THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 245393. November 10, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. NOLI ALATA y NASURADA, accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated November 10, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 245393 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee v. NOLI ALATA y NASURADA, accused-appellant.) — This Court resolves the appeal filed by Noli Alata (Alata) assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision 2 convicting Alata of rape under Article 266-A 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
In a June 7, 2011 Information, Alata was charged with raping then 13-year-old AAA 4 as follows:
That in [sic] or about and during the period comprised between May 25 and 28, 2011, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation commit sexual abuse upon the person of AAA, a minor, 13 years old, assisted by Nilda del Rosario, Social Worker III and Rowena Dinglas, Community Affairs Officer II, by then and there undressing her and thereafter covering her mouth, punching her on the stomach and tying her hands with a garter, pushing her on a bed and went on top of her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with AAA, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Law. 5
On arraignment, Alata pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial and trial then ensued. 6
The prosecution presented private complainant, AAA, and medico-legal officer, Dr. Merle Tan, among others, as witnesses. Taken together, their testimonies tended to prove the following version of the facts.
Orphaned by her mother, AAA worked as a babysitter for the child of a certain Menchie and Totoy. 7
Between May 25 to 28, 2011, at about 8:00 a.m., AAA was left alone with the child she was babysitting because Menchie and Totoy were at work. While babysitting and sweeping their room, Alata barged in. Without warning, he attacked AAA and slapped her in the face several times, using both his hands to shove her inside the room. AAA tried to defend herself by kicking Alata, but this did not deter him from attacking her. She eventually fell unconscious from Alata's repeated beatings. 8
When AAA regained consciousness, she found herself naked, with her hands and feet tied to the bed and her vagina bleeding and painful. 9 At this time, only the three-year-old child whom AAA was babysitting was present. Alata was no longer in the room, but the three-year-old child witnessed what happened and told AAA that accused inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. 10 Thereafter, Menchie and Totoy accompanied AAA to the police station to file the complaint against Alata. AAA then gave her statement to Police Officer III Rascaridad Azares. 11
On June 3, 2011, Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) conducted an ano-genital examination on AAA. Dr. Tan found that AAA had healed lacerations at her vagina's 4 and 9 o'clock positions, which might have been caused by an insertion of a blunt object. Dr. Tan also found perennial skin healed laceration at the 12 and 9 o'clock positions of AAA's anus which could have been caused by an insertion of something hard, noting that the laceration in her anus was still swollen. 12 CAIHTE
Alata solely testified for the defense, mainly denying the accusation against him. He claimed that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA between May 25 and 28, 2011 because he fetched his partner at that time. Neither could he physically hurt AAA because he was suffering from a disability, particularly on his right hand, which was deformed. 13
In a March 4, 2016 Decision, 14 the Regional Trial Court convicted Alata as charged. After determining that AAA had a low intelligence quotient (IQ), the trial court said that AAA could not have fabricated a story and relay it in detail if it were not true. 15 It also rejected Alata's denial and claim of deformity because, according to the trial court, "lust turns a [person] into a [superhuman] . . . capable of doing anything which ordinarily [they] could not do, just to satisfy [their] lustful desire." 16 Thus, the trial court disposed of the case in this wise:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused NOLI ALATA y NASURADA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is ordered to indemnify his victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED." 17
The Court of Appeals affirmed Alata's conviction. It found that Alata failed to successfully impeach AAA's straightforward testimony, calling his submissions "off-tangent." 18 AAA's evidence was primarily circumstantial because she was unconscious during the commission of the crime. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals found that the pieces of collateral facts established an unbroken chain of established circumstances, enough to prove that Alata indeed raped AAA.
The Court of Appeals further rejected Alata's argument that the lacerations on AAA's vagina should have been fresh — not healed — considering that the medical examination was done on June 3, 2011, which was just a few days after AAA's alleged rape on May 25 to 28, 2011. The Court of Appeals said that the presence of healed lacerations does not mean that AAA was not raped, because "hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of defloration." 19
Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals refused to believe that Alata's deformed hand prevented him from slapping and then raping AAA. The Court of Appeals cited the trial court when it said that Alata could have very well learned how to utilize his right hand despite its deformity. 20 As to the lack of evidence of injuries that should have resulted from the alleged slapping, the Court of Appeals emphasized that this "did not discount the fact that [Alata] was responsible for AAA's [rape]." 21
With nothing but denial to oppose AAA's positive identification of Alata, the Court of Appeals gave credence to her testimony. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' May 31, 2018 Decision 22 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant APPEAL is hereby DENIED. Nonetheless, the Decision dated March 4, 2016 in Criminal Case No. 11-283966 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 9, is hereby AFFIRMED with modification insofar as the payment of exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 in addition to the award of moral damages and civil indemnity. Further, the civil indemnity and damages imposed are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 23
Thereafter, Alata filed his Notice of Appeal on June 25, 2018. 24 In an April 8, 2019 Resolution, 25 this Court noted the records, allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs, and required the Chief Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, to confirm to this Court of Alata's confinement there.
In a July 16, 2019 Manifestation, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, indicated that all matters and issues raised in the December 22, 2016 Appellant's Brief had already been discussed in the April 11, 2017 Appellee's Brief. However, it reserves its right to file a Supplemental Brief in case Alata will raise new matters and issues in his own supplemental brief. 26
In a separate July 19, 2019 Manifestation, Alata indicated that he will no longer file a Reply. 27
In a September 9, 2019 Resolution, this Court noted the separate manifestations of both parties, as well as the letter of the Chief Superintendent. 28
The issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Noli Alata y Nasurada is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. Subsumed in this issue are the following: first, whether or not AAA's testimony was credible; and second, whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting accused-appellant's alibi.
Accused-appellant maintains that AAA's testimony was not credible. For one, she had no evidence of injuries on her face when she alleged that accused-appellant punched and slapped her on the face several times. Another is that her evidence against accused-appellant is merely circumstantial, with AAA only testifying to the fact that it was accused-appellant who rendered her unconscious. DETACa
As to AAA's claim that accused-appellant tied her hands, accused-appellant insists that he could not have done so due to his deformed right hand with three missing fingers. With respect to the lacerations found in AAA's vagina, accused-appellant points out that they were healed lacerations, negating the allegation that she was raped between May 25 to 28, 2011. If it were true that she was raped on those dates, accused-appellant argues that the lacerations found in AAA's vagina should have been fresh, considering that the medical examination was conducted on June 3, 2011, which was a little over a week after the alleged rape.
Lastly, accused-appellant contends that the trial court and the Court of Appeals should not have discounted his alibi, especially since the prosecution's case against him is weak.
The People of the Philippines counters that accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, with all the elements of rape having been "proven with moral certainty through AAA's spontaneous, categorical, and straightforward testimony." While it is true that AAA's testimony mainly consisted of circumstantial evidence, the pieces of evidence are nevertheless credible and sufficient to prove that accused-appellant indeed raped her. Given AAA's minority and low intellect, she could not have fabricated a detailed story of how she was raped.
Further, as for the deformity of accused-appellant's right hand, the People of the Philippines argues that it is only a flimsy excuse, especially since it could not have rendered accused-appellant incapable of punching and slapping AAA. As for the lacerations, the argument is allegedly "immaterial[,] as the nature and extent of genital trauma or injury is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape."
With respect to accused-appellant's denial and alibi, the People of the Philippines argues that the defense "fails in light of AAA's positive testimony and identification of him as the one who attacked and raped her." Furthermore, accused-appellant failed to prove that he was far enough from the place of the crime that it would have been impossible for him to commit the crime charged.
Lastly, the People of the Philippines argues that the award of moral damages and civil indemnity should be increased from P75,000.00 each to P100,000.00, in light of this Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta. 29
The appeal is dismissed.
As stated in People v. Feliciano, Jr., 30 "[a]s a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and credence on review." 31 This is because "[t]he trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct[,] and attitude on the witness stand." 32 Thus, this Court accords great respect to the Regional Trial Court's findings, 33 especially when it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 34 The exception to this rule is when both or any of the lower courts "overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected the outcome of the case." 35
A careful examination of the records does not show anything that would warrant a reversal of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals' decisions.
Mainly, accused-appellant alleges that it was physically impossible for him to have slapped or punched AAA because of his birth defect — his deformed right hand. 36 As if not incredulous enough, he added that it was impossible for him to tie AAA up because his right hand is missing three fingers. The Regional Trial Court was correct in ruling that the deformity on accused-appellant's hand does not render him incapable of tying up, slapping, and punching AAA repeatedly. 37 Further, at 27 years old, he had already learned to utilize his hands despite the deformity. 38
Accused-appellant's claim that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime because he was "fetching his partner at the time," 39 does not persuade this Court. Though, in the case of Lejano v. People, 40 this Court had occasion to discuss that:
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye. 41
However, it has been repeatedly held that to establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (1) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 42 Further, this Court ruled that: aDSIHc
"Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed." 43 (Citation omitted)
Here, the defense neither offered the partner's testimony — whom accused-appellant was allegedly fetching — nor was there any assertion as to the actual place where accused-appellant was allegedly in at the time of the crime. As such, there was no evidence offered to establish the physical impossibility. On the contrary, it was sufficiently proven that AAA and accused-appellant lived in the same house, and that accused-appellant knew AAA. Ultimately, accused-appellant's defense of denial shattered in the face of AAA's positive identification that, indeed, accused-appellant sexually violated her, as can be seen in her testimony. 44
Accused-appellant also alleges that there was no way that AAA could have validly identified him as the assailant because she was unconscious. 45 On this matter, the Court of Appeals correctly held that direct evidence was not the only means of proving rape beyond reasonable doubt, but circumstantial evidence as well. 46
The following pieces of relevant collateral facts established the commission of rape, that: (1) accused-appellant was in the vicinity when AAA was cleaning her employer's house, in fact, he lived upstairs from AAA's employer; (2) accused-appellant suddenly entered the room and slapped AAA; (3) the force generated from the slap rendered AAA unconscious; (4) when AAA regained consciousness, she observed that she was naked and that her wrists and feet were tired; and (5) AAA felt pain in her vagina. 47
It also does not escape this Court's attention that the three-year-old child that AAA was babysitting told her that accused-appellant inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. 48 There is no showing of any ill-motive as would impel a three-year-old child to concoct false claims against accused-appellant.
Moreover, in People v. Nuyok, 49 this Court held that:
[A]n accused . . . can be declared guilty of rape even if the sole witness against him was the victim who had been rendered unconscious at the time of the consummation of carnal knowledge provided sufficient circumstantial evidence existed showing that the victim was violated, and that it was the accused and no other who had committed the violation. To disallow such showing is to obstruct the successful prosecution of a rapist who renders his victim unconscious before the consummation. 50 (Citation omitted)
Accused-appellant insists that the presence of healed lacerations, as reflected on the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Merle P. Tan, negated the claim of rape. 51 According to him, if indeed there had been penile penetration, then AAA's wounds should have been fresh when examined a few days after the incident, as opposed to the actual findings that the wounds were healed. 52
However, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the medical finding actually supported AAA's testimony of rape. 53 Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. When a rape victim's consistent and forthright testimony is consistent with medical findings, as in this case, the essential requisites of carnal knowledge are deemed to have been sufficiently established. 54
All told, accused-appellant was correctly convicted of simple rape as defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, and was correctly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Consequently, he must pay AAA the following: (1) P75,000.00 moral damages; (2) P75,000.00 civil indemnity; and (3) P75,000.00 exemplary damages, all to earn six percent (6%) interest from the finality of this judgment until full payment.
WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals May 31, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08416 is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant, Noli Alata y Nasurada, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is ORDERED to pay AAA the following amounts: (1) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (2) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn the legal interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 55
SO ORDERED." (Lazaro-Javier, J.,designated additional Member per Raffle dated October 27, 2021; Dimaampao, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2839)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-17. The May 31, 2018 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08416 was penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and was concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a member of this Court) and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin of the Fourteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
2. CA rollo, pp. 51-57. The March 4, 2016 Decision in Crim. Case No. 11-283966 was penned by Acting Presiding Judge Marivic Balisi-Umali of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court, Manila.
3. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 266-A provides:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
4. In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9262, the names of offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
5. Rollo, p. 4.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5-6.
13. Id. at 6.
14. CA rollo, pp. 51-57.
15. Id. at 55.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 56-57.
18. Rollo, p. 8.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3-17.
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. CA rollo, p. 135.
25. Rollo, pp. 24-25.
26. Id. at 26-29, Manifestation in Lieu of Supplemental Brief dated July 16, 2019.
27. Id. at 30-34, Manifestation in Lieu of a Reply dated July 19, 2019.
28. Id. at 35-36.
29. 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
30. 734 Phil. 499 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
31. Id. at 500.
32. Ditche v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 35, 36 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
33. People v. Montinola, 567 Phil. 387, 404 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing People v. Fernandez, 561 Phil. 287 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; People v. Bejic, 552 Phil. 555 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
34. People v. Baraoil, 690 Phil. 368 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
35. People v. Montinola, 567 Phil. 387, 404 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing People v. Fernandez, 561 Phil. 287 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]; People v. Bejic, 552 Phil. 555 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
36. CA rollo, pp. 47-48, Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
37. Rollo, p. 7, Court of Appeals Decision.
38. Id.
39. CA rollo, p. 44, Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
40. Lejano v. People, 652 Phil. 512 (2010) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
41. Id. at 581.
42. People v. XYZ, G.R. No. 244255, August 26, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66516> [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division], citing People v. Ramos, 715 Phil. 193, 206 (2013) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
43. Id.
44. Rollo, p. 11, Court of Appeals Decision.
45. CA rollo, p. 46, Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
46. Rollo, p. 9.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 15.
49. People v. Nuyok, 759 Phil. 437 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
50. Id. at 450-451, citing Diega v. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 385 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
51. CA rollo, p. 47, Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
52. Id.
53. Rollo p. 10, Court of Appeals Decision.
54. People v. Sabal, 734 Phil. 742 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing People v. Perez, 357 Phil. 17 (1998) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].
55. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].