THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231960. January 10, 2018.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. MANUEL BISMORTE @ "MANING", accused-appellee.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 10, 2018, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 231960 (People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Bismorte @ "Maning"). — The Court:
(1) NOTES and GRANTS the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) Manifestation and Motion dated July 6, 2017 stating that when it filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari, it inadvertently and mistakenly used June 23, 2017 as the reckoning period, instead of June 28, 2017, or 15 days from notice of the assailed Court of Appeals' Resolution, and praying that such error be rectified and it be given until July 28, 2017 within which to file said petition; and
(2) NOTES:
(a) the letter dated September 22, 2017 of PIS Rufino A. Martin, MBA, Officer-in-Charge of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del Norte, confirming the confinement therein of accused-appellant since February 27, 2015;
(b) the OSG's Manifestation dated September 25, 2017 stating that it is adopting its Appellee's Brief of October 19, 2015 which was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) and dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief; and
(c) accused-appellant's Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated October 19, 2017 manifesting that he would no longer file a supplemental brief and instead, adopts all his arguments in his appellant's brief filed before the CA.
Before the Court is an Appeal under Rule 125 of the Rules of Court of the Decision 1 dated February 28, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01348-MIN, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated July 21, 2014 of Branch 39, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Polomolok, South Cotabato in Criminal Case Nos. 1320 and 1321, where accused-appellant Manuel Bismorte @ "Maning" was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was charged in an Information and a criminal complaint, which reads: 3
INFORMATION
That on or about the 21st day of May, 2001 at about midnight thereof, at x x x Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his 14 year old daughter [AAA], against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
That [on or about] 1:00 O'clock AM, May 22, 2001 at the dried creek within the pineapple plantation area, in the vicinity of the x x x province of South Cotabato, PHILIPPINES & within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a father, with delibe[r]ate intent to have carnal knowledge, by use of force and intimidation and taking advantage of the tender age of his daughter a 14-years (sic) old did, then & there forced her to lie down on the same place & again took off her upper clothing, short pant & panty, embraced her, kissed her on the lips, & to her breast went on top of her & before performed sexual intercourse, accused put saliva on his penis & to the organ of her daughter purposely to lubricate & have sexual intercourse which is against the will & wishes of the undersigned."
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each crime charged during his arraignment. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 6
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented AAA 7 as its witness, who testified that she was born in Leyte on May 23, 1987 to accused-appellant and his spouse. The spouses, however, later broke up. Thus, in April 2001, accused-appellant and his children, including AAA, transferred to Polomolok. AAA recalled leaving their mother in Leyte since she was already living with her new husband then. 8 aScITE
In the evening of May 21, 2001, AAA, along with her brother and accused-appellant, went to the house of her aunt in Asuncion Village in Polomolok to attend a relative's birthday party. They arrived at the aunt's house at around 8:30 in the evening and left three hours after. AAA and accused-appellant walked home while her brother was left in the aunt's house since he was drunk and had fallen asleep. 9
On their way home, AAA noticed that they had taken a different route heading towards a creek. Accused-appellant excreted then later gathered some leaves and placed them on the ground for them to sit on. Her father started holding her, prompting her to stand up, but he held her shoulder and started removing her shorts and panty. He then removed her shirt and sleeveless top, pushed her to the ground and lied down. AAA was frightened since accused-appellant had a "Batangas knife" with him. 10
A bit later, accused-appellant started undressing himself and placed himself on top of AAA. Helpless, she started crying, trying to fight back but her father continued with his sexual advances. He "placed saliva" on their private parts and forcibly tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but was unable to penetrate inside, although she felt pain. She also could not remove herself from him since he was holding her elbows while doing a "push and pull motion." 11
Minutes later, accused-appellant stood up and put on his clothes. AAA insisted for them to go home, but she was told to wait as it was still dark. Not long after, her father again undressed her and himself. While she tried to kick him, it was to no avail since he was holding her elbows. Accused-appellant then repeated the act of putting saliva on their private parts and started kissing her lips and breast while she was helplessly moving her head from side to side. This incident lasted for about ten minutes. Thereafter, accused-appellant left and AAA put on her clothes. Accused-appellant then sat beside her and consoled her, telling her not to worry about getting pregnant as he would give her pills and use a condom. AAA just cried. 12
AAA's testimony was corroborated by prosecution witness, BBB (accused-appellant's sister), by testifying that the former relayed to her the incidents of the rape and when the latter accompanied AAA to the police to report the incidents of sexual abuse. 13
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He specifically denied raping AAA at about midnight of May 21, 2001 and at about 1:00 in the morning of May 22, 2001. 14
Instead, accused-appellant testified that during the first incident of rape, he attended a birthday party at his brother-in-law's house in Asuncion, Polomolok, along with his son and AAA. They arrived at the party around 7:00 in the evening and at around 9:30 in the evening, they had already finished eating and drinking. Thereafter, he allegedly brought AAA to the house of CCC (his mother-in-law) after she had intimated wanting to sleep there, and left his son to sleep at the house of DDD (accused-appellant's brother-in-law). Immediately after, he went to his friend's house, where he drank more alcohol and slept. He woke up at around 6:00 in the morning on May 22, 2001, fetched AAA from CCC's house and brought her to his sister's house where they were staying to cook rice. Afterwards, he went to work. 15
Ruling of the RTC
On July 21, 2014, the trial court rendered a Decision 16 finding accused-appellant guilty for two counts of rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, accused Manuel Bismonte (sic) is hereby found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE. Accordingly, he is thus SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole for each count of rape. If warranted, he is accorded full credit of preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Further, he is DIRECTED to PAY private complainant for each of the two counts of rape (Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 1320 and 1321) an award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages conformably with People v. Araojo, G.R. No. 185203, 17 September 2009, 600 SCRA 295, 309, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.17
The trial court found credibility in the testimony of AAA, which it declared to be credible and untainted by any hint of falsehood or prevarication. 18 It ruled that AAA's testimony on both occasions of rape is worthy of credence and is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellant. AAA positively detailed the incidents of defilement and duly identified him as her abuser. The trial court observed that she never wavered in her testimony and maintained even on cross-examination that he was her rapist. 19
Accused-appellant's denial and defense of alibi were discredited by the trial court, ruling that these were refuted by AAA during her cross-examination where she related the circumstance why she did not immediately file a complaint or report the rape incidents to her aunt or the police authorities. 20 HEITAD
The trial court concluded that the elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of the RPC were present in this case.
Accused-appellant elevated the case on appeal to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 21 July 2014 Decision of RTC, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato, in Criminal Case Nos. 1320 and 1321 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant, in line with recent jurisprudence, is ORDERED to pay private complainant, for each of the two (2) counts of rape, the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% reckoned from the date of finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.21
The CA gave credence to AAA's categorical testimony, which was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC. 22 It found no merit to accused-appellant's argument that AAA's actuations after the alleged rape are totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. Instead, it ruled that neither accused-appellant aver nor did the records show that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted substantial facts or circumstances in appreciating the testimony of AAA. 23
As for the penalty, the CA modified the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, pursuant to recent jurisprudence. 24
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the CA erred in affirming the accused-appellant's conviction.
The Court's Ruling
There is no merit in the appeal.
It is settled that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court. This can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the records that the trial court had overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the result. 25 This holds particularly true on the issue of credibility of witnesses, where the trial court had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and behavior of witnesses while testifying. Thus, the trial court is in a better position to gauge their credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often conflicting evidence for both parties, 26 most especially in rape cases where, most of the time, the only witnesses are the victim and the accused.
A review of the assailed Decision shows that the appellate court committed no error in affirming the conviction of accused-appellant.
Article 266-A of the RPC provides that a rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the elements of rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC had been sufficiently established by the prosecution. Accused-appellant argues otherwise, claiming that AAA's actuations after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. The CA, however, had squarely addressed this issue in the assailed Decision, ruling thus:
However, to recap, the accused-appellant imputes doubt on AAA's credibility and on the truthfulness of the latter's testimony. In imputing the same, he argues that the actuations of private complainant after the alleged rape are totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped.
To address this argument, it is suffice to say that the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Marcos held that:
It may appear odd that AAA did not run away from her tormentor. Her conduct of staying with her tormenter and her failure to prevent the repetition of the rape incident should not be interpreted against her. She was too disturbed and too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly acts inflicted on her by the appellant. Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims. Certainly, the Court has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been violated. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. Indeed, different people act differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience. It would be insensitive to expect the victim to act with equanimity and to have the courage and the intelligence to disregard the threat made by the appellant. When a rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently. (Emphasis added) ATICcS
In the instant case, it bears noting that the private complainant was merely 13 years old at the time she was raped. Given her tender age, it would be apathetic to expect from her, after she was violated, the behavior of escaping from the oppressor as a standard under the situation. Even older women in her situation who experiences the shock of being raped would be confused on the course of action to take under the circumstances. In the first place, as previously discoursed, there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience. 27
However, We find it necessary to correct the crimes charged against accused-appellant. Based on the facts alleged in the information and criminal complaint, as well as on the facts which had been duly established during trial, accused-appellant is not only guilty for the crime of rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC.
Article 266-B of the RPC not only provides the penalties for the crime of rape, but also the aggravating or qualifying circumstances thereof, to wit:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
For the crime of rape to be qualified under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. 28
In the present case, the elements of qualified rape were sufficiently alleged in the Information and the Criminal Complaint, such that: a) the victim was 14 years old on both days of the alleged rape; and b) accused-appellant is the victim's father. These elements were also sufficiently proven by the prosecution and never denied by accused-appellant during presentation of their respective evidence. During trial, it was actually established that AAA was 13 years old during the commission of both rapes based on the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, We find that accused-appellant is guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC.
Nevertheless, We affirm the modification on the penalty made by the CA, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in the recent case of People v. Jugueta. 29
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court DISMISSES the appeal for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision as to warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction and AFFIRMS the Decision dated February 28, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01348-MIN, with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Manuel Bismorte is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, without any further modification as to the penalties imposed.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-14. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.
2. Records, pp. 39-51. Rendered by Judge Eddie R. Rojas.
3.Rollo, p. 4.
4.Id. at 4.
5.Id. at 4.
6.Id. at 4.
7. Pursuant to Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the real name of the victim shall be withheld in all cases involving violence against women and their children, and the Court shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her. In addition, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, as well those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. (See People of the Philippines v. Melchor Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 426)
8.Rollo, p. 5.
9.Id. at 5.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15. CA rollo, p. 41.
16.Id. at 39-51. Rendered by Judge Eddie R. Rojas.
17.Id. at 51.
18. Id. at 41.
19. Id. at 47.
20. Id.
21. Rollo, p. 13.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 12-13.
24. Id. at 13.
25. People of the Philippines v. Luis Antonio Garchitorena, G.R. No. 184172, May 8, 2009, citing Tommy Ferrer v. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143487, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 31, 50.
26. People of the Philippines v. Aida Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 694, 705.
27. Rollo, pp. 11-12.
28. People of the Philippines v. Jose Descartin, Jr. y Mercader, G.R. No. 215195, June 7, 2017.
29. G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.