FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 242948. October 13, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ERNESTO AGUELO alias "AMBOY'', accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 242948 (People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Aguelo alias "Amboy''). — Submitted before Us is an appeal 1 from the Decision 2 dated August 6, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01568-MIN, which affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant Ernesto Aguelo alias "Amboy" (Ernesto) for the crime of Murder but modified the civil indemnity and the moral, exemplary and temperate damages awarded and imposed an interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from finality of the Decision until fully paid.
The Antecedents
In an Information dated July 15, 1990, Ernesto was indicted for the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 8th of July 1989, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Simbo, Municipality of Tupi, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, while armed with an UNLICENSED rifle of still undetermined caliber, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and with intent to kill, shoot therewith BARTITO ZOLINA hitting and inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds on the face which directly caused the instantaneous death of said Bartito Zolina.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 aDSIHc
When arraigned, Ernesto, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution is primarily anchored on the testimony of George Balad-on (George), the eyewitness. George testified that in the morning of July 8, 1989, the victim, Bartito Zolina (Bartito), hired him to assist in loading sacks of corn in Bartito's bull cart. Thereafter, he, together with Bartito and three other individuals, delivered the sacks of corn from Barangay Simbo to Koronadal Proper, South Cotabato. After delivery, they rested for a while to give the carabao pulling the bull cart some time to wallow before they headed back home. 4
At around 2:00 p.m., they travelled back to Barangay Simbo riding the same bull cart. While traversing a winding road, they noticed Ernesto by the roadside standing on an elevated portion. 5 He knew Ernesto for at least 10 years because they both live in Barangay Simbo. Ernesto is also known as "Amboy" while Bartito is Ernesto's father-in-law. 6 As they were approaching Ernesto, the latter shouted and told them to stop. When they stopped, Ernesto ordered everyone who had no business with him to go down from the bull cart. 7 All of a sudden, Ernesto raised his firearm and pointed the same at them. He and his companions were able to jump off from the bull cart leaving Bartito alone. When he was about six meters away from the bull cart, he heard Ernesto uttered, "Tay, what is that you said that you will chop my head when I go to your house?" In response, Bartito said, "It would all depend on how we could figure things out." Ernesto then replied, "This is the story, Tay" and shot Bartito on the head while the latter was still holding the rope of the carabao. After the shooting incident, he ran towards the house of Barangay Chairman Pracio Emanel (Barangay Chairman Emanel) to inform him of what happened. Acting thereon, Barangay Chairman Emanel went to the scene of the incident with members of the Civilian Auxiliary Force Geographic Unit, but Bartito was already dead. 8
Elaborating on the victim's injuries, Dr. Apolinario Hatulan, Municipal Health Officer of Tupi declared that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the victim's cadaver and found four fatal wounds caused by a shotgun. 9
Meanwhile, Norma Zolina, the wife of the victim testified on the civil aspect of the case. She claimed that she spent P75,000.00 for the burial expenses and has suffered financial hardship as a result of the sudden death of her husband. 10
For the defense, the following witnesses were presented: (1) accused-appellant Ernesto Arguelo; and (2) Robert Maguan (Robert).
Ernesto proffered the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around 2:00 p.m. of July 8, 1989, he was at Barangay Datalbob, a remote mountain community in the Municipality of T'boli, South Cotabato to oversee the farmers of his father. He averred that Barangay Datalbob, T'boli is not less than eight kilometers from Barangay Simbo, Tupi where he resides and the only mode of transportation is through a carabao and a sledge. The travel time between these two places is three hours. He, however, admitted that he and Bartito, his father-in-law both reside in Barangay Simbo. From his house to the house of his father-in-law, the distance is only three kilometers and would take one hour walk. He alleged that he left Barangay Datalbob about 5:00 p.m., and arrived at his house at 8:00 p.m. 11
To corroborate Ernesto's defense, Robert testified that, on July 8, 1989, at around 12:00 noon, he, together with his wife, son, a certain Pabling and Bartito were gathering and ferrying sacks of corn which they loaded in Bartito's bull cart. He claimed that George, the prosecution witness, was not with them at that time. He also averred that he was the owner of the sacks of corn and the one who hired Bartito to load the same in his bull cart. On their way back home from Koronadal Proper, they heard a gunshot which caused them to scamper away. However, he did not see who fired the shot. Thereafter, they went home 12 and only found out about the death of Bartito the following morning. 13
Robert also explained that during the initial proceedings of the case, he testified against Ernesto. However, when the case ensued, he changed his testimony because his conscience bothered him. He claimed that the family of Bartito, particularly a certain Nona, threatened to kill him forcing him to testify against Ernesto. At that time, he was brought to General Santos City where a lawyer taught him what to say while the family of Bartito detained his wife for five days. Despite the threats and illegal detention of his wife, he did not file a case against Nona or the family of Bartito. 14 ETHIDa
On December 7, 2010, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24 of Koronadal City, South Cotabato rendered a Decision 15 finding Ernesto guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, he is hereby sentenced to suffer prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay the heirs of Bartito [P]50,000.00 as moral damages; [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]25,000.00 as temperate damage[s] in lieu of actual damage[s]; and [P]25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED. 16
In convicting Ernesto, the RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimony of George, who positively identified Ernesto as the person responsible for killing the victim. The RTC found the testimony of George narrating the events before and after the shooting incident to be clear, direct and without any inconsistencies pertaining to material facts. The RTC also held that defense witness Robert corroborated the material facts of the incident and even testified during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that Ernesto shot and killed the victim. According to the RTC, Robert's retraction of his earlier testimony did not weaken the prosecution's case as his motive for changing his testimony was highly suspicious. Robert did not file a case against Nona whom he claimed to had threatened his life and illegally detained his wife.
Apart from the positive identification of Ernesto as the culprit, the RTC opined that the prosecution had established the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the attack on the victim, albeit frontal, was sudden and unexpected.
As for Ernesto's defense of denial and alibi, the RTC debunked the same. The RTC ratiocinated that it was not physically impossible for Ernesto to be at the crime scene because Barangay Datalbob is only eight kilometers away from Barangay Simbo, Tupi, South Cotabato, where the victim was killed. Ernesto also admitted that the crime scene was only three kilometers away from his house. Ernesto's alibi was also unsubstantiated because he failed to present as witness the farm workers he was supposedly overseeing at that time.
Dismayed by the unfavorable judgment, Ernesto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 17 but to no avail, as the RTC denied the same in its Order 18 dated July 10, 2015.
Undeterred, Ernesto filed an appeal before the CA, claiming that the RTC erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of George despite its inherent incredibility and inconsistencies. Further, Ernesto asserted that the RTC erred in finding him guilty for murder despite the prosecution's failure to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On August 6, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 07 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, City of Koronadal, South Cotabato, in Criminal Case No. 3118 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Bartito Zolina: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages. cSEDTC
Further, he is ORDERED to pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 19
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave due weight and credit to the positive testimony of George pointing to Ernesto as the assailant. The CA also found Robert's retraction of his earlier testimony that George was not with them to be unreliable. The CA likewise sustained the finding of treachery. According to the CA, while a conversation between Ernesto and the victim preceded the shooting, the attack on the latter was sudden and unexpected as he was not given an opportunity to repel the attack or defend himself.
At odds with the ruling, Ernesto filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA, which the latter granted in its Resolution 20 dated October 4, 2018.
Thus, in a Resolution 21 dated February 11, 2019, the Court notified the parties that they may file their respective Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice.
In a Manifestation (in lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated May 16, 2019, 22 plaintiff-appellee Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that the filing of the Supplemental Brief is no longer needed as the arguments and issues raised by Ernesto in his Appellant's Brief have already been traversed and thoroughly discussed in the Appellee's Brief, and judiciously considered and passed upon in the appealed Decision of the CA.
In the same vein, Ernesto filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Supplemental Brief) 23 dated November 27, 2019, praying that he be allowed to adopt all the allegations and arguments set forth in his Appellant's Brief filed before the CA in support of his prayer for acquittal.
Issue
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In his quest for acquittal, accused-appellant continues to assail the credibility of George, the eyewitness, who claimed that he accompanied the victim's group in loading and delivering the sacks of corn to Koronadal Proper and that, upon returning to Barangay Simbo, he saw accused-appellant shoot the victim, resulting to the latter's death. According to accused-appellant, the testimony of George was contradicted by the testimony of Robert, the defense witness, who categorically declared that there were only five of them who accompanied the victim and George was not one of them. 24 Hence, George could have not possibly witnessed the shooting incident or saw accused-appellant shoot the victim. As between the straightforward testimony of Robert and the dubious claim of George, accused-appellant propounds that the testimony of the former should prevail. 25
The Court does not agree.
It is jurisprudentially settled that when the credibility of the eyewitness is at issue, due deference and respect shall be given to the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, its assessment of the probative value thereof and its conclusions anchored on said findings. 26 The reason for this is obvious. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. 27 These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies, as in this case. 28 Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve. 29 Thus, it has been invariably held that findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. 30 This rule finds an even more stringent application where the CA sustains the findings of the trial court. 31 SDAaTC
In this case, the RTC gave full faith and credence to the direct, positive and categorical testimony of George that he saw accused-appellant shoot the victim as against the testimony of Robert who alleged that George was not with them during the shooting incident. Since the RTC had the direct opportunity to examine the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand, the RTC was clearly in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly and to determine whose testimony is more credible.
Moreover, there is no showing that the RTC overlooked, misapprehended or misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight or substance so as to materially affect the disposition of the case or doubt the credibility of George. In fact, even the CA affirmed the RTC's appreciation of George's testimony which makes the same invariably conclusive and binding on the Court. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the trial courts' calibration of testimonies and its assessment thereon, more so, when as here, such assessment was undisturbed by the CA.
Lending further credence to George's credibility is the absence of any clear and convincing evidence showing that he was impelled by a sinister or ulterior motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant for the serious crime charged. While accused-appellant claims that George was merely coached by his mother-in-law to testify against him, he could not cite any plausible reason as to why his mother-in-law would pin him for murder. 32 He even admitted that prior to the death of Bartito, he was in good terms with his mother-in-law. 33 The same is true with respect to George as he considers him as one of his close friends because they both live in Barangay Simbo. Prior to the shooting incident, there was also no animosity between them. Thus, there could have been no reason for George to wrongfully accuse him for killing the victim. Pertinently, the absence of such improper motive on the part of George strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
It may not be amiss to add that the testimony of defense witness Robert was in the nature of a recantation. It was aimed at renouncing his previous testimony during the preliminary investigation before the MTC, where he categorically declared that George was with them during the shooting incident and that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim. 34 Courts have long been skeptical of recantations of testimonies for being exceedingly unreliable. Thus, where a witness recants an earlier statement, courts do not automatically exclude the original testimony. 35 As We have explained in People v. Dollano, Jr.: 36
A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration.
It is also a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimony solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his mind for one reason or another. This will make a mockery of solemn trials and put the investigation of crimes at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. 37
Indeed, mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible. 38 The rule is settled that, in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. 39 A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, 40 both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. 41 acEHCD
Instructive on this point is the case of People v. Clamor, 42 where the Court extensively expounded on how a recanted testimony should be examined:
Where a witness testifies for the prosecution and retracts his or her testimony and subsequently testifies for the defense, the test in determining which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules in evidence, as enunciated in People v. Ubina [97 Phil. 515 (1955)], where the Court said:
The testimony of Ruben Francisco for the prosecution is claimed to be unworthy of credit because later on he testified for the defense, declaring that all he had stated against the defendants is not true . . .
The theory of the defense that Francisco's previous testimony is false, as he subsequently declared it to be so, is as illogical as it is dangerous. Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now says is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous contradictory statement (Rule 123, section 91); not that a previous testimony is presumed to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this Court has always been otherwise, i.e., that contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the contractions are satisfactorily explained. We have also held that if a previous confession of an accused were to be rejected simply because the latter subsequently makes another confession, all that an accused would do to acquit himself would be to make another confession out of harmony with the previous one. Similarly, it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one reason or another, for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. If Francisco says that when he testified for the prosecution, he was paid P700, what can prevent the court from presuming that subsequently he testified for the defense because the defendants also paid him to testify for them? The rule should be that a testimony solemnly given in court should not be lightly set aside and that before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one be carefully compared, the circumstances under which each given carefully scrutinized, the reasons or motives for the change carefully scrutinized in other words, all the expedients devised by man to determine the credibility of witnesses should be utilized to determine which of the contradictory testimonies represents the truth. 43 EcTCAD
Irrefragably, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, as in this case, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. 44 Before accepting a retraction made by a witness, they must also examine the circumstances surrounding the retraction and possible motives of the witness in reversing his testimony. 45
In this case, a review of Robert's previous testimony before the MTC revealed that he was clear, candid and straightforward, i.e., that he was accompanied by prosecution witness, George, his wife, his son, a certain Pabling and Bartito when the shooting incident happened. He also categorically declared that it was accused-appellant who shot Bartito. 46 Even during the grueling cross-examination, Robert never wavered and remained steadfast on his declarations. 47 Surprisingly, in a complete turnaround, Robert testified during trial before the RTC that they were five in the group and George was not one of them. He also did not see who fired the gunshot. 48 In renouncing his previous testimony, he explained that his conscience bothered him and believed that accused-appellant had no fault. He also claimed that he was merely forced to testify against accused-appellant because of a certain Nona who threatened to kill him and illegally detained his wife. 49 However, aside from his bare allegations, no concrete evidence was adduced to substantiate the same. In fact, he even admitted that he did not file a case against Nona despite the threats to his life and the illegal detention of his wife. 50 This led the courts a quo to correctly disregard his recanted testimony for being highly suspicious and unworthy of belief. Indeed, unless there is a clear and convincing evidence to support his allegations, Robert's recanted testimony remains to be a naked claim. It would not suffice to taint the credibility of George, much less render the prosecution's evidence against the accused-appellant inconclusive.
In the alternative, accused-appellant contends that, assuming that he committed the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not duly proven. George himself testified that a conversation between him and Bartito preceded the shooting incident which buttresses the conclusion that the attack was not sudden and unexpected. It cannot also be said that the victim had no opportunity to run, seek cover or employ a defense. 51 Moreover, the gunshot wounds sustained by Bartito were all frontal which negate the claim that the attack was sudden leaving the victim defenseless. 52
The Court is not swayed.
Murder is defined and punished under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, 53 to wit:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
Thus, to successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 54
Correlatively, one of the circumstances qualifying the killing of the victim to murder is treachery. Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 55 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. A swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim is an indication that treachery is present. 56 What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. 57 In that sense, even attacks that occur from the front may be considered treacherous if the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for self-defense. 58 The mode of attack must also be consciously adopted. This means that the accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attack to defend himself or retaliate. 59 The mode of attack, therefore, must be planned by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. 60 HSAcaE
Thus, in order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. 61
In this case, both elements are present. As vividly narrated by George, he, together with Bartito and three other persons, were on their way back to Barangay Simbo on board a bull cart. While traversing a winding road, they saw accused-appellant by the roadside standing on an elevated portion. As they were approaching accused-appellant, the latter shouted at them to stop and ordered those who do not have business with to him go down. 62 Accused-appellant then raised his long firearm and pointed the same at them. 63 George and his other companions were able to jump off from the bull cart leaving Bartito alone. At a distance of six meters, George heard accused-appellant utter, "Tay, what is that you said that you will chop my head when I go to your house?" In response, Bartito said, "It would all depend on how we could figure things out." Accused-appellant then replied, "This is the story, Tay" and in a rapid motion, shot Bartito on the head. 64 Clearly, the attack was so sudden, deliberate and swift that Bartito, who was unarmed and still holding the rope of the carabao pulling the bull cart, had no opportunity to defend himself or fight back. Also, the fact that (1) accused-appellant waited for the victim's group at a winding road; (2) positioned himself on an elevated portion giving him vantage view of the victim; and (3) armed himself with a firearm evidently showed that he consciously and deliberately adopted the means and methods to ensure the commission of the crime and that the attack was not a mere product of a sudden emotional response.
Furthermore, although the accused-appellant and the victim had a brief exchange of remarks prior to the incident, there is still treachery because the swiftness and the mythological manner by which the attack was carried out absolutely gave the hapless and unarmed victim no opportunity to mount any defense, thereby ensuring accused-appellant's execution of the crime without any risk to himself. Jurisprudence also instructs that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, 65 as in this case.
Similarly, the fact that the gunshot wounds of the victim were all frontal does not negate the finding of treachery. To reiterate, the essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. 66 This criterion applies, whether the attack is frontal or from behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. 67
On this score, it is beyond cavil that all the elements of the crime of murder were sufficiently established. First, Bartito was shot and killed. Second, the accused-appellant killed the victim, as testified by prosecution witness, George. Third, the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Fourth and lastly, the killing was neither parricide or infanticide.
At the other end of the spectrum, accused-appellant could only muster mere denial and alibi as a defense. It is well-settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. 68 For the alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establishes two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. 69
In this case, accused-appellant claims that he was at Barangay Datalbob, a remote mountain community in the Municipality of T'boli, South Cotabato to oversee the farmers of his father at the time of the shooting incident. 70 However, no corroborative evidence was adduced to substantiate the same. He could have presented the farm workers who supposedly were with him at that time to strengthen his defense but none was presented in court. He also admitted that Barangay Datalbob is only eight kilometers away from Barangay Simbo where the crime took place and can be reached by a beast of burden. He likewise confirmed that his house was only three kilometers away, or a one hour walk, from the house of Bartito in Barangay Simbo. 71 Due to the proximity of these places, it was indeed not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of the shooting incident. Thus, his defenses of denial and alibi crumbles, especially, in light of the direct, positive and categorical testimony of the prosecution witness that he committed the crime. HESIcT
It is an oft-repeated doctrine that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 72
All things considered, the courts a quo did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder.
As to the propriety of the penalty imposed, Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides that Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Relatedly, Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294, 73 provides that "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. 74 The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution. 75
In this case, the Information alleged that accused-appellant used an unlicensed rifle to kill the victim. Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the same. However, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the rifle used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such rifle was recovered, whether or not such rifle was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the courts a quo were also silent on this matter. As the allegation of unlicensed rifle was not duly proven, the same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
Verily, there being no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for treachery which was used to qualify the killing to Murder), accused-appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to the case of People v. Jugueta, 76 the Court sustains the following monetary awards in favor of the heirs of the victim: (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, (2) P75,000.00 as moral damages, (3) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and (4) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
Finally, in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, 77 the Court upholds the imposition of legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the finality of this resolution until full payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 6, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01568-MIN is AFFIRMED.
Accused-Appellant Ernesto Aguelo alias "Amboy" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Bartito Zolina: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
Further, he is ORDERED to pay legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary damages awarded from the finality of this Resolution until full payment. caITAC
SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 14-15.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Walter S. Ong; id. at 3-13.
3. RTC Records, pp. 1-2.
4. TSN, December 11, 1992, pp. 4-5.
5. TSN, December 11, 1992, p. 5; TSN, April 12, 1993, pp. 8-9.
6. TSN, December 11, 1992, p. 3; TSN, April 12, 1993, p. 12.
7. TSN, April 12, 1993, p. 9.
8.Id. at 10-14.
9. TSN, November 6, 1995, p. 4, p. 8.
10. TSN, October 11, 1993, pp. 1-5.
11. TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 4-8.
12. TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 3-7.
13. TSN, October 2, 1997, pp. 2-3.
14. TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 7-9; TSN, October 2, 1996, pp. 4-5.
15. Penned by Judge Oscar E. Dinopol; CA rollo, pp. 91-98.
16.Id. at 98.
17.Id. at 99-110.
18. Penned by Presiding Judge Lorenzo F. Balo; id. at 113.
19.Rollo, pp. 12-13.
20.Id. at 17.
21.Id. at 20-21.
22.Id. at 22-23.
23.Id. at 35-36.
24. CA rollo, p. 80.
25.Id. at 82.
26. See People of the Philippines v. Pulgo, 813 Phil. 205, 211 (2017).
27.People of the Philippines v. Gomez, 345 Phil. 195, 203-204 (1997).
28.Planteras, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018.
29.People of the Philippines v. Villalon, 799 Phil. 370, 377 (2016).
30.People of the Philippines v. Ombrog, 335 Phil. 556, 564 (1997).
31. See People of the Philippines v. Regaspi, 768 Phil. 593, 598 (2015).
32. TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 12-13, p. 15.
33.Id. at 15.
34. See RTC Records, pp. 122-124; pp. 126-128.
35. See People of the Philippines v. Enad, 402 Phil. 1, 23 (2001).
36. 675 Phil. 827 (2011).
37.Id. at 840-841.
38.People of the Philippines v. Dalabajan, 345 Phil. 944, 955 (1997).
39.People of the Philippines v. Lamsen, 721 Phil. 256, 259 (2013).
40.Molina v. People of the Philippines, 328 Phil. 445, 468 (1996).
41.People of the Philippines v. Bañez, et al., 770 Phil. 40, 47 (2015).
42. 275 Phil. 695 (1991).
43.Id. at 708-709. (Emphases supplied)
44.People of the Philippines v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384, 397 (1996).
45. See People of the Philippines v. Ceniza, 458 Phil. 150, 162 (2003).
46. See RTC Records, pp. 122-124, pp. 126-128.
47.Id. at 130-132.
48. TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 3-5.
49. TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 7-8; TSN, October 2, 1996, pp. 3-4.
50. TSN, October 2, 1996, p. 4.
51. See CA rollo, pp. 84-87.
52.Id. at 87.
53. Entitled "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," approved on December 13, 1993.
54.People of the Philippines v. Las Piñas, 739 Phil. 502, 524 (2014).
55.People of the Philippines v. Racal, 817 Phil. 665, 677 (2017).
56.People of the Philippines v. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173, 186 (2018).
57.People of the Philippines v. Nugas, 677 Phil. 168, 179 (2011).
58.People of the Philippines v. Perez, 404 Phil. 380, 388 (2001).
59.People of the Philippines v. Rimorin, 387 Phil. 925, 935-936 (2000).
60.People of the Philippines v. Flores, 466 Phil. 683, 694 (2004).
61.Supra note 54 at 524-525.
62. TSN, April 12, 1993, p. 9.
63.Id. at 10.
64.Id. at 11-13.
65.People of the Philippines v. Tanoy, 387 Phil. 750, 759 (2000).
66.People of the Philippines v. Lopez, 443 Phil. 268, 283 (2003).
67.People of the Philippines v. Alfon, 447 Phil. 138, 148 (2003).
68.People of the Philippines v. Ronquillo, 818 Phil. 641 , 652 (2017).
69.People of the Philippines v. Manalili, 716 Phil. 762, 774-775 (2013).
70. TSN, May 24, 2020, pp. 4-5.
71.Id. at 5-7.
72.People of the Philippines v. Vidaña, 720 Phil. 531, 543 (2013).
73. "An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended."
74. See Ramos v. People of the Philippines, 803 Phil. 775, 784 (2017).
75.People of the Philippines v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 216056, December 2, 2020.
76. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
77.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 716 Phil. 267, 282 (2013).