People v. Aguas y Ramos

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 241092. October 6, 2021.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RANDY AGUAS y RAMOS, MARLON DELA CRUZ y MACALINAO, EDWARD CASTILLO y CAMARAO, A.K.A. EDUARDO CASTILLO y CAMARAO, LEO BRIONES y AGUIRRE, A.K.A. NONOY, REX GALANEDA, WILLIAM GONZALES y FUERTE, AND JOHN DOE, A.K.A. BONG BAKLA, accused,

RANDY AGUAS y RAMOS, accused-appellant.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 241092 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. RANDY AGUAS y RAMOS, MARLON DELA CRUZ y MACALINAO, EDWARD CASTILLO y CAMARAO, a.k.a. EDUARDO CASTILLO y CAMARAO, LEO BRIONES y AGUIRRE, a.k.a. NONOY, REX GALANEDA, WILLIAM GONZALES y FUERTE, and JOHN DOE, a.k.a. BONG BAKLA, accused; RANDY AGUAS y RAMOS, accused-appellant.) — For this Court's resolution is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision 1 and Resolution 2 affirming the Regional Trial Court Judgment 3 finding Randy Aguas (Aguas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

On October 8, 2012, Aguas, together with his co-accused: (1) Marlon Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz); (2) Edward Castillo, a.k.a. Eduardo Castillo (Castillo); (3) Leo Briones, a.k.a. Nonoy (Briones); (4) Rex Galaneda (Galaneda); (5) William Gonzales (Gonzales); and (6) John Doe, a.k.a. Bong Bakla (Bong), were all charged in an Amended Information, 4 which reads:

That on or about the 11th day of October 2009, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, ganged up and stab RICARDO OARDE y PINEDA, thereby causing serious physical injuries upon the latter which caused the latter's death at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center on the above-specified date.

Contrary to law. 5 (Citation omitted)

On October 12, 2010, the Caloocan City Police Station Criminal Investigation and Detection Team arrested Aguas. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 6

On February 1, 2016, Gonzales and Castillo voluntarily surrendered before the Regional Trial Court and pleaded not guilty upon their arraignment. The other accused remained at large. Upon the desistance of Elena Cruz (Cruz), Ricardo Oarde's (Oarde) sister, the case against Gonzales and Castillo was dismissed. 7

Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued against Aguas. 8

The prosecution offered as evidence the testimonies of: (1) Aurora C. Borcelango (Borcelango); (2) Krischell C. Delos Santos (Delos Santos); and (3) Cruz, while the defense offered Aguas's lone testimony. Investigating officer Police Officer II Ricky D. Pelicano's (PO2 Pelicano) and medico-legal officer Dr. Bonnie Y. Chua's (Dr. Chua) testimonies were both dispensed with after the parties stipulated on matters they would testify on. 9

The prosecution established that on at around 9:00 p.m. on October 11, 2009, Borcelango was at a corner of an alley near a store in Julian Felipe, Sangandaan, Caloocan City. 10 Meanwhile, Bong, Gonzales, Dela Cruz, Castillo, Briones, Galaneda, and Aguas were drinking nearby. 11 Suddenly, Bong insulted Borcelango's husband, which prompted Gonzales to urge Bong to confront and stab Borcelango. 12

Bong then uttered to his companions, "Asan na ba yung mga patalim diyan[?] [I]labas na n[i]yo." Just then, Oarde appeared on his way to the store where the commotion was brewing. Gonzales then taunted Oarde, saying, "Ano ba pogi, ano problema?" to which Oarde replied, "Wala naman." Thereafter, Gonzales slapped Oarde in the face for no apparent reason, causing Oarde to fall to the ground. Gonzales's drinking companions then immediately rushed towards Oarde and proceeded to incessantly maul and stab him with a bladed weapon. 13

Delos Santos, who also witnessed the incident, hurriedly left the scene to ask for help, failing to witness how Ricardo was stabbed to death. 14 Borcelango, on the other hand, testified that after the group relentlessly stabbed Oarde, Dela Cruz pulled Oarde "out of the corner where he was stabbed" and laid him face up in front of a well-lit store. 15 As the group left, Borcelango saw Aguas holding the bladed weapon, which Borcelango initially described as a "sparkling thing." 16 She then told two of Oarde's siblings what happened, and all three of them reported the incident to the police on October 27, 2009. 17 Per the Medico-Legal Report issued by Dr. Chua, Oarde's cause of death was "Multiple Stab Wounds of the Thorax and Abdomen with Severe Blunt Traumatic Injuries of the Head." 18

For his part, Aguas denied the charges against him and narrated that on October 11, 2009, between 8:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., he had just come home from work as a construction steelman. 19 He was then eating dinner in his parents' house, when he heard the disturbance and the gunfire that ensued. 20 Being a barangay tanod, he wanted to check the commotion, but his parents prevented him from going outside. 21

In an August 2, 2016 Judgment, 22 the Regional Trial Court found Aguas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, accused RANDY AGUAS y RAMOS is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the Amended Information for the death of Ricardo Oarde y Pineda, and he is thus sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As to damages, the accused is hereby adjudged LIABLE for civil indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), for moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and for actual damages of Twenty Nine Thousand Sixty Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P29,060.50) to the heirs of Ricardo Oarde Y. Pineda.

Costs against accused Randy Aguas y Ramos.

Issue alias warrants of arrest against Marlon dela Cruz y Macalinao, Leo Briones y Aguirre, a.k.a. Nonoy, Rex Galaneda, and one alias Bong Bakla, all of whom are still at large.

SO ORDERED. 23

The trial court found Borcelango's testimony candid, convincing, and credible. 24 It considered the following circumstantial evidence in Borcelango's testimony to unequivocally establish Aguas's guilt: (1) that there was a "sparkling thing," which Borcelango later described as a "bladed weapon" during the "entire course" of the act's commission; (2) that Aguas was among those who mauled and pounced on Oarde for about half an hour; (3) that Aguas was holding the bladed weapon when he and the other accused left Oarde at the scene; and (4) that Oarde was full of blood after being dragged by Dela Cruz to a well-lit store. 25

The trial court held that the eyewitness testimony prevails over the alibi of the defense. 26 It also considered the presence of conspiracy, treachery, and abuse of superior strength in this case. 27

In an August 4, 2017 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision, with modification as to the amount of damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 02 August 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant — in addition to the actual damages and civil indemnity, is further ordered to pay moral damages and exemplary damages in the amounts of P75,000.00 each; and the aggregate amount of these damages shall earn interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.28 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court of Appeals ruled that there was conspiracy against all the accused because of their "conspicuous presence during the incident[,]" as well as their simultaneous and contemporaneous efforts in mauling and stabbing Oarde, which resulted in his death. 29 It noted that none of the accused stopped the attack and that their confederation and participation in it proved conspiracy to murder Oarde. 30 Further, it confirmed the presence of treachery and abuse of superior strength, which is already absorbed in treachery. 31 Finally, it dismissed the defenses of alibi and denial, in view of the witnesses' clear, categorical, and unwavering testimonies pointing to Aguas as one of the assailants. 32

In a January 3, 2018 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Aguas's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the arguments were mere reiterations of resolved issues and arguments. 33

On June 25, 2018, the Court of Appeals elevated the records of the case to this Court in compliance with its March 12, 2018 Resolution 34 giving due course to Aguas's Notice of Appeal. 35

In its June 3, 2019 Resolution, 36 this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of Appeals and notified the parties that they may file their supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice, if they so desire.

On August 22, 2019, the Public Attorney's Office, on behalf of accused-appellant, filed a Manifestation 37 adopting its Appellant's Brief filed before the Court of Appeals. On August 29, 2019, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a similar Manifestation 38 adopting its Brief filed before the Court of Appeals.

In its November 6, 2019 Resolution, 39 this Court noted the parties' manifestations.

In his Brief, 40 accused-appellant essentially argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, since his identity as one of the perpetrators of the crime was not clearly established. 41 He further claims that the witnesses' testimonies offered by the prosecution lack credibility. 42 On the other hand, the prosecution claims that it proved accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, since the eyewitness' account was consistent in pointing to accused-appellant as one of the victim's assailants. 43

The sole issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not accused-appellant Randy Aguas y Ramos was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

We dismiss the appeal.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or any other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

To prove the commission of the crime of murder, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: "(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is not parricide or infanticide." 44

Here, it is undisputed that the victim was killed, and that it was not due to parricide or infanticide. To reiterate, the victim died due to "[Multiple Stab Wounds with Severe Blunt Traumatic Injuries of the Head]" 45 per the Medico-Legal Report. Moreover, there is no evidence showing that the victim and accused-appellant are related by affinity or consanguinity. Accused-appellant, however, insists that the prosecution failed to establish the perpetrator's identity. 46

Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that a person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if the following are present:

SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The following circumstances were considered here, pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. To reiterate the trial court's finding: (1) there was a "sparkling thing," later described by the eyewitness as a "bladed weapon"; (2) accused-appellant was among those who mauled and pounced on the victim for about half an hour; (3) accused-appellant was holding the bladed weapon when he and the other accused left the victim; and (4) the victim was full of blood after being dragged by accused Dela Cruz to a well-lit store. 47

The combination of these circumstances show an "unbroken chain[,]" leading to "one fair and reasonable conclusion" that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. 48

Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the witnesses' clear, categorical, and unwavering testimonies all pointed to accused-appellant as one of the assailants. Generally, when sustained by the Court of Appeals, the trial court's findings of fact are given great weight and credence on review. 49 This is because the trial court can assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies "because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct[,] and attitude on the witness stand." 50

Accused-appellant merely denied the charge against him and raised the defense of alibi. However, as held in People v. Petalino, 51 denial and alibi do not trump the witnesses' "positive identification" of the accused in their categorical, consistent, and unbiased testimonies. Similarly, in People v. Acabado, 52 this Court held that alibi is one of the weakest defenses, one which is unworthy of credence, particularly when it is not physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime and when a positive identification of the accused was made.

Here, accused-appellant's alibi is unmeritorious, because it is self-serving and uncorroborated. Even if friends' and relatives' corroborative testimonies are generally treated with skepticism, 53 accused-appellant could have at least asked his parents to corroborate his testimony to strengthen his alibi. He likewise claimed coming from work on the night of the incident, but did not offer any proof of his employment. 54 Furthermore, the alibi will still not prosper, because it was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene since his house is just around the neighborhood where the crime happened. 55

Even assuming that accused-appellant was not proven to have stabbed the victim, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy in killing the victim, making the act of one the act of all. 56 In People v. Albaran, 57 this Court held:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or implied, to commit the felony and forthwith, to actually pursue it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused, indubitably revealing their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in committing the crime. Thus, it is not required that there was an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence, it is sufficient that the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense and that they had the same purpose or common design, and that they were united in its execution. 58 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Here, the trial court aptly found that conspiracy can be deduced:

[F]rom the collective conduct of the accused, viewed in its totality, from the time [accused Bong] confronted eyewitness Borcelango, to the roughly half-hour long assault on the victim, up to the point when accused [Dela Cruz] dragged the victim's body in front of a lit area, that a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments existed in bringing about the crime committed. 59

Furthermore, in appreciating the presence of conspiracy, the Court of Appeals considered that each of the accused's contributory acts, without any semblance of desistance and without any of them preventing each other, reflected their resolution to commit the crime. 60

However, this Court finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating the presence of treachery in this case.

As a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction for murder, treachery must be conclusively proven with clear and convincing evidence:

A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing evidence." Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its existence "cannot be presumed." As with the finding of guilt of the accused, "any doubt as to its existence should be resolved in favor of the accused." 61 (Citations omitted)

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides for two conditions that must occur before treachery or alevosia may be properly appreciated:

(1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods, or manner of execution. 62

Further, the prosecution must not only prove that the victim was unable to defend themself, but also that the accused consciously adopted the mode of attack to facilitate the killing without putting themselves at risk. 63 This Court clarified in Cirera v. People: 64

The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim's position was merely accidental. The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. 65 (Citation omitted)

Thus, as held in Petalino, 66 "treachery could not be appreciated despite the attack being sudden and unexpected when the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and . . . done impulsively."

In Recto v. People, 67 this Court clarified that a mere suddenness of an attack is not sufficient to constitute treachery:

Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor. 68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similarly here, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant, together with his co-accused, deliberately reflected and adopted the means employed to attack the victim. Verily, the lower courts only held that treachery was present considering that the victim just passed by accused-appellant and his companions on his way to the store, without expecting or any hint of the impending assault against him. Further, it was not shown that accused-appellant consciously or deliberately adopted the means to attack the victim. Based on the facts, the meeting between accused-appellant and the victim was casual. Moreover, the attack was done impulsively, following the exchange between accused Gonzales and the victim. 69 As mentioned in the Court of Appeals August 4, 2017 Decision:

Just then, [Oarde] appeared on his way to the store. [Gonzales] confronted [Oarde], "Ano ba pogi, ano problema?" [Oarde] replied, "Wala naman." But then, [Gonzales] suddenly slapped [Oarde] in the face, causing the latter to fall to the ground. [Gonzales's] drinking buddies thereafter rushed towards [Oarde] and incessantly mauled, kicked and stabbed him with a bladed weapon. 70

The provocation in this case is one which triggers impulsive reactions. There was likewise no evidence of premeditation indicating the possibility of choice and planning necessary to achieve the elements of treachery. 71

Moreover, the acts constituting treachery were not sufficiently averred in the Amended Information, 72 which merely states, to reiterate:

[T]he above named accused conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, ganged up and stab [Oarde][.] 73 (Emphasis supplied)

In Petalino, 74 this Court held that merely stating in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough, because the usage of the term "treachery" was but a conclusion of law, thus:

It is clear from the averments to the effect that "accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation, with a decided purpose to kill . . . stab, hit and wound Johnny Nalangay with the said knife . . . causing upon the latter injuries on vital parts of his body which caused his death" did not state that the accused-appellant had deliberately adopted means of execution that denied to the victim the opportunity to defend himself, or to retaliate; or that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attach to ensure himself from any risk from the defense that the victim might make.

To merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because the usage of the term treachery was but a conclusion of law. As we pointed out in People v. Valdez:

. . . It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill, was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.

The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. Thus, the facts stated in the body of the information should determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried. The information must sufficiently give him knowledge of what he had allegedly committed because he was presumed innocent and unaware of the illegal acts imputed against him. 75 (Citations omitted)

Despite not being able to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery, accused-appellant was still properly convicted of murder because the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

In People v. Canillo, 76 this Court discussed the presence of superior strength, as follows:

There is abuse of superior strength "whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."

Abuse of superior strength refers to the purposeful "use of force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." Thus, in considering this aggravating circumstance, the court looks into "the age, size, and strength of the parties." 77 (Citations omitted)

The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the notorious inequality of forces, since the accused-appellants used their combined strength, positioning, and weapons to corner the victim and then hack him to death.

Similarly in People v. Dimapilit y Abellado, 78 the abuse of superior strength was appreciated, given the disparity between the ages of the victim, who was 72 years old, and his assailants, who were, 50, 27, and 18 years old. The assailants were physically stronger than the victim, and the manner by which the assailants killed the victim reflects how they "took advantage of their superior strength to weaken the defense and guarantee execution of the offense." 79

Here, the prosecution was able to show the manifestly disproportionate force between the victim and the accused, as it proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, together with the six other accused, used their combined strength — and a bladed weapon — to pounce on, maul, gang up on, and stab the victim to death, who was merely a defenseless, unassuming passerby.

Based on the eyewitness' testimony, after accused Gonzales slapped the victim, causing him to fall to the ground, the other six accused began to gang up on and maul him. 80 That all of them only stopped assaulting him after nearly half an hour showed how they took advantage of their strength to ensure the victim's death. 81 Considering these circumstances, the attack on the victim was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Necessarily, the conviction for murder stands.

WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the August 4, 2017 Decision and January 3, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08534. Accused-appellant Randy Aguas y Ramos is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is also liable to indemnify the heirs of Ricardo Oarde y Pineda civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages at P75,000.00 each, and actual damages at P29,060.50.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Resolution until fully paid. 82

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 2-10. The August 4, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08534 was penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Renato C. Francisco of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

2. CA rollo, pp. 149-151. The January 3, 2018 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08534 was penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Renato C. Francisco of the Former Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 53-65. The August 2, 2016 Judgment in Criminal Case No. C-83613, was penned by Judge Remigio M. Escalada of Branch 123, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City.

4. Id. at 53.

5. Id.

6. Id. at 54.

7. Id.

8. Id.

9. Rollo, p. 4.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 4-5.

13. Id. at 5.

14. CA ro11o, p. 58.

15. Id. at 56.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Rollo, p. 5.

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. CA rollo, p. 60.

22. Id. at 53-65.

23. Id. at 65.

24. Id. at 60.

25. Id. at 60-61.

26. Id. at 61.

27. Id. at 62-63.

28. Rollo, pp. 9-10.

29. Id. at 7.

30. Id.

31. Id. at 7-8.

32. Id. at 8.

33. CA rollo, p. 150.

34. Rollo, p. 14.

35. Id. at 11-12.

36. Id. at 15-16.

37. Id. at 26-28.

38. Id. at 31-33.

39. Id. at 38-39.

40. CA rollo, pp. 36-50.

41. Id. at 43-44.

42. Id. at 45.

43. Id. at 91 and 96.

44. People v. Almosara, G.R. No. 223512, July 24, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65548> [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, Second Division], citing People v. Flores, et al., 838 Phil. 499, 499 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

45. Rollo, p. 5.

46. CA rollo, p. 41.

47. Id. at 60-61.

48. Cirera y Ustelo v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 43 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

49. People v. Feliciano, Jr., 734 Phil. 499 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

50. Ditche v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 35, 36 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].

51. G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64504> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

52. People v. Acabado, 136 Phil. 154 (1969) [Per J. Capistrano, En Banc].

53. Madali v. People, 612 Phil. 582 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].

54. CA rollo, p. 60.

55. Rollo, p. 5.

56. Id. at 7.

57. People v. Albaran, G.R. No. 233194, September 14, 2020, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66477> [Per J. Peralta, First Division].

58. Id.

59. CA rollo, p. 62.

60. Rollo, p. 7.

61. Cirera y Ustelo v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 45 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing People v. Felix, 357 Phil. 684, 700 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc]; and People v. Ayupan, 427 Phil. 200, 218 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

62. People v. Vargas y Jaguarin, G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65659> [Per Acting C.J. Carpio, Second Division].

63. G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64504> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

64. Cirera y Ustelo v. People, 739 Phil. 25 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

65. Id. at 45.

66. G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64504> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

67. Recto v. People, G.R. No. 236461, December 5, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64797> [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].

68. Id.

69. Id.

70. Rollo, p. 5.

71. Cirera y Ustelo v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 46 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

72. CA Rollo, p. 53.

73. Id.

74. G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64504> [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

75. Id.

76. G.R. No. 244051, April 28, 2021, <https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/20385/> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

77. Id. at 11.

78. 816 Phil. 523 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

79. Id. at 551.

80. Rollo, pp. 56-57.

81. Id.

82. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].