FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 246586. October 6, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. RODEL BALBA y DELA ROSA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 6, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 246586 (People of the Philippines v. Rodel Balba y dela Rosa). — For consideration of the Court is the appeal of the Decision 1 dated September 20, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09083 which affirmed with modification the Amended Decision 2 dated February 21, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), finding the respondent guilty of qualified rape under paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.
The appeal must be dismissed.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1, of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present[.] 3
Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
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The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
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5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old[.]
In sum, the elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, of the RPC, as amended, are: (i) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (ii) the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented. If there are no aggravating/qualifying circumstances present under Article 266-B, the criminal offense is simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. If there are aggravating/qualifying circumstances present under Article 266-B, the criminal offense is qualified rape, punishable by death. However, as R.A. No. 9346, enacted on June 24, 2006, prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, the Court may no longer affirm the death sentences imposed by the courts a quo or itself impose the death penalty. In lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. 4 Moreover, persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of R.A. No. 9346, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. 5 cHDAIS
That the victim was only seven years old at the time of rape is undisputed. The only issue at hand is whether Rodel had carnal knowledge of ______. Rodel argues that the prosecution failed to prove this. Specifically, he offers the following arguments: First, the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Hernandez did not reveal any injury on ______'s genitalia. The great disparity in the age and size between Rodel and ______, who was then only seven years old, would have greatly injured her private parts or would have certainly left lacerations at the minimum. Thus, the lack of finding as to the presence of injury in the Medico-Legal Report is decisive on the lack of penile penetration. And therefore, the testimony of ______ that there was penile penetration was not credible. 6Second, the Final Medico-Legal Report, which indicates a perianal skin laceration, is highly inconsistent with the provisional Medico-Legal Report which indicated no evident injury and was prepared immediately after the examination of ______. 7Third, ______'s testimony as to the number of times she was allegedly rape is inconsistent. Her Sinumpaang Salaysay states that she was raped twice by Rodel: the first time was after she arrived home from school, and the second time after she took her bath, just after the first rape incident. However, on trial, she contradicted herself and stated that she was only raped once, and that she was not raped after she took her bath. 8Fourth, there appeared to be a discrepancy as to the alleged dates of the commission of the rape. The criminal informations state that the alleged rape happened on January 25, 2015. The Sinumpaang Salaysay appears to indicate that the incident happened on January 22, 2014. The testimony of _________________, to whom ______ spoke with on January 21, 2015, appeared to reveal that the rape incident happened on January 19, 2015.
The Court is not persuaded.
The absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse, for the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum constitutes carnal knowledge. Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible. A medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction for rape is proper. 9
The foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. 10
In this case, the conviction of Rodel is based primarily on the credibility of the testimony of ______ who testified in a clear, positive and straightforward manner that Rodel raped her. Rodel's argument that the Medico-Legal Report did not reveal any injury on ______'s genitalia is contradicted by the clear statement of ______, who testified that: "Yung ari nya po pinasok nya po roon sa ari ko tapos po nagdugo." 11 ______ clearly and straightforwardly narrated the incident of rape, as follows:
Q: Tapos pagdating mo sa bahay, nandoon si Tito Rodel nakaupo sa kama, anong ginawa ni Tito Rodel sa iyo?
A: He first defecated.
Q: Tapos, pagkatapos nyang tumae anong sumunod na ginawa nya?
A: Tinulak nya po ako sa kama.
Q: Tapos pagkatulak sa iyo sa kama ni Tito Rodel anong ginawa niya sayo?
A: He held both my hands.
Q: Tapos noong hinawakan nya yung dalawang kamay mo anong sumunod na ginawa ni Tito Rodel?
A: He removed my uniform.
Q: Pagkatanggal ng uniform mo anong ginawa ni Tito Rodel na sumunod?
A: He removed also my sando.
Q: After he removed your sando what happened next?
A: He also removed my skirt.
Q: Tapos, pagkatanggal ng palda mo, ano ang sumunod na tinanggal ni Tito Rodel.
A: My shorts.
Q: And after your shorts, ano pa ang sumunod na tinanggal ni Tito Rodel?
A: Boxer.
Q: Kaninong boxer?
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A: Tito Rodel removed my panty-boxer which was given to me by Tita Aleli.
Q: Tapos pagkatanggal ni Tito Rodel 'nung short mo at panty-boxer mo na bigay ni Tita Aleli, what did Tito Rodel do next?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: After Tito Rodel removed your panty, what did he do next?
A: He also removed his clothes.
Q: After Tito Rodel removed his clothes, what did he do next?
A: He removed his shorts.
Q: After Tito Rodel removed his shorts, anong sumunod na tinanggal nya?
A: Brief.
Q: After Tito Rodel removed his brief, what did he do next?
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A: Yung ari nya po —
Q: Lakas-lakasan mo. Sige na, lakasan mo para marinig namin kasi isusulat doon e. Kapag hindi namin narinig, hindi maisusulat doon. Sige na, para marinig. Maisulat 'yung kuwento mo. Tayo lang naman ang may alam 'nun. Walang ibang makakaalam.
A: Bawal po sabihin.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Do not force.
(The child witness is whispering to the Public Prosecutor)
Q: O sige lakasan mo. Okay na. Narinig ko na. Sige lakasan mo. Ulitin mo lakasan mo.
A: 'Yung ari nya po —
Q: Sige na, sige na, sige na. Sige lakasan mo na. Hindi kasi makukuha ni ate. 'Yung?
A: 'Yung ari nya po pinasok nya po roon sa ari ko tapos po nagdugo. 12
This clear, positive and straightforward testimony of the victim is sufficient to establish carnal knowledge of ______ by Rodel.
With respect to the discrepancy in the number of times ______ was allegedly raped, this does not contradict the fact that ______ was raped at least once. ______'s Sinumpaang Salaysay states that she was raped twice by Rodel: the first time was after she arrived home from school, and the second time after she took her bath, just after the first rape incident. However, on trial, she contradicted herself and stated that she was only raped once, and that she was not raped after she took her bath. 13 However, in both versions of the incident, there was at least one incident of rape, and the inconsistency between the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the testimony on trial does not negate the fact of carnal knowledge. The RTC had already acquitted Rodel in respect of the alleged second incidence of rape, and thus, the count/s of rape is no longer in issue. ISHCcT
It must be noted that two criminal informations were filed against Rodel: one for the rape incident occurring before, and one for the rape incident occurring after, ______ took a bath. Here, the inconsistencies between the Sinumpaang Salaysay and ______'s testimony in court are not contradicting with respect to the first incident of rape. It is only with the second alleged incident of rape that ______'s testimony no longer supports the Sinumpaang Salaysay. However, insofar as the first incident of rape is concerned, both the Sinumpaang Salaysay and ______'s testimony are materially consistent. This is why the trial court convicted Rodel under the first information, but not under the second information.
Moreover, inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness with regard to minor or collateral matters do not diminish the value of the testimony in terms of truthfulness or weight. Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-victim narrates the details of a harrowing experience like rape. Such inconsistencies on minor details are in fact badges of truth, candidness, and the fact that the witness is unrehearsed. These discrepancies as to minor matters, irrelevant to the elements of the crime, cannot, thus, be considered a ground for acquittal. 14
With respect to the alleged discrepancies in the dates of the commission of the rape, We rule that this is not a valid ground for acquittal. The exact date of the sexual assault is not an essential element of the crime of rape. What should control is the fact of the commission of the rape or that there is proof of the penetration of the female organ. 15 The only elements of rape that are relevant to the instant case are (i) carnal knowledge of a woman, and (ii) the fact that the woman is under 12 years of age. A slew of cases have discussed the elements of such a crime, and the time and date of its commission are not one of these elements.
In People v. Ceredon, 16 We held that in rape cases, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The date or time the rape was committed is not an essential ingredient as it is the carnal knowledge through force and intimidation (or, in this case, the fact that the woman is under 12 years of age) that is the gravamen of the offense. It is, thus, sufficient that the date of commission alleged is as near as possible to the actual date. 17
In People v. Bunagan, 18 We reiterated that the exact date of the sexual assault is not an essential element of the crime of rape; what should control is the fact of the commission of the rape or that there is proof of the penetration of the female organ. 19
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated: 20
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
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Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information. 21
In the instant case, the first information states that the alleged rape happened on January 25, 2015. The Sinumpaang Salaysay appears to indicate that the incident happened on January 22, 2014. The testimony of ____________, to whom ______ spoke with on January 21, 2015, appeared to reveal that the rape incident happened on January 19, 2015. Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, the conviction of Rodel does not depend on the date and time the rape was committed but on the credibility of ______, whom the trial court found to have testified in a clear, straightforward, and consistent manner. Her testimony outweighs Rodel's weak defense of denials and alibi. He may be convicted on the sole testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, a factor which exists in the present case.
Having established the fact of rape, We now come to determine whether the same constitutes simple rape or qualified rape under Article 266-A or Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. CAacTH
As discussed above, the facts constituting rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, have been established: (i) Rodel had carnal knowledge of ______, and (ii) ______ is under 12 years of age. However, We find that the prosecution failed to prove any applicable qualifying or aggravating circumstance under Article 266-B, which provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
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5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old[.]
Neither of these two circumstances have been established nor are applicable. First, with respect to the circumstance under item (1), while it is true that the minority of ______ is undisputed, Rodel was never established as parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of ______. The only reason Rodel was living with ______ was because he was the best friend of ______'s mother, and that he started living with ______'s family sometime in 2005 because his house was demolished. 22 In fact, ______, the aunt of ______, stood as guardian of AAA when the case was filed. 23 The family of ______ was in financial distress and Rodel contributed to their upkeep. 24 Rodel also acted as ______'s godfather when she was baptized. 25 These circumstances do not prove that Rodel is a step-parent, guardian, or common-law spouse of the parent of ______. These circumstances are not sufficient to establish the common-law relationship (if any) between Rodel and ______'s mother. Moreover, the aggravating or qualifying circumstance under item (1) was not alleged in the criminal information.
Second, with respect to the circumstance under item (5), ______ was alleged in the information to be "a minor 7 years old," a fact which remained undisputed on appeal. The requirement under item (5) is "the victim is a child below (7) seven years old." The word "below" denotes that the child has not reached her seventh birthday. A child who is established to be seven years old has already reached her seventh birthday, and thus is no longer "below seven (7) years old." Accordingly, this circumstance does not apply to the case.
In summary, We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court and appellate court that this is a case of qualified rape. Instead, We hold Rodel guilty of statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), of the RPC, as amended.
This being a case of statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), of the RPC, as amended, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua. We thus modify the penalty imposed by the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, to the effect that Rodel is sentenced to suffer a penalty of "reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole." The penalty should only be reclusion perpetua. The use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole" is only applicable in cases where the death penalty should be imposed were it not for Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346). This is in line with A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC which reads:
(1) In cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no need to use the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua; it is understood that convicted persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole; and
(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. 9346, the qualification of "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346.
Consequently, as this case warrants only a conviction of simple rape, rather than qualified rape, the applicable civil liabilities of the offender for simple rape, pursuant to People v. Jugueta26 and People v. Tulagan27 are as follows: (i) civil indemnity of P75,000; (ii) moral damages of P75,000; and (iii) exemplary damages of P75,000.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed September 20, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED, in that Rodel Balba y Dela Rosa is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay ________________________________ the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages and P75,000 as exemplary damages.
The foregoing civil liabilities shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (now a retired member of the Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob; rollo, pp. 3-17.
2. Penned by Judge Roberto P. Quiroz (now a Justice of the Court of Appeals); CA rollo, pp. 74-93.
3. Emphasis supplied.
4. Section 2, R.A. No. 9346.
5. Section 3, R.A. No. 9346.
6.Rollo, p. 60.
7.Id. at 61.
8.Id. at 62-63; TSN dated June 2, 2015, p. 17.
9.People v. Baltazar, 358 Phil. 1023, 1036 (2000).
10.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 236562, September 22, 2020.
11. CA rollo, p. 60; TSN, June 2, 2015, p. 15.
12. TSN, June 2, 2015, pp. 12-15.
13.Id. at 62-63; TSN, June 2, 2015, p. 17.
14.People v. DDD, G.R. No. 233323, August 26, 2020.
15.People v. Bunagan, 579 Phil. 271, 276 (2008).
16. 566 Phil. 536, 558 (2008).
17.People v. Aboganda, 603 Phil. 1, 10 (2010), citing People v. Ceredon, 566 Phil. 536, 558 (2008).
18.Supra.
19.People v. Aboganda, supra, citing People v. Bunagan, supra.
20. Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sections 6 and 11.
21. See People v. Delfin, 738 Phil. 811, 817 (2014).
22.Rollo, p. 5.
23.Id.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 6.
26. 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).
27. G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.