SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232366. September 15, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs. SALIK ATAO y SAMPULINA and POLEX DAUP y MARI, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 15 September 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232366 (People of the Philippines v. Salik Atao y Sampulina and Polex Daup y Mari). — On appeal is the December 11, 2015 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05898, which affirmed the June 13, 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 53, in Criminal Case Nos. 08-259330, 08-259331, and 08-258879 finding accused-appellants Salik Atao y Sampulina (Salik) and Polex Daup y Mari @ Flex (Flex) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Factual Antecedents:
Flex was charged in an Information dated January 11, 2008 with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, which alleges:
Criminal Case No. 08-258879:
That on or about January 03, 2008, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with another whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts is still unknown and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell to a poseur-buyer ZERO POINT EIGHT TWO NINE (0.829) gram and ZERO POINT EIGHT ONE SIX (0.816) gram of white crystalline substance placed in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic marked as DAID-1 and DAID-2, respectively, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as "SHABU," a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 3
Salik was likewise charged on January 31, 2008 under two separate Informations with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 08-259330:
That on or about January 3, 2008, the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with POLEX DAUP y MARI who is also charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53 under Criminal Case No. 08-258879 and mutually helping each other, not being lawfully authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport, or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell or attempt to sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport, or distribute ZERO POINT EIGHT TWO NINE (0.829) grams of white crystalline substance commonly known as SHABU, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 4
Criminal Case No. 08-259331:
That on or about January 3, 2008, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT EIGHT ONE SIX (0.816) gram of white crystalline substance known as SHABU, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law. 5
Both Salik and Flex pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution:
On January 3, 2008, SPO1 Jerry Velasco (SPO1 Velasco) reported for duty at the office of the Manila Police District (MPD) District Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Group (DAID-SOG) when a confidential informant told him that a certain alias "Flex" was selling prohibited drugs in the city of Manila. According to the informant, she was waiting for a call from Flex regarding a drug transaction involving P2,000.00 worth of shabu. 7
On the basis thereof, the police officers conducted a briefing to plan a buy-bust operation, where they designated SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos (SPO1 Ramos) as the team leader, PO1 Arthur Cordero (PO1 Cordero) as the poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Velasco, PO1 Archie Bernabe (PO1 Bernabe), and PO2 Modesto Bornel (PO2 Bornel) as back-up operatives. 8 Further, the team prepared the buy-bust money 9 and coordinated with Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). 10
Once the informant received the call that the delivery of the drugs would take place in Anda Circle, along Bonifacio Drive corner 13th St. in Port Area, Manila at 4:00 pm of the same day, the police officers, together with the informant, proceeded to go to the target area. 11 Upon arriving thereat, PO1 Cordero and the informant waited for Flex at the tricycle terminal while the back-up operatives strategically positioned themselves at a distance of about 10 meters from PO1 Cordero and the informant's location. 12
A few moments later, the buy-bust team saw Flex driving and arriving in a yellow tricycle with Salik seated in the passenger's side. 13 The informant then approached the appellants and introduced PO1 Cordero as the purported buyer of the shabu. PO1 Cordero told Flex that he would pay only after seeing the item. Flex conversed with Salik in a local dialect, and afterwards, Salik took out from a cigarette pack one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing suspected shabu and handed it over to Flex, who then gave the same to PO1 Cordero. In exchange therefor, PO1 Cordero gave Flex the supposed payment. 14 After examining the sachet, PO1 Cordero lit a cigarette, which was the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the police officers to apprehend the appellants. 15
Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, the other police officers immediately rushed to the scene. PO2 Bornel assisted PO1 Cordero in arresting Flex and recovered from the latter the buy-bust money. On the other hand, SPO1 Velasco and PO1 Bernabe apprehended Salik. 16 PO1 Velasco frisked Salik and recovered from his pocket a cigarette pack which contained a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance. 17
After apprising appellants of their constitutional rights, the police officers brought them to their office for investigation. 18 Once they arrived, PO1 Cordero marked the sachet of shabu that he recovered from Flex with "DAID-1." Meanwhile, PO1 Velasco marked the other sachet recovered from Salik with "DAID-2" while the cigarette pack itself was marked as "DAID." 19
Thereafter, SPO2 Eduardo Pama (SPO2 Pama) prepared a Memorandum Request for Laboratory Examination and brought the seized drugs to the crime laboratory on the same day. Upon a positive finding by the forensic chemist, PS/Inspector Elisa G. Reyes, that the evidence confiscated from appellants were indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), the police officers proceeded to file the Informations against them. 20
Version of the Defense:
Salik, the lone witness for the defense, vehemently denied the accusations against him. He testified that on January 3, 2008, at around 8 o'clock in the morning, he and his companion were on the way to Divisoria, Manila, when they took a brief stop at the Petron Gasoline Station near South Harbor for gasoline. 21 While at the gas station, SPO1 Velasco, SPO1 Ramos, and SPO2 Pama approached Salik and asked for his license. Salik obeyed the officers' request and was subsequently told that his license had already expired. Thus, they brought Salik to the precinct located at UN Avenue, Manila and detained him. 22 SPO1 Velasco asked Salik to give him P50,000.00 in exchange for his freedom; however, Salik failed to do so as he did not have any money. Salik was then made to sign a Counter-Affidavit without the assistance of a lawyer and without knowing the contents thereof since he did not know how to read. He only found out that he was charged with violating RA 9165 when he was brought to court. 23
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:
In its June 13, 2012 Decision, the RTC found Salik guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 while Flex was found guilty of violating Section 5 of the same law. The trial court disregarded the defense of denial raised by Salik and instead gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It held that all the elements of the crimes were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The RTC thus ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In criminal Case No. 08-259330, finding accused SALIK ATAO y SAMPULINA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay fine in the amount of P500,000.00.
2. In Criminal Case No. 08-259331, finding accused SALIK ATAO y SAMPULINA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 11(3), Article II, Republic Act 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Twelve(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years, as maximum, and to pay fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 08-258879, accused, POLEX DAUP y MARI @ FLEX GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay fine in the amount of P500,000.00.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED. 24
Appellants' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in an Order dated September 17, 2012, 25 where the trial court reiterated its previous ruling that the elements had been duly proven by the prosecution. Additionally, it held that non-compliance with the chain of custody rule outlined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest illegal or the items inadmissible, considering that the prosecution was able to establish that the drugs seized from the appellants had been properly preserved. 26
Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, Salik and Flex elevated the case to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The CA denied the appeal in its December 11, 2015 Decision. It ruled that the prosecution successfully established the elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs for both Salik and Flex as well as the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous drugs on the part of Salik. 27 Moreover, the appellate court held that non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 was not necessarily fatal considering that the prosecution succeeded in proving that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were duly preserved. 28 It also upheld the validity of the buy-bust operation and gave credence to the narration of the prosecution witnesses since they are police officers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Ultimately, the CA found no convincing reason to disturb the RTC's findings. 29 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant APPEAL is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated June 13, 2012 in Criminal Case Nos. 08-259330-31, as to SALIK ATAO Y SAMPULINA's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II and violation of Section 11(3), Article II of Republic Act 9165, and Criminal Case No. 08-258879, insofar as accused-appellant POLEX DAUP Y MARI's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 30
Subsequently, appellants Salik and Flex filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 31 Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, 32 and Prayer for Justice with Mercy. 33 However, the appellate court denied the same for lack of merit in a Resolution dated November 8, 2016. 34
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The sole issue to be resolved in the present case is whether appellants are guilty of violating the provisions of RA 9165.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, this Court finds the appeal meritorious and resolves to reverse the ruling of conviction. Accordingly, herein appellants are acquitted of the crimes charged.
Inconsistencies of the
For an accused to be successfully convicted for the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Meanwhile, in instances wherein an accused is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, three elements ought to be proved by the prosecution, namely: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession was not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 35
Basic is the rule that in criminal prosecutions, an accused is presumed to be innocent of the charge laid against him until and unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the duty and burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. 36
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. What is only required is moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution so fails to meet the required amount of evidence, logically, the defense need not even present evidence on its behalf, such that the presumption of innocence prevails and the accused should be necessarily acquitted. 37
Here, the prosecution failed to overcome such presumption when it presented inconsistent versions of what transpired during the buy-bust operation.
In the Affidavit of Poseur-Buyer 38 submitted by the prosecution, it was narrated that PO1 Cordero saw Salik take the plastic sachet of shabu from his cigarette pack and give the same to Flex, who subsequently handed it over to PO1 Cordero. 39 PO1 Cordero also stated that he gave Flex the buy-bust money in exchange for the drugs. 40 After signaling to the other Police officers that the sale had been consummated, the back-up operatives came to assist PO1 Cordero in apprehending the appellants. 41 According to the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension, 42 PO1 Cordero and PO2 Bornel were the ones who arrested Flex, while SPO1 Velasco and PO1 Bernabe apprehended Salik, where they found and recovered another plastic sachet containing shabu from Salik's person. 43
However, the above statements were contradicted by PO1 Cordero himself when he testified and asserted that: a) he took the sachet of dangerous drugs from Salik; b) gave Salik the buy-bust money; and c) arrested Salik with the assistance of PO2 Bornel:
Q: After Salik and Polex conversed in Muslim dialect, what happened next?
A: After they have talked Polex got something from his cigarette pack and handed it over to Salik Atao.
Q: What did Salik Atao do with the item handed by Polex Daup?
A: Salik Atao handed to me the item and then I gave him the money. 44
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Q: After you lighted a cigarette, what did you do?
A: I immediately arrest[ed] Salik Atao, sir.
Q: What did you do to Salik Atao?
A: As I arrest[ed] Salik Atao, it was PO3 Modesto Bornel [who] assisted [me] and then I recovered the buy-bust money from Salik Atao. 45
To make matters worse, PO1 Cordero failed to correctly identify Flex and Salik during his testimony:
Q: Will you please look around and point to us if the said alyas Flex and alyas Salik [are] inside this room?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Point to us first this alyas Flex.
Interpreter:
Witness is standing and pointing to a third person seated on a back row beside the female person who when asked to stand up and stated that his name is SALIK ATAO Y SAMPULINA.
Q: How about his companion?
A: Eto po sa dulo, sir. Si Salik.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person in yellow t-shirt who when asked to stand up identified himself as POLEX DAUP Y MARI.
Witness:
Excuse me, sir. Nalito lang po ako. Pero kilala ko po silang dalawa. Ayun po si Salik Atao at yun naman po si Polex Daup.
Court Interpreter:
Witness corrected the identification of the two (2) accused. 46
Though PO1 Cordero was quick to correct his mistake, SPO1 Velasco also made the same apparent error when it was his turn to take the witness stand on a different date:
Q: Will you please look around inside this room and point to us that said alias Flex if he is present?
A: Siya po. Pang-apat po sa last row.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person wearing yellow shirt who when asked his name identified himself as Salik Atao Y Sampulina.
Q: Now so where did he come from again Mr. Witness?
A: Umikot po sa may Anda Circle.
Q: No. What I mean [is] where did he alight from the vehicle?
A: He is the one driving the tricycle Your Honor. 47
Further, SPO1 Velasco also contradicted the statements found in the police officers' Joint Affidavit of Apprehension that he, together with PO1 Bernabe, arrested appellant Salik and recovered from his person a plastic sachet containing shabu, apart from the one which was the subject of the alleged sale. During his testimony, he claimed to have arrested Flex, not Salik:
Q: Now you said that after you saw the poseur buyer made signal, you proceeded to the place and arrested a certain person. If that person whom you arrested is inside this room right now, will you be able to recognize him?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Will you please point to that person?
A: Yung pangatlo po sir sa last row.
Court Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a male person whom when asked his name identif[ied] himself again as Polex Daup Y Mari.
Q: After you arrested this accused Polex Daup what did you do?
A: I saw one pack of cigarette inside the right pocket of the suspect sir.
Q: How did you able to recover the plastic pack of cigarette?
A: I frisked the suspect sir.
Q: And what was the contents of the cigarette?
A: When I examined it I saw one (1) plastic sachet with white crystalline substance inside the cigarette pack sir. 48
Meanwhile, PO2 Bornel who also testified for the prosecution stuck to the narrative found in the affidavits. 49 The clear inconsistency in the overall presentation of facts is fatal to the prosecution's case. It creates doubts as to whether the drug transaction really occurred or not. In the same manner, the inconsistency relating to whom SPO1 Velasco retrieved the other plastic sachet of shabu, whether from Salik or Flex, is fatal to the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, considering that it is not clear who between the two appellants was actually carrying it in his possession. Although the defense of denial used by the appellants is said to be weak, such cannot relieve the prosecution of the obligation to present proof beyond reasonable doubt that an illegal sale and possession actually took place. 50
Further, it has not escaped our attention that the narration of events that the police officers gave in their affidavits or testimonies is also inconsistent with what was provided in the Information filed against Flex on January 11, 2008. To recall, the said Information states:
That on or about January 03, 2008, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with another whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts is still unknown and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell to a poseur-buyer ZERO POINT EIGHT TWO NINE (0.829) gram and ZERO POINT EIGHT ONE SIX (0.816) gram of white crystalline substance placed in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as DAID-1 and DAID-2, respectively, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as "SHABU,'' a dangerous drug. 51
From this, it can be gleaned that at the time the Information was filed against Flex, his co-conspirator was not yet arrested and his real identity was not yet known. However, based on the prosecution's account, Flex and Salik were simultaneously apprehended. Additionally, while the Information stated that two sachets were supposedly sold by and recovered from Flex, PO1 Cordero testified that only one was obtained from him during the buy-bust (which was the subject of the illegal sale), while the other was found in Salik's possession. 52
It has been repeatedly held that inconsistencies and discrepancies referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not weaken the witnesses' credibility. If the cited inconsistency has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, it cannot be considered as a ground to reverse a conviction. 53 However, it is an altogether different story when the inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses refer to material details pertaining to the events that transpired in the buy-bust operation — in which case, such inconsistencies can overturn the judgment of conviction. 54 Here, the inconsistencies in the narration of the police officers touched on the very elements of the crimes charged, i.e., the identities of the accused, who sold or delivered the dangerous drug and accepted the payment therefor, and who was discovered to be in possession of the prohibited drug.
The Court does not agree with the CA's conclusion that the inconsistencies are not material enough to acquit the appellants. 55 We are not convinced with the appellate court's explanation that the officers' failure to correctly identify the appellants "may be attributed to the circumstance that six months had passed since the time of the arrest of the accused-appellants and taking into consideration the number of cases handled by police officers." 56 To subscribe to such a view may set a dangerous precedent. While it is understandable to forget minor and inconsequential details due to the passage of time, police officers should still be expected to remember material details with regard to the cases they are dealing with, especially if it concerns the very elements of the crime. They cannot be given the leeway to overlook such vital information as it can gravely affect the outcome of the case. Moreover, if the buy-bust operation truly happened, the police officers could at least be familiar or somehow remember the accused by their faces, considering that, here, PO1 Cordero came face to face with Flex and Salik during the purported drug transaction for a considerable amount of time and SPO1 Velasco also had the opportunity to directly see and come in contact with Salik when he arrested, frisked, and read to him his constitutional rights.
At this juncture, we also point out that the Court does not support the CA's opinion that if the charges were false or simply made up, "it was odd that . . . the record was bereft of any indication as to the filing of administrative or criminal charges against the police officers." 57 As far as this Court is concerned, the filing of such complaints is not and has never been considered as proof that the appellants committed the offenses charged.
From the foregoing, the prosecution's failure to establish with moral certainty all the elements of the crime as well as to identify the accused as the perpetrator connote that it failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence that every accused enjoys in a criminal prosecution. When this happens, as in this case, the courts need not even consider the case for the defense in deciding the case; a ruling for acquittal must therefore ensue. 58
The buy-bust team failed to
Apart from committing the above-discussed inconsistencies with regard to material points surrounding the events that transpired during the buy-bust operation, the police officers are likewise guilty of committing several errors in the procedure laid down in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, casting serious uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti.
In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally sold or possessed by the accused is the same substance presented in court. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labelling, and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. 59 By requiring the prosecution to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the illegal drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime, the evils of switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence are to be avoided. 60
Thus, in both Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession and sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 61
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which covers the rule on the handling and custody of dangerous drugs, states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x 62
In the present case, the police officers bewilderingly failed to comply with the procedures and requirements provided under the said law, as dearly depicted in the following testimonies of PO1 Cordero, SPO2 Pama, and SPO1 Ramos:
Q: During the arrest, Mr. Witness and recovery of illegal substance, did you make an inventory of such illegal substance?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about photograph of the illegal substance in front of the accused?
A: No, sir. We did not take.
Q: Is there a representative of any government agency like the Department of Justice during the arrest, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.
Q: How about any elected official like Brgy. Official, is there a coordination with them?
A: None, sir.
Q: Are you familiar with RA 9165, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about Sec. 21 paragraph 1 of the same law, are you familiar with that?
A: Only a part of it, sir regarding the inventory of the evidence recovered.
Q: Is it safe to say that you are not familiar of Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165?
A: I have only little knowledge of it, sir.
Q: That is the law that you are implementing, Mr. Witness, will you agree with me, Mr. Witness that Republic Act 9165 Sec. 21, Paragraph 1 is the law you are implementing and you failed to implement, correct?
A: Yes. 63
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Q: I will repeat my question, Your Honor. Listen carefully, Mr. Witness. During your investigation in the office of DAID, is it not that there was no photograph of illegal substance taken at the place of arrest presented to you, correct?
A: Yes, sir. The arresting officers did not present any picture to me, sir.
Q: No inventory also of the illegal substance signed by the elective official during the arrest and prepared during the arrest presented to you during the investigation, correct?
A: There was no inventory presented to me, sir. 64
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Q: During the arrest Mr. Witness, immediately after that, after the seizure and confiscation of illegal substance, did you make inventory?
A: No more, sir.
Q: During the arrest, did you take photograph of the illegal substance together with the accused?
A: No, sir.
Q: Is there any representative from media and DOJ during the arrest of the accused?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about elected public official who [is] to sign the inventory?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you familiar with Republic Act 9165 Sec. 21 paragraph 1, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not comply, Mr. Witness, correct?
A: Yes, sir. 65
Based on their testimonies, it is painstakingly obvious that the arresting officers failed to photograph and prepare an inventory of the seized items in the presence of a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and any elected public official, as distinctly required by the law.
The evident purpose of requiring the apprehending officers to conduct an inventory and to take photographs is to ensure that the identity of the drugs seized from the accused are the drugs for which he would be charged. Any discrepancy should therefore be reasonably explained and accounted for, otherwise, the regularity of the entire seizure procedure would be put into question. 66 Here, the break in the chain of custody and the lack of justification therefor effectively tainted the integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; thus, the very identity of the seized drugs became highly questionable.
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the police officers did not immediately mark the contraband after seizing the same from the appellants since the markings were only done when they transferred to their office. 67 It is also not apparent from the records why they transferred to their office instead of marking it at the place of apprehension and if the markings were made in the presence of Salik and Flex.
In People v. Dahil, 68 this Court noted that the act of marking, though not explicitly found in RA 9165, is a separate and distinct step from the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the said law. Nonetheless, long before Congress had passed RA 9165, the Court had consistently ruled that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. 69
In People v. Lumaya, the Court explained the significance of marking:
According to case law, "the first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value." To note, "marking upon immediate confiscation has been interpreted to include marking at the nearest police station, or x x x the office of the apprehending team." 70
In Zarraga v. People, 71 the police failed to place markings on the alleged seized shabu immediately after the accused were apprehended and likewise failed to prepare an inventory of the seized drugs. As such, the Court held that the prosecution was not able to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. 72
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence in the case before us, we hold that there is serious doubt as to whether the sachets of drugs purportedly found in appellants' possession were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination and presented as evidence in the trial court.
It also bears stressing that the buy-bust team did not secure the presence of the three required witnesses. Given the fact that a buy-bust operation is, by its very nature, a planned activity, it strains credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured their presence pursuant to Section 21. 73
Considering the absence of all three insulating witnesses, there were no unbiased witnesses to prove the veracity of the events that transpired on the day of the incident, whether the said buy-bust operation actually took place, or whether the drugs presented in court were the ones actually seized from the accused.
How the buy-bust team could have omitted these basic and vital steps in the initial handling of the seized drugs is truly baffling. Also, their nonchalant admission of their limited knowledge of Section 21 is quite alarming. A cursory reading of the said law shows that there is nothing overly complicated, demanding, or difficult therein. 74 All that law enforcers have to do is follow Section 21's instructions. They do not even have to profoundly intellectualize their actions. 75 Here, the police officers' utter disregard for Section 21 by not even bothering to conduct an actual inventory, take pictures, or secure the presence of third-party persons to ensure the integrity of their self-proclaimed marking raises grave doubts not only on the integrity of the allegedly seized items, but even on their own. 76
Given such procedural missteps, this Court is left with absolutely no guarantee of the integrity of the sachets other than the self-serving assurances of the police officers. This is precisely the situation that the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act seeks to prevent. The very process that Section 21 requires is supposed to be a plain, standardized, even run-of-the-mill, guarantee that the integrity of the seized drugs and/or drug paraphernalia is preserved. 77 Compliance with Section 21 is especially important in instances where only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is involved, such as in this case. As enunciated in People v. Holgado:78
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives."
xxx xxx xxx
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. 79
From the foregoing, the prosecution's admitted, unexplained, and unjustified disobedience and deviation from the prescribed process under Section 21 is fatal to their cause.
The saving clause does not apply
The Court has recognized that depending on the varying field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be plausible. Given this, it has been ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in the said law does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. 80
Nevertheless, this is with the caveat that it is still necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. 81 Jurisprudence is replete with the doctrine that the prosecution has the positive duty to explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. 82 As the Court explained in People v. Reyes: 83
Under the last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that not every case of non-compliance with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of custody will irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's case against the accused. To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or explanation would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the Prosecution did not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token justification or explanation for them. The failure to justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused deserves acquittal. 84
In the present case, the prosecution did not prove, much less allege, any specific reason to explain the police officers' deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The multiple unexplained breaches seriously cast doubt upon the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs and give rise to the probability that the seized evidence may have been compromised while under police custody.
All told, the prosecution failed to justify why the chain of custody was not properly complied with, thereby militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of regularity
In light of the glaring inadequacies and flagrant procedural lapses that the police committed in handling the seized drugs, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot be invoked in this case.
A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute which authorizes the performance of an act or duty, or which prescribes a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption can only be made to apply if there is nothing in the records that would suggest that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law. Consequently, where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. 85
In the case at bar, given the evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody that was previously discussed, the lower courts were manifestly incorrect when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. To reiterate, these lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 86
In view of all the foregoing, this Court finds that the prosecution miserably failed to discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Salik and Flex. Thus, their acquittal is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The December 11, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05898 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Salik Atao y Sampulina and Polex Daup y Mari @ Flex are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for some other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is DIRECTED to report to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution the action he has taken. Let entry of final judgement be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED." (J. Rosario designated as additional Member per Special Order No. 2835 dated July 15, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 136-154; penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam (now a retired Member of the Court) and Francisco P. Acosta.
2.Id. at 20-25; penned by Presiding Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra.
3. Records, Vol. II, p. 1.
4. Records, Vol. I, p. 2.
5.Id. at 4.
6.Id. at 40; records, Vol. II, p. 27.
7. Records, Vol. I, p. 18.
8. CA rollo, p. 21.
9. Records, Vol. I, p. 18.
10. CA rollo, p. 21.
11. Records, Vol. I, p. 18.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 19.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19. CA rollo, p. 139; TSN, February 2, 2009, p. 24.
20.Id. at 139.
21. TSN, October 3, 2011; pp. 4-9.
22.Id.
23.Id.
24. CA rollo, pp. 24-25.
25.Id. at 74-75.
26.Id.
27.Id. at 144-145.
28.Id. at 146-147.
29.Id. at 148-153.
30.Id. at 154.
31.Id. at 159-177.
32.Id. at 182-196.
33.Id. at 199-210.
34.Id. at 220-221.
35.People v. Cabrellos, G.R. No. 229826, July 30, 2018.
36.People v. Clara, 715 Phil. 259, 273 (2013).
37.Id.
38. Records, Vol. I, p. 18.
39.Id.
40.Id.
41.Id.
42. Records, Vol. I, p. 19.
43.Id. at 19.
44. TSN, July 21, 2008, pp. 11-12.
45.Id. at 12-13.
46.Id. at 10-11.
47. TSN, February 2, 2009, p. 18.
48.Id. at 21-23.
49. TSN, July 14, 2008, pp. 10-11.
50. People v. Clara, supra note 36, at 278.
51. Records, Vol. II, p. 1.
52. TSN, July 21, 2008, p. 15.
53.People v. Clara, supra note 36, at 279.
54.Id. at 278.
55. CA rollo, p. 151.
56.Id. at 150.
57.Id. at 153.
58.People v. Que, 824 Phil. 882, 899-900 (2018), citing People v. Kamad, 624 Phil. 289 (2010).
59.People v. Garcia Miranda, G.R. No. 218126, July 10, 2019.
60.People v. Baptista, G.R. No. 225783, August 20, 2018.
61.People v. Que, supra note 58, at 898, citing People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 401 (2010).
62. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, Article II, Sec. 21; Emphasis supplied.
63. TSN, July 21, 2008, pp. 27-28.
64. TSN, August 11, 2008, pp. 9-10.
65. TSN, September 1, 2008, pp. 17-18.
66.People v. Lumaya, 827 Phil. 473, 487 (2018).
67. CA rollo, p. 138; TSN, February 2, 2009, p. 24.
68. 750 Phil. 212 (2015).
69.People v. Dela Victoria, 829 Phil. 675, 688 (2018), citing People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015).
70.People v. Lumaya, supra note 66, at 489-490.
71. 519 Phil. 614 (2006).
72.People v. Que, supra note 58, at 901-902, citing People v. Magat, 588 Phil. 395-407 (2008).
73.People v. Claudel, G.R. No. 219852, April 3, 2019.
74.People v. Que, supra note 58, at 912.
75.Id. at 907.
76.Id. at 912.
77.Id. at 907.
78. 741 Phil. 78 (2014).
79.People v. Que, supra note 58, citing People v. Holgado, 741 Phil. 78 (2014).
80.People v. Claudel, supra note 70.
81.Id.
82.Id.
83. 797 Phil. 671 (2016).
84.People v. Claudel, supra note 73, citing People v. Reyes, 797 Phil. 671 (2016).
85.People v. Que, supra note 58, at 899.
86.People v. Salonga, 717 Phil. 117, 130 (2013).