Peñalosa v. Abosta Shipmanagement Corp.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 258490. September 19, 2022.]

ROGELIO J. PEÑALOSA, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, petitioner, vs. ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION, CIDO SHIPPING [KOREA] LTD., AND/OR C/E ALEX ESTABILLO, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 19, 2022, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 258490 (Rogelio J. Peñalosa, as Represented by his Heirs v. Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation, Cido Shipping [Korea] Ltd., and/or C/E Alex Estabillo). — After a judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, the Court finds the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 bereft of merit. The Court of Appeals (CA) did not err when it affirmed the Decision 2 dated April 5, 2018 of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA), National Conciliation and Mediation Board, which dismissed the claim for total and permanent disability benefits filed by Rogelio J. Peñalosa (petitioner).

At the onset, the petition lacks proper verification as required under Section 4 3 of the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 To be precise, the "Verification & Certification Against Forum Shopping" attached to the petition was signed by the alleged counsel of petitioner's heirs without an attached special power of attorney and the additional attestations that "[t]he pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and that "[t]he factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery." 5 A pleading that lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 6

Also, the general rule is that only questions of law may be reviewed by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In fact, a question that invites a review of the factual findings of the lower tribunals is beyond the scope of this Court's power of review and generally justifies the dismissal of the petition, except in cases where there was serious misappreciation of facts on the part of the lower courts, 7 which is not extant in the present case.

Notably, petitioner failed to submit himself for a post-employment medical examination to the company-designated physician within three working days from his disembarkation. The Court has held that the three-day rule must be observed by all those claiming disability benefits, including seafarers who disembarked upon the completion of contract. 8 Failure to comply with this requirement results in the forfeiture of the seafarer's claim for disability benefits. 9 Although there are exceptions 10 to the rule, petitioner's case does not fall under any of them.

Further, the Court agrees with the PVA and the CA that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim for disability benefits.

It must be stressed that petitioner cannot claim disability benefits under the parties' CBA, as disability compensation under said contract applies only when the seafarer's permanent disability resulted from an accident while in the employment of the company. 11

Neither is petitioner entitled to total and permanent disability benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).

Records show that petitioner was repatriated due to a finished contract. He was diagnosed of Lung Cancer by his private doctor two days after he arrived in the country. In BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc. v. Jones, 12 the Court reiterated the procedure to be followed in claims involving disability benefits for illnesses that manifest after a seafarer's employment, viz.:

In instances where the illness manifests itself or is discovered after the term of the seafarer's contract, the illness may either be (1) an occupational illness listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is categorized as a work-related illness if it complies with the conditions stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an illness not listed as an occupational illness under Section 32-A but is reasonably linked to the work of the seafarer.

For the first type, the POEA-SEC has clearly defined a work-related illness as "any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." What this means is that to be entitled to disability benefits, a seafarer must show compliance with the conditions under Section 32-A, as follows:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described therein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

As to the second type of illness — one that is not listed as an occupational disease in Section 32-A — Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel13 instructs that the seafarer may still claim provided that he suffered a disability occasioned by a disease contracted on account of or aggravated by working conditions. For this illness, "[i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had." Operationalizing this, to prove this reasonable linkage, it is imperative that the seafarer must prove the requirements under Section 32-A: the risks involved in his work; his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks; the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and he was not notoriously negligent.14 (Emphases supplied)

Here, petitioner's illness (Lung Cancer) is not an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. Thus, he is burdened to show by substantial evidence the reasonable linkage between his illness and the nature of his work for his illness to be considered work-related, and, thus, compensable. Apart from his bare allegations, however, petitioner adduced no other evidence to show: the risks involved in his work; that he acquired Lung Cancer as a result of his exposure to such risks; that he contracted said illness within a period of exposure; and that there was no negligence on his part. This, along with the fact that petitioner completed his last employment contract without any significant health incident on board respondents' vessel, effectively militates against his claim for disability benefits.

Anent the assertion of petitioner's heirs that they are now entitled to death benefits in view of petitioner's death during the pendency of his claim for disability benefits, the same also cannot be sustained. Suffice it to state that payment of death benefits under either the parties' CBA or the POEA-SEC requires, as a general rule, that the death of the seafarer to have occurred during his/her employment. 15 As an exception, a seafarer's death occurring after the term of his employment shall still be compensable under the POEA-SEC, provided that such death was caused by a work-related injury or illness that was sustained during the term of the seafarer's employment. 16 Such exception, nonetheless, is unavailing in the instant case since petitioner's illness was not established to be work-related.

All told, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the ruling of the PVA.

On a final note, while the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC, We cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates compensability, We have no choice but to deny the claim, lest We cause injustice to the employer. 17

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 14, 2020 and the Resolution dated December 14, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 164183 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 31-81.

2. Id. at 253-269; signed by Chairperson Jaime C. Aquino, and members Walfredo D. Villazor, and Nelson P. Ramirez.

3. Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath or verified.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit of an affiant duly authorized to sign said verification. The authorization of the affiant to act on behalf of a party, whether in the form of a secretary's certificate or a special power of attorney, should be attached to the pleading, and shall allege the following attestations:

(a) The allegations in the pleading are true and correct based on his personal knowledge, or based on authentic documents;

(b) The pleading is not filed to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and

(c) The factual allegations therein have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likewise have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

The signature of the affiant shall further serve as a certification of the truthfulness of the allegations in the pleading.

A pleading required to be verified that contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (Emphases supplied)

4. Effective May 1, 2020.

5. 2019 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7, Section 4 (b) and (c).

6. Id. at Section 4.

7. BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc. v .Jones, G.R. No. 240518, December 9, 2020.

8. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. v. De Leon, 804 Phil. 279, 285 (2017).

9. Corpuz, Jr. v. Gerwil Crewing Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 205725, January 18, 2021.

10. Id.; (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician.

11. Rollo, p. 132.

12. BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc. v. Jones, supra.

13. 707 Phil. 210 (2013).

14. BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Inc. v. Jones, supra note 7.

15. Rollo, p. 132; Section 20 (B) (1) of the 2010 POEA-SEC provides:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

xxx xxx xxx

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. See also Magsaysay Maritime Corporation v. Heirs of Buenaflor, G.R. No. 227447, June 23, 2020.

16. Heirs of Licuanan v. Singa Ship Management, Inc., G.R. Nos. 238261 & 238567, June 26, 2019.

17. Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., 635 Phil. 350. 360 (2010).