SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 212927. September 29, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RANDY ANDES1y RAMOS, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Special First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 212927 (People of the Philippines v. Randy Andes y Ramos). — This is a Motion for Reconsideration 2 of the Court's Resolution 3 dated August 14, 2019 dismissing the appeal of Randy Andes (accused-appellant) for failure to sufficiently prove that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed reversible error in rendering its Decision 4 dated October 25, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05701. The CA affirmed the Decision dated May 29, 2012 of Branch 39, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, finding accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. 5
The Antecedents
Accused-appellant was charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs in an Information 6 that reads:
That on or about October 6, 2007, at around 4:40 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon, more or less, at Barangay Calero, City of Calapan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal authority nor corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, transport or distribute to a poseur-buyer, PO1 ALMA F. DELA PENA, methamphetamine [sic] hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, weighing 0.070 gram, more or less.
Contrary to law. 7
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 8
Trial on the merits ensued. 9
On October 5, 2007, Police Officer 1 Alma F. Dela Peña (PO1 Dela Peña) was on duty at the Calapan City Police Station when an "asset" tipped off the police authorities that a certain Danilo Cabagay (Cabagay) was engaged in the illegal trading of dangerous drugs. A buy-bust operation was planned wherein PO1 Dela Peña was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer, while Police Officer 3 Jomer Rodil (PO3 Rodil), Police Officer 2 Gruet Mantuano (PO2 Mantuano), Police Officer 2 Virgilio Rosales, Avelino Masongsong, and Police Officer 3 Reden Dueñas were designated as backup. PO1 Dela Peña prepared the boodle money consisting of one P500.00 bill and ten P50.00 bills. 10
Later in the afternoon, the buy-bust team went to Brgy. Calero and strategically positioned themselves near the residence of Cabagay. PO2 Mantuano coordinated with Barangay Councilor Romeo Gargullo (Barangay Councilor Gargullo). Thereafter, PO1 Dela Peña and the asset proceeded to the intersection near Luzdelmar Resort. A man, later identified as the accused-appellant, approached them and asked what they needed. When PO1 Dela Peña and the asset informed accused-appellant that they were on their way to see Cabagay to buy shabu, accused-appellant told them that they cannot go directly to Cabagay. At that point, PO1 Dela Peña handed the boodle money to the asset who, in turn, gave it to accused-appellant. Accused-appellant then went inside the house of Cabagay. When accused-appellant came out, he handed to the asset a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in the presence of PO1 Dela Peña. Thereafter, the asset turned over the item to PO1 Dela Peña. Suddenly, someone shouted, "may pulis!" Accused-appellant immediately ran towards the back portion of Cabagay's house. PO2 Mantuano and the other members of the backup team saw accused-appellant running towards them and tried to stop him. 11
The police officers eventually arrested accused-appellant behind the Luzdelmar Resort. They frisked him and recovered from him the boodle money consisting of one P500.00 bill and eight of the ten P50.00 bills, as well as a fan knife. PO2 Mantuano turned over the boodle money and the fan knife to team leader SPO2 Roberto Andres, Sr. (SPO2 Andres). They apprised accused-appellant of his Miranda rights and later brought him back to where the sale transaction took place. Thereat, PO1 Dela Peña marked the small plastic sachet subject of the sale with her initials, "AFD." She also photographed all the confiscated items, while SPO2 Andres conducted the inventory in the presence of the buy-bust team, accused-appellant, Irish Vallada, a media representative from TV Net, and Barangay Councilor Gargullo. The inventory of confiscated/seized items was signed by PO3 Rodil, PO2 Mantuano and Irish Vallada, with the annotation, "refused to sign Barangay Councilman Romeo Gargullo." 12
After qualitative examination, the seized 0.070 gram white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu. Furthermore, the laboratory tests conducted on the urine sample of accused-appellant also showed positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride. 13
For his part, accused-appellant denied the charges against him. He alleged that he went to Barangay Calero, Calapan City on October 6, 2007 to borrow a ping-pong set from a certain Ka Unyong Dimayuga. He was walking on a small passageway when he saw several men in civilian clothes and in possession of firearms walking towards his way. He noticed that the men were looking for someone and that one of them was holding a document. The men proceeded to a house where another man came out. Suddenly, two men grabbed him and asked where he came from. He explained that he was looking for the house of a friend, but the men forced him to go with them at the police station. 14
On May 29, 2012, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged. It decreed as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused RANDY ANDES y RAMOS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged in the aforequoted [I]nformation and in default of any modifying circumstances attendant, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, with the accessory penalties provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if any.
The 0.070 grams [sic] of "methamphetamine hydrochloride" (shabu) subject matter of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED. 15
The RTC held that the prosecution had sufficiently established all the elements of the offense charged: (1) that accused-appellant delivered the prohibited drug to the confidential agent and to PO1 Dela Peña after the latter gave the marked money; (2) that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody and had accounted for all the persons who handled the seized drugs from the time it was turned over to PO1 Dela Peña until its presentation in court; (3) that the inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant do not negate the existence of the elements of the offense; and (4) that accused-appellant failed to show proof in support of his alibi. 16
On appeal, the CA upheld accused-appellant's conviction. 17
In the Resolution 18 dated August 14, 2019, the Court affirmed the CA decision.
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed the present Motion for Reconsideration. 19
In his motion, accused-appellant reiterated that the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165 and the inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses should warrant his acquittal. 20
In its Comment, 21 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that accused-appellant failed to give any compelling reason to disturb the Court's resolution dismissing his appeal. 22
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the Motion for Reconsideration. 23
The main issue in this case hinges on the determination of whether the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were all satisfied, and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized shabu were duly preserved by complying with the requirements provided under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 24 The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence, and that there must be an unbroken chain to establish the corpus delicti. 25
Jurisprudence identified four critical links in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs, to wit: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 26 The purpose of the chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. 27 To avoid any doubt, the prosecution must show the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence. 28
In Mallillin v. People, 29 the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody, viz.:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 30
In order to avoid planting, tampering, substitution, and contamination of the confiscated substance, Section 21 (a), Article II of RA 9165 provides for the manner by which law enforcement officers should handle the seized items in dangerous drugs cases. This law was later amended on August 7, 2014 by RA 10640. 31
The law requires that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the confiscated drugs must be conducted immediately after seizure. Moreover, the law directs that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official; 32 or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media. 33 Evidently, before the amendment of RA 9165, three witnesses are required to be present during the inventory and photography of the seized items. After the law's amendment, only two witnesses are required to be present. The presence of these witnesses is intended to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. 34
In People v. Tomawis, 35 the Court explained the rationale of the law in requiring the presence of these witnesses; thus:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-bust conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused." 36
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds that the prosecution utterly failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged as it failed to demonstrate that the police officers observed the three-witness rule.
The offense charged was purportedly committed on October 6, 2007 when RA 9165 was not yet amended. Thus, the three-witness rule applies in the instant case.
Records would show that there was no representative from the DOJ to witness the inventory. To make things worse, the elected public official, Barangay Councilor Gargullo, testified that he refused to sign the inventory receipt because he did not know where those items came from. 37 Media representative Irish Vallada also declared that she did not personally see the seized items and that she simply affixed her signature thereto without personally examining them. 38 It is worthy to note that the requirement of securing the presence of an elected public official, a member of the DOJ, and a member of the media is not a mere surplus that may be dispensed with by the apprehending team. The requisite serves a vital purpose, that is, to protect the accused against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. 39
In fact, the prosecution failed to satisfactorily show that the apprehending team exerted honest-to-goodness efforts to secure the presence of the DOJ representative to witness the conduct of inventory and photography of the confiscated items.
The Court cannot merely gloss over the glaring lapses committed by the police officers, especially when what had been allegedly seized from accused-appellant was only 0.070 gram of shabu. Recent cases have highlighted the need to ensure the integrity of the seized drugs in the chain of custody when only a miniscule amount of drugs was allegedly seized from the accused. 40
Indubitably, accused-appellant should not be deprived of his freedom. With the prosecution's pieces of evidence pointing to accused-appellant's acquittal, the Court is given sufficient reasons to put into serious question the identity of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from him. While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellant to be presumed innocent and cannot itself constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. This presumption of regularity remains just like a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. 41
By failing to follow the three-witness requirement under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the police officers cannot be presumed to have regularly exercised their duties during the buy-bust operation. The blatant violations committed by the law enforcers cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, the Court will be giving the law enforcers a license to abuse their power and authority, defeating the purpose of the law, violating human rights, and eroding the justice system in this country.
Although it is well settled that non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses, 42 records disclose that no plausible explanation was forwarded by the prosecution as to why there was no representative from the DOJ during the inventory and photography of the allegedly confiscated shabu. Neither was it proven by the prosecution that the police officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of the required witness. The failure to follow the three-witness requirement under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 was completely ignored and left unjustified by the prosecution.
The evidence of accused-appellant may be weak and uncorroborated; however, this cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the circumstances shown to exist yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused for the evidence does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. 43
The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of seized drugs will not secure a conviction. In drugs cases, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. 44
In light of the above disquisitions, the identity of the object of the sale not having been adequately established, the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant based on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and SETS ASIDE the Resolution dated August 14, 2019. The appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 25, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05701 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Randy Andes y Ramos is hereby ACQUITTED.
The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City is ORDERED to: (a) cause the immediate release of Randy Andes y Ramos, unless he is being held in custody for any other lawful reason; and (b) inform the Court of the action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. aScITE
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Erroneously referred to as "Andres" in some parts of the rollo.
2.Rollo, pp. 49-58.
3.Id. at 41-48.
4.Id. at 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.
5.Id. at 15.
6. As culled from the CA Decision, id. at 4.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 4-5.
11.Id. at 5-6.
12.Id. at 6-7.
13.Id. at 7.
14.Id. at 8.
15.Id. at 8-9.
16.Id. at 44.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 41-48.
19.Id. at 49-58.
20.Id. at 49-56.
21.Id. at 62-66.
22.Id. at 62-63.
23.Id. at 49-58.
24.People v. Yagao, G.R. No. 216725, February 18, 2019.
25.People v. Sipin, 833 Phil. 67, 79-80 (2018).
26.People v. Belmonte, 835 Phil. 719, 737 (2018).
27.People v. Alboka, 826 Phil. 487, 502 (2018), citing People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21, 29 (2017). See also People v. Andrada, 833 Phil. 999, 1010 (2018).
28.People v. Belmonte, supra at 744.
29. 576 Phil. 576 (2008).
30.Id. at 587.
31. Entitled "An Act to Further Strengthen the Anti-Drug Campaign of the Government, Amending for the Purpose Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, Otherwise Known as the 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,'" approved on July 15, 2014, and which took effect on August 7, 2014.
32. Section 21 (1) and (2), Article II of RA 9165.
33. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640.
34.People v. Alconde, G.R. No. 238117, February 04, 2019.
35. 830 Phil. 385 (2018).
36.Id. at 408-409.
37.Rollo, pp. 50-51.
38.Id. at 51-52.
39.People v. Callejo, 832 Phil. 881, 900 (2018).
40.People v. Del Mundo, 818 Phil. 575, 588 (2017).
41.People v. Cantalejo, 604 Phil. 658, 668 (2009), citing People v. Cañete, 433 Phil. 781, 794 (2002) and Mallillin v. People, supra note 29.
42.People v. Alconde, supra note 34.
43.People v. Santos, Jr., 562 Phil. 458, 473 (2007), citing People v. Samson, 421 Phil. 104, 122 (2001) and People v. Batoctoy, 449 Phil. 500, 521 (2003).
44.People v. Villojan, Jr., G.R. No. 239635, July 22, 2019, citing People v. Hementiza, 807 Phil. 1017, 1038 (2017). See also People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 403 (2010).