive identification of accused-appellant as the person who defiled her deserves full faith and credence. It has been a settled doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 34 As the Court of Appeals aptly ruled in its Decision dated July 27, 2012:
In the case at bar, accused-appellant's denial cannot prevail over the positive and corroborated testimony of AAA who identified him as her malefactor. Established is the rule that a bare denial is a negative declaration which deserves no consideration and cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of the victim which is corroborated by more evidence. It cannot survive the positive identification of the malefactor by the victim. Affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative one, especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness, such as accused-appellant's own cousin. For being unproven and uncorroborated and for being inherently weak and unreliable, accused-appellant's denial must fail. 35
In sum, the prosecution was able to present proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of raping AAA on May 8, 11, and 22, 1992. Nevertheless, we declare that accused-appellant committed simple rape under Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and not statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph (3) of the same Code, as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, given that there is no proof on record of AAA's age when she was raped.
In People v. Pruna, 36 we laid down the guidelines in proving age as an element or a qualifying circumstance of a crime, viz.:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Apart from AAA's testimony, the prosecution did not offer any other documentary or testimonial evidence of AAA's age at the time that she was raped. AAA's testimony that she was eight years old when she was raped by accused-appellant does not suffice as accused-appellant made no express and clear admission about AAA's age. Hence, there is no satisfactory proof that AAA was below 12 years old in May 1992 to hold accused-appellant liable for statutory rape.
It bears to point out, however, that the three Informations filed against accused-appellant also alleged his use of force and intimidation against AAA. Evidence for the prosecution established that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through the use of force, i.e., accused-appellant threw AAA on the bed, forced AAA's legs apart, covered AAA's mouth with a pillow, and held AAA's shoulders down when AAA tried to get away. BBB was also able to recall seeing bruises on AAA's thighs and arms shortly after the rape occurred. Thus, accused-appellant should be convicted of simple rape under Article 335, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, which is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation. 37
For simple rape, the penalty is still reclusion perpetua. The monetary awards to AAA's heirs are modified and increased in accordance with the latest jurisprudence, 38 to wit: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00, as moral damages; and P75,000.00, as exemplary damages, which are all subject to six percent (6%) interest per annum from the finality of this judgment until they are fully paid. CHTAIc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03961 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Romarico V. Blaza is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of simple rape, and for each count he is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ORDERED to pay AAA's heirs the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all monetary awards herein from the finality of this judgment until they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2-35, penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz with Associate Justices Magdangal M. de Leon and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.
2. CA rollo, pp. 10-24, penned by Presiding Judge Rosanna Fe Romero-Maglaya.
3. Accused-appellant Blaza was also referred to in the record as "Bong."
4. The real name of the victim was withheld pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006).
5. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717), p. 1.
6. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109718), p. 1.
7. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109719), p. 1.
8. The testimony of Dr. Daniel was dispensed with by the trial court after the defense admitted her medical findings regarding the existence of healed hymenal lacerations, proving that AAA was no longer a virgin, but with the qualification that it was not caused by the alleged rape committed by accused-appellant Blaza. (TSN, April 11, 2007, pp. 2-6).
9. TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 11.
10. TSN, October 14, 2003, p. 10.
11. TSN, February 23, 2004, p. 9.
12. TSN, October 14, 2003, p. 12.
13. Accused-appellant Blaza got married on March 10, 1996, Certificate of Marriage (records [Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717], p. 249).
14. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717), pp. 247A-247B.
15. At the scheduled hearing held on October 14, 2003, the defense moved that AAA's testimony be stricken off the record. After hearing the oral arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the RTC directed both parties to submit their respective memorandum on the matter (TSN, October 14, 2003, pp. 5-6). Accused-appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Write-Off Testimony of AAA (records [Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717], pp. 78-81), basically alleging that he was not afforded the right to confront and cross-examine AAA before she died, hence, AAA's testimony should be stricken from the record. The prosecution, in its Memorandum (records [Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717], pp. 86-90), countered that AAA's direct examination was concluded on July 7, 2003. Thereafter, the cases were set on July 21, 2003 and again on August 27, 2003. AAA was present on both hearing dates but the defense, aware of AAA's failing health, agreed to defer the cross-examination. The prosecution posited that the defense could not claim of being denied the right to cross-examine AAA as it opted not to exercise said right when AAA was available for cross-examination.
16. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717), pp. 156-157.
17. Id. at 172-175.
18. CA rollo, p. 24.
19. Rollo, pp. 34-35.
20. Id. at 40.
21. CA rollo, p. 44.
22. An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes. (December 13, 1993.).
23. An Act Expanding the Definition of the Crime of Rape, Reclassifying the Same as a Crime against Persons, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Penal Code and for Other Purposes. (September 30, 1997.)
24. 724 Phil. 759, 773 (2014).
25. 681 Phil. 631, 635-636 (2012).
26. CA rollo, pp. 17-21.
27. Rollo, pp. 11-17.
28. Supra note 25.
29. Rollo, pp. 18-21.
30. 448 Phil. 749, 770 (2003).
31. Issued on July 18, 2002 by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. (Records [Crim. Case No. Q-02-109717], p. 84.)
32. Rollo, pp. 29-30.
33. 366 Phil. 527, 551 (1999).
34. People v. Dela Torre, 339 Phil. 1, 10 (1997).
35. Rollo, p. 33.
36. 439 Phil. 440, 470-471 (2002).
37. People v. Salazar, 327 Phil. 663, 669 (1996).
38. People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.