People v. Anuengo y Lugod

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 249257. July 28, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAZON ANUENGO y LUGOD, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 28, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 249257 (People of the Philippines v. Jazon Anuengo y Lugod).

After a review of the records, this Court resolves to DISMISS the appeal for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its May 31, 2019 Decision 1 as to warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.

Jazon Anuengo y Lugod (appellant) was charged with the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in an Information dated May 6, 2013, which reads:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 2013, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one DAN PAUL HERRERA y MANABAT, by then and there stabbing him, hitting him on his NECK, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said DAN PAUL HERRERA y MANABAT.

Accused planned the commission of the crime prior to its execution until its commission and consciously adopting sudden and unexpected models of attack upon the victim to ensure that victim will not be able to defend himself thus, accused committed the attending circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

Essentially, the elements of murder are: (i) that a person was killed; (ii) that the accused killed him or her; (iii) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 of the RPC; and (iv) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 3

All these elements were present in the instant case. First, the prosecution was able to prove that the victim, Dan Paul Herrera y Manabat (Herrera), was killed by the fatal stab wound in his neck.

Second, the prosecution was likewise able to prove that appellant killed Herrera. In fact, in raising self-defense, appellant admitted that he stabbed Herrera which resulted in the latter's death.

Third, the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself/herself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 4 "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow." 5

To substantiate its allegation of treachery, the prosecution must prove: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. 6

Here, both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA found that treachery attended appellant's attack on Herrera. The CA held:

Soriano categorically testified that he and Herrera were watching people playing billiards when [appellant] suddenly emerged from behind and then stabbed Herrera at the right side of his neck with a kitchen knife. At that instance, Herrera was not given the chance to defend himself or repel the assault coming from accused-appellant. 7

Lastly, the killing committed by appellant was neither parricide nor infanticide.

To escape criminal liability, appellant invokes self-defense to justify the killing of Herrera. Appellant claims Herrera accosted him and extorted money from him. When he resisted, Herrera pushed him and immediately pulled out a knife. Appellant claimed that the push caused a laceration on his right foot. He fought back to defend himself, grappled with Herrera for the possession of the knife and, in the process, he was able to stab Herrera with the same knife which Herrera used to attack him.

An admission of self-defense frees the prosecution from the burden of proving that the accused committed that act charged against him or her. The burden is shifted to the accused to prove that his or her act was justified:

It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. 8

For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be appreciated in the accused's favor, the accused must prove the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 9

It bears noting that unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense. For every plea of complete and incomplete self-defense, the accused must establish the concurrence of the three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (i) there must have been a physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the attack or assault must be unlawful. It must be proven that the aggression caused by the victim put the accused's life in a real and grave peril. 10

In the instant case, the Court agrees with the findings of the CA that Herrera's act of pushing and simply pulling out a knife cannot be considered as unlawful aggression as there was yet no actual risk or peril to the life or limb of appellant. 11 It is settled in jurisprudence that the mere drawing of a knife by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression. In People v. Escarlos, 12 the Court explained that in such act, the danger sought to be avoided is merely speculative:

In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their argument. Appellant adds that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the weapon and used it to stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the circumstances, he was legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to wait for the knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defend himself would be asking too much, he argues.

The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated the confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that the former was subjected to an unlawful aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase.

The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.

Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative. 13

Moreover, appellant rests his entire defense on his sole and uncorroborated testimony. He claims that he sustained a laceration on his right foot but the records are bereft of any evidence to prove the same. Surely, appellant's lone testimony cannot be considered as clear and convincing proof that he acted in self-defense. 14 Thus, in the absence of unlawful aggression attributable to Herrera, appellant's claim of self-defense is unavailing.

Both the RTC and the CA gave full credence to Jeffrey Soriano's unwavering eyewitness account of the incident. He positively testified that appellant suddenly appeared from behind Herrera, then stabbed the latter at the right side of his neck with a kitchen knife. His credible testimony was, thus, sufficient to support a verdict of conviction against appellant.

In this jurisdiction, the assessment of credibility is best undertaken by the trial court since it has the opportunity to observe evidence beyond what is written or spoken, such as the deportment of the witness while testifying on the stand. 15 Hence, the RTC's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses are binding and conclusive on the reviewing court, especially when affirmed by the CA, as in this case. 16

As to the penalty, the Court agrees with the CA and the RTC in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with the provisions of Art. 248 of the RPC, in relation to Art. 63 of the same code.

Moreover, consistent with People v. Jugueta, 17 the CA correctly ordered appellant to pay the heirs of Herrera the amounts of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages. In addition, temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded in lieu of actual damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The May 31, 2019 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09462 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Jazon Anuengo y Lugod is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Dan Paul Herrera y Manabat the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as temperate damages with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-13; penned by Associate Justice Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.

2.Id. at 4.

3.People v. Archivido, G.R. No. 233085, September 21, 2020.

4.Id.

5.Id.

6.People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020.

7.Rollo, p. 11.

8.People v. Antonio, supra note 6.

9.Id., citing Belbis v. People, 698 Phil. 706, 719-720 (2012).

10.People v. Archivido, supra note 3.

11.Rollo, p. 10.

12. 457 Phil. 580 (2003).

13.Id. at 596, as cited in People v. Raytos, 810 Phil. 1007, 1018-1019 (2017).

14.People v. Docay, G.R. No. 233479, October 16, 2019.

15.Id.

16.Id.

17. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).