THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244675. June 28, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ANDRES BARIRING y HILAGA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 28, 2021, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 244675 (People of the Philippines v. Andres Bariring y Hilaga). — On appeal 1 is the September 28, 2018 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. NO. 09784, affirming the Judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 21610-B which found accused-appellant Andres Bariring y Hilaga (accused-appellant or Bariring) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Accused-appellant and Renz Bariring y Bunao (Renz or co-accused) were charged with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an Information 4 that alleges:
That on or about January 7, 2011 at Cabuyao, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery and while conveniently armed with a gun, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Ernesto Capunpon on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery was in attendant (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
During arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty 6 while Renz remained at large. Thereafter, pretrial and trial ensued. The prosecution presented Amelia Capunpon, (Amelia) daughter of Ernesto Capunpon (Ernesto), while the defense offered appellant's lone testimony.
Version of the Prosecution:
On January 6, 2011 at around 4:00 in the afternoon, John Paul (Amelia's half-brother) and Mae (appellant's daughter) were playing outside Amelia's house. It was during this time that Renz witnessed John Paul push Mae which prompted him to hit John Paul on the nape while uttering, "Sige magsumbong ka sa tatay mo."7 Angered by what happened, Ernesto confronted Renz outside accused-appellant's house. This matter led to an altercation between the parties and was brought before the barangay, but was left unsettled.
On January 7, 2011, at around 7:00 in the morning, Amelia was in the sala while Ernesto was outside by the pasilyo, about three (3) meters away from her. She saw Bariring and Renz arrive and position themselves near Ernesto. Accused-appellant, while positioned behind Ernesto, held the latter's hands to prevent him from moving. On the other hand, Renz, armed with a shotgun, shot Ernesto three (3) times. Amelia rushed to her father's side, but Renz and the appellant had already fled. When she cried for help, her relatives who lived nearby came to her aid. Thereafter, they proceeded to the police to report the incident. As noted in the Medico-Legal Report, Ernesto's cause of death was due to gunshot wounds: two (2) on the head and one (1) on lower left extremity. 8
Version of the Defense:
Accused-appellant denied 9 the charge against him and raised the defense of denial and alibi.
He testified that on January 6, 2011, at 8:00 in the evening, he was already asleep with his wife in their house. 10 He woke up at 7:00 in the morning the following day, took a short walk, then went back home to take his medicine at around 7:30 a.m. For the rest of the day, he just stayed at home with his wife and children. He only learned of the complaint against him regarding Ernesto's death through the rumors circulating in their neighborhood the following day. Due to the fear of being incarcerated for a crime he did not commit, he left and hid in San Pablo for two (2) years.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
In its January 29, 2016 Judgment, 11 the trial court found Bariring guilty of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. The diapositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused ANDRES BARIRING is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As civil liability, accused is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the following: P75,000.00 for the death of the victim; P25,000 for the wake and burial expenses; P30,000 as exemplary damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 12
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Amelia who positively identified Bariring and Renz as the perpetrators of the crime. The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defenses of denial and alibi for failure to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the crime and also considering his unexplained flight which indicated guilt on his part. It also held that treachery was present because accused-appellant and his co-accused ganged up on the victim and made it impossible for the latter to defend himself or to retaliate.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 13 which was given due course by the RTC in its Order 14 dated March 3, 2016.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its September 28, 2018 Decision, 15 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC judgment, viz.:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Judgment dated 29 January 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, City of Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
He is therefore ORDERED TO PAY an increased amount of exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. He is further ordered in pay an interest at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum on all the monetary awards for damages from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. The rest of the Decision STANDS.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence, the present appeal. The issues and matters raised before the Court are the same issues raised in the appellate court there being no supplemental briefs filed.
Assignment of Errors
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF ERNESTO CAPUNPON.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT DUE TO THE SELF-SERVING, INCONSISTENT, AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF AMELIA [CAPUNPON].
III.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER [IN SPITE OF] THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE ALL OF ITS ELEMENTS.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL. 17
In sum, accused-appellant disputes the credibility of Amelia as a witness.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Credibility of the witness versus
Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution's evidence must fail for being solely based on the biased, uncorroborated, and self-serving allegations of the victim's daughter, Amelia. He also points out that Amelia was inconsistent on substantial points of her testimony, i.e., where her exact location was when Ernesto was shot and at what point in time she went outside to rush to her father. Consequently, Amelia's incredible testimony renders the existence of treachery and of the crime itself, doubtful. Accused-appellant further contests her testimony regarding the manner by which the shooting took place. He claims that if indeed accused-appellant was holding Ernesto's arms at his back, and considering that the bullet entries were in the left frontal region, right temporal region, and middle third (3rd) of the left thigh, there would have been bullet particles that could have hit accused-appellant.
This argument fails to persuade Us.
The Court adheres the long-standing principle that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will usually not disturb the findings of the trial court. 18 This is due to the fact that the trial court has the opportunity to hear the witnesses themselves and observe their demeanor while testifying, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, which could affect the outcome of the case. 19
After due consideration of accused-appellant's arguments, We find no cogent reason to depart from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court. We have held in a catena of cases that the mere relationship of a witness with the victim does not render one a biased witness or impair one's credibility. There is nothing under law or jurisprudence that disqualifies or discredits a witness by the sole reason that one is a father, 20 wife, 21 son, 22 sister, 23 cousin, 24 or any other relative of the victim, absent any showing of ill motive. 25 In fact, "the earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime." 26 Consequently, Amelia cannot be considered a biased or incredible witness by the sole reason that she is the daughter of the victim.
In his attempt to paint Amelia as an interested witness, Bariring cites the case of People v. Rodrigo. 27 However, such reliance is misplaced. The case involved an irregular photographic identification of the accused by the wife of the victim, where the accused was a stranger to the witness, viz.:
We hold it highly likely, based on the above considerations, that Rosita's photographic identification was attended by an impermissible suggestion that tainted her in-court identification of Rodrigo as one of the three robbers. We rule too that based on the other indicators of unreliability we discussed above, Rosita's identification cannot be considered as proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of Rodrigo as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
A first significant point to us is that Rosita did not identify a person whom she had known or seen in the past. The robbers were total strangers whom she saw very briefly. It is unfortunate that there is no direct evidence of how long the actual robbery and the accompanying homicide lasted. But the crime, as described, could not have taken long, certainly not more than a quarter of an hour at its longest. This time element alone raises the question of whether Rosita had sufficiently focused on Rodrigo to remember him, and whether there could have been a reliable independent recall of Rodrigo's identity.
x x x by providing only a lone photograph, complete with a name identified as the suspect, the police did not even give Rosita the option to identity Rodrigo from among several photographed suspects; the police simply confronted her with the photograph of Rodrigo as the suspect. 28 (Emphasis supplied)
This pronouncement cannot be applied in the present case as there was no photographic identification involved since the accused-appellant was identified in open court. More importantly, there is no question that the accused-appellant is Amelia's uncle. Clearly, he is no stranger to Amelia, having testified as follows:
Q: Who killed your father?
A: Renz Bariring shot my father and Andres Bariring.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: If these two accused Andres and Renz Bariring are present in court, can you identify them one by one?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point to them.
Witness pointing to a man seated third from the right on the second row, wearing yellow shirt, who when asked of this name answered Andres Bariring.
Q: How do you know he was Andres Bariring?
A: He is my uncle.
Q: How about Renz Bariring?
A: He is not here, he is in hiding.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Madam witness are you related to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact your mother is the elder sister of the accused?
A: Yes, sir. 29
Accused-appellant's argument that there were inconsistencies between her Sworn Statement and testimony in open court is also of no moment. Amelia stated in her Salaysay30 that "x x x ako ay nasa aming salas nang may narinig akong kaluskos ng tsinelas na nagmumula sa gilid ng aming pasilyo kaya ako ay agad agad na lumabas x x x at si Andy hawak hawak ang dalawang braso ng aking ama x x x at kitang kita ko na ipinutok ni Renz and baril at binaril ang aking ama at dahil sa takot ko ay tumakbo papasok sa loob ng aming bahay x x x." On direct examination, Amelia testified:
Q: When you first saw these 2 accused where were you?
A: I was in our sala.
Q: How about your father, where was he?
A: He was in the "pasilyo."
Q: How far is that pasilyo in relation to the house? Was that inside our [sic] outside the house?
A: It was outside the house.
Q: Before you went out you saw your father at the pasilyo. How far were you from your father when you saw him at the pasilyo?
A: Very near sir.
Q: Approximately how far or near?
A: Malapitan lang po, more or less 3 meters.
Q: How about these 2 accused which you mentioned, where were they?
A: There [sic] were there near my father. 31
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where were you in particular when your father was shot by Renz?
A: I was in the terrace.
Q: How far is that terrace from the place where your father was shot by Renz with the help of Andres?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to the lawyers' table which is approximately 3 meters.
Q: When Renz Bariring shot your father, what happened after that?
A: I ran outside the house and the accused were no longer there. 32
On cross examination, she stated:
Q: You only came out of the house when you heard the gunshot?
A: I heard kaluskos ng tsinelas so I went outside the house.
Q: You testified earlier the relative position of the accused. How did you know their position?
A: I saw them there. I was in the terrace of the house and after that I went out. 33
On redirect, she further said:
Q: You mentioned that when you first saw your father in the alley and you were inside the house in what particular part of the house were you when you saw them?
A: I was in the terrace.
Q: So up to the time Renz shot your father you were still in the terrace?
A: Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How did it happen that you were in the terrace?
A: Because I wanted to get out as I heard shots. 34
The alleged inconsistencies are too minor to overturn the positive identification by Amelia of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime in open court. 35 The fact of whether she was in the sala or at the terrace when she first saw accused-appellant, or whether or not she immediately went out after hearing the gunshots, are insignificant details that do not affect her testimony. Either away, she was only about three (3) meters away from accused-appellant when the crime happened, 36 making him readily identifiable. Besides, the testimonies of witnesses are not always expected to be perfect, 37 and minor inconsistencies negate the likelihood of a rehearsed testimony. 38 We held in People v. Dayaday39 that:
x x x [T]his Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. 40
Concerning accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi, we sustain the lower courts' finding that his alibi of being at home when the crime happened cannot overturn Amelia's positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. 41 For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime took place, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places." 42
In the case at bar, Amelia testified that accused-appellant is their neighbor who lives only two (2) posts away from their house. 43 Such fact was not refuted by the defense. The distance between accused-appellant's house and the place where the crime was committed discounts any physical impossibility on the part of accused-appellant to be present at the crime scene. It is also noteworthy to mention that neither accused-appellant's wife or any other witness was presented to corroborate his alibi. Absent any convincing proof that it was impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime, his defense of denial and alibi cannot hold water.
It has also not escaped Our attention that accused-appellant went into hiding for two (2) years in San Pablo after the crime took place. 44 As this Court has consistently held, flight has always been a strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility. 45 All told, Amelia's testimony heavily outweighs accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi, especially in light of the unjustified flight of the accused-appellant.
Crime and civil liability:
We agree that treachery qualified the killing of Ernesto. There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to oneself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 46
In the case at bar, accused-appellant's act of holding Ernesto's arms from behind insured the latter's killing, without causing any risk to the perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, Ernesto was left unable to defend himself. As to the other qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated for the prosecution's failure to prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow the offender time to reflect upon the consequences of the act. 47 Similarly, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated for it is considered absorbed in treachery. 48
With respect to accused-appellant's civil liability, we deem it necessary to modify the ruling of the appellate court. Murder is punishable by reclusionperpetua to death. In this case, in the absence of any other aggravating circumstance, the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua. People v. Jugueta, 49 laid down the amounts of damages when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, to wit:
a. Civil indemnity — P75,000.00
b. Moral damages — P75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages — P75,000.00
However, We note that the appellate court overlooked the award of temperate damages. 50 Thus, the heirs of the victim shall also be entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages, in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence which fixes the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages in murder cases, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court or if the amount proved is less than P50,000.00. 51
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated September 28, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 09784 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Andres Bariring y Hilaga is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00; and temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 52 aScITE
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 112-113.
2.Rollo, pp. 3-16; penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybanez and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.
3. CA rollo, pp. 56-62; penned by Judge Teodoro N. Solis.
4. Records, p. 1.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 29.
7. TSN, March 19, 2014, pp. 11-12.
8. Records, p. 9.
9.Id. at 29.
10. TSN, July 29, 2015, pp. 2-3.
11. CA rollo, pp. 56-62.
12.Id. at 62.
13. Records, p. 114.
14.ld. at 115.
15. CA rollo, pp. 3-16.
16.Id. at 14-15.
17.Id. at 35-36.
18.People v. Macandog, 411 Phil. 76, 85 (2001) citing People vs. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494 (1993) citing People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 (1979).
19.Id.
20.People v. Toyco, Sr., 402 Phil. 427, 441 (2001).
21.People v. Desalisa, 451 Phil. 869, 876 (2003); People v. Castillano, 427 Phil. 309-330 (2002).
22.People v. Callet, 431 Phil. 822, 632 (2002).
23.People v. Macandog, supra note 18 at 91.
24.People v. Cariño, 438 Phil. 771-779 (2002); People v. Daen, Jr., 314 Phil. 280-296 (1995).
25.Id.
26.People v. Toyco, Sr., supra citing People v. Realin, 361 Phil. 422-443 (1991).
27. CA rollo, pp. 13-16.
28.People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 537-540 (2008).
29. TSN, March 19, 2014, pp. 3-11.
30. Records, pp. 7-8.
31. TSN, March 19, 2014, p. 4.
32.Id. at 6-7.
33.Id. at 14.
34.Id. at 16.
35.Id. at 7.
36.Id. at 4-6.
37.People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 191759, March 2, 2020 citing People v. Alviz, 703 Phil. 58, 71-72 (2013).
38.Id. citing People v. Givera, 402 Phil. 547 (2001).
39. 803 Phil. 363 (2017).
40.Id. at 372-373 citing People v. Yanson, 674 Phil. 169 (2011).
41. CA rollo, p. 60.
42.People v. Mosquerra, 414 Phil. 740, 749 (2001) citing People v. De Labajan, 317 SCRA 566, 575 (1999).
43. TSN, March 19, 2014, p. 13.
44. TSN, July 29, 2015, p. 4.
45.People v. Cueto, 443 Phil. 425, 436 (2003).
46.People v. Lotoc, 366 Phil. 942, 955 (1999). Citations omitted.
47.Id. citing People v. Sumalpong, G.R. No. 124705, January 20, 1998.
48.People v. Lotoc, 366 Phil. 942, 955 (1999) citing People v. Violin, 266 SCRA 224 (1997).
49.People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806-856, (2016).
50.Id. at 851-853.
51.Id.
52.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).